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EXISTE-T-IL UNE RACINE *MAH EN VÉDIQUE?

Par Sylvain Brocquet, Paris

On rencontre dans le Rgveda (RV) quatre formes verbales qui posent un problème étymologique, morphologique et sémantique: *sám mahemā*, 1.94.1b; *sám maheta*. 1.111.3c; *sám ... mahema*, 7.2.3d; *maha* (*mahe*), 7.97.2b. GRASSMANN¹ pose une racine verbale *MAH* « groß sein/machen », issue de la racine i.e. **meg'-é/óh₋₂ / még'-h₂*- « grand » (cf. grec μέγας, lat. *magnus*, etc): l'occlusive dorsale post-palatale de l'i.e. est représentée en indo-iranien par une palatale (cf. avest. *maz-*, *mazānt-* « grand », et l'instrumental védique isolé *majmánā*), susceptible d'être aspirée par le contact de la laryngale **h₂*, l'aspiration étant analogiquement étendue aux formes présentant le degré plein; la désocclusion devant voyelle est bien attestée dans ce cas en sanskrit: *mahānt-*, *māhi-* « grand »; *mahimán-* « grandeur », etc. Cette reconstruction se heurte cependant à un double obstacle: étymologique tout d'abord, puisqu'aucune autre langue i.e. ne possède de racine verbale issue de ce prototype (les verbes qui en sont dérivés sont tous dénominatifs: lat. *magnificare*, grec μεγαλόω, etc.); sémantique ensuite: outre la difficulté que représente la coexistence d'un causatif, *maháyati*, ayant le même sens, la valeur proposée ne peut rendre compte des quatre occurrences du RV (en particulier pour 7.97.2b, où le sens semble être « donner »; cf. infra). GRASSMANN est ainsi conduit à rattacher *MAH* à *mámhate* « donner », ce qui est peu probable sémantiquement et phonétiquement.

TOSHIFUMI GOTŌ (Die I. Präsensklasse im Vedischen, Wien 1987) parvient à restaurer l'unité sémantique des quatre formes en posant un radical *mah-a-* (p. 242–244), issu de la racine i.e. **māg^h* « être prêt, « pouvoir » (cf. allem. *mögen*, iran. *magu* « mage », tokh. A *mokats* « puissant », grec μηχανή, μηχανος « expédient », etc.), qu'il traduit par « zustande bringen » pour l'actif, et « imstande sein », « vermögen » pour le présent moyen statif en 7.97.2b: *bṛhaspátir no maha ā sakhāyagḥ* « Bṛhaspati ist für uns imstande, [kommt] o Genossen herbei! » (p. 243). Il distingue ce radical aussi bien du verbe *mámhate* (p. 233–234) que d'une racine qu'il pose *²*MAH*, attestée dans *maháyati* « magnifier » (p. 243). Mais cette hypothèse est peu satisfaisante du point de vue phonétique: tous

¹ Wörterbuch zum Rigveda, Leipzig 1873, p. 1011.

les autres thèmes issus de i.e. **māg^h* ont conservé l'occlusive vélaire sonore aspirée (*maghá-* « don », « richesse »; *maghāvan-* « libéral », etc.); les quatre formes verbales seraient donc les seules à avoir subi la désocclusion: leur isolement plaide contre cette étymologie. Par ailleurs, STEPHANIE W. JAMISON² montre que le sens de « être disposé à » est originellement celui de *mām̐hate*, qui prend celui de « donner » à partir de la formule *dānāya mām̐hate* (+ acc.) « être prêt pour le don de »³.

Ces données, ainsi que l'isolement des quatre formes étudiées (deux seulement dans le noyau ancien du RV⁴), qui ne sauraient constituer une véritable conjugaison, me conduisent à l'hypothèse qu'il n'existe pas en védique de racine verbale *MAH*. Chaque occurrence peut s'expliquer autrement: pour 1.94.1b, O. BÖHTLINGK–R. ROTH⁵ corrigent *sám mahemā* en *sám ahemā*, optatif aoriste de *HI* « susciter », « mettre en mouvement », « créer »: *imān stómam árhate jātávedase, rátham iva sám + ahemā manīśáyā* / « cette louange, nous voulons la composer par la force de notre pensée, comme un char, pour Jātavedas qui en est digne »; plusieurs passages énoncent le procès *sám-HI* + *stómam*, *rátham* servant de comparant à *stómam*⁶. La même correction peut être adoptée pour 1.111.3:

² Function and form in the *-āya-* formations of the Rig Veda and Atharva Veda, Göttingen 1983, p. 130.

³ *mām̐hate* est attesté 14 fois dans le RV, dont 4 dans le tour *dānāya mām̐hate*; 2 fois sans accusatif: 6.45.32c *sadyó dānāya mām̐hate* // « il est prêt à donner aussitôt » et 8.52.6ab avec datif du bénéficiaire, *yásmāi t_uvām vaso dānāya mām̐hase, sá rāyás póṣam invati* / « celui au bénéfice duquel tu es prêt pour le don, ô Vasu, celui-là obtient son enrichissement »; 2 fois avec accusatif: 8.61.8ab *t_uvām purú sahásrāṇi śatāni ca, yūthā dānāya mām̐hase* / « toi, tu es prêt pour le don (de) multiples milliers et centaines de troupeaux », d'où: « tu es prêt à donner ... » – et 10.62.8cd *yáh sahásraṁ śatāśśvām, sadyó dānāya mām̐hate* / « qui est prêt à donner aussitôt mille centaines de chevaux ». Dans ces deux exemples, *dānāya* joue le rôle d'un infinitif-datif de *DĀ* avec rection verbale. Sur les 10 occurrences de *mām̐hate* sans *dānāya*, on a 2 intransitifs: 9.82.4a et 10.62.6d (« se montrer généreux ») et 8 transitifs, où *mām̐hate* est l'exact équivalent de *DĀ*: 1.11.3d, 4.31.8c, 8.5.38b, 8.24.22c, 8.45.12c, 8.50.1d, 8.56.2c et 9.1.10c – parmi lesquels le COD à l'accusatif est deux fois *maghá-* (1.11.3d et 9.1.10c), qui forme ainsi une sorte de tour interne, à rapprocher de 4.17.8d *dātā maghāni maghāvā*, « le généreux donateur de (grands?) dons ».

⁴ Ce noyau ancien, défini par E. V. ARNOLD in *Vedic Metre in its Historical Development* (Cambridge 1905), regroupe les *maṇḍala* 2 à 7 et 9.

⁵ Sanskrit-Wörterbuch, St. Petersburg 1855–1875, VII/1609.

⁶ Suggestion de G. PINAULT, in *L'expression de la comparaison dans les hymnes védiques* (thèse de doctorat en cours): par exemple 1.61.4ab *asmā id u stómam sām hinomi, rátham ná tāṣṭeva tātsināya* « c'est pour lui que je compose la louange – comme le charron le char pour qui en prend possession » (trad. PINAULT).

ā takṣata sātīm asmābhyam ṛbhavaḥ, sātīm rāthāya sātīm ārvate naraḥ |
sātīm no jāitrīm sām + aheta viśvāhā, jāmīm ājāmīm pṛtanāsu sakṣānim ||
« Charpentez un gain pour nous, ô Ṛbhus, un gain pour le char, un gain
pour le coursier, seigneurs; puissiez-vous créer pour nous un gain victo-
rieux, pour toujours, propre à l'emporter dans les combats sur l'ennemi
de même race ou de race différente! »

On peut aussi, comme L. RENO⁷, y voir un optatif aoriste de *māmhate*:
la présence d'un actant au datif, *nas*, permet l'ambiguïté. C'est sans
doute un aoriste moyen du même *māmhate* qu'on trouve en 7.97.2ab,
ainsi que le propose également RENO⁸: ā dāivīyā vṛṇmahé ā'vāmsi,
bṛhaspātir no maha ā sakḥāyaḥ | « nous souhaitons les faveurs divines;
Bṛhaspati nous (les) donne, amis ».

Le cas de 7.2.3cd est plus difficile: *manuṣvād agnīm mānunā sāmīd-
dhan, sām adhvarāya sādām in mahema* | « Agni qui fut enflammé par
Manu, nous voulons comme Manu le magnifier (ou: stimuler?), toujours,
pour la cérémonie ». Le sens peut être celui de *mahāyati*, d'où la correc-
tion de St. INSLER⁹, qui y voit une haplogogie de *mahayema*, impro-
bable car sans parallèle connu. L'éloignement du préverbe *sām* semble
exclure une correction en *sām ... ahema*, malgré les nombreux syntag-
mes attestés dans le RV du type *HI + agnīm* (ou tout autre nom de
dieu), au sens de « stimuler »¹⁰. C'est néanmoins cette hypothèse que je
retiendrai, en considérant que l'analogie de 1.94.1ab et 1.111.3 a pu
jouer, ainsi qu'une stratégie linguistique reposant sur la confusion
étymologique (cf. infra).

Quant à *mahāyati*, plutôt que le causatif d'une racine verbale mal
attestée, on peut, ainsi que le propose JAMISON¹¹, l'interpréter comme
un dénominatif factitif de *mahā-*, qui apparaît dans l'acc. *mahām* et
fournit la base du thème fort de *mahānt-*. La forme attendue serait
**mahāyāti*, mais une loi métrique, mise en évidence par JAMISON sur une
suggestion d'Insler¹², permet d'expliquer la substitution de la forme à
voyelle brève: les verbes de structure *CṼCāya* prennent la forme
CṼCāya si la syllabe initiale est suivie de trois syllabes quand la
pénultième est longue, et si l'initiale est suivie de deux syllabes lors-
qu'elle est la cinquième ou la sixième d'un *pāda* de onze ou douze
syllabes; sur 19 attestations de *mahāyati* dans le RV, 15 sont dans un

⁷ Études védiques et pāninéennes, XV, Paris 1966, p. 81–82.

⁸ Ibidem p. 67.

⁹ The Vedic Type *dheyām*. Die Sprache 21 (1975) 1–22, p. 6–7 n. 13.

¹⁰ Ainsi: 1.143.4c, 7.7.1ab, 8.43.19, 10.156.1a, etc.

¹¹ Op. cité, p. 87–88.

¹² JAMISON, op. cit., p. 50; se reporter aussi à sa thèse soutenue à l'Université
de Yale en 1977, p. 78–79 et 101 n. 6.

de ces deux cas¹³; l'analogie peut expliquer les 4 autres (3.24.4b, 3.25.5c, 6.15.2d, 7.32.19a). Le thème a alors été réinterprété comme un causatif, d'où le déplacement de l'accent sur l'antépénultième.

Le problème essentiel n'est cependant pas celui d'une reconstruction étymologique nécessairement hypothétique: l'ensemble des formes attestées dans le RV présente une tendance évidente à l'homonymie, que les poètes n'ont pas manqué d'exploiter dans une perspective pragmatique, afin de réaliser une mise en scène poétique et linguistique de la procédure d'échange entre hommes et dieux qui est en oeuvre dans le rituel: les hommes «grandissent» les dieux par l'hymne et le sacrifice, et attendent en retour de leur part aide et bienfaits; les deux procès peuvent se décrire comme un transfert de grandeur, que la répartition lexicale met en évidence:

- 1) l'adjectif *mah-* qualifie les actes rituels (*gír-*, *stóma-*; etc.) par lesquels les hommes «grandissent» les dieux; *maháyati* explicite ce procès;
- 2) *mahānt-* qualifie les dieux ainsi grandis par l'éloge; *maghāvan-* les qualifie en tant que susceptibles d'accorder des bienfaits (c'est une requête indirecte). Ici s'opère le basculement: être *mahānt-* «pourvu de grandeur» implique d'être aussi *maghāvan-* «donateur de (grands) biens»;
- 3) *māmhate* dénote exclusivement l'action pour les dieux d'accorder aux hommes des bienfaits; ceux-ci ont souvent pour épithète *mah-*, sauf quand le verbe signifiant «donner» est précisément *māmhate*: ce dernier intègre le sème de «grandeur», et la séquence *māmhate* + acc. équivaut à la formule largement attestée du type *DĀ* + *mah-* + acc.

La stratégie des poètes réside dans le postulat implicite d'une unité étymologique artificielle entre tous ces signifiants: ainsi l'éloge et sa contrepartie, le don, sont-ils étroitement associés par les liens du langage. Tout éloge devient alors une requête implicite, les dieux ne pouvant accepter la grandeur qu'il leur confère sans du même coup assumer la générosité qu'il présuppose. Les quatre formes verbales étudiées ici constituent le pivot de cette identification: étymologiquement divergentes mais phonétiquement semblables, elles ont probablement été réinterprétées comme appartenant à un lexème unique **MAH*, situé à la charnière des deux familles lexicales que l'hymne s'efforce d'associer: ces formes, en effet, énoncent les deux phases du procès d'échange: l'éloge en 1.94.1 et 7.2.3, le don en 1.111.3 et 7.97.2 – tandis que

¹³ Sont dans le premier cas: *maháyantam*, 1.178.1c; *mahayāmasi*, 3.37.4b; *maháyantas*, 4.17.18d, 5.31.4c, 8.3.16c et 10.65.4c; *mahayanta*, 3.3.3b. Sont dans le second cas: *maháyan* (participe présent), 1.54.2b et 3.3.11c (6^e syllabe); *mahayan* (3^e pluriel), 7.42.3a (idem); *mahayā* 1.52.1a (5^e syllabe), 7.23.1b et 7.96.1c (6^e syllabe); *mahayam*, 7.61.6a (idem); *mahāye*, 10.65.3d (5^e syllabe).

morphologiquement, elles peuvent être interprétées comme issues de *mámhate* (aoriste thématique) aussi bien que de *mah*(*ā*)- « grand ».

Cette approche, essentiellement sémantique, envisage l'hymne comme acte de parole, remplissant une fonction pragmatique dans le cadre de la communication: il est perçu comme le champ d'une stratégie verbale, où s'observe en particulier la propension indienne au jeu de mot, appelé à un riche avenir dans le *kāvya*. On voit comment l'éclairage de la linguistique moderne – plus précisément, ici, la théorie de la pragmatique¹⁴ – peut nous conduire à reformuler certains problèmes en apparence de pure philologie¹⁵.

¹⁴ La linguistique pragmatique, « fondée » par AUSTIN (*How to do Things with Words*, 1962) et illustrée par les recherches de SEARLE (*Speech Acts*, 1969), DUCROT (*Dire et ne pas dire*, 1972), etc., pose la notion d'énoncé performatif, produisant des « actes illocutoires », parmi lesquels se distinguent des « actes directs » et des « actes indirects », réalisés par des énoncés en plus des premiers. Ainsi un énoncé qualifiant le dieu de *mahānt-*, en contexte rituel, produit simultanément un acte direct d'éloge et un acte indirect de requête – celle-ci demeurant implicite, mais étroitement associée, par les liens du langage, à la louange.

¹⁵ SYLVAIN BROCQUET, Sur la stratégie de l'éloge dans le *Ṛgveda*. BEI 4 (1986) 215-253.

PRAKRITIC WORDFORMS IN THE R̥GVEDASAMHITĀ*

The Case of $\text{ṛ} \rightarrow \begin{Bmatrix} \text{a} \\ \text{i} \\ \text{u} \end{Bmatrix}$

By Chlodwig H. Werba, Vienna

“assimilatio, hiatus et cerebralium atque aspiratarum praedilectio (iam) in Vedis magnas partes agunt”, thus refering to the “main laws of the Prakrit languages” ALBRECHT WEBER¹ was the first to assume that *vaidika śabdā*s may be influenced by m(iddle-)i(ndo)a(ryan) phonetics. One year later, in the Göttingische Gelehrte Anzeigen of 1846 (p. 754), THEODOR BENFEY adopted a similar view for their morphophonemics. The philological and etymological research on the Vedic vocabulary carried on since then amply documented the validity of their opinion by bringing forth a wealth of Prakritic material from almost every Vedic text. Especially the oldest of them, the R̥gvedasamhitā (RV), proved to be a veritable storehouse of *padas* which may or must be explained *in toto* or *partim* on the basis of mia. sound changes, e.g. the *cvi*-information *ak(h)khalīkītyā* (VII 103,3c) ‘making, i.e. pronouncing (words) in syllables’ which – as was detected by PAUL THIEME² – is based on *akkhala-*, the regular Māgadhī outcome of *akṣāra-*³, the Lsg. *kāté* (I 106,6b) ‘in the pit’ being developed from *karté* by the mia. rules

* This is a slightly revised version of a paper delivered to the honourable participants of the VIIIth World Sanskrit Conference in Vienna on Friday, the 31st of August 1990, to vindicate the following rectification of the 46th stanza of Viśākhadatta’s *Mudrārākṣasa* (II 18, ed. A. HILLEBRANDT, p. 59,6–9; cf. Bhartṛhari’s *Śatakatraya* 277): *ārabhyate na khalu vighnadhīyaiva dhīraiḥ, prārabhya vighnavihatā viramanti madhyāḥ | vighnaiḥ punaḥ-punar api pratihanyamānāḥ, prārabdham uddhṛtadhiyo ’ham ivodvahanti ||*.

¹ In part II of his dissertation, *Yajurvedae specimen cum commentario*, published in Bratislava 1845 (*non vidi*), quoted by WEBER himself in his *Indische Studien* II (Berlin 1853) 87n.

² KZ 71 (1954) 198 = *Kleine Schriften*, ed. G. BUDDRUSS. [Glasenapp-Stiftung, Vol. 5]. Wiesbaden 1971, part 1, p. 138.

³ THIEME’s etymology was accepted by K. HOFFMANN (AzI I/176n.1), M. WITZEL (StII 10 [1984] 236f.), et al., whereas J. SCHINDLER (LuE 387n.7) remains sceptical (cf. EWAia I/44).

of assimilation and metathesis of quantities⁴, or *bhūt* as contraction of *bhuvāt* in IV 43,4a⁵ and *śriyē* to be pronounced with Svarabhakti as *[śiriyē]* in X 45,8b, as the metre shows⁶.

Although at least five state-of-the-art reports have been published in the foregoing decades⁷ and G. V. DEVASTHALI made a promising collation of some R̥gvedic data with the 8th *adhyāya* of the Siddhahe-macandra in 1970⁸, what is still missing is a comprehensive survey of

⁴ Already realized by A. WEBER, *Indische Studien*, loc. cit. (cf. EWAia I/335f.).

⁵ *kā vām bhūd upamātiḥ kāyā na(s)*, where *bhūt* – in accordance with the parallel *gamathas* ‘will you (two) come’ in *pāda* b – clearly functions as a subjunctive (: ‘will be’), although it is formally identical with the 3sg.Aor.Inj. of *√bhū*. That this is not a case of functional equivalence between injunctive and subjunctive, as K. HOFFMANN (IiV 221 and 245: “Vertauschbarkeit von Injunktiv und Konjunktiv”) does figure it out, but the result of a Prakritic contraction of the 3sg.Aor.Subj. *bhuvāt*, which took place in the oral tradition prior to the establishment of the Śākalya recension, goes without saying, if one considers, that the metre (: *triṣṭubh* with early caesura) calls for two syllables instead of the monosyllabic *bhūt* (: -- ◡ -- ◡ ◡ -- ◡ --).

⁶ *durmārṣam āyuh śriyē rucānāḥ* |, the anapaestic central portion of which corresponds to the cretic *urviyā* in *pāda* a and equally anapaestic *abhavat* and *janāyat* in c and d. The originality of the three syllables forming the 2nd part of the Vedic *triṣṭubh*-line in their anapaestic sequence (: ◡ ◡ --) was recently proven by J. GIPPERT, who demonstrated the existence of the same prosodic feature in the hendecasyllabic lines of Zaratustra’s *Gāṇās* (*Zur Metrik der Gathas*. Sprache 32 [1986(88)] 257–275, esp. p. 261ff. and 273ff.).

⁷ I.e. J. WACKERNAGEL, *Altindische Grammatik I*. Göttingen 1896, Introd., p. XVIIIff.; W. WÜST, *Indisch*. Berlin–Leipzig 1929, p. 42ff.; J. MANSION, *Esquisse d’une histoire de la langue Sanscrite*. Paris 1931, p. 129ff.; L. RENOU, *Altindische Grammatik*. Introduction générale. Göttingen 1957, p. 54ff. and M. B. EMENEAU, *The Dialects of Old Indo-Aryan*. In: *Ancient Indo-European Dialects*, edd. H. BIRNBAUM – J. PUHVEL. Berkeley – Los Angeles 1966, p. (123–138) 129ff. (= *Sanskrit Studies* of M. B. Emeneau. Selected Papers, ed. B. A. VAN NOOTEN. Berkeley 1988, p. 111f.). See also the remarks of O. VON HINÜBER in his *Das ältere Mittelindisch im Überblick*. [SbÖAW 467 = Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Sprachen und Kulturen Südasien 20]. Wien 1986, p. 22f.

⁸ *Prakritism in the R̥gveda*. [Publications of the Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit, No. 34]. Poona 1970 (p. 199–205). In contrast to DEVASTHALI, who defines his topic as those “variations in the language” of the RV which “closely correspond to some phenomena, which are found in the Prakrits”, and/or “can easily be described as the likely source . . . of their counterparts in the Prakrits” (p. 199), this article deals exclusively with R̥gvedic words and names for the etymology of which the application of at least one *mia*. sound-change is required. With a much wider scope DEVASTHALI’s approach was taken up recently by T. Y. ELIZARENKOVA, *About Traces of a Prakrit Dialectal Basis in the Language of the R̥gveda*. In: *Dialectes dans les littératures indo-aryennes*, éd.

the mia. 'Lautgesetze', which left their traces in the RV. Such a survey would have to include not only a complete list of all positive instances of a given law defining its scope and possible restrictions, but also the ratio of their distribution over the ten *maṇḍalas* and an inventory of doubtful cases. Its importance for Vedic etymology in general and for the history of the RV in particular is illustrated in the following by means of one of the earliest laws of Common Mia.: the change of *r̥-sonans* into a short vowel⁹ first taken into consideration by ALBRECHT WEBER¹⁰.

(I) $r̥ \rightarrow a$

(A) Old Etymologies:

1. *ogaṇá-* 'powerful' (X 89,15b *máhi vrādhanta ogaṇása indra*) ← **ogr̥ná-* (H. KERN – K. HOFFMANN; cf. EWAia I/276f.): ved. (SV, YV) *úgaṇa(s)-* (: *ugr̥á-*), pii. **Háũḡ-as-/Háũg-(a)r-* (> yav. *aogarə*); cf. *ambhṛ-ṇá-* (: *ám̐bhas-*) and *a=lātr̥-ṇá-* (: **rāt̥[a]r-/rāt̥r̥-*).

C. CAILLAT. [Publications de l'Institut de Civilisation Indienne, Fasc. 55]. Paris 1989, p. 1–16.

⁹ The elimination of the oia. phoneme /*r̥*/ is governed by the following rules:

(1) the context-free $r̥ \rightarrow a$, its scope being restricted by 4 context-sensitive ones,

(2) $r̥ \rightarrow \begin{bmatrix} i \\ u \end{bmatrix} / _ \$ \begin{bmatrix} i \\ u \end{bmatrix}$, (3) $r̥ \rightarrow i / _ \begin{bmatrix} + \text{cons} \\ + \text{pal} \end{bmatrix}$, (4) $r̥ \rightarrow i / \# \# \left(\begin{bmatrix} + \text{sib} \\ + \text{pal} \end{bmatrix} \right) _$

and (5) $r̥ \rightarrow u / \begin{bmatrix} + \text{cons} \\ + \text{lab} \end{bmatrix} _$. As it often happens in the mia. material that analogy brings confusion into the three outputs of these five rules, their investigation and description was by no means an easy task. The merit to have carried it out belongs to HERMANN BERGER who published his epoch-making findings as first part of his *Zwei Probleme der mittelindischen Lautlehre*. [Münchener Indologische Studien 1]. München 1955, p. 19ff. (cf. VON HINÜBER, op. cit. [n. 7], p. 78ff.).

¹⁰ Loc. cit. (n. 1). Of the 28 items being given in the following list six (nos. 4, 5, 16, 18, 22 and 23) have met with the – more or less reluctant – approval of F. B. J. KUIPER in his booklet *Aryans in the R̥gveda* ([Leiden Studies in Indo-European 1]. Amsterdam–Atlanta 1991, p. 28, 79, 80), which was written to disprove "the 19th century theory" of "Prakritisms in the RV" (p. 2), substituting them – as far as possible – by 'Dravidisms' and 'Mundaisms'. The remaining 21 (: 14 is left unmentioned) are treated as non-indo-aryan, with the exception of 9 (s. p. 29f.) featuring in KUIPER's concluding list of "The Foreign Elements in the R̥gvedic Vocabulary" (p. 89–93, nos. 1–383): 1 = 61, 2 = 70/252, 3 = 157, 6 = 332, 7 = 85, 8 = 251, 10 = 103, 11 = 137, 12 = 156, 13 = 172–174, 15 = 365, 17 = 98, 19 = 41, 20 = 213, 21 = 230, 24 = 212, 25 = 47, 26 = 239, 27 = 279/(278), 28 = 244.

2. *kāṇva-* PN (I²⁵, V¹, VIII³¹, X⁴; *kāṇ_uvā-* VIII⁷; *kāṇvāyanās* VIII 55,4a; *prāskanva-* I², VIII³) ← **kṛṇvā-* ‘acting (magically)’ (K. HOFFMANN; cf. EWAia I/293): oir. **karnv-a°* (→ op. *karnuvaka-*); cf. *hinv-ā-* (: *hinó-*).

3. *gaṇā-* m. ‘flock’ (I¹², II³, III⁶, IV², V¹², VI⁴, VII³, VIII⁵, IX³, X⁸; *gāṇyā* III 7,5d) ← **gṛṇā-* < pia. **Hgrṇā-* (A. FICK; cf. EWAia I/458f.), derived from the pie. root *h₂ger* ‘to flock, to gather’ (: gr. ἀγέρε^o) the initial laryngal of which may have caused the lengthening of the *u* in the compound (PN) *rāhūgaṇās* (I 78,5a) ← **raghūgrṇa-*; cf. *ghṛṇā-* (from the pia. root **g^{har}*).

4. *durhāṇā-* ‘bad(ly) anger(ed)’ (adj. I 38,6b *nīrttir durhāṇā vadhāt* – subst. I 121,14a *tvām no asyā ind_ara durhāṇāyāḥ*; *durhāṇāvān* VIII²; *durhaṇāyuvam* IV 30,8c; *durhaṇāyatās* X 134,2a) ← *durhrṇ°* (J. NARTEN, MSS 41 [1982] 140) in *durhrṇāyū-* (I¹, VII¹) and *durhrṇāyatās* (SV).

5. *vikaṭa-* ‘deformed, monstrous’ (X 155,1a *ārāyī kāṇe vikaṭe*) ← *vīkṛta-* (Sāyaṇa – CH. BARTHOLOMAE; cf. KEWA III/201) used from the RV (I¹, II¹) onwards.

6. *śakaṭi-* ‘wagon’ (X 146,3d *śakaṭir iva sarjati*), fem. of (omg.) *śakaṭa-* (ChU +) ← **sākrta-* (K. L. JANERT; s. W. F. KNOBL, JNIBS 6 [1981] 24ff., 34–42): ved. (TS +) *kāṭa-* (EWAia I/290).

(B) New Etymologies:

7. *kavāṣa-* PN (VII 18, 12a *ādha śrutām kavāṣaṃ vṛddhām apsú*) ← **kavāvaṣa-* (cf. I 163,10b *śūraṇāsas* ← **śūraraṇ°* [J. WACKERNAGEL, KZ 67 (1942) 174 = Kleine Schriften. Göttingen ²1969, I/390]) ← **kavā-vṛṣa(n)-* ‘belittling the male ones’: cf. ved. (RV) *kavāri-* / *kavāsakhā-* (AzI II/412f.), yav. (PN) *kauuārasman-* (EWAia I/326), and, for the accent, ved. (PN) *trasādasyu-*.

8. *prāmaganda-* PN (III 53,14c *ā no bhara prāmagandasya védas*) ← **prāmṛgāda-* (for *ā* → *an/_D* cf. PN *puruṣānti-* [I¹, IX¹] ← **puruṣāti-*), i.e. *prā* (cf. Nir. VI 32) + **mṛgāda-* ‘deer-eater’: cf. ved. (RV +) *āmād-*, (AV +) *annāda-* (s. G. DUNKEL, Festschrift for Henry Hoenigswald, Tübingen 1987, p. 91ff.).

(C) Further Evidence:

9. *kākāṭa-* n. ‘back of the head, neck (?)’ (VI 28,4a *ná tā árvā reṇúkakāṭo aśnute*) ← *kṛkāṭa-* (M. MAYRHOFER, EWAia I/388) occurring in AV IX 12,1: cf. ved. (AV X 2,8b) *kakāṭikā-* (with the variant *kṛk°*) > pkt. *kīyāḍiyā-*.

10. *kīkaṭa-* EN (III 53,14a *kīṇ te kṛṇvanti kīkaṭeṣu gāvas*)* ← **kīnkṛta-* (Yāska – Sāyaṇa) *kīṇ kriyābhīr iti* (Nir. VI 32), a (popular) etymology

which already the author of the *ṛc* might have had in mind; but cf. EWAia I/355.

11. *kévaṭa-* ‘pit’ (VI 54,7b *mākīm sámśāri kévaṭe*) ← **kévr̥ta-* (F. K. JOHANSSON; cf. EWAia I/400) continuing a pie. **káiv̥r̥t-* which may be connected with gr. *καίαιτα* (NApl.) < pie. **káiv̥r̥t°* as its heteroclitic variant; but the R̥gvedic hapax could, by means of spontaneous cerebralization (cf. e.g. X 146,2a *āghātībhis* ← **āghātī°*), also have arisen from oia. **káivata-*, either to be identified with gr. *καίετό-* or formed as *párvata-* (s. AzI I/336f.).

12. *gāṅgā-* RN (X 75,5a *imāṃ me gāṅge yamune sarasvatī*; *gāṅgīyās* VI 45,31c) ← **gr̥ṅgā-* (W. WÜST; cf. KEWA III/692); but without a satisfying explanation of its formation (cf. *gārgara-*) this etymon seems much inferior to the old *gāṅgā gamanāt* (Nir. IX 26; cf. EWAia I/457).

13. *jāṭhāra-* n. ‘belly’ (I³, II², III⁷, V², VI², VIII¹, IX⁸, X⁵; *jāṭharasya* I 112,17a; *jāṭhalasya* I 182,6c) ← **jṛthāra-* (Ch. BARTHOLOMAE; s. E. POLOMÉ, *Sanskrit and World Culture*. Berlin 1986, p. 287) < pii. **jṛtH°* which may stem from a pie. **g’l̥-t(á)h₂-* and thereby be connected with germ. (goth.) *kilþ°* ‘child’ (*kilþei* ‘womb’) < pie. **g’él-t°* (cf. III 29,14d *yád ásurasya jāṭhārād ájāyata*); but cf. EWAia I/565.

14. *vratāti-* f. ‘creeper’ (VIII 40,6b *vratāter iva guṣpítām*) being a hybrid substitute for **vatāti-* (cf. I 122,10b *gūrtásravās* for **gūrtásavās*, i.e. oia. **gūrtásavHās*, forming the cadence of a *triṣṭubh*-line) ← **vṛtāti-* (P. TEDESCO; KEWA III/277f.); but as long as a reason for the increment of the *r* is lacking, the assumption of a metathesis *ar* (: **vartāti-*) → *ra* remains unrefutable.

15. *sāṅkā-* ‘fight (?)’ (VI 75,5c *iṣudhīh sāṅkāh pṛtanās ca sáravās*) ← **sṛṅkā-* (W. WÜST; cf. KEWA III/416); but not to mention the problem of wordformation, the semantic analysis given by WÜST of ved. (KaU) *sṛṅkā-* – which he assumes to be the same word – does not bear closer examination (s. H. W. BODEWITZ, WZKS 29 [1985] 13ff.).

(II) *ṛ* → *i*

(A) Old Etymologies:

16. *kitavá-* ‘gambler’ (II¹, V¹, X 34⁴) ← **kṛtavá-* (Yāska – J. WACKER-NAGEL; cf. EWAia I/350f.), a possessive derivative in *°vā-* (for Yāska’s gloss *kṛtavān* [Nir. V 22] cf. p. *kitavā* [J VI/228, 19]) from *kṛtá-*, the best/winning ‘course’ in the game of dice.

17. *kimīdín-* a certain fiend (VII 104², X¹) ← **kṛmīdín-* (J. CHARPENTIER – J. SCHINDLER; cf. EWAia I/351f.), an *°in*-derivative of **kṛmi-Hd-á-* ‘worm-eat-er’: cf. *śva-ghn=in-*.

18. *śithirā-* 'loose, slack' (V¹, VI¹, VII²) ← **śrthirā-* (TH. ZACHARIAE; cf. KEWA III/336), derived from the root *śrath*ⁱ: ved. (YV +) *śithilā-*.

(B) A New Etymology:

19. *īṭātas* 'of right, rightly' (X 171, 1a *t_uvām tyām īṭāto rātham*) ← **ṛtātas*: cf. ved. (RV +) *ṛtāt*, *ṛténa*. In the brahmanical tradition this form was re-interpreted as G(Ab)sg. of a PN *ītant-* (s. EWAia I/187).

(C) Further Evidence:

20. *nin_iyā-* 'secret' (I³, IV², VII³, IX¹, X¹) replacing mia. **niñña-* < oia. **nṛnyā-* (A. MEILLET, *Anekaśiṣyasuhrtpaṇḍitaviracitanibandhaḥ Karpapūjagranthaḥ*. Opstellen geschreven ter Eere van Dr. H. Kern. Leiden 1903, p. 121 f. – W. WÜST, *ABORI* 58–59 [1978] 418 ff.): cf. ved. (RV IV 5,8b) *nipīk*, a hapax which is explained either as being derived therefrom (W. WÜST, *ibid.* 420) or as the result of a contamination of *ninyām* and **n_iyāk* (L. RENOUE, *Études védiques et pāṇinéennes* XIII [Paris 1964] 97); but neither a suffix **nya-* (s. KEWA II/161) nor a *n*-formation of **n(a)r* is found anywhere else.

21. *pīthīnas-* PN (VI 26,6c *t_uvām rajīm pīthīnase daśasyān*) ← **pṛthīnas-* (M. MAYRHOFER, KEWA II/275): cf. the Rgvedic PNs *pṛthī-* and *ṛjūnas-* ('having a straight nose').

(III) *ṛ* → *u*

(A) Old Etymologies:

22. *kuru* 'do' (X²; *kurmās* X 51,7a) ← *kr̥nu* (J. WACKERNAGEL; cf. AzI II/584) occurring 8 times in the RV.

23. *mūhur* 'at once' (I², V¹, VI¹, VII¹, VIII², X⁴; *muhūrtā-* III²) ← **mṛhūr* (J. BLOCH; cf. KEWA II/661): cf. *muhukā-* (IV³, including 20,9b where, instead of *mūhu kâ*, + *muhukâ* is to be read) derived from pii. **mr̥ǵhū-* (> yav. *mərəzu-*), in analogy to which a pie. NAsg. **mrég^h-uṛ* could easily have been transformed into pii. **mr̥ǵhūṛ*.

(B) A New Etymology:

24. *nicumpunā-* (VIII 93,22c *apām jāgmīr nicumpunās*) replacing mia. **nicimpunā-* < oia. **nityampr̥nā-* 'constantly filling': cf. ved. (RV V 44,12a) *sadāpr̥nā-*.

(C) Further Evidence:

25. *udumbalā-* epithet of Yama's dogs (X 14,12a *urūṇasāv asutīpā udumbalāu*) either to be derived from the tree name *udumbāra-* ←

**ṛdūb*° (Ch. H. WERBA in EWAia I/217), meaning 'reddish' (s. M. WITZEL, IJ 25 [1983] 239f.) or ← **ṛdur-b*° 'with hurting force' (?): cf. ved. (RV) *ṛdūdāra-* and yav. *arəduš-* resp.

26. *pr̥ṇya-* 'good, auspicious' (II¹, VII¹) ← **pr̥ṇya-* (J. WACKERNAGEL; cf. KEWA II/303); cf. 24; but its derivation is still open to question.

27. *busā-* 'mist, (drizzling) rain (?)' (X 27,24c *āvīh s_uvāh kr̥ṇutē gūhate busām*) ← **br̥sā-* (Ch. BARTHOLOMAE, ZDMG 50 [1896] 712) / ← **br̥sā-* ← *vr̥sā-* (P. TEDESCO; cf. KEWA II/440); but on the one hand there does not exist any parallel to a change *v(r) → b(u)* / # __ (TEDESCO's explanation of *bundā-* [VIII³] as continuing an oia. **vr̥ddhá-* [Lg 22 (1946) 190] is utterly arbitrary), on the other **br̥sā-* lacks an (indo-) aryan etymology (cf. KEWA II/440f.).

28. *śācipūjana* Vsg. (VIII 17,12a *śācigo ś.*) of (omg.) **śācipūjana-* (the first syllable of which was lengthened due to the stress of the vocative accent; s. P. THIEME, MSS 44 [1985] 248ff.) ← **śācipr̥ñcana-* (P. THIEME; cf. KEWA II/320f.) 'having hospitality with him': cf. ved. (RV +) *sāci*(°). The cited Pāda may therefore be translated as follows: 'O You, whom cows, whom hospitality accompanies'.

Appendix: Evidence to be discarded

1. *āñjas(ā)* / *āñjasīna-* 'quick(ly), direct(ly)' ← **īñjas*(°) (K. F. GELDER; s. EWAia I/54f.) vs. oia. **īñja-* > mia. (p.) *iñja-* (cf. 19) and ved. *āñjas-*.

2. *ānva-/ānvī-* 'fine, tiny (hole/finger)' ← **īnv*° (E. KUHN; s. EWAia I/55f.) vs. oia. **īnv*° > mia. **in̥v*° (cf. p. *ina-*, 19) and oia. *(*H*)*ānu-*.

3. *kātuka-* 'pungent' ← **k̥tu*° (J. SCHMIDT; s. EWAia I/290) vs. oia. **k̥tu*° > mia. **ku̥tu*° (cf. p. *muḍu-*, 22–23) and oia. **kātu*° (cf. gr. *κεντέω*).

4. *kūṭa-* '?' ← **k̥ṭa-* (Yāska – A. WEBER; cf. EWAia I/361) vs. oia. *kṛtā-* > mia. (as. +) *kaṭa-* (cf. 5–6) and oia. **kūta-* (cf. yav. *kutaka-*).

5. *kūṇāru-* '?' ← **k̥ṇā*° (J. WACKERNAGEL, Altindische Grammatik I. Göttingen 1896, p. 21) vs. oia. **k̥ṇā*° > mia. **kaṇā*° (cf. 3–4).

6. *jālhu-* 'dull (?)' ← **j̥dhu-* (J. WACKERNAGEL; cf. V. CVETKO, Acta Neophilologica 14 [1981] 109) vs. oia. **j̥dhu-* > mia. **judhu-* (cf. p. *muḍu-*, 22–23) and oia. **jādhu-* 'needy', which may be explained as being derived from the pii. root **j̥(h)ad^h* 'beg' (> oir. *jad*).

7. *taḥit-* 'adjacent' ← **tr̥dīt-* (Ch. BARTHOLOMAE; cf. EWAia I/615f.) vs. oia. **tr̥dīt-* > mia. **tidīt-* (cf. p. *kittima-*, 17–18.21).

8. *pani-* ← **pr̥ni-* (A. HILLEBRANDT – J. WACKERNAGEL; cf. KEWA II/195) vs. oia. **pr̥ni-* > mia. **pini-* (cf. p. *pit̥hi-*, 21) and oia. **pani-* 'toiling, base (?)' (cf. gr. *πένομαι*, etc.).

9. °*pánīphaṇat*- 'springing' ← °*phṛṇat*- (A. MEILLET; cf. KEWA II/390) vs. oia. °*phṛṇa*° > mia. °*phuna*° (cf. p. *phusa*-).
10. *pīṅgā*- a musical instrument ← °*pṛīṅgā*- (W. WÜST; cf. KEWA III/757) vs. oia. °*pṛīṅgā*- > mia. °*puṅgā*- (cf. p. *putṭha*-, 26.28).
11. *vanīj*- 'merchant' ← °*vṛṇīj*- (J. WACKERNAGEL, op. cit. [s.v. 5], p. 192) vs. oia. °*vṛṇīj*- > mia. °*vinij*- (cf. p. *vicchika*-, 17-18.21) and oia. °*vanīj*- (KEWA III/130f.).
12. *sáktu*- 'groats' ← °*sṛktu*- (W. WÜST; cf. KEWA III/411) vs. oia. °*sṛktu*- > mia. °*suttu*-.

Abbreviations

AzI	KARL HOFFMANN, Aufsätze zur Indoiranistik. Vols. 1-2, ed. J. NARTEN. Wiesbaden: Dr. Ludwig Reichert Verlag, 1975-1976; Vol. 3, edd. S. GLAUCH - R. PLATH - S. ZIEGLER. Ibid. 1992.
EWAia	MANFRED MAYRHOFER, Etymologisches Wörterbuch des Altindischen. Vol. I-. Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1986ff.
IiV	KARL HOFFMANN, Der Injunktiv im Veda. Eine synchronische Funktionsuntersuchung. Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1967.
KEWA	MANFRED MAYRHOFER, Kurzgefaßtes etymologisches Wörterbuch des Altindischen / A Concise Etymological Sanskrit Dictionary. Vol. I-IV. Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1956(51)-1980.
LuE	Lautgeschichte und Etymologie. Akten der VI. Fachtagung der Indogermanischen Gesellschaft Wien, 24.-29. September 1978, edd. M. MAYRHOFER - M. PETERS - O. E. PFEIFFER. Wiesbaden: Dr. Ludwig Reichert Verlag, 1980.

EINE DISSIMILATIONSREGEL IN DEN AŚOKA-INSCHRIFTEN

(Ein kleiner Beitrag zur Sprachgeographie Indiens)

Von Thomas Oberlies, Würzburg

Seit langer Zeit werden die im Pali erscheinenden Adverbien *pure* und *suve* auf Grund des auslautenden °e als „Magadhismen“ betrachtet. Gegen diese gängige Anschauung hat zuerst HERMANN BERGER, Zwei Probleme der mittelindischen Lautlehre, München 1955, p. 15, Einwände erhoben: „Wenn z. B. statt des nach den Pali-Lautgesetzen zu erwartenden **puro* < *purah* in der Überlieferung konsequent *pure* erscheint, so kann man diese Form nicht kurzerhand für einen Überrest aus der Ostsprache erklären, denn es ist nicht einzusehen, warum die Pali-Übersetzer gerade bei diesem einen, so gewöhnlichen Wort die Übertragung in die entsprechende westliche Form versäumt haben sollten, während ihnen bei anderen Adverbien (*tato*, *bahuso* usw.) dasselbe Versehen niemals passiert wäre.“ BERGER sieht, einem Vorschlag Karl Hoffmanns folgend, in diesen Formen Analogiebildungen zu Adverbien wie *agge* (BERGER, loc. cit., p. 15 n. 5: „In Wirklichkeit liegt eine analogische Umbildung vor: der Auslaut von *pure* hat sich nach dem synonymen *agge* gerichtet [K. Hoffmann, Vorlesung].“). HEINZ BECHERT (in: Die Sprache der ältesten buddhistischen Überlieferung, Göttingen 1980, p. 31) nahm das Problem noch einmal kurz auf, sich BERGER und HOFFMANN anschließend. Zuletzt äußerte sich O. VON HINÜBER, Das ältere Mittelindisch im Überblick, Wien 1986, p. 89f., der, beide Erklärungen verbindend, wieder zur alten Erklärung zurückkehrte: „... eine östliche Form ... wie P *pure* oder *suve* : skt. *śvaḥ* ... , die sich nach *agge* und anderen Beispielen in das System der Adverbien einfügen ließ, und die daher nicht umgesetzt wurde“ (vgl. auch NORMAN [brieflich] apud BECHERT, op. cit., p. 31 n. 3).

Das Problem liegt m. E. in der von BERGER selbst zitierten Form (Aśoka / Pali) *tato*. In den Aśoka-Inschriften entwickelt sich das auslautende °as von *tatas* nie zu °e: man erwartete zumindest auf den östlichen Aśoka-Inschriften **tate*, das doch in amg. *tae* fortlebt (Uvāsa-gadasāo § 185–198, Uttarajjhayaṇasutta, Vipākaśruta 1.1.5 [PSM s.v.]). Es ist folglich zunächst einmal das Verhältnis *pure/pule/suve* : *tato* in den Aśoka-Inschriften zu klären.

Anders als BLOCH, der das auslautende °o des „östlichen“ *tato* damit erklären will, daß das Wort „faisait nécessairement groupe avec le mot

suivant“ (BSOS 6 [1931] 292 [= Recueil d'Articles de Jules Bloch, Paris 1985, p. 260])¹, kann man zunächst auch davon ausgehen, daß *tato* die regelmäßige Vertretung von aia. °as (in -tas-Ableitungen und Adverbien) zeigt – zumal in Anbetracht einer Form wie *yaso* „Ruhm“ ([< aia. *yaśas*] FE X Dh G K [°šo] M [°šo] Sh Y). Betrachten wir nun die auf °as auslautenden Adverbien² in den Aśoka-Inschriften:

<i>pule</i>	FE I K Y
<i>pure</i>	MRE I Maski
<i>purā</i>	FE I G M Sh
<i>bhuye</i>	FE VIII Dh K M Sh Y, SE VII Tōprā (<i>bis</i>)
<i>bhuya</i>	FE VIII G (hierzu vgl. ALSDORF, Kl. Sch., p. 441–444, bes. p. 442)
<i>suve</i>	SE I (überall außer Mīraṭh)

und die auf suffixiales -tas auslautenden Wörter:

<i>ite</i>	SE IV (überall [außer Mīraṭh] āvā ite pi ca me āvuti)
<i>kute</i>	1. Sep. Dh J
<i>takhasilāte</i>	1. Sep. Dh J
<i>tato</i>	FE IX K M Sh (Y om./unleserlich), FE XIII Sh (<i>tato apavudhe</i>), XIII K M Sh Y (<i>ter</i>) [Lesung von Y jeweils unsicher]
<i>duvālate</i>	1. Sep. Dh J, 2. Sep. Dh J
<i>mukhate</i>	FE VI Dh J K Y
<i>mukhato</i>	FE VI G M Sh
<i>viyaṃjanate</i>	FE III Dh K M Y
<i>viyaṃjanato</i>	FE III G Sh
<i>suvaṃṇagirīte</i>	MRE I Brahmagiri, Siddāpura
<i>hetute</i>	FE III Dh M Y
<i>hetuto</i>	FE III G Sh,

so sehen wir erst, wie sehr sich die Form *tato* in den östlichen Edikten abhebt. Um ein einheitliches Bild der Vertretung von °as zu gewinnen, bietet es sich an, die aufgeführten Wörter zunächst mechanisch einzuteilen. Hierbei wird man auf eine Gruppe von zweisilbigen Wörtern, bestehend aus *ite*, *kute*, *tato*, *pure/ā* (*pule*), *bhuye/a* und *suve*³, geführt. Die angestrebte Einheitlichkeit der Vertretung von °as erreicht

¹ Als weitere Gründe führt BLOCH (loc. cit.) an: „il a été isolé de la déclinaison; aussi bien le suffixe n'y a-t-il plus exactement le sens de -te employé librement pour former des ablatifs d'origine ou des adverbes comme *kute*; *tato* a pris rang parmi les mots accessoires comme *no* et *kho*“.

² Im folgenden ist der AkkSg. des Stammes *bhuyas-* als Adverb eingeordnet (vgl. J. BLOCH, Les inscriptions d'Asoka, Paris 1950, § 24).

³ Der hier aufgestellten Regel zufolge ist das SE I bezeugte *suve-suve* nicht der viersilbige Fortsetzer des alten Āmreḍita-Kompositums *śvāḥ-śvāḥ* (z. B.

man, wenn man annimmt, daß in diesen zweisilbigen⁴ Wörtern auslautendes °as generell (zu *ite* s.u.) zunächst durch °o vertreten wurde (über *°ā/ō⁵), das bei *u*-Vokalismus der ersten Silbe jedoch zu °e dissimiliert wurde (ũ __ o > ũ __ e)⁶. Diese Dissimilationstendenz ist den Ásoka-Inscripfen nach zu urteilen vor allem für den ‚Osten‘ Indiens typisch⁷.

Auch bei den bei Ásoka bezeugten -as-Stämmen entwickelt sich der Auslaut gemäß dieser Regel: einem *yaso* und (in der Kompositionsfuge) *rayo-mahālakānaṃ* (SE VII Topra) steht das dreisilbige *daviye* (1. Sep. Dh) „noch weiter“ (< *davīyas* [vgl. H. LÜDERS, Phil. Ind., p. 341]) und das dissimilierte *bhuve* (s.o.) gegenüber⁸.

Die beschriebene Dissimilationstendenz ist zunächst auf aus aia. °aḥ entstandenes °o zu beschränken. Doch wäre immerhin auch das FE I und II bezeugte östliche *duve*⁹ statt erwartetem **duvo* (FE I G *dvo* mask. [FE II *dve* fem.]) so erklärbar, was im Osten zum Zusammenfall der mask. und der fem. Form führt¹⁰. Doch ist diese Form wohl durch Verallgemeinerung von aia. *duvé* zu erklären (LINDEMANSche Variante)¹¹.

Diese Dissimilationstendenz wäre auch eine Erklärung dafür, warum wir zwar RV 7.69.4b *sūro duhitā* belegt finden, im späten (weiter ‚östlich‘ entstandenen) 1. Maṇḍala des RV (1.34.5d) aber *sūre duhitā* (anders BLOCH, BSOS 6 [1931] 293 n. 1 [= Recueil, p. 261 n. 1]: *uria*. Sandhi-Form **sūraz-duhitā*¹²).

⁴ Zur Relation Wortlänge: Auslaut vgl. die Beschränkung von auslautendem Langvokal auf Monosyllaba im Jungavesta.

⁵ Vgl. altavestisch °ā (< urar. *°as), jungavestisch -ō.

⁶ Bereits TRECKNER, Pali Miscellany, London 1879, p. 79 machte auf verschiedene Fälle von o __ u- und u __ o-Dissimilationen im Pali aufmerksam: *ahesum* neben *ahosi*, *pure*, *bhiyyo* (vgl. *yebhuyyena*), *vīto* (für **vīto*), *suve*, *duve*, *hetuṇṇe* (hierzu GEIGER, Pāli Literatur und Sprache, § 204.1b). Hierher ließe sich auch Thienes Erklärung von Pali *urejāta*- stellen: „*urejāta* Māgadhismus für *uro-jāta*“ (KZ 66 [1939] 132 n. 2).

⁷ Einer separaten Untersuchung bedarf die vergleichbare ũ __ o/o __ ũ-Dissimilationstendenz in den neuindischen Sprachen (vgl. u. a. h. *gehūm* „Weizen“ [< *godhūma*- (CDIAL 4287)], mth./h. *lehū[m]* „Blut“ [< **lohūm* < *lohitam* (CDIAL 11165)]).

⁸ Zu *mano-atileke* ~ *mana atileke* 1. Sep. Dh J vgl. L. ALSDORF, Kl. Schr., p. 487: „Ich ... möchte mit einiger Zuversicht die auch von Lüders als wahrscheinlichste bezeichnete Lesung *mana* für die allein richtige halten“.

⁹ FE I: Sh *duvi*, M *duve*, K J Y *duve*; FE II: G M *dve*, K Y *duve*, Sh *duvi* (weitere inschriftliche Belege bei M. A. MEHENDALE, Historical Grammar of Inscriptional Prakrits, Poona 1948, § 101/2, 201, 305, 353).

¹⁰ Eine andere Erklärung findet sich bei VON HINÜBER, op. cit., § 287/392.

¹¹ Freundlicher Hinweis von Dr. Werba (Wien).

¹² So schon CH. BARTHOLOMAE, BB 15 (1889) 1f. Vgl. auch M. MAYRHOFER,

Dieser Erklärung aber läuft das SE IV belegte „östliche“¹³ (*ava* [Töp] / *āvā* [Ara, Nand, Rām] / *āva* [All]) *ite* (*pi ca me āvuti*) – wenn dies wirklich *aia. itas* fortsetzt¹⁴ – zuwider: man erwartete statt dessen **ito*. Gegen die Annahme, daß durch die nachfolgenden enklitischen Wörter *pi* und *ca* dieses *tas*-Adverb als viersilbiges Wort behandelt worden ist, spricht die Behandlung des *as*-Auslautes im Innern eines Kompositums (vgl. Delhi-Topra VII *vayo-mahālakānam*), da bekanntlich im Kompositum im Ai. auch der Satzsandhi gilt (AiGr II.1, § 55). Alle Schwierigkeiten schwinden, wenn man *āvā-ite* als Univerbierung (bzw. Kompositum) faßt (: viersilbig)¹⁵. Zu genau demselben Ergebnis kam MICHELSON, IF 23 (1908/09) 235f., im Zuge seiner Untersuchung der Quantität auslautender Vokale auf den Säulenedikten¹⁶: „The *-ā* of *āvā* is kept because *āvā-ite* ‚from this time on‘ is felt to be one word“ (p. 236)¹⁷.

Stellt man nun Pali *kuto* (Ja VI.243.12*), *pure* (Ja IV.271.3*, 329.19*) und *s(u)ve* (Ja V.507.19*) einander gegenüber, so wird man anders als BECHERT und BERGER die beiden letzteren doch – mit NORMAN und VON HINÜBER – als „Magadhismen“ betrachten müssen, wofür auch ś. *kudo* und *suvo* (PISCHEL § 185, § 345) einerseits und amg. *pure* und *su(v)e* (PISCHEL § 345) andererseits sprechen¹⁸.

Handbuch des Pali, Heidelberg 1951, p. 70 n. 1, und K. R. NORMAN, *The dialects in which the Buddha preached*, in: BECHERT, op. cit., p. 70f.

¹³ Die Sprache ausnahmslos aller Säulenedikte ist „östlich“ (ALSDORF, Kl. Sch., p. 450 n. 6; vgl. C. CAILLAT *apud* M. WITZEL, *Tracing the Vedic dialects*. In: *Dialectes dans les Littératures Indo-Aryennes*. Paris 1989, p. 265).

¹⁴ Vgl. BLOCH, BSOS 6 (1931) 292 n. 1 (= *Recueil*, p. 260 n. 1): „Dans le IV^e édit sur piliers, *ava ite* reste obscur malgré les efforts des traducteurs“. Die m. W. letzte (allerdings beiläufige) Behandlung findet sich bei ALSDORF, Kl. Sch. p. 476f., der *āva ite pi ca me āvuti* übersetzt: „Und so weit geht meine hingebende Pflichterfüllung“ (vgl. LÜDERS, *Phil. Ind.*, p. 312).

¹⁵ Vgl. BHS *yāva(d)-etto* Mvu I.327.20, 329.5 (EDGERTON s.v.).

¹⁶ Rāmpurvā, Ararāj und Nandangarh schreiben bekanntlich Kurzvokale am Ende von Wortgruppen, während Tōprā und Mīraṭh an dieser Stelle Langvokale zeigen (vgl. auch K. R. NORMAN, *The Inscribing of Aśoka's Pillar Edicts*. In: *India and the Ancient World* [Professor P. H. L. Eggermont Jubilee Volume]. Leuven 1987, p. 131f.).

¹⁷ Ein Problem *sui generis* ist der Vergleich der hier erzielten Ergebnisse mit denen K. L. JANERTS zu den Schreibkonventionen in den Aśoka-Inschriften (K. L. JANERT, *Abstände und Schlußvokalverzeichnungen in Aśoka-Inschriften*, Wiesbaden 1972).

¹⁸ Doch vergleiche man amg. *ahe* (< *adhas*), *bhujjo* (und ś. *bhūo* [PISCHEL § 414]) und *rahe* (< *rahas*). Daneben sind aber auch amg. *aho* und *raho* belegt (PISCHEL § 345).

SŪYAGAḌAMGA STUDIES II

By K. R. Norman, Cambridge

In an earlier number of this Journal¹ I concluded a review-article, which I had devoted to an assessment of the contribution made by W. B. BOLLÉE (= B.) to the study of the Sūyagaḍaṅgasutta (= Sūy.), by saying "The fact that the title page bears upon it the label 'Teil I' holds out hope that we shall soon see further instalments of BOLLÉE's studies of this very important text". I was perhaps over-optimistic in including the word "soon" in this statement, but it is nevertheless good to be able to welcome the publication, eleven years after the first part appeared, of Teil II of his Studien zum Sūyagaḍa².

The general pattern of this second part follows that of the first one. The edition of a portion of the Sūyagaḍaṅganijjutti (verses 36–61) is followed by critical editions (p. 3–24) of the sections of Sūy. corresponding to these Nijjutti (= N.) verses: 1,2,1–3; 1,3,1–4; 1,4,1–2. Then follows a translation of these portions of the text into German, accompanied by valuable notes upon the contents of the verses, their translation, and matters of grammatical interest (p. 25–186).

The bibliography (p. 187–97) serves as a supplement to the bibliography in Teil I, and now includes the omissions pointed out in my earlier review-article. Then follows a word index (p. 198–224) to the portions of Sūy. included in this study, although some of the references given, e.g. those s.vv. *āya-daṇḍa*, *ārambha*, *āraya-mehuna*, refer to portions not included here, but perhaps scheduled for future publication. There is a *pāda* index and also a reverse index of *pādas*, which is very useful for tracing verses which, as is frequently the case, are parallel except for the opening word or words. There is also a glossary to the Nijjutti, the absence of which I noted in my earlier article, listing words included in both this part and also Teil I. There is a general index, an index of passages quoted or referred to in Pāli, Prakrit and Sanskrit, and a list of citations from the Cūrṇi and the Ṭīkā. There are two supplements to Teil I: a list of additions and corrections to that volume,

¹ K. R. NORMAN, Sūyagaḍamga Studies. WZKS 25 (1981) 197–203.

² Studien zum Sūyagaḍa. Textteile, Nijjutti, Übersetzung und Anmerkungen. Teil II, von WILLEM B. BOLLÉE. [Schriftenreihe des Südasien-Instituts der Universität Heidelberg, Band 31]. Wiesbaden 1988. IX + 301 p. DM 98,-.

and (following the pattern just mentioned) an index of passages quoted there or referred to in Pāli, Prakrit and Sanskrit. There is also an Appendix which consists of a general index and a list of corrections to B.'s "Traditionell-indische Vorstellungen"³. The volume closes with lists of *addenda* and *corrigenda* to Teil II, and a supplement to the index of passages quoted or referred to.

To help with the translation of these sections B. had available to him the same two translations which he had for Teil I, i.e. those of JACOBI⁴ and SCHUBRING⁵, although, as I noted before, in places they were of doubtful value. For Section 1,4 he also had the assistance of ALSDORF's treatment⁶. Everything which I said in my earlier review I could also say about this volume. Like its predecessor, it gives ample evidence of the breadth and depth of B.'s reading, and of his critical insight into the very difficult Prakrit in which the Sūy. and, even more, the Nijjutti are composed.

Although B. includes many references to both metrical and lexical matters in his notes, he does not concentrate on these two aspects of his study of Sūy., and more could be said about both. As a contribution to Sūyagaḍaṃga studies I should like to examine the metres of the portions of Sūy. which B. includes in this book, point out some of the more interesting facts about the readings, and make certain suggestions for improving some of the defective ones. I should also like to comment upon B.'s word lists and make suggestions about the etymology of a number of words which occur in them.

Metre

There is an interesting variety of metres in the sections of Sūy. included in this book. The Nijjuti is Āryā; 1,2 is Vaitāliya; 1,3 is Anuṣṭubh; and 1,4 is Old Āryā.

NIJJUTTI: ĀRYĀ

In N 41d B. reads *suha-ppamāḍ*, producing a line with 6½ *gaṇas* instead of the usual 7½. If he had not emended *-ppamāḍ* to *-ppamāḍ*, then we should have had 7½ *gaṇas* with the expected single short syllable in the 6th *gaṇa*.

³ Which appeared in BAVA 5 (1983) 227–81.

⁴ H. JACOBI, *Jaina Sūtras II*. [Sacred Books of the East XLV]. Oxford 1895.

⁵ W. SCHUBRING, *Worte Mahāvīras*. Göttingen–Leipzig, 1926.

⁶ L. ALSDORF, *Itthīparinnā*. A Chapter of Jain Monastic Poetry, edited as a Contribution to Indian Prosody. IJ 2 (1958) 249–70 (= Kleine Schriften. Wiesbaden 1974, p. 193–214).

N 45cd has 6½ gaṇas and needs emendation. We might suggest, for want of something better, reading *so* (u) *wasaggo* and assume that *u* has dropped out by haplography.

N 47ab is hyper-metric, with ◡ – ◡ in the 5th gaṇa. If we omit *saṃyama-* and assume that this was added as a gloss when the compound *vigghāya-kāri* was thought to need explanation, then we have ◡ – ◡ in the 4th gaṇa. We are then, however, left with a line which has a single syllable in the 6th gaṇa, i.e. the verse is an Upagīti.

N 50ab is non-metrical, even after B.'s reading of short syllables in *a-heuehī* and *-paḍiehī*. We could correct the scansion by omitting *sa-* in *sa-samaya-*, on the assumption that it appeared by dittography before *samaya*.

N 51ab does not have the caesura at the end of the third gaṇa, but the fourth gaṇa is not an ambhibrach, as the classical form of the Āryā demands. The same applies to N 56ab and N 56cd.

In N 60ab B. prints *daḍhā-mai*. It is not clear why he does this, since only *daḍhā-* scans correctly.

1,2,1–3: VAITĀLĪYA

In Section 1,2,2: 5d does not scan, and it is not clear why B. reads *avihannū*; it would scan if we followed the reading *avihaṇṇu*.

In 6b it would seem preferable to read *muṇṇ*, since the final syllable is long in every other *pāda* b.

In 10d it is not clear why B. prints *'gāra-m-āvase*, rather than *'gāram āvase*. We find *gāraṃ ... āvase* in 1,2,3,13a and *agāraṃ āvasantassa* in 1,3,2,18c. In Pāli too *āvasati* is constructed with an accusative.

In 13a B. reads *pīhe*, but the metre requires *pihe* (< *apidadhāti*; see Index, p. 214), giving a syncopated opening – ◡ – ◡, or *pīhē* which would give the more normal opening – – ◡ ◡.

In 20a the cadence is ◡ ◡ ◡ – ◡ –, showing resolution of a long syllable into two short syllables.

In 20d the cadence is ◡ ◡ ◡ – ◡ –, showing resolution of a long syllable into two short syllables, but the normal cadence (– ◡ – ◡ –) can be obtained by reading *-mattē 'saṇaṃ*.

In 25bd we have syncopation in the opening of both *pādas* (– ◡ – ◡). Cf. 1,2,3,20d.

In Section 1,2,3: 4b is hyper-metric even after reading short -ō- in *ajjhōvavannā*, and it is possible that this word has been introduced from Section 1,3,2,22 etc., because of the connection with *kāmehi*, as a replacement for a more metrical reading.

In 9d the metre is incorrect, and we should read *āsūriyaṃ*. I do not understand the reason for reading a short nasal in *āsuriyā*. This pro-

duces a prior Vaitāliya *pāda* instead of the required posterior, but with the resolution of a long syllable into two short syllables in the cadence (— ∪ ∪ ∪ — for — ∪ — ∪ —).

In 11b we have a prior *pāda* where we would expect a posterior. We can correct the metre by reading *saddahasū a-ddakkhu-*, in place of *sadda-hasu a-dakkhu-*.

In 20d we have syncopation of the opening (— ∪ — ∪ [= 1,2,2,25d]).

1,3,1-4: ANUṢṬUBH

There are many nine-syllable *pādas*, but they can all be explained by assuming the resolution of a long syllable into two short syllables, or by ignoring a *svarabhakti* vowel.

In Section 1,3,1: 1d (1st); 2a (6th); 3b (3rd; *svarabhakti* vowel ?); 10b (1st); 12a (6th); 12d (1st); 14c (1st); 16b (4th); 17b (1st).

In Section 1,3,2: 6c (1st); 7d (6th; *svarabhakti* vowel ?; in the cadence); 15b (4th); 16d (1st); 20a (6th; *svarabhakti* vowel ?).

In Section 1,3,3: 3b (1st); 5b (1st, if we read *valayāñ*); 15c (1st).

In Section 1,3,4: 1c (1st); 2a (5th); 4a (7th); 9d (1st); 10b (1st); 13d (6th; in the cadence); 20a (6th; *svarabhakti* vowel ?).

In 1,3,2: in 2cd B. reads both *ṇe* and *ne*. The first of these readings is presumably a misprint, since only *ne* is listed (s.v. *aham*) as the enclitic form of the first person pronoun plural.

In 10c I do not understand the reading *evā*. The *pāda* scans correctly if we read *evam*.

In 22c (= 1,3,4,13c) the significance of printing the anceps syllable in *ajjhovavannā* is not clear. In Pāli the opening — — ∪ — is acceptable with the cadence —, — — ∪, so there is no reason to doubt that we could have the final long —ā here.

In 1,3,3: in 20a it is not clear why B. reads *dhammā* instead of *dhammam* before a word beginning with a vowel.

In 21d the metre is incorrect. We should read *parivvae* in place of *parivvaejjāsi*, which has probably been borrowed from the Old Āryā *pāda* 1,4,2,22.

1,4,1-2: OLD ĀRYĀ

For the most part B. follows ALSDORF's text, except that he consistently reads -y- where ALSDORF read -d- in intervocalic positions. He frequently follows ALSDORF in reading a short nasal (-ā or -ī) at the end of *pādas*, in place of the -am or -im of the editions in Nāgarī script, in the very position where one would expect non-historic lengthening of syllables. I do not understand why either of these scholars should do this. Like ALSDORF he frequently prints a diphthong or nasalised vowel as short m.c., but he does not print any vowels long m.c., although in

the notes he sometimes suggests doing so. I do not understand why he should make such a distinction.

ALSDORF pointed out that in 1,4,1,2c and 31c and in 1,4,2,4c and 14c we find odd Śloka *pādas*. B. prints these *pādas* in this form, but for 2c he notes that the metre requires *ūvāyā* instead of *uvāyā* to scan as Old Āryā. Unexpectedly, he lists the word in the forms *uvāya* and *uvvāya* in the index, but not *ūvāya*, without any cross-references. In 31c he points out that *ālāu-* would scan instead of *alāu-*, but he does not list this in the index. He notes that the other two *pādas* scan as Śloka, but does not suggest any emendation, although it would be simple to turn them into Old Āryā by lengthening vowels m.c.

Section 1,4,1: in 3b ALSDORF points out that the *pāda* begins with the full *gaṇa* ◡ – ◡.

In 4c *eyāni* must be a misprint for *eyāṇi*. Cf. 6c.

In 4d the metre is incorrect. B. quotes ALSDORF's suggestion of reading *pāsāṇi* for *pāsāṇi*, and gives *pāsāṇi* as an alternative suggestion, but does not introduce either of these into the text.

In 6d the metre is incorrect. B. compares *pāsāṇi* in 4d.

In 7b B. states in the index that we should read *ūgasittāṇam* m.c. in place of *uvagasittāṇam*, doubtless to obtain the scansion ◡ – ◡ in the sixth *gaṇa*. Such a change seems unnecessary, since the scansion ◡ ◡ ◡ ◡ is quite acceptable in that position, and is found elsewhere in the text, e.g. in 1,4,2,6d.

In 7d ALSDORF notes that the metre is incorrect. B. suggests reading *kāhāhī*, but does not introduce this into the text.

In 13b he notes with ALSDORF that the initial *morae* are missing. He prints *dhārhim* rather than ALSDORF's *dhārhi*, to obtain a short final syllable before an initial vowel, although elsewhere he prints *ī* in a comparable position, e.g. *āmalaḡāi udaga-* in 1,4,2,10b.

In 13c the metre is incorrect, but it can be corrected by reading *vā*, with ALSDORF, instead of *va*.

In 25a the metre is defective, but can be corrected by reading *juvāi* with ALSDORF. The reading *juvai* is perhaps a misprint.

In 25d *ne* is perhaps a misprint for *ne*, since only *ne* is quoted in the index. Cf. 1,3,2,2c, supra.

In 26c he departs from ALSDORF's reading *jau-kumbhē jahā uvajjōi*, which scans as an even *pāda* instead of the expected odd one, by emending to *jau-kumbhē jahā uvajjōi*. This, however, cannot be correct, since it gives ◡ – ◡ as the third *gaṇa*. We should rather read *jau-kumbhē jaha uvajjōi*.

In 29b the 5th *gaṇa* is ◡ ◡ ◡ ◡, which is very rare and consequently suspect.

Section 1,4,2: in 3c B. points out that the 2nd gaṇa is $\cup \cup -$, and not $\cup - \cup$. We could obtain this by reading *vāhā* for *v' ahaṃ*.

In 3d the 5th gaṇa is deficient ($- \cup$). We could repair the metre by reading *annatthā* for *annattha*.

In 4b the 6th gaṇa is $\cup \cup -$, which as ALSDORF noted is incorrect, although he was unable to suggest a correction. B. makes various suggestions, of which *eva-rūvehī* for *tahā-rūvehī* is perhaps the simplest. We find *eva-rūpa* in Pāli.

In 8a *kutṭham* before *tagaraṃ* is presumably a misprint for *kutṭham*.

In 9a B. follows ALSDORF in reading *nandīcuṇṇagāḥ* which he translates "Nandī-Puder", but he points out, with ALSDORF, that this gives an even *pāda* instead of the expected odd one. He suggests reading *nādi-m.c.*, which would produce the required odd *pāda*.

In 14d B. reads *āvāsahaṃ* which does not scan. We should read *āvasa-haṃ*, with ALSDORF. B. actually lists the word in this form in the index.

In 16b ALSDORF states that the metre is so corrupt that the text cannot be right, but he is unable to suggest a plausible emendation. We might think of reading *geṇha vā ṇaṃ ahavā jahāhi tti* instead of *geṇhasu vā ṇaṃ ahavā jahāhi*.

Word lists

I have combined my comments on words in Sūy. and words in the Nijjuttī, putting (N) against the latter. In his two word indexes B. adds a Sanskrit equivalent whenever possible after each item. Sometimes this provides an etymology, e.g. *gheppai* < **ghrpyati*, and sometimes a translation, e.g. *¹āhiya* = *ākhyāta*. It is not always made clear which is intended in each case, which may cause confusion in the minds of readers. It is unclear whether there is any significance in the fact that a verbal root is sometimes denoted by the abbreviation W and sometimes by the symbol $\sqrt{\quad}$.

acāiya: a number of forms are listed with -c- (see also *acāya(n)t(a)*, *²cayai*, *cāiya*, *CĀYA*, *cāyai*), and they are all explained as parts of *śak*, although they cannot be direct developments of that root, and are in fact explained in CDIAL 4535⁷ as coming from \sqrt{cak}^2 .

ajjhovavanna: the Critical Pāli Dictionary's suggestion of *adhi* + *ava-panna* is given, and also *adhi* + *upapanna*. It seems likely that the form is in fact a conflation of the two: *ajjhopanna* × *ajjhupapanna* > *ajjhopapanna* > *ajjhovavanna*.

⁷ R. L. TURNER, Comparative Dictionary of the Indo-Aryan Languages. London 1966. p. 246.

adu: *yad u* is queried as the equivalent. It seems likely that *adu* is extracted from *aduvā*, interpreted as *adu vā*. This is to be derived < *yad vā* (in an Eastern dialect which had *ad* for *yad*) with a *svarabhakti* vowel. *aṇantasō*: BHS *nāntasas* is given as the equivalent. No reference is given, and no such form is listed in EDGERTON'S Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary. It is perhaps a misprint for *nāntasās* (although this is not given in BHSD either), since BHS *antaśas* is given as the equivalent for *antaso*.

annattha: the Sanskrit equivalent is given as *anyatra*, but we have the same ending as in *ettha*. See *etto*, *infra*.

alūsaya: the Sanskrit equivalent is given as *a + dūṣaka*, and Pāli *adūsaka* is quoted. There seems to be no reason for rejecting a derivation from the root *lūṣ*. See *LŪSA*, *infra*.

avahaṭṭu: *apasrīvā* (a non Pāṇinian absolute) is queried as an equivalent, and the word is also listed with a query under ¹*SARA* (= *SṚ*). It is, however, also listed under *HARA* (= *HṚ*), without a query.

āhākamma (N): this is explained as *āghāta + kamma*, an etymology which was mentioned in Teil I, but put aside in favour of LEUMANN'S explanation **yāthākāmya*. Since R. P. JAIN'S work, to which reference was made there, has now been published⁸, it would have been useful to have a page reference to it, so that readers can see for themselves if the reason for adopting this etymology is convincing.

ukkanta: the Sanskrit equivalent is given as *avakarta*, with no explanation of the way in which the form might have developed. It is presumably a noun from the present stem *okantati* < *avakantati* < Sanskrit *avakṛntati*, with the further development of *ōk-* > *ōkk-* > *ukk-*.

udāhu: the statement "pā. ts.; sa. *utāho*" is misleading since it gives the impression that Pāli has a *tatsama* form, i.e. the same as Sanskrit. It seems, however, that the abbreviation is being used here in the sense of "the same as Prakrit". See next.

uddissa: the statement "pā. ts.; sa. *uddeśya*" is misleading. See prec. The Pāli form is identical with the Prakrit form, not with the Sanskrit one. The abbreviation ts. should only be used in its customary way, as it is s.v. *uddhara*, where ts. means that the Prakrit form is identical with the Sanskrit one.

ummukka: *unmukta* is listed as the Sanskrit equivalent, giving the impression that here *-kt-* > *-kk-* instead of the usual *-tt-*. Although this is possibly an analogical formation, there seems to be no reason for

⁸ Piṇḍasuddhi: Das sechste Kapitel von Vaṭṭakeras Mūlācāra und der Āhākamma-Abschnitt der Piṇḍa-Nijjuttī. Herausgegeben, übersetzt und kommentiert von RAJENDRA PRASAD JAIN. New Delhi 1983.

rejecting the usual explanation given for *mukka*, i.e. that it is to be derived < **mukna*⁹. The rejection of this etymology on the grounds that *-kn-* would be expected to develop > *-gn-*, which would give **mugga*¹⁰, ignores the fact that *-kn-* does sometimes develop > *-kk-* in Middle Indo-Aryan, e.g. *śaknoti* > *sakkoti*. Even in Sanskrit the development of *k* + nasal is ambivalent, e.g. both *śakman* and *śagma* occur. Cf. *vimukka*, infra.

egaiya: BHS *ekatya* is given as the equivalent. It would have been helpful to list Aśokan *ekatiya*, since this shows the same development of a *svarabhakti* vowel as the Prakrit form. Pāli *ekacca*, on the other hand, shows palatalisation of the consonant group. For the *-tya* / *-tiya* suffixes see the comments on *bīiya* and *bīya* below.

etto (N): *etasmāt* is given as an equivalent. The word shows the quasi-ablative suffix *-to* added to the stem *et-*, cf. Sanskrit *ittham* and *itthā*, with *-tham* and *-thā* added to *it-*¹¹. B. does consider such a possibility when listing *ettha*, which he derives from **ittha*, although it is perhaps more likely that it is < *et* + *-tha*.

omaddei: we are invited to see *ummaddei*, but no reference to *omaddei* is given there.

osiya: we are invited to see *usiya*, but no reference to *osiya* is given there.

ghara: *gr̥ha* is listed as the equivalent, but *ghara* is rather to be explained as a derivative from the root **ghr* which we find (with a *p*-extension) in the root **ghrp*, which B. correctly gives (in Nijjutti-Glossar, s.v. *GHEPPA*) as the basis of *gheppai*.

KA(TT)HA (N) (= *KAH*): this is confusing, since it is not clear what (*TT*) implies. We also find *KAHA* (= *KATH*) listed. Under *kahai* there is a reference to *kattha* (N), which is described as the gerundive of *kahai*, and s.v. *kattha* the Sanskrit equivalent is given as *kathya*. It would have been helpful to have a comment on the absence of palatalisation, since *kathya* might have been expected to develop > *kaccha*, as in Pāli.

ta: there is some confusion here. *te* is said to be the accusative. Under *tumam*, *te* is said to be the genitive/dative.

tūṇhikka (N): this must be a misprint for *tūṇhikka*.

to: the meanings *tadā* and *tataḥ* are given, but no etymology. The word is to be derived from *ato* < *atas*, with prodelision of the initial *a-*.

⁹ R. FISCHER, Grammatik der Prakrit-Sprachen. Straßburg 1900, §566.

¹⁰ See Oskar von HINÜBER, Das ältere Mittelindisch im Überblick. Vienna 1986, § 493.

¹¹ See K. R. NORMAN, Middle Indo-Aryan Studies II. JOIB 10 (1960–61) 348–52.

DISA (= *DIS*): comparison is made with *ādīttha*. This must be a misprint for *ādītṭha*.

dei: we find *dadāti* given, whereas we must rather assume a present stem **dayati*¹².

dhāi: we find *dadhāti* given as the equivalent, whereas it is presumably based upon a non-reduplicated stem **dhāti*.

niggantha: the etymology is given as **nigrantha*, with no hint as to why we should reject the attested *nirgrantha*.

nidhatta (N): we find *nihita* (with a query, and a reference to PISCHEL § 565). Although PISCHEL states that this is derived from the present stem (< **dadh-ta*) and thinks that this is better than his alternative suggestion < **nidhapta*¹³, it is hard to understand his reasoning, since that suggestion requires a further explanation of the metathesis of the aspirate.

pariheī: we find *paridadhāti* given as the equivalent, whereas we must rather assume a present stem **paridhayati*, cf. **dayati* (s.v. *dei*, supra).

pavvaya: the equivalent is said to be *parvat*. This must be a misprint for *parvata*.

phala: this is said to be a ts. Checking the references shows that besides the common meaning “fruit”, it also means some sort of weapon at 1,3,1,16. Although MONIER-WILLIAMS includes the meanings “point of an arrow” and “blade of a sword or knife” under the same entry as the “fruit” word¹⁴, it would seem more likely that we are dealing with two homonyms. CDIAL lists *phala*⁻¹ with the meaning “fruit”¹⁵, and *phala*⁻² with the meanings “point of an arrow” or “blade of a knife”¹⁶.

bīya (N): Sanskrit *dvitīya* is given as the equivalent, and comparison is made with *docca*, although s.v. *bīya* (N), which shows the contraction of *-ii-* > *-ī-*, only Sanskrit *dvitīya* is quoted. It would seem that these ordinal numerals can be formed by adding *-tya*, *-tiya* (it is not clear whether this is an independent form or merely a *svarabhakti* development from *-tya*) or *-tiya* to the numeral stem, e.g. for “second” we have Sanskrit *dvi-tīya*, Prakrit *bīya* > *bīya* < **dvi-tiya* and Pāli *du-tiya* (< **du-tiya*), and Ardha-Māgadhī *docca* (< **du-tiya*). We find for “third” Sanskrit *tr-tīya*, Pāli *ta-tiya* (< **tr-tiya*), and Ardha-Māgadhī *tacca* (<

¹² See K. R. NORMAN, Middle Indo-Aryan Studies XIII. Palatalisation of Vowels in Middle Indo-Aryan. JOIB 25 (1975-76) 328-42.

¹³ PISCHEL, op. cit., § 286.

¹⁴ See Sir MONIER MONIER-WILLIAMS, Sanskrit-English Dictionary, s.v. *phala*.

¹⁵ CDIAL 9051.

¹⁶ CDIAL 9052.

**tr-tya*). Cf. *egaiya*, supra (although the formation from *eka* is not an ordinal).

bhoccā: the reference to PISCHEL § 199 must be a misprint for § 299. The change of *-tvā* > **-tyā* > *-ccā* which is suggested by PISCHEL is unlikely, and we are probably dealing with an analogical form, extended from the use of the absolutive ending *-tya* found in Sanskrit after vowels in some compounded verbs, e.g. *-krtya*, with the older historically correct final long *-ā* (cf. *soccā*, infra).

LŪSA: the Sanskrit equivalents are given as *DUṢ*, *RUṢ*, although both cannot be simultaneously correct. It is not clear why B. rejects SCHUBRING's suggestion, which he quotes, of *LŪṢ*¹⁷.

vinnappa: B. points out that Sanskrit *viññāpya* is used as a neuter abstract noun. Other examples of the future passive participle being used as an action noun can be quoted¹⁸.

vimukka: *vimukta* is given as the equivalent, giving the impression that here *-kt-* > *-kk-* instead of the usual *-tt-*. Cf. *ummukka*, supra.

vi(y)a(ant): referred to under *vi(y)a* and *VIYA* (= *VID*), where B. queries whether it is a participle, although he does not state what case of the participle *viyā* might be. B. also queries Sanskrit *vidant*. If the reading is correct, there seems to be no reason for assuming that it is a present participle, since it may be either Sanskrit *vid* transferred to the *a*-declension in Middle Indo-Aryan, or Sanskrit *vida* itself, since that exists in the sense of "knowing"¹⁹.

viannu: the equivalent is given as **vihanyant*, i.e. a present participle, which seems unlikely. It is rather to be derived < *hatnu*, i.e. the weak grade of $\sqrt{\text{han}}$ with the suffix *tnu*, with the assimilation of *-tn-* > *-nn-*. Both *hannu* and *ghannu* are found in Ardha-Māgadhī.

vosirai: it is not clear how this could be derived from Sanskrit *vyavasṛ-jati*, and the comparison with Pāli (*v*)*ossajjati* is misleading. In form the word must be from *vyava-sṛ* (although the development of the causative sense is probably the result of some sort of contamination), and it should be separated from the absolutive *vosijja*, which is from *vyavasṛ-jya*. The entry under ²*SAJJA* (= *SRJ*) should therefore refer to *vosijja*, not to *vosirai*, and the entry under *vosijja* should state that it is the absolutive of *vosaḥjajai*, not *vosirai*. Nor should *SR(J)* be included with

¹⁷ See also T. BURROW, Skt. *lubbh* "to disturb". JRAS 1956, p. 191-200.

¹⁸ See K. R. NORMAN, Pāli Lexicographical Studies VI. JPTS 13 (1989) 219-27.

¹⁹ See Sir MONIER MONIER-WILLIAMS, Sanskrit-English Dictionary, s.vv. *vid*, *vida*.

²*SARA, SIRA*, with a reference to *vosirai*, nor with *SIRA SAR* × *SRJ* (*sirai*), with the same reference.

sam̐dhei: *sam̐dadhāti* is given as the equivalent, whereas it is presumably from **sam̐dhayati*, cf. **dayati* (s.v. *dei*, supra).

sahaṇaṃ: it seems best to take this as *saha ṇaṃ* with *itthē* in 1,4,2,3, assuming that *ṇaṃ* is a particle. It therefore seems probable that we should adopt the same explanation in 1,4,1,12 with *itthīsu*, although we should prefer the instrumental case to the locative. Perhaps *itthīsu* represents an incorrect "translation" from an eastern *itthīhi* which could be both instrumental and locative.

sunna-ghara: *śūnya* + *gṛha* is given as the equivalent. See the comment on *ghara*, supra.

soccā: *śrutvā* is given as the equivalent. It is rather to be derived from the absolutive of the compounded verb *-śrutya*, with the older historically correct final long *-ā*²⁰.

hecca: *hitvā* is given as the equivalent. It is rather to be derived from the absolutive of the compounded verb **-hitya*, showing the weak grade of \sqrt{h} , whereas Sanskrit has *-hāya*.

Conclusion

It would have been appropriate, while welcoming the (albeit delayed) appearance of this volume, to express the hope that we might see further sections of Dr. Bollée's *Studien zum Sūyagaḍa* before too long. B. has, however, forestalled me. In his Vorwort, which begins in German but switches halfway through into English, doubtless with the aim of making his plight more widely known, B. recounts the difficulties he encountered in trying to obtain a grant to publish this volume. He ends with the words, "The users of my 'Studien' will pardon me for not continuing the work after this encouraging [sic. presumably used sarcastically] experience". Nevertheless, all readers of this very valuable work will, I know, hope that, despite everything, the future is not quite as black as it appears to Dr. Bollée.

²⁰ See K. R. NORMAN, Some Absolutive Forms in Middle Indo-Aryan. *IJ* 2 (1958) 311-15.

INTERPOLATIONS IN A JAIN PAMPHLET
OR
THE EMERGENCE OF ONE MORE ĀTURAPRATYĀKHYĀNA*

By Colette Caillat, Paris (URA 1058)

The C(andāvejjhaya) traditionally counts as the sixth of the P(aiṇṇayas)¹, or collection of “Miscellanea” which is accepted as canonical by those Śvetāmbaras who regard the Siddhānta as being composed of 48 treatises².

In this group an old nucleus has been recognized, several P of which bear on questions of discipline, especially on the typical ritual Jaina death, by fasting. They are, in particular, the Āurapaccakkhāṇa, Bhat-taparinnā, Mahāpaccakkhāṇa, Saṁthāra(ga), which have been dealt with in a masterly Dissertation by KURT VON KAMPTZ³. The C also is related to this series.

To judge from almost all the mss. and edd., the C was composed of 175 stanzas (or so), nearly all *āryās*⁴. Except for a comparatively few details this text can, on the whole, be considered as well established and as the vulgate text of C (cf. JAS, Intr. p. 96).

It deals with some of the main aspects of Jain monastic life, and points, in particular, to the right conduct and to the main goals on which to focus attention at the different moments of a religious career. It appears as comparatively well balanced, with *dvāragāthās* clearly defining the subject, and delineating the beginning and the end of each of its 7 sections. These are stated to concern education (*vinaya*, 17 *gāthās*), the virtues of the master (*ācāryagūṇas*, 14g.), those of the student (*śiṣyagūṇas*, 16g.), those connected with the clinging to educa-

* This article is the revised version of a paper read at the VIIIth World Sanskrit Conference, Vienna, August 27 – September 2, 1990.

¹ But it is the 3rd in the recent edition prepared by the late Muni PUṆYAVI-JAYA and Pandit A. M. БНОВАК, published in the Jaina Āgama Series [= JAS] 17.1, Bombay 1984.

² But the P*aiṇṇayas* are not included in the canon of the Sthānakvāsins; cf. L. ALSDORF, *Les études jaina*, [Paris], Collège de France 1965, p. 31 f. – Note the many overlappings and repetitions in the same or different P.

³ Über die vom Sterbefasten handelnden älteren P*aiṇṇa* des Jaina-Kanons, Hamburg 1929.

⁴ Cf. the JAS and Ee editions.

tion (*vinayanirgrahaḡas*, 13g.), the virtues of (religious) knowledge (*jñānaḡas*, 31g.), those of religious conduct (*caranagūnas*, 16g.), and last, but not least, with the virtues of religious death (*maranagūnas*, 56g.). The general pattern would thus seem to be clear⁵.

But, curiously, in transcripts prepared by the late Caturvijaya and mentioned in the Jaina Āgama Series edition, a proportionally important number of additional *gāthās* (in fact as many as 108[!]) have been recorded. Many of them are evidently corrupt and copied by a very careless scribe, a fact which almost certainly precludes any possibility that Caturvijaya could have been their initiator. So the origin of this additional text remains mysterious. According to the JAS introduction (p. 83), it could stem from an old, until now untraced ms., while the insertion of the various stanzas at the relevant place of the vulgate text could go back to Caturvijaya himself. In fact, in most cases, there can be little doubt about their right location.

Several can be regarded as being little more than *dvāragāthās* or casual enlargements of this or that C stanza. On the other hand, some interpolations are more substantial, for instance in the *jñāna* section⁶. As for the *marāṇa* section of C, it seems that it could include three different types of interpolations, and altogether 88 additional stanzas, distributed as follows: 1) 8 more or less stray g.; 2) after C 128, a group of 5 g. expanding the *candāvejḡhaya* motto or simile⁷; 3) finally, towards the end of the text, a comparatively coherent group of 75 stanzas, appended after C 167-9, which remind listeners that there is no external support at the hour of death⁸. The 75th of the latter is in the form of an exhortation addressed to the listeners of this tract – *āurapaccakkhāṇaṃ eyaṃ soṭṭha* – thus expressly named *āurapaccakkhāṇa*, or “The renunciation of the sick” (henceforward CĀ).

⁵ Cf. C 3, and the titles inserted in certain mss. and edd.: *viṇayo* (4–21), *āyariyaḡuṇe* (22–36), *sīsagūṇe* (37–53), *viṇayanigḡahagūṇe* (54–67), *nāṇagūṇe* (68–99), *caranagūṇe* (100–116), *maranagūṇe* (117–173).

⁶ E.g. it has been inflated at a particularly emotional juncture, by the addition of a group of 13g. These develop 3g. (93–95) of the vulgate text which insist on the necessity to always keep in mind a minimum portion of the sacred scriptures, to strive and remember it at the crucial hour of death (C 94): *ekkammi vi jammi pae saṃvegaṃ ... | vaccai naro ... taṃ maraṇante na mottavvaṃ ||* “at the hour of death, one should cling to that passage (*pada*) – be it unique – by means of which one reaches the impetus (to renouncement)”.

⁷ C 128cd: *vindhai candagavejḡhaṃ jhāyanto uppaṇo sikkhaṃ ||* “he pierces the apple of the eye target, if he considers the teaching embedded in himself”.

⁸ *na vi māyā na vi ya piyā ... | purisassa maraṇakāle na honti ālambaṇaṃ kiṃ ci ||* (167).

In fact, if added to the 56g. which form the basic *marāṇa* section of the vulgate C text, these three groups of altogether 88 interpolated g. would transform it into a more or less unitary tract of 144g. on religious death. It would thus compare favourably with the Āurapaccakkhāṇa-paiṇṇa (71g.), the Bhattaparinnā (173g.), the Mahāpaccakkhāṇa (142g.) and the Saṃthārāga (122g.)⁹.

In these circumstances, the above interpolations will be deemed worthy of some further analysis. Even though they do not add important or new material to our knowledge, these passages, especially the long CĀ development, can throw more light on the preoccupations surrounding the wise man's conscious death or *paṇḍitamaraṇa*¹⁰. As a preliminary to this investigation, some general remarks should be presented.

It will be remembered that the interpolated text, as printed in the JAS notes, reproduces the Caturvijaya transcript. Though the wording is said to be very corrupt, and though a critical edition of these g. would undoubtedly have been an easy task for the learned editors of the *Paiṇṇayasuttāim*¹¹, emendations have very seldom been proposed. Thus the printed document at our disposal can be regarded as exactly reflecting the (lost [?]) original manuscript.

In this additional development, the language is classical Jaina Māhārāṣṭrī, comparable to that of the rest of C. It is characterized, e.g., by the addition of the emphatic particle *-je* to the infinitive (*kāuṃ-je*, 75), by the influence of Skt. (as in the a.v. *adatta* for MIA *adinna*, 11), etc. The Pkt. of the CĀ therefore can be regarded as comparatively recent¹².

Metrically, the classical *āryā* largely prevails, though some *vipulās* also occur¹³. As in C and in other such texts, there are some *anuṣṭubhs*, probably quotations of older sayings. On the whole, then, language and metre appear to be contemporaneous.

⁹ There seem to have existed several Āurapaccakkhāṇas; cf. JAS, Intr. 75–78. Three are edited in JAS: ĀP, 71g.; Ā [1], 30g.; Ā [2], 34g.

¹⁰ Already extolled in the old parts of the canon; cf. Āyāraṅga 1 (the two last chapters), Uttarajjhāyā 5. There are also a number of *ārādhanāprakaraṇas*, which are due to be edited, together with the *Ārāhanāpadāgā*, as Jaina Āgama Series 17.2 (JAS, Intr. p. 76ff. [see the addendum on p. 44]). For a recent survey, see S. SETTAR, Pursuing death, Dharwad [1990], *ubi alia*; further, see *infra*, n. 19.

¹¹ Especially as they usefully point to the existence of several parallels between CĀ and connected texts.

¹² For grammatical notes on C, cf. Ee §§ 20–78.

¹³ On the metre(s) in C, cf. Ee §§ 79–82; *vipulā* in CĀ 16c–d.

As for the style, it is conspicuously commonplace. Comparisons, it is true, are interspersed, but they are not original. Naturally some key-words do occur and mention is made of the "vessel of asceticism" (*tavapoṣa*, 71), the "banner of accomplishment" (*ārāhaṇapaḍāga*, 40), perhaps also *saṁsthāra*, denoting the purified soul of the dying man as well as his last ritual couch (63). Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that various stylistic devices, which are prominent in the parallel stanzas of the other P, *anuprāsas* for instance¹⁴, are often blurred in these C additional *gāthās* in the form in which they have been transmitted in Caturvijaya's transcript.

It is time to consider more specifically the additional stanzas of the *marāṇa* section (= CĀ). Many of them have exact parallels in other disciplinary P, a point to be examined now.

Naturally, parallel passages the wording of which is practically identical can nevertheless differ in some details, so that it may sometimes be difficult to decide whether the slight variations should be deemed significant or negligible: when adding up the parallel stanzas, undisputable figures will not be easy to reach. But the general pattern is clearly recognizable, and can be described as follows.

In those interpolations which precede the so-called Āurapaccak-khāṇa additions and at the beginning of this same long development, a few g. tend to reproduce at least partially stanzas of the C vulgate. This is not surprising: such small additions are generally stray *pādas* so that they readily serve as transitions between the C vulgate text and the next development. Further, two capital assertions of C reappear in CĀ¹⁵. In fact, these internal borrowings are few and not really significant.

As for the external parallels they are numerous, and are specially abundant between CĀ and Mahāp: 29g. are identical, 13 are partially identical or very similar in both texts¹⁶. In several instances, the same g. also recur in the Mar(aṇasamāhi).

¹⁴ For stylistic notes on C, cf. Ee §§ 83 ff. (*ubi alia*); for *anuprāsas* in the P, cf. KAMPTZ, op. cit. (n. 3), p. 11. The simile from which C derives its name (viz. reaching the religious goal = piercing the pupil of the eye) is developed in C 128. This g. gives rise to 5 additional stanzas, the 1st and 5th of which repeat C 128c (*vindhai candagavejjham* [written *-ve/ijjam*]), while the 3rd (*pāda* d) introduces a variant (*candagavejjhwaṇ na sāhe*).

¹⁵ CĀ 27a-b ~ C 161a-b (*anuṣṭubh*); CĀ 41 = C 98 ~ ĀP 62, Māc 2.97.

¹⁶ Thus 42g. of CĀ (more than half!) are also found in Mahāp. – For internal and external parallels in C, cf. Ee §§ 93 f.

Not only is the number of parallel g. impressive: their distribution also is relevant, as can be shown.

Parallels between CĀ and Mahāp (and the corresponding Mar g.) are found almost throughout the CĀ additional text¹⁷. The general arrangement, it is true, can differ; but in both texts there occur identical clusters of 2 or 3 connected stanzas, which in many cases result from the enlargement of one corresponding g. of the ĀP¹⁸.

As a matter of fact the parallels between CĀ and Mahāp fall into two categories: 1) those which have no counterpart in the ĀP proper (they feature in the second part of CĀ: 46–75); 2) those which do have a counterpart in the ĀP, whether an exact counterpart (they number 13), or a proximate counterpart (numbering 3).

Further, as many as 14 have an exact equivalent, 2 a near equivalent, in the M(ūl)āc(āra), an old Digambara treatise, the second *pariccheda* of which is known to have much in common with the ĀP¹⁹.

Thus, the parallels with ĀP and/or with Māc each total 16, are all to be found in the first half of CĀ (g. 8–46), and concern more or less one half of the first part of this inserted pamphlet.

At the point where the CĀ and ĀP parallels cease, another series starts, viz. between CĀ and S. Such a concatenation is not really surprising as soon as it is remembered that the second chapter of Māc has been given precisely the title Br̥hatpratyākhyānasamstarastavādhikāra (whereas the third is called Saṃkṣepapratyākhyānādhikāra). Moreover, connexions between CĀ and S are foreshadowed already in the first half of CĀ²⁰. They become more numerous after CĀ 54, the second half of which reproduces exactly S 1c–d²¹. They total 11 identical and 3 comparable g. Further, in the passage preceding the conclusion, CĀ borrows an important feature of S, viz. the praise of

¹⁷ Except for an interruption from CĀ 46 to 67.

¹⁸ E.g. CĀ 23–24–25 ~ ĀP 48.

¹⁹ Cf. KAMPTZ, op. cit. (n. 3), 13 n. 1. Concerning the connections between Vaṭṭakera's Mūlācāra and the Śvetāmbara tradition, see E. LEUMANN, Übersicht über die Āvaśyaka-Literatur ... Aus dem Nachlass hrsg. von W. SCHUBRING, Hamburg 1934; further, RAJENDRA PRASAD JAIN, Piṇḍasuddhi: Das sechste Kapitel von Vaṭṭakera's Mūlācāra ..., New Delhi 1983, Vorwort p. II, mentions unpublished papers of E. LEUMANN on the Ārādhana literature of the Digambaras (E. L., Nachlaß in the Institut für Kultur und Geschichte Indiens und Tibets, Universität Hamburg), also quoted in K. OETJENS (infra n. 24), p. 31 n. 1.

²⁰ CĀ 38 = S 114.

²¹ *saṃthārammi nibaddhaṃ guṇaparivāḍiṃ nisāmeha* // "listen to the series of virtues related to the (correct) death-bed".

heroes and heroic deaths, a famous development which also inspires passages of Mahāp and Mar²².

This general survey should help us to understand the genesis of texts such as Mahāp or CĀ. They result from the stringing together of g. which, though known to belong more particularly to a definite text or development, also remain common property, liable to be massively recast, if necessary, into other works, so that they ultimately transform the latter.

In this way the *marañā* section of C has been open to rearrangements and to enlargements, which are fundamentally drawn from two texts, the ĀP and S. The first of these, though composed in *āryās*, seems to have absorbed much old material – an assumption based on the fact that, as the present CĀ shows, this Śvetāmbara tract shares many g. with the Digambara Māc. The C interpolations thus bear testimony to a prolonged process of reflection and compilation.

It remains to be asked what the choices of CĀ are, what, therefore, were the preoccupations of those who assembled and embedded this anthology on the wise man's death, the *pañḍīyamaraṇa*. All the teachings emphatically bear on the spiritual preparation and exercises required from the dying believer.

The death-bed, *saṁthāra*, is nowhere presented as a ritual object, but as a symbol of, a sort of testimony to, the spiritual purity of the departing person (63c–d):

appā khalu saṁthāro hoi visuddho marantassa // “for the dying man, if it is pure, the soul, yes the soul, is the dying bed”²³; or “(Like) the banners of champions – such is the death-bed of those who are perfectly well prepared” (56c–d *mallāṇaṁ ca paḍāgā taha saṁthāro suvihiyāṇaṁ* //)²⁴. Evidently, the believer's enemies are his passions, hence he ex-

²² CĀ 64–67; cf. S 56–57 (KAMPTZ, op. cit. [n. 3], p. 24ff.).

²³ CĀ 63 c–d ~ Mar 287 = Mahāp 96 ~ S 53. S 53 a–b, Mar 287 a–b and Mahāp 96 a–b expressly state that neither the grass layer nor the pure ground are instrumental to a pure death: *na vi kāraṇaṁ taṇamao saṁthāro na vi ya phāsuyā bhūmī* | *appā khalu saṁthāro havi visuddhe carittummi* // (S 53; Mar and Mahāp read *hoi visuddho maṇo jassa*); cf. Ā [2] 28 [CĀ a–b should certainly be corrected following S and Mar/Mahāp].

²⁴ CĀ 56c = S 3c; d = S 3d = 14d = 30d; cf. Śivāryas Mūlārādhana. Ein Beitrag zur Kenntnis der Sterbefasten-Literatur der Jainas, Diss. . . . Hamburg 1976 . . . von KARL OETJENS, Hamburg 1976, p. 139 (Māc 22c–23): *jaha so kumāramallo rajjapaḍāgaṁ balā haradi* // *taha bhāvidasamaṇṇo micchatt'ādī rivū vijedūna* | *ārāhaṇāpaḍāyaṁ harai susaṁthāraraṅgammi* //. Also compare CĀ 55d (*paḍāgaharaṇaṁ jīṇakkhāyaṇa*) and Mar 156c (*samayaḍāgaharaṇaṁ*); cf.

claims *hantūṇa rāgadose harāmi ārāhaṇapaḍāgaṃ* (40c-d), “having smashed down love and hate, I uplift the banner of accomplishment”²⁵.

Such similes recur several times. On the contrary, not one prescription concerns the lay-out of the *saṃstāra*, or the grass of which this last couch is to be made, or any other ritual feature²⁶. The only exception concerns a casual and irrelevant mention of the rock-surface on which the dying man lies (*silāyalagaya*): a symbol of his total and final renouncement – his last spotless, pure, halting-place before he reaches the supreme Goal (74). This, it is stressed, is the culminating point of the Doctrine, as taught by the wise Heroes, practised by the Righteous Ones²⁷.

But what is it which is salutary? The answer is given already in the third stanza²⁸; it lists asceticism, if well conducted, religious knowledge and rectitude, poverty, non-violence, true speech (*avihiṃsā saccavayaṇaṃ ca*). Truthfulness is particularly praised: according to a *śloka*, it leads to Perfection (*siddhi*), or helps destroy all bad *karman* and gain paradise or good destiny (47 *sacceṇa mayā sijjhanti saggo sacceṇa sijjhai / sacceṇa khīṇakammāṇo jīvā vaccanti saggaim*). In fact, the fundamental dogma should always be remembered:

“My real Self resides in Right knowledge, in Right faith and Right conduct; in renunciation, in barring (*karman*), in Right practice” (8)²⁹. Hence the imperious necessity to confess and repent (9–11), to lead the controlled life of a real *samaṇa* (12), therefore to take the five great vows (13), and to reject all food (14), as it is the source of crime(s) and miseries (17–18), and can never content the *jīva* (19–22), but only prevents the safe crossing of the *saṃsāra* (23f.)³⁰.

Mahāp 133 a–b (*dhīra paḍāgaharaṇaṃ kareha . . .*), 129d (*harāhi ārāhaṇapaḍāgaṃ*), BhattaP 80 a–b (*ārāhaṇāpaḍāgāgahāṇe*).

²⁵ CĀ 40d ~ Mahāp 129d = 134d = BhattaP 150d (*harāhi*).

²⁶ On the contrary, Āyāraṅga 1 analyses also the preliminary material preparation, even if only in general terms (SCHUBRING's ed., p. 37ff.; German trsl. in *Worte Mahāvīras*, p. 111ff.).

²⁷ CĀ 74cd: . . . *silāyalagayā sāhenti uttamaṃ aṭṭhaṃ* || = S 92 (*sāhanti u. a. [v. l. ṭhānaṃ]*) ~ Mahāp 84d (*sāhenti appaṇo aṭṭhaṃ*).

²⁸ *aha kiṇ me hoi hiyaṃ tavo suciṇṇo suyāṃ ca sāhū ya / dāvaggahaṇaniyattī avihiṃsā saccavayaṇaṃ ca* ||.

²⁹ *āyā majjhaṃ nāṇe, āyā me dāsaṇe caritte ya / āyā paccakkhāṇe, āyā me saṃvare joge* || ~ Mahāp 11 (d: *saṃjame joe*) ~ ĀP 25 (*āyā hu mahāṃ . . . saṃjame j.*). The wording of Māc 2.46 is remarkably close: *ādā hu majjha nāṇe, ādā me dāsaṇe caritte ya / ādā paccakkhāṇe, ādā me saṃvare joe* ||.

³⁰ CĀ 9 c–d: *te sarve nindāmi, paḍikkame . . .* (d = 13d) = Mahāp 12 (2d) = Mar 217 ~ Ā 29 ~ Māc 2.50 [CĀ 9d = 13d is to be emended following the other versions]. – CĀ 11: *savvaṃ pāṇārambhaṃ paccakkhāmi ya aliyavayaṇaṃ ca / savvaṃ adattādānaṃ [adatta] JAS abbambha pariṇiggaṃ ceva* || ~ Mahāp 33

These considerations will lead to the firm resolve to die the *paṇḍiya-maraṇa* (24f.), the only sensible one for anybody who realizes that the *jīva*, the soul, is unique and alone (*eka*), this being a fundamental truth (infra) expressed in a famous *śloka* (27):

ego 'haṃ natthi me koṭi n'evāhaṃ avi kassaī /
evaṃ adīṇamaṇaso appāṇaṃ aṇusāsai //

"I am one and alone, no one belongs to me, nor do I belong to any one . . ." ³¹.

The unescapable conclusion of such teachings is the necessity to abandon the body and all that is extraneous, in order to attain full accomplishment and *nirvāṇa* (40f.): he who has severed external ties, abolished passions, will lift the banner of accomplishment (40). When all the preparatory exercises have been accomplished, on the brink of the supreme goal, there remains an important obligation: to concentrate on the right "reflexions", a point emphasised in 12 g. of the CĀ: *kiṃ vā cinteyavaṃ* (42) – *eso uvaeso . . . cinteyavvo* (53). To put it as Mar (570): *bhāvehi bhāvaṇāo bārasa* "reflect on the twelve reflexions".

A number of them (several of which have in fact already been dealt with before) are quoted in two connected g. (43f.), e.g., "impermanence" (*aniccatta*), "separateness" (*annatta*), "helplessness" (*asaṛaṇa*), "loneliness" (*egatta*), "transmigration" (*saṃsāra*), "universe" (*logasa-*

~ Mar 233 ~ ĀP 21 (*mehūṇa ya*) ~ 13 (*adinnādāṇaṃ mehuṇṇa*). Similarly Māc 2.41 = 3.109: *savvaṃ pāṇārambhaṃ paccakkhāmi alīyavayaṇaṃ ca / savvaṃ adattādāṇaṃ, mehuṇa pariggahaṃ ceva //*. – CĀ 13 a–b: *pañca ya mahavvayāiṃ tivīhaṃ tivīheṇa āruheṇaṃ /* = Mahāp 67 a–b = Mar 257 a–b. – CĀ 14: *savvaṃ āhāravīhiṃ cauṃvīhaṃ . . . / . . . cayāmi savvehi bhāvehiṃ //* ~ ĀP 15 ~ Māc 3.111. – CĀ 18 a–b: *āhāranimittā ṇaṃ jīvā gacchant' aṇuttaraṃ narayaṃ /* ~ ĀP 52 a–b ("nimittēṇaṃ macchā gacchanti sattamīṃ puḍhaviṃ") ~ Mar 248 ~ Mahāp 54 ("āgaṃ [!] macchā"). Note Māc 2.82: *āhāranimittam kira macchā gacchanti sattamīṃ puḍhaviṃ /*. – CĀ 20 especially has numerous parallels: *taṇakattīheṇa va aggī lavaṇajalo vā naīsaḥassehiṃ / na imo jīvo sakko tippeuṃ bhoyaṇavīhīhiṃ //*, but (d) *kāmbhogehiṃ* in the parallel versions: Mahāp 55 (compare 56f.) ~ Mar 249 (*lavaṇasamuddo*) ~ ĀP 51 (*taṇakattīhehi*) ~ Māc 2.80: *tinakattīheṇa va aggī lavaṇasamuddo nadīsaḥassehiṃ / na imo jīvo sakko tippeduṃ kāmbhogehiṃ //*.

³¹ CĀ 27 = Mahāp 13 (b being subject to v.l.); a = C 161a; b ~ C 161b. Compare ĀP 26 and, already in the old Āyāraṅga (1.37.7): «*ego aham aṃsi na me atthi koī na yāham avi kassai*». Dasaveyāliya II 4c quotes an old *tristubh* pāda: «*na sā mahaṃ no vi aham pi tise*». For further references (to Epic and Buddhist parallels), see C Ee *ad* 161. The parallel Mahābhārata stanza 12.309.84–85 recurs in other works (cf. Jñānaprakāśa, Śivayogarātna, ed. T. MICHAEL, 142b–143).

hāva), “stoppage of karmic influx” (*saṃvara*), “shedding of *karman*” (*nijjarā*), “rarity of religious Enlightenment” (*bohidullahatta*) . . .³².

Whatever the individual details, each man should, in view of the difficult moments ahead, always keep in mind the *śloka* which, for him, has proved to be the factor of salvation (46)³³. These salutary thoughts pave the Jaina way to *nirvāṇa* (45), lead to clear contemplation and purification (*jhāṇajjhayaṇa*, *sohaṇa*), so that the purified *jīva* reaches its full accomplishment (*vaccaṃ siddhiṃ* [52]), and, finally, is free from all misery (*muccaḥa savvadukkhāṇaṃ* [75]).

The systematic cultivation of *bhāvanās* is characteristic not of ancient Jainism but of more recent epochs. As a matter of fact, it has been noted that some of the P teachings can be regarded as comparatively late. In particular, the possibility of obtaining liberation in one moment (38), or thanks to one minimum fragment of the Scriptures (46), is not mentioned in the early canonical texts³⁴. Nor are the latter generally concerned with the lay believer’s progress, concentrating as they do on the *śramaṇa*’s life. On the contrary, CĀ seems not to make any fundamental difference between the two. It expressly mentions on the same plane, so to say, the *śramaṇa* and the *śrāvaka* (48). Further, before inviting the listener to take the five great vows (13), it mentions the necessity to revile, and repent of, all transgressions of the *mūla*- and *uttaraṅga*’s, i.e. of the *aṇuvratas*, the “smaller” vows which are taken by the lay believers (9)³⁵.

These doctrinal aspects can be compared with the linguistic and metrical characteristics defined above. They all point to a relatively late compilation, reflecting the views of circles whose members wish the efforts to concentrate not on external rituals, but on religious

³² The English translation of these technical terms is borrowed from A. N. UPADHYE, Svāmi-Kumāra’s Kārttikeyānupreksā (Kattigeyānupekḥā) – An Early Treatise on Jaina Doctrines, Especially Anupreksās – . . ., Agas 1960 (Śrīmad Rājachandra Jaina Śāstramālā); cf. Intr., p. 44ff.

³³ Cf. supra n. 6. – For concordances with Mahāp and Mar, also with Māc, cf. Ee p. 52 and 125. Perhaps compare ŚB XI 5.6.9; *sā céd āpi prabalām iva nā śaknuyād āpy ēkaṃ devapadām ādhīyātaivā* “And should he be altogether unable (to study), let him at least read a single divine word” (J. EGGERLING [L. RENOU, JAs 1941–2, p. 136 prefers “un passage au moins de texte sacré”]).

³⁴ Cf. KAMPTZ, op. cit. (n. 3), p. 22 n. 1. – Even the *marāṇa* section of C insists on the necessity of a careful and exhaustive preparation (cf. the refrain *so maraṇe hoi kayajogo*, 133d–140d).

³⁵ CĀ 13 a–b = Mahāp 67 a–b = Mar 257 a–b. For CĀ 9, supra n. 30. Note the proximity of these g. specially in CĀ, where they delineate a small unitarian development (on self-blame), a fact underlined by the identity of their last *pāda*.

knowledge and on purity of heart, on moral and on spiritual progress, which, ultimately, will allow the individual souls to be delivered from evil and from suffering, thus to hit the target, be it as difficult to reach as “the apple of the eye”.

Abbreviations

=	“identical with”
~	“similar to”
Ā	Āurapaccakkhāṇa
ĀP	Āurapaccakkhāṇapaiṇṇaya, ed. JAS
C	Candāvejjhaya/Candagav°, ed. JAS 3 (→ Ee)
CĀ	the 75 additional g. interpolated after C 169 (p. 84–88), termed Āurapaccakkhāṇa in CĀ 75c
Ee	Candāvejjhaya. Introduction. Édition critique. Traduction. Commentaire par COLETTE CAILLAT, Paris 1971 (Publications de l’Institut de Civilisation Indienne 34)
g.	<i>gāthā(s)</i>
JAS	Jaina Āgama Series 17.1: Painṇayasuttāim 1, edd. Muni Shri PUṆYAVIJAYA – A. M. BHOJAK, Bombay 1984
Māc	Mūlācāra: ŚrīmadVatṭakerācāryapraṇītaMūlācāra, edd. K. C. SHASTRI – J. SHASTRI – P. JAIN, Delhi 1984 (Jñānpīṭh Mūrtidevī Jaina Granthamālā 19)
Mahāp	Mahāpaccakkhāṇapaiṇṇaya, ed. JAS 7
Mar	Marāṇasamāhi, ed. JAS 5
P	Paiṇṇaya
S	Samthāragapaiṇṇaya, ed. JAS 10

Addendum to n.10: The Painṇayasuttāim Part II (JAS 17.2, ed. by Late Muni Shri PUṆYAVIJAYA and Pt. AMRITLAL MOHANLAL BHOJAK, Bombay 1987) is now available, an information for which I gratefully thank Prof. Dr. Klaus Bruhn. Interestingly, the editor A. M. BHOJAK states in the Introduction (p. 28–31) that one of these pamphlets is extracted from the Kuvalayamālākahā (Singhi Jain Series, p. 269–280), another from Devacandrasūri’s Śāntināthacaritra, a third one from the Triṣaṣṭīśālākāpuruṣacaritra (ed. Jaina-Dharma-Prasāraśāstrī, Bhavnagar 1908, X 230–267).

THE WRITING DOWN OF THE TRIPITAKA IN PĀLI

By Heinz Bechert, Göttingen

It is well known that the Pāli chronicles relate the writing down of the scriptures during the reign of King Vaṭṭagāmaṇi Abhaya (89–77 B.C.). This event is recorded in two stanzas of equal wording in the Dīpavaṃsa 20.20–21 and in the Mahāvaṃsa 33.100–101:

*piṭakattayapāliṃ ca tassā aṭṭhakathaṃ pi ca |
mukhapāṭhena ānesuṃ pubbe bhikkhū mahāmatī ||
hāniṃ disvāna sattānaṃ tadā bhikkhū samāgatā |
ciraṭṭhitatthaṃ dhammassa potthakesu likhāpayuṃ ||*

“Before this time, the wise Bhikkhus had orally handed down the text of the three Piṭakas and also the Aṭṭhakathā. At this time, the Bhikkhus who perceived the decay of created beings, assembled and in order that the Religion might endure for a long time, they recorded (the above-mentioned texts) in written books” (OLDENBERG’s translation).

This tradition has been generally accepted as a historical record of the first writing down of the Pāli scriptures. W. GEIGER formulates the *communis opinio* that this passage attests “the fact that the text of the canonical Buddhist literature, the Tipiṭaka, which had been orally handed down up to that time, was written down in books during the reign of king Vaṭṭagāmaṇi in the last century B.C.”¹ GEIGER adds that “this passage is so clear and simple that we are not allowed to put a sophisticated construction on it. It is true history, for we all know the important part which oral tradition of sacred texts always played in India, even when the art of writing had already become a general practice.”² GEIGER also draws our attention to the reference to the commentaries (*aṭṭhakathā*) on this passage; these ancient commentaries were composed in Eḷu, the Old-Sinhalese language, and therefore called *sīhalatṭhakathā*, “the Sinhalese commentary”. The *Sīhalatṭhakathā* is lost, and therefore it is difficult to judge the historical contents of this part of the information. It is also well-known that the collection of scriptures was enlarged after this period so that the scriptures which

¹ W. GEIGER, *Culture of Ceylon in Mediaeval Times*, Wiesbaden 1960, § 65, p. 68.

² Loc. cit.

were written down in the first century are not fully identical with the *Tipiṭaka* which has been handed down to us.

The place of the meeting of the monks is not recorded in the chronicles. Ceylonese tradition considers the *Aluviḥāra* (*Ālokaviḥāra*) near *Matale* as this place. This tradition is found in the *Pūjāvaliya* (composed 1266 A.D.), in the *Nikāyasaṅgrahaya* (ca. 1375) and in various later historical sources. The *Saddhammasaṅgaha*, however, locates the meeting in the *Mahāvihāra* in *Anurādhapura*³. *Dhammakitti Mahā-sāmi*, the author of this work, did not come from India to Ceylon and return to India, as asserted by K. R. NORMAN⁴, probably on the basis of the outdated remark by G. P. MALALASEKERA⁵. His home was *Ayuthya* in *Siam*⁶.

In his above quoted remark, GEIGER stated that "we are not allowed to put a sophistical construction" on the record of the writing down of the scriptures. Here GEIGER evidently refers to an article by FRIEDRICH WELLER⁷. WELLER had sent an off-print to GEIGER who, however, considered WELLER's theory as rather abstruse and therefore restricted himself to this indirect reference.

However, it may be useful to discuss WELLER's relevant explanations, which seem to have escaped the notice of most scholars. J. W. DE JONG recently pointed out that nobody has tried yet to refute WELLER's opinion that the verses in question are a later interpolation⁸. WELLER discussed these verses in the context of his attempt to prove the existence of a written tradition of the canonical texts in the earliest period of Buddhist literary tradition. He claims that the Pāli text of the *Dīghanikāya* has been "transcribed" into the Pāli version from manuscripts originating from mainland India⁹. Though WELLER's theory concerning written sources for these earliest Buddhist texts is obsolete and need not be discussed again, I shall summarize and discuss his remarks on these stanzas, because they are interesting as pieces of textual criticism.

³ *Journal of the Pali Text Society* 1890, p. 48f. = *Saddhammasaṅgaho*, ed. MAHESH TIWARY, Patna 1961, p. 25-27.

⁴ *Pāli Literature*, Wiesbaden 1983, p. 179f.

⁵ *The Pali Literature of Ceylon*, London 1928, p. 245.

⁶ See *Saddhammasaṅgaha*, ed. MAHESH TIWARY, Introduction, p. XII; for a more recent study of this work see HANS PENTH, *Reflections on the Saddhamma-Saṅgaha*. *Journal of the Siam Society* 65 (1977) 259-280.

⁷ *Die Überlieferung des älteren buddhistischen Schrifttums*. *Asia Major* 5 (1928) 149-182, p. 160-164, repr. in *Kleine Schriften*, Stuttgart 1987, vol. 1, p. (121-154) 132-136.

⁸ *IJJ* 32 (1989) 242.

⁹ WELLER, *op. cit.*, p. 159.

WELLER pointed out that the two stanzas stand in a different context in the two chronicles. In the *Dīpavaṃsa* they are placed between the record of Vaṭṭagāmaṇi's reign and that of Mahācūli Mahātissa's reign. From the context he concludes that the narration of these events requires verse 20.22 (*tass' accaye mahācūli mahātisso akārayi raṇṇaṃ* ... "after his [Vaṭṭagāmaṇi's] death Mahātissa reigned ...") to be a sequel to verse 20.19 where the duration of Vaṭṭagāmaṇi's rule is recorded. From this observation, WELLER¹⁰ further concludes that the two relevant stanzas, 20.20 and 21, represent "a later interpolation". In the *Mahāvamsa*, the two relevant verses (33.100–101) have exactly the same wording, but they are recorded in the section dealing with Vaṭṭagāmaṇi's reign, which ends with the chronological information on Vaṭṭagāmaṇi in stanza 33.102. There is an additional stanza after 33.98 in some manuscripts: *mahāabhayaabhikkhū te vaḍḍhetuṃ dīpavāsino | vaṭṭagāmaṇibhūmino pattim nāma adāsi so ||* "To bring prosperity to the bhikkhus dwelling on the island, who belonged to the great Abhaya- (giri-community), the lord of the land, Vaṭṭagāmaṇi, made over to them the so-called *patti*"¹¹.

This verse was considered a spurious interpolation by WILHELM GEIGER¹² since it is missing in the Burmese and in the Cambodian recensions of the text and not found or commented upon in the *Mahāvamsaṭīkā*. WELLER¹³, however, argues that this verse is not spurious, but part of the original text, because it provides the grammatical subject (viz. King Vaṭṭagāmaṇi) for stanza 99 which GEIGER had to supplement from the context. He further states that there is a "Störung" in the narration in this sequence.

His conclusion is: "Nach den Zeugnissen beider Chroniken haben wir also in dem Doppelvers über die schriftliche Abfassung des Tripiṭaka samt der Auslegung dazu einen jener häufigen Fälle vor uns, daß ein Verspaar ursprünglich am Rande eines fertigen Manuskriptes nachgetragen wurde, das nun von einem Benutzer dieser Handschrift an der einen, vom anderen an der anderen Stelle eingeschoben wurde. Mit solchen zugeflogenen Randbemerkungen aber kann man zum mindesten so lange keine Geschichte schreiben, als man ihre Herkunft nicht einwandfrei nachgewiesen und ihre Zugehörigkeit nicht sichergestellt hat."¹⁴

¹⁰ Op. cit., p. 163.

¹¹ GEIGER's translation (W. GEIGER, *The Mahāvamsa*, transl., p. 237, n. 1).

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Op. cit., p. 180, n. 22.

¹⁴ Op. cit., p. 164.

It seems to me that WELLER's explanation is extremely improbable. Which particular "finished manuscript" could have been made use of by readers of the two chronicles and then inserted in the archetypus of all existing manuscripts of both chronicles? Moreover, WELLER's argument does not at all prove that the two verses are of later origin since, if this were the case, they would have to have been added at a very early stage of the textual tradition, and necessarily from an early source, viz. from that particular "finished manuscript" – which, however, I consider to be WELLER's invention. WELLER, being so preoccupied with his theory of an early written tradition, takes no notice of the history of these texts. He does not even consider other interpretations of the existing text.

A. P. BUDDHADATTA considers the verses 33.95–98 (in GEIGER's edition; they correspond to stanzas 33.96–99 in BUDDHADATTA's edition) as later additions, because their deletion restores the continuity of the narration¹⁵. This correction would indeed not only provide the missing subject "the king" (*rājā*) for verse 33.99, but would, I should add, at the same time provide the missing context for this verse. From a purely formalistic point of view of textual history, this correction is preferable to WELLER's restitution of the additional verse after 33.98, for this additional verse is not found in the rather ancient *Mahāvamsaṭṭhā* and is therefore possibly of later origin. It could have been composed later on in order to provide the missing link to the preceding passages long after the supposed interpolation of 33.95–98. The interpolation of 33.95–98, however, would have to be considered a very early one since, firstly, these verses are contained and commented upon in the *Mahāvamsaṭṭhā*, and, secondly, the information about *kulasamṣaṭṭha-dosa* (with v.l. *kulasamṣaggadosena*, "by the fault of frequenting lay families") in 33.95 is hinted at in the *Nikāyasaṅgrahaya* (p. 10).

However, there are other ways of "correcting" the text, viz. supposing that stanza 33.99 was misplaced in the textual tradition. Its original place could have been in various places in this chapter of the *Mahāvamsa* (after 33.81, 33.82, 33.86 or 33.94). It could have been inserted between the lines in the archetypus of our *Mahāvamsa* manuscripts and placed wrongly by an early copyist. Considering the length of the lines in Sinhalese palm-leaf manuscripts, the correct place could have been between 33.94 and 33.95.

However, at this point, another possibility must be discussed, viz. that the verse after 33.98 is not spurious. This verse relates the grant

¹⁵ *Mahāvamsa*, ed. A. P. BUDDHADATTA [in Sinhalese characters], Colombo 1959, p. 181, n. *.

of “the so-called *patti*”. The meaning of this word – which WELLER did not try to explain – seems to be “revenue”¹⁶. S. PARANAVITANA¹⁷ pointed out that granting income from land which was vested in the monasteries was an innovation that seems to have originated during this very period in order to make the Sangha more independent on the liberality of individual supporters. If PARANAVITANA’s suggestion is correct, the stanza should be restituted. The place of this stanza after the record of the formation of the Abhayagiri community as a separate monastic group (in the verses 33.95–98) is coherent, and there is no “Bruch” in the text.

Our discussion reveals the weakness of the methodology applied by WELLER. To recognize interpolations by pointing out interruptions, contradictions or other irregularities in the context is a valid method of textual criticism, but it must be made use of in a sensible way. In particular, all possible ways of “correcting” the text must be considered. WELLER and some later scholars of his school, however, tend to point out one particular “correction” or rearrangement of the textual material which happens to “correct” the confused text and reconstitute a coherent meaning, thereby disregarding other possible solutions of the textual problem as well as the feasibility that the author himself admitted or even used interruptions in the composition of his work, e.g. for stylistic reasons. Generally, WELLER’s methodology means to prefer or to reconstruct according to the *lectio facilior* instead of the *lectio difficilior*. Moreover, the so-called correction which allegedly restitutes the original text is the one which fits into a preconceived theory. In our case, this is the theory of the very early date of written tradition of Buddhist texts.

In order to understand the texts which have come down to us we must consider the character of the literary works in question. In the case of the Dīpavaṃsa, it may be described as a collection of excerpts from earlier texts consisting of what are called *ākhyāna* and memorial verses drawn from two or three different source books, viz. redactions of the Sīhalaṭṭhakathā-Mahāvāṃsa, compiled without much redactional change. Therefore, WELLER’s argument concerning the order of the stanzas Dīpavaṃsa 20.19–21 is irrelevant. It only allows us to conclude that the two stanzas relating the writing down of the scriptures were found in the source-book before the record of the accession of King Mahācūli Mahātissa, and, therefore, must belong to the relation of Vaṭṭagāmaṇi’s reign.

¹⁶ Cf. GEIGER, loc. cit. (n. 11).

¹⁷ University of Ceylon History of Ceylon, vol. I, p. 245, n. 1.

The Mahāvamsa is a rather sophisticated literary work dealing with the same subject matter as the Dīpavamsa. It was written in order to replace this earlier chronicle¹⁸. Here, the material is well arranged and largely rewritten, only some verses being directly borrowed from the earlier sources. Thus, we may either suppose that verse 33.99 was misplaced in the course of the textual tradition, or reconstitute the additional verse before 33.99, for distortions of this type are not likely to have existed in the original text of the Mahāvamsa. For all these reasons, we may state that there is not the least indication that the two stanzas 33.100–101 are less likely to relate historical events than any other information of this section of the Mahāvamsa. On the contrary, the very fact that the verses are found in both sources confirm that they were derived from the source-book, viz. the Sīhalaṭṭhakathā-Mahāvamsa, and are thus to be considered reliable historical material. It is needless to repeat that WELLER's hypothesis that a marginal note from one particular manuscript would have been inserted in the two chronicles, is a rather incongruous view. It disregards all known facts concerning the tradition of these texts.

In his paper WELLER has, however, pointed out yet another open question, viz. whether the monks who assembled for writing down the texts, belonged to the Abhayagirivihāra or to the Mahāvihāra¹⁹. His argument that only the monks of the Mahāvihāra could have been meant, since the texts speak of oral tradition "earlier" and monasteries other than the Mahāvihāra did not exist earlier, is again incongruous. First of all, "earlier" (*pubbe*) in 33.100 evidently does not refer to particular monks, but to monks in general. The "Bruch in der Erzählung" maintained by WELLER, therefore, does not exist. And, secondly, many other monasteries besides the Mahāvihāra had been founded during the rather long period between Mahinda's mission and King Vaṭṭagāmaṇi, and it is difficult to understand why WELLER seems to consider these non-existent.

I have discussed the question of the relation of the writing down of the texts at the so-called fourth or fifth "council" (*saṅgāyanā*) elsewhere in detail²⁰. Therefore, a short remark may be sufficient here. It is evident that the available source-material does not allow us to decide whether the meeting was held under the patronage of the king or not,

¹⁸ See W. GEIGER, A Short History of Ceylon. IHQ 2 (1926) 1–15, p. 3; E. FRAUWALLNER, Nachgelassene Werke, Vol. 1, Wien 1984, p. 17f.; cf. also H. BECHERT, Die Lebenszeit des Buddha. NAWG 1986, p. 132 and n. 11.

¹⁹ Op. cit., p. 162f.

²⁰ Zur Geschichte der buddhistischen Sekten in Indien und Ceylon. La Nouvelle Clio 7–9 (1955–57) 311–360, p. 330f.

and whether it was a meeting supported by all Ceylonese monks or by the Mahāvihāra faction only. In the very detailed and clear description of the event in the Saddhammasaṅgaha it is said that the meeting was sponsored by the king and held in the Mahāvihāra, but this relation is evidently a rather late construction invented with the aim of exemplifying the supremacy of the Mahāvihāra and of proving the legitimacy of this "council".

The reason for writing down the scriptures is given in the two chronicles as *sattānaṃ hānī* ("the decay of the beings" ²¹). This is the only relevant information available in the chronicles and the Mahāvamsa-*saṭṭkā*.

There were various political and natural disasters during Vaṭṭagāmaṇi's rule: (1) the rebellion of a young brahmin, named Tīya of Nakulanagara in Rohaṇa; (2) a great famine during this period of rebellion; (3) the second Tamil invasion of Sri Lanka; (4) conflicts in the Sangha including the first schism in the Sangha of Sri Lanka arising after the foundation of the Abhayagirivihāra²². The rebellion of the brahmin Tīya is related very shortly in the Mahāvamsa (33.37–41), but the commentarial literature gives much additional information. In modern writing, it is mostly known as the "Brāhmaṇatissa rebellion", because the name of the rebel Tīya is found as Tissa in the printed editions and in modern translations of the Mahāvamsa as well as in several editions of the commentaries in Pāli. However, the Sinhalese form of his name, Bāmiṇi-Tiyā proves that Tīya must be considered the correct form, as has been pointed out by S. PARANAVITANA²³. The correct form is attested in many of the more reliable manuscripts, and in several Oriental editions, including BUDDHADATTA's edition of the Mahāvamsa. The error occurred because the characters for *s* and *y* are easily misread in the Sinhalese script. There are various reports on this famine and the resulting decay in the Pāli commentaries and in the mediaeval Sinhalese literature. Here, the event is known as *bāmiṇi-tiyā sāya*, i. e. the famine (*sā*) caused by the brahmin Tiyā²⁴. In the Pūjāva-

²¹ Cf. also Mahāvamsaṭṭkā, ed. G. P. MALALASEKERA, vol. 2, London 1935, p. 623: *tato oramaṃ kalikāle parihīṇāyukasattānaṃ satibuddhiparihāṇiṃ disvā* "having noticed the decay of mindfulness and wisdom of the beings whose age becomes deficient in the Kali age from then onwards".

²² For these events, see E. W. ADIKARAM, Early History of Buddhism in Ceylon, Colombo ²1953, p. 73–79; S. PARANAVITANA in University of Ceylon History of Ceylon, vol. I, p. 165–172.

²³ Op. cit., p. 166, n. 5.

²⁴ SORATA, Śrī-Sumaṅgalasābdakoṣaya, p. 647, s.v. *bāmiṇitīyāsā* and 1027, s.v. *sā* 3. The more correct form of the title of the literary work relating this

liya²⁵ the event is related in the sentence preceding the record of the writing down of the scriptures. In later texts, a more direct relation of these two events is spoken of. It is evident that the danger of some parts of the scriptures being lost as a result of the death of monks who had memorised them, which is related in the commentaries, must have contributed to the decision to write down the texts.

This view is also held by modern historians. Thus, E. W. ADIKARAM²⁶ gives a list of the following causes that led to the writing down of the texts: "(1) the danger of being attacked by non-Buddhist foreigners and wars, (2) the so-called Brāhmaṇatissa famine, (3) the entering of irresponsible and irreligious people into the Order, and (4) the formation of the separate school of Abhayagiri". This list has been reproduced by various later authors with minor changes, e. g. by N. A. JAYAWICKRAMA²⁷. According to K. R. NORMAN²⁸ the "Dīpavaṃsa states that during the reign of Vaṭṭagāmaṇi Abhaya (29–17 B.C.) the monks who had previously remembered the Tipiṭaka and its commentary orally now wrote them down in books, because of the threat posed by a famine, war, and the growing power of the newly established Abhayagiri viḥāra, which enjoyed the king's favour". This statement is quite misleading since no such detailed reasons are found in the Dīpavaṃsa passage, which is the only authority quoted by NORMAN, but the reader remains under the impression that these reasons are found in the relation of the Dīpavaṃsa.

Reconsidering the question on the basis of the available evidence, we may consider the writing down of the scriptures during the reign of Vaṭṭagāmaṇi Abhaya as a historical fact. It is not unlikely that this may be said of the traditions concerning the Aluviḥāra as the place of the relevant meeting of knowledgeable monks as well. There cannot be much doubt that the famine as well as the political and social disasters of the preceding period contributed to the decision to commit the texts to writing. However, no reliable information has been handed down in ancient sources about a direct relation of this event to the foundation of the Abhayagirivihāra and its conflict with the Mahāvihāra. We do not know if these events are interrelated. The Aluviḥāra meeting and the writing of the scriptures are not unlikely to have been organized by

event is *bāminītiyā (maha)sāya* (cf. Siṃhala Śābdakoṣaya, vol. 1, Colombo 1937, p. XLV), not *bāminītiyā (maha)sāya*.

²⁵ See The thirty-fourth chapter of the Pūjāvaliya by Mayūrapāda, ed. M. MEDHANKARA, Colombo 1923, p. 9.

²⁶ Op. cit. (n. 22), p. 79.

²⁷ Literary Activity in Pali. Pali Buddhist Review 5,3 (1980) 79.

²⁸ Pali Literature, Wiesbaden 1983, p. 10f.

monks who came together (*bhikkhū samāgatā*) for this purpose on their own initiative, and not at the instigation of the king or of any established ecclesiastical organisation. It was a group of monks with the then rather “progressive” idea of making use of the medium of writing for handing down and spreading Buddhist texts. There are several instances of important innovations resulting from the initiative of individuals in the later history of Theravāda, and this is even more likely in this early period when the structure of the formal ecclesiastical organization was not yet fully developed. The conspicuous absence of information on this event and the existence of many references to oral tradition in the early Pāli commentaries seem to point in this very direction. Most probably not all the texts were written down at the same time. As we learn from the well-known references to the existence of the *bhāṇaka* tradition existing until later periods²⁹ and from several other sources³⁰, oral tradition continued to exist side by side with written scriptures for many centuries to come. Thus, the so-called writing down of the scriptures was only the beginning of a new form of tradition, and this innovation was probably opposed by the more conservative monks. As with many other innovations, it was only after some time that it was generally accepted. Therefore, it was much later that the records of this event were transformed into an account of a “council” (*saṅgāyanā* or *saṅgīti*) which was held under the patronage of King Vaṭṭagāmaṇi.

²⁹ See E. W. ADIKARAM, *op. cit.* (n. 22), p. 24–32.

³⁰ Cf. OSKAR VON HINÜBER, *Der Beginn der Schrift und frühe Schriftlichkeit in Indien*, Wiesbaden 1989, p. 68–70.

A PHILOLOGICAL RECONSTRUCTION OF THE OLDEST KṚṢṆA-EPIC*

Some Remarks in the light of the Pralamba-Myth

By Utz Podzeit, Vienna

The tradition of the Kṛṣṇacarita in the Purāṇas is characterized by the fact that numerous passages in the versions of the Harivaṃśa¹, of the Viṣṇu-² and of the Brahmapurāṇa³ show an extensive textual agreement. Besides this we can notice also an agreement with regard to the events of the Kṛṣṇacarita. Based on these peculiarities WALTER RUBEN attempted in his two publications, namely "On the Original Text of the Kṛṣṇa-Epic"⁴, and "The Kṛṣṇacarita in the Harivaṃśa and Certain Purāṇas"⁵, to reconstruct the oldest textual shape of the Kṛṣṇacarita. RUBEN tried to demonstrate that it is possible on the basis of a comparison of the three above mentioned versions by exclusion of the textual enlargements and revisions to reconstruct a version of the Kṛṣṇacarita which is shorter than all Purāṇic versions handed down and which must have been the closest to the original Kṛṣṇa-epic. RUBEN was of the opinion that in the passages with textual agreements the Viṣṇupurāṇa was following the Brahmapurāṇa. This was also a reason why he paid less attention to the Viṣṇupurāṇa. Our own observations however do not support this opinion. Unfortunately we cannot enter into details here, but we will investigate this matter in greater detail at a later date. In this connection I would like to point to the

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¹ The Harivaṃśa being the Khila or Supplement to the Mahābhārata, for the first time crit. ed. by PARASHURAM LAKSHMAN VAIDYA. Poona 1969.

² ŚrīViṣṇupurāṇa, 4. saṃsk. Gorakhpur 1933; and: ŚrīParāśaramaharṣipra-
nītam purāṇaratnaṃ nāma śrīViṣṇupurāṇam (śrīViṣṇucittiyākhyayā) vyā-
khyayā sanātham. Prativādi BHAYAMKARA ANNAṆGARĀcāryaiḥ paryavekṣitam
saṃpāditam ca. SAMPATKUMĀRĀcāryaiḥ pariśodhitam. [Sadācāryasūktimālā].
Kāñcīpuram 1972.

³ MahāmuniśrīmadVyāsapraṇītam Brahmapurāṇam. [Ānandāśramasaṃ-
skṛtagranthāvalī 28]. Poona 1895.

⁴ In: A Volume of Eastern and Indian Studies. Presented to F. W. Thomas,
edd. S. M. KATRE and P. K. GODE. [New Indian Antiquary Extra Series 1].
Leiden 1939, p. 188-203.

⁵ JAOS 61 (1941) 115-127.

opinion of other scholars: I refer to the publication of HORST BRINKHAUS, "Zur Entstehung und textgeschichtlichen Entwicklung des *Harivaṃśa*"⁶ in which he suggests that the *Brahmapurāṇa* in those passages investigated by him is a patchwork of older texts, namely of *Harivaṃśa* and of *Viṣṇupurāṇa*. Similarly PETER SCHREINER as quoted by BRINKHAUS (loc. cit.) comes to the conclusion that the *Brahmapurāṇa* is dependent on the *Viṣṇupurāṇa*. No matter at what conclusion future scientific research may ever arrive: RUBEN's method of text-comparison will certainly maintain its importance in the philological effort of reconstructing the oldest textual shape of the *Kṛṣṇacarita*.

In the course of our investigations we could ascertain that it is possible to differentiate four groups of text-passages in the *Kṛṣṇacarita* of *Harivaṃśa*, *Viṣṇu-* and *Brahmapurāṇa*: first, sections of text which fully correspond mutually word by word; second, sections of text in which wordly agreement is only partial; third, sections of text which correspond to each other with regard to their contents only; and fourth, sections of text without any agreement whatever, neither in words nor in their contents. The text-comparison with regard to the *Pralambavadha* in *Harivaṃśa*, *Viṣṇu-* and *Brahmapurāṇa* gives us the following picture: out of 58 stanzas of *Harivaṃśa*, 38 stanzas of *Viṣṇupurāṇa*, and 30 stanzas of *Brahmapurāṇa* remain only 23 stanzas, and these stanzas should be considered as the closest to the text of the oldest *Pralambavadha*. Before we enter into further details let us turn to the references to *Pralamba* in the *Mahābhārata* and in the *Purāṇapañcalakṣaṇa*.

In the text of the *Purāṇapañcalakṣaṇa* edited by WILLIBALD KIRFEL⁷ *Pralamba* is mentioned only in a single passage. This stanza, in which *Pralamba* is named among the sons of *Danu*, is closely associated with a stanza in the first book of the *Mahābhārata*⁸: both stanzas refer to the same context, namely to the listing of the sons of *Danu*, and in both stanzas *Pralamba* is mentioned together with *Naraka*. However, in these stanzas there is no indication at all of a more developed stage of the *Pralamba*-myth as it is handed down in the later *Purāṇic* traditions.

An interesting reference to the *Pralambavadha* however we can find in a stanza of the seventh book of the *Mahābhārata* where it is men-

⁶ In: XXIV. Deutscher Orientalistentag vom 26. bis 30. September 1988 in Köln. Ausgewählte Vorträge, hrsgg. von WERNER DIEM und ABDOLDJAVAD FALATURI. Stuttgart 1990, p. 415–425.

⁷ W. KIRFEL, *Das Purāṇa Pañcalakṣaṇa. Versuch einer Textgeschichte*. Bonn 1927.

⁸ The *Mahābhārata*. For the first time critically edited by VISHNU S. SUKTHANKAR. Poona 1933ff.

tioned that Kṛṣṇa-Govinda, the 'Lotus-eyed' (*puṣkarekṣaṇah*), has killed Pralamba and other demons. It is worthy of note that this passage for the first time mentions a Pralambavadha, although without further details. It is also remarkable that Kṛṣṇa and not Balarāma appears as the killer of Pralamba. This possibly points to an extremely old tradition according to which Kṛṣṇa had killed Pralamba. In later times this tradition seems to have been overlapped. The only exception is the very late Brahmapurāṇa⁹ where again Kṛṣṇa appears as the killer of Pralamba. And this could be judged as a possible reminiscence of that ancient tradition. Apart from that, Pralamba is mentioned in just two other passages of the Mahābhārata and both times in connection with the epithet *pralambahan*. The first passage in the ninth book of the Mahābhārata leaves it open to whom this epithet belongs. It states only that 'the killer of Pralamba' (*pralambahā*) is very wise (*mahāprājñah*) and has gone to the Agnitīrtha. The other passage, also in the ninth book of the Mahābhārata, brings *pralambahan* in connection with Balarāma who is upset about Bhīma's unfair and foul play in the battle. There is no reference whatsoever to the Pralambavadha of the Purāṇic story. This is the only passage in the Mahābhārata, though vague and barren, which mentions Balarāma in connection with a Pralambavadha.

Let us turn now to those 23 stanzas which we have separated following RUBEN's method of comparison. In these stanzas the following story is told: after killing the Dānava Dhenuka, Balarāma and Kṛṣṇa, the two sons of Vasudeva, play different games by a Bhāṇḍīra-tree and go in for competitive sports. The demon Pralamba appears in the form of a herdsman and mingles with the playing herdsmen with the intent of kidnapping Balarāma and Kṛṣṇa. The herdsmen begin now to play the Hariṇākṛīḍana-game, which according to late V. RAGHAVAN¹⁰ is a pair of boys running a race, jumping or hopping like deer. In the course of that game Kṛṣṇa defeats Śrīdāman and Balarāma Pralamba. The losers must carry the winners on their shoulders to the Bhāṇḍīra-tree and bring them back. Pralamba carries Balarāma and he is oppressed by his heavy burden. Pralamba himself rises to a gigantic and frightening shape and hurries away with Balarāma crossing over – against the rules – the limited playground. Being in such a great distress

⁹ ŚrīmadDvaipāyanamunipraṇītaṁ Brahmapurāṇam (dvitīyo bhāgaḥ: Śrīkṛṣṇajanmakhaṇḍa), edd. V. Ś. S. VĀSUDEVASĀSTRĪ MARĀṬHE – V. Ś. S. PURUṢOTTAMASĀSTRĪ RĀNADE. [Ānandāśramasaṁskṛtagraṇthāvalī 102]. Poona 1935.

¹⁰ V. RAGHAVAN, Festivals, Sports and Pastimes of India. Ahmedabad 1979, p. 231.

Balarāma turns towards Kṛṣṇa seeking his help. Kṛṣṇa knows the true strength of Balarāma and he appeals to him to realize the mystery of his true nature, namely that Balarāma together with Kṛṣṇa is the cause of the world. Kṛṣṇa admonishes him to remember his *ātman* and to kill the Dānava. Comforted by this speech of Kṛṣṇa Balarāma kills Pralamba and he is praised by the herdsmen.

If we examine this passage, we are able to distinguish between two groups of textual agreements: first, stanzas and single *pādas* which fully correspond mutually word by word, and second, such stanzas and *pādas* in which wordly agreement is only partial. The passages with full correspondence are found in three complete stanzas, namely in stanza 5, 8 and 10, and in 9 single *pādas* which are spread over the stanzas 1 to 4 and 12 to 14. The other stanzas and *pādas* show only partial wordly agreement. The picture which is outlined in these three corresponding stanzas and which is complemented by the 9 single *pādas* shows a well-rounded core of the story of the Pralambavadha: both sons of Vasudeva entertain themselves with different games. In the course of these games they are confronted with the demon Pralamba who quickly raises Saṃkarṣaṇa-Balarāma on his shoulders. And Balarāma slays Pralamba with his fist.

It is interesting to note that this game as well as the confrontation with the demon Pralamba are activities which are characteristic features of a hero. NOEL SHETH describes these characteristic features which are the most important for a hero in the epic poetry as follows: "In the absence of trials and quests, he [namely the hero] may occupy himself with vigorous sports and games. He may pit himself against a variety of adversaries: nature, beasts, human beings, demons and monsters, and even gods."¹¹ All these features of a hero listed by SHETH are found in the story of the Pralambavadha. It is beyond doubt that the milieu of this core of the story of the Pralambavadha belongs to the milieu of heroes and that the various developments within the narration of the Pralambavadha took their starting-point from there. In this connection I would like to point to some important results published by HERBERT HÄRTEL¹². Significant archaeological evidences show that a *vīravāda* was the first stage of the development of Bhāgavata-religion. These results are in accord with the results of our investigations of the Pralambavadha. Further extensive investigations of the oldest Kṛṣṇa-carita viewed also from this standpoint will be certainly of interest.

¹¹ N. SHETH, The divinity of Krishna. New Delhi 1984, p. 4.

¹² H. HÄRTEL, Archaeological Evidence on the Early Vāsudeva Worship. In: *Orientalia Iosephi Tucci Memoriae dicata*. Roma 1987, II/573-587, 10 plates.

Let us now switch over to those passages of the reconstructed text of the oldest Pralambavadha in which wordly correspondence is only partial. We find in these passages the first beginnings of the mythological and theological revisions of the *vīra*-milieu of the core of the story. On the one hand we find here Purāṇic enlargements which are inserted in a stereotyped way, for instance when in stanza 16 the dreadfulness of Pralamba is depicted; he is *raudra*, his eyes are compared with cart-wheels, and the earth bends under his burden. On the other hand theological innovations are introduced. For example, different theological epithets are used: *mahātman* for Kṛṣṇa, *sarvātman*, *viśvātman* and *ameyātman* for Balarāma. All these epithets are handed down in the Viṣṇupurāṇa (and in accordance with it also in the Brahmapurāṇa), but not in the Harivaṃśa. Another example of a theological enlargement of the Pralambavadha represents Kṛṣṇa's saying about the mystery (*guhya*) of the *ātman* of Balarāma: *sarvaguhyānāṃ guhyād guhyātmanā tvayā* "by you whose self is more mysterious than the mystery of all mysteries"; or the instruction that Kṛṣṇa and Balarāma are the only cause (*kāraṇam*) of the world, or of the creation (*bhuvah*). We have to investigate all the episodes of the Kṛṣṇacarita carefully and find out whether there is a continuation of these trends: namely, that the Harivaṃśa in the reconstructed form of the Kṛṣṇacarita has retained that text in the best form, which must have been the closest to the original *vīravāda*; and that the text of the Viṣṇupurāṇa contains the first theological and mythological revisions which have been copied by the Brahmapurāṇa and which were fructified in the tradition of the Bhāgavatapurāṇa.

ON THE ALLEGEDLY SUPERIOR QUALITY
OF THE SOUTHERN RECENSION
OF VĀLMĪKI'S RĀMĀYAṆA. THE GLOSSING THEORY*

By Leendert A. van Daalen, Leiden

The mss. of Vālmīki's Rāmāyaṇa can be divided into two groups, the S and N recensions, the latter to be sub-divided into the NE, NW (and W)¹ (sub-)recensions. Since SCHLEGEL the S recension is generally regarded as the better one; the Bengali grammarians were said to have removed the *scabritiem*, 'roughness', of the language: obsolete words, rambling syntax, grammatical irregularities (SCHLEGEL 1829, LI; quoted in JACOBI 1893, 5n.3).

JACOBI, op. cit., p. 8ff., disagreed on this. He objected against the concept of an intentional reworking of the text, because traces thereof are a very tiny minority in comparison with the arbitrary changes. He pointed to the effects of oral transmission, with its inevitable great changes, and to bards in the North who could not help adapting their language to the environment they were in, the centres of classical Sanskrit culture, as a result of which the grammatical irregularities gradually disappeared.

Although GORRESIO 1843, LXXIIIff., had tried to defend the NE recension with the observation that that recension too had its irregularities, the S recension remained the recension regarded as the better one, because it has more of them. And this is the position of the editors of the Baroda Critical Edition. From its text the interpolations, both S and N ones, have been removed, on the whole correctly, but its text is that of the S recension, because they, too, regard that recension as the better one; it is said to be more conservative, since it has kept more grammatical irregularities.

My own position is that Vālmīki most likely had a command of Sanskrit and that the irregularities now found in the mss. are due to the transmitters or occur in secondary passages (DAALEN 1980; cf. 1989). It was not my aim to reconstruct the archetype; an archetype is discern-

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¹ The status of W as a sub-recension is not clear; cf. DAALEN 1980, 261; GOLDMAN 1984, 5n.7, and esp. BROCKINGTON 1986, 20ff.

able, but a reconstruction through-out seems unfeasible²; however, if one tries, one should start from the best recension, the NE one.

The subject of this paper is the glossing theory of the Princeton translators of the CE, GOLDMAN (1984), POLLOCK (1986) and others, as expressed by POLLOCK 1979 and 1984, 85–90.

According to POLLOCK 1984, 85 “the basic suggestion – that the northern recension presents some sort of revision –” is “correct, but not necessarily for the reasons usually given. For the argument supporting that theory is based on the preservation in the southern recension of grammatical irregularities and no longer seems tenable. ... more common than any attempt to bring the poem into conformity with the rules of classical grammar or rhetoric” are two phenomena:

1) the frequent difference in wording in the N recension from that of the S recension “without appreciably altering the text’s grammatical regularity or poetic acceptability. ... on virtually every page ... the northern recension rephrases the southern recension almost gratuitously ...” (p. 85).

2) “The northern recension ... often tends towards a popularization or glossing of the southern text. ... The text came to be viewed as obscure in places, ... The northern singers seem to have been particularly sensitive to this, and in the course of the centuries, they evolved a somewhat simpler idiom, vulgarizing Vālmīki’s poem for the sake of their audiences.” (p. 85f.).

The southern recension is more conservative, because “In the South the religious significance imputed to the text lent it an almost scriptural status, insulating it to a greater extent from alteration”. The commentators are thought to have been helpful in this preservation (op. cit., p. 86 n. 10).

POLLOCK admits that the S recension, too, has its corruptions (1984, 89). The oral transmission is accountable for the wide divergence in the recensions (p. 86ff.). When the variants are neutral, i.e. in the absence of other criteria, the choice from among these variants must be made on the basis of the generally best recension (p. 89). (In principle this is correct; I do not agree on the choice.) However, “... where the choice between versions (= recensions, v.D.) is not neutral, we must review the recensions with care; for if they all ultimately derive more or less independently from the same oral source, then the correct reading in any given case may be preserved by any one of them” (ibid.).

² Cf. SRINIVASAN 1984. Even if a wholesale reconstruction may not be possible, we can still discern an archetype and study particular features both in it and, by higher criticism, in the poet’s text.

In this theory two contradictory elements are combined: on the one hand the S recension is said to be more static than the other recension; on the other hand the necessity is felt to explain why the correct readings may be found anywhere. The actual application of this theory amounts to saving the S recension as long as it is not wholly unreasonable to do so and to ascribing meanings to words in the S recension which are "unique" (POLLOCK 1986, *passim*)³ on the basis of normal usage of other words in the N recension.

From the point of view of the N recension it is the S recension which has changed the wording, introducing more grammatical and other irregularities in the course of the centuries.

"The religious significance imputed to the text" is said to be the cause of the more conservative character of the S recension. The worth of this argument is dubious. For we must keep in mind three facts:

- 1) The original Rāmāyaṇa was not a Vaiṣṇavite text; Rāma was not divine; Viṣṇu is hardly mentioned at all (for lit. see DAALLEN 1980, pages mentioned in index s.v. Viṣṇu and Rāma-Viṣṇu; cf. GOLDMAN 1984, 43-47).
- 2) The split into recensions must have occurred at an early date; their existence is attested in the 6th C. A.D. (for lit. see DAALLEN 1980, 18).
- 3) It will be hard to point to any popular Rāma-movement between the first appearance of a Vālmīki Rāmāyaṇa, say 4th C. B.C. (DAALLEN 1989, 40 and n. 20) and the time at which the split into recensions was already there⁴.

The alleged preservation by commentators is an antique argument. Commentators knew their own recension only; so they are testimonia

³ For instance at 2,46,9a *nātikrāntam* is said to mean "unexpected" on the ground of *atarkitas* in the N recension. On another instance, *vyasane*, "at law" (!), see below.

⁴ For a short survey of Rāma's rise from human hero to an avatar of Viṣṇu see SMITH 1988, 17ff. and BROCKINGTON 1984, 323ff.; cf. WHALING 1980. According to SMITH (1988, 17) V. S. AGRAWALA and RAI KRISHNADASA state in their review of the Critical Edition, Vol. I, JAOS 82 (1962) 578, that "the establishment of a Rāma cult was later (than the 5th cent. A.D., v.D.) still and began in South India where around the sixth or seventh century the southern recension of Vālmīki came to be considered a sacred text", whereas, actually, they guess that the S recension came to South India in this period, because "it is about this period that the earliest references to Rāma story begin to appear in the songs of the Alvar saints. Prior to this the Tevāram songs of Nainar inspiration invariably sing of Rāvaṇa as one of the greatest Śaiva devotees." By the way, according to AGRAWALA and KRISHNADASA the N recension is of greater antiquity than the S one; they asked for an examination *de novo* of the grammatical and metrical irregularities.

only for their own recensions. The earliest one lived 1100 A.D., long after the split into recensions had occurred (DAALEN 1980, 17ff.)⁵. Moreover the designation "southern" may be misleading. In the earliest days of European Indology the S recension was called *septentrionalis*, 'northern'; JACOBI changed the term on the ground that this recension occurred in South-India also (1893, 1f.). The S recension was prevailing up to Ujjain at least (RUBEN 1936, 55). On these arguments one cannot base a theory that holds that the S recension was exempt from the vagaries of oral transmission.

In JACOBI's theory people in Northern India did not tolerate grammatically irregular Sanskrit; in POLLOCK's theory these self-same people are in need of a simpler Sanskrit. Both act as if the questions Who knew Sanskrit, where, when and to what extent? are answerable in all detail; in any case their answers are at variance.

The northern glossing activity is said to have lasted for centuries. Of course, positing a single bard from whom the northern recension must ultimately derive would not do. For it is hardly imaginable that an oral performer could have produced a text inclusive of the alleged glosses while reflecting upon the original text without them. Moreover such a concept would be as objectionable as VON SCHLEGEL's theory that was criticized by JACOBI. So it must have been a process involving many individuals over the centuries.

The implicit supposition of this theory is that a gloss which had arisen somewhere in Northern India caught on in such a way as to spread across the whole of Northern India, from Rajasthan, Kashmir

⁵ This is not the only instance of failure to mention the refutation of an antique argument: POLLOCK (1984, 89n.21) mentions RUBEN's argument of the agreement of the Rām. S recension in the parallel passages of the Mahābhārata against the Rām. N recension as a ground for the relative antiquity of the S recension. Neither DAALEN 1980, 49–56 is mentioned, nor, surprisingly, a fellow Chicago translator, B. A. VAN NOOTEN (The Rāmopākhyāna and the Rāmāyaṇa. IndT 8–9 [1980–81] 293–305). VAN NOOTEN concludes that the Mbh. adopted the Rāma episode before the split into the Rām. recensions, N/S (p. 301). Then it is interesting to observe that most of the passages borrowed by the Mbh. occur in the NE recension and some more in the N recension in general, whereas the S recension has only one passage exclusively in common with the Mbh., sharing its other common passages with one or more N sub-recensions, and three-quarters of them with the NE sub-recension. I would conclude that the N, and esp. the NE, recension has preserved the text as it existed at the time of the Mbh.'s borrowing better than the S recension; cf. BROCKINGTON (1984, 310f.) whose conclusion is similar. VAN NOOTEN (p. 302) has an understatement: "It would seem that the text-historical model (i.e. that of the CE, v.D.) might need revision and that perhaps the NE version should be given a more prominent place in the earlier stages of the development of the text".

up to Bengal, not only along genetic lines in the area of its origin, but also through contamination across the subcontinent. Of course, there has been a lot of contamination between the sub-recensions and even between the recensions⁶. However, the condition for a glossing theory to be posited is that there are quite a number of innovations which have arisen and spread in the described way and which are universally attested in the N mss. at present. When we take into consideration the area involved, it is most unlikely in itself that this could have happened. Moreover, such a tendency towards uniformity would be strange when viewed from an oral transmission's aptitude to change the wording while telling the same story.

From the modern researcher's point of view the existence of such a theory means that he can declare a universal testimony of the N mss. to be secondary rather than original, caused genetically. It means that he can reject such a testimony if it does not suit him, that he is more inclined to believe that an original reading is preserved at places where there is wide variance than that he is prepared to believe that a universal testimony is original. In short, such a theory is a tool for destroying the only certainty we have, that of universal testimony by the mss. Cf. DAALLEN 1989, 26 (bottom), 28 (sub 3,4,3), 33 ff., 41. These references are concerned with the universal testimony of all the mss., both N and S, but the same applies when we look at one particular recension and want to establish its original readings⁷.

Instances of glosses are said to be numerous. POLLOCK (1984, 86 n. 11) mentions seven of them; as six of them were already mentioned earlier (POLLOCK 1979), they are apparently regarded as representative.

I for one cannot see glosses in them – e.g. *iti* at 2,51,12c is translatable with 'reflecting, thinking'; must those mss. which have a reading with *iti* + the participle *cintayatā* be regarded as having glossed the text which missed that participle originally, or is it just a variant reading? – and that is why I dismissed them earlier (DAALLEN 1986, 409–413; 1989, 27). However, let us have a closer look at them.

At 2,51,11, preceding the verse just mentioned, the S recension reads *drakṣyāmas* (c), which must be a passive reflexive (POLLOCK 1986, 420), whereas the N recension has a perfect *śloka* (1227*). Most of the other irregular passive forms belong to the present system and are recognizable through the suffix *-ya-* (cf. DAALLEN 1980, 86; HOLTZMANN 1884,

⁶ When a transmission which was, at least partly, oral is concerned, 'contamination' is not a felicitous term; some neutral term would be better, but that is not the point here.

⁷ See the appendix.

25f.); perfect and future active forms with passive sense are rare⁸. *drakṣyāmas*, passive, is too bad Sanskrit. In my opinion the S reading at *śloka* 11 is secondary and the N reading original. And then it is more likely that the N recension has kept the original reading in the very next *śloka* than that the other recension has done so. So *iti* + the participle *cintayatā* is the original reading and is not a gloss. I reject *drakṣyāmas* on the general ground of the non-occurrence of irregularities in the original Rāmāyaṇa; in the next two instances the context, too, shows that the irregularities are not original.

At 2,17,6 Kausalyā is worshipping. The S recension reads *juhoti* at 7c and *hāvayanīm* at 8d. The N recension has different readings. If one thinks it is improbable that a woman, herself, would sacrifice, one must take *juhoti* in causative sense; if one thinks a woman may sacrifice, then *hāvayanīm* must have the meaning of the simplex. At *śloka* 6 the S recension tells us she is worshipping Viṣṇu, whereas the N recension says she is worshipping the gods. In a poem which came to be regarded as a Vaiṣṇavite text it is more likely that Viṣṇu crept in than that he was thrown out⁹. So we see that the S recension has changed the text at 6, 7 and 8. Must we now believe that the N reading *maṅgalavādinīm* is a gloss on the S reading *kṛtamaṅgalā* at 7d? It is the S reading that is secondary; there is no gloss.

At 1,8,9 *dvaividhyam brahmacaryasya bhaviṣyati* (ab) must mean something like: his "chastity will be destroyed" (GOLDMAN 1984, 139), *dvaividhyam* being the difficult point, said to be glossed in the N recension. In *sarga* 8 Ṛṣyaśṛṅga's story is told as a prophecy; the N recension keeps to the future tense. At 10b the S recension reads *samabhivartata*, augmentless imperfect (3 S mss. °*vartate*), thus showing the S recension's inability to tell a story properly. Must we now believe that the S reading *dvaividhyam* is original instead of one of the N variants?

In *adharmabhayaabhītaś ca paralokasya ... / tena ... nādyāham ātmānam abhiṣecaye* //, "I fear the danger of unrighteousness, ..., and I fear what other people might say. That is why I do not have myself consecrated at once" (POLLOCK 1986, 186) at 2,47,26 *tena* stands at an odd

⁸ N. SEN (The secondary conjugations in the Rāmāyaṇa. Poona Orientalist 14 [1949] 102f.) lists one perfect form, active with passive sense, *bibhidur*, occurring once; future forms: *upamokṣyasi* (once) and *hāsyati* (twice). Perfect forms in HOLTZMANN 1884, 18 include *dadrśur*, 'they looked like'. For future forms in Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit see F. EDGERTON, BHS, Vol. I: Grammar, New Haven 1953, § 37.14.

⁹ See e.g. 2,102,2e Brahman is the Boar, but in the NW sub-recension and a number of other N mss. Viṣṇu's name has crept in; on the passage see GONDA 1969, 140; for other literature see DAALEN 1980, 275f.

place and *paralokasya* (genitive instead of ablative) is dependent on °*bhītaś*, the last member of a compound. Such a thing is rare and no Sanskrit. One must say that the S recension is corrupt here instead of regarding *lokavādabhayena* as a gloss.

At 2,24,7 the predicate *śreyān* + ablative is said to be a gloss on *viśiṣyate* + instrumentalis.

In the *kaccid-sarga* 2,94, which is modelled after Mbh. 2,5, *śloka* 49 "I trust your wise ministers, . . . , render judgement impartially when a rich man and a poor man are engaged in a suit" *vyasane* is said to mean "in a suit" on the ground of the alleged N gloss *vivadato . . . balino durbalasya ca*. The corresponding Mbh. verse is 2,5,95: "Or do your ministers corrupted by bribes see matters falsely if something arises between a wealthy man and a poor man, . . . ?" (BUTTENEN 1975, 44); "if something arises": *vyutpanne*; the S reading is *vyaktam te*: "Are you sure they do not see falsely . . . ?" Two S mss. read *vyasane*. Are we to suppose that all the other Mbh. mss. glossed this *vyasane*? *vyasane* is more likely to be a corruption for *vyamsane*, 'deceiving, cheating'; cf. Mbh. 9,60,35c *vyamsanena*, v.l. *vyasanena* (cf. pw, s.v. *vyasana*-). The sense, then, is: "when a poor man and a wealthy man are cheating . . .".

The last instance occurs in the *sarga* wherein Rāma takes leave of his mother Kausalyā: 2,21,11 "From these words of Rāma's, Kausalyā recognized what was proper. 'So be it,' she replied, though without joy to tireless Rāma" (POLLOCK 1986, 129). The CE follows the S recension, *tathety uvāca supṛitā* (*pāda c*). At 12d Kausalyā is said to be "in deep sorrow". POLLOCK (p. 368f.) observes this and the N variant at 11c *duḥkhārtā*, "sick with grief". So he conjectures (and translates) *asupṛitā*, commenting: "The emendation to [*uvācā*] *supṛitā* is easy, besides being necessary. The meter is no problem for the heavy sequence is not uncommon, see 20.18a". However, the metre makes the conjecture impossible: a third *vipulā* is not uncommon, but it has a caesura after the fifth syllable¹⁰, and that is absent here. So the N recension must be followed at *pāda c*. And is it now probable that the N recension has glossed *śubhadarśanā* at *pāda b* with *dharmadarśinī*, when we see a S change in the next *pāda*? That is highly unlikely.

To sum up: as to one of the seven instances a comparison with the Mbh. makes a gloss unlikely (the *vyasana*-question at 2,94,49); in another case there is the failure to see very bad Sanskrit as a corruption (2,47,26); in four other cases a southern change immediately preceding or following the allegedly glossed word causes us to regard the N

¹⁰ See e.g. H. JACOBI, Zur Lehre vom Çloka. Indische Studien 17 (1885) 443 (= Kleine Schriften, ed. B. KÖLVER, Wiesbaden 1970, I/176).

readings not as glosses but as original readings. I admit that in two of these four cases the S readings can be saved by the old polishing theory, which, however, is no longer defensible (DAALEN 1980, 1989). So both general grounds and an examination of the seven representative instances lead us to reject the glossing theory.

Vālmiki's Rāmāyaṇa was originally a good text, grammatically and stylistically. Many accretions flew into it, some at such an early date as to have been already present in the archetype, others were added later on, now present in a various number of various mss. Through the transmitters, less *śiṣṭa* than the poet himself, corruptions have crept in, at various places in all the recensions, albeit that more of them have crept into the S recension.

The Critical Edition is based upon the S recension, and so upon the wrong one¹¹. Consequently the value of any translation of its text is limited.

Appendix: On the Universal Testimony of the Mss.

GOLDMAN (1984, 44f. n. 85) argues that *sarga* 6,105, where Rāma is called a god by the gods, is late. Both this identification and the unusual textual homogeneity we see in this *sarga* "indicates not antiquity but a late and sectarian passage accepted with little change by all scribes. ... Passages such as this must make us very wary of claims, such as those put forward by DAALEN 1980, pp. 5–13, that universal testimony is a sign that passages belong to the archetype or even to the corpus of the original poet".

At what time should the passage have been accepted by all scribes? It is hard to imagine that this would have happened centuries after the archetype (1st or 2nd C. A.D.); for that would mean that an addendum must have been delivered all over India to scribes for incorporation at a given point. If a passage has reached all later scribes, it must have been present at the place and at the time of origin of the archetype, or in any case it must have been not very far removed from it in place and time for inclusion as an afterthought. A generalizing theory may neglect this nicety.

¹¹ The CE based upon the S recension, cannot claim to represent the archetype. And even as to the S recension matters are not as simple as the CE would lead us to believe: BROCKINGTON 1986 finds indications of "a definite alternative tradition which must have enjoyed some currency in Kerala" (p. 22); the CE's M4 is not the only S ms. with N leanings; there are at least two others. See also BROCKINGTON 1990.

6,105 belongs to the story of Sītā's Fire-ordeal (6,103; 104; 106), declared late by W. PRINTZ, and by N. SEN, whereas MUIR already saw that 6,105 is late. Since it occurs in all the mss., we must ascribe the passage to the archetype, while negating its authenticity by higher criticism.

There are a number of cases of irregular voice which are universally attested: at 6,99,1; 33; 101,39; 103,8; 11; cf. 104,19. They must be ascribed to the archetype. In DAALEN 1980 (cf. 1989) I have shown that the majority of universally attested irregularities occur in late passages, whereas the well-attested cases are heavily concentrated in these same passages (1989, 38f.). On these and other observations I base my thesis that the poet, himself, had a command of Sanskrit. So the universal testimony of irregular forms is one argument more for regarding the passage, though part of the archetype, as secondary. My results coincide with those of predecessors working with other methods. For details, on this passage, see DAALEN 1980, 189ff.

So why one should be "very wary" about my claim that universal testimony leads to the conclusion of presence in the archetype, escapes me. I make a careful distinction between archetype and poet's text; see e.g. DAALEN 1980, 7, 10, and 12; notice that GOLDMAN refers to my pages 5–13. Suggesting that I claim to reach the poet's text on the ground of universal testimony – and suggesting this in a discussion of *sarga* 6,105 which I regard as late with GOLDMAN and others, at that –, is highly misleading. One wonders whether any discussion is possible.

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ZUM GEBRAUCH VEDISCHER MANTRAS IN DEN SCHLUSSKAPITELN DER AHIRBUDHNYASAMHITĀ*

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I. Einleitung

Es ist seit langem bekannt, daß die religiös-philosophische Literatur des Viṣṇuismus und des Śivaismus von zahlreichen Versuchen zeugt, ihre eigenen theologischen, philosophischen und vor allem rituellen Ausführungen mit Elementen des vedischen Opfers oder bestimmten vedischen Mantras zu verbinden. Auch in den von der brahmanischen Orthodoxie als häretisch und Veda-feindlich verurteilten tantrischen Schriften dieser beiden religiösen Richtungen treten Bestrebungen, Teile der vedischen Tradition den eigenen, neuen Gedanken zu assimilieren, offen zutage. Bereits vor einiger Zeit gelangte K. BHATTACHARYA in seinem Aufsatz „Le « védisme » de certaines textes hindouistes“ zu der allgemeinen Feststellung, daß sich von allen „neo-brahmanischen Religionen“ in erster Linie der Viṣṇuismus mit seinen beiden Hauptschulen, dem Pāñcarātra und dem Vaikhānasa, am engsten der vedischen Tradition angeschlossen habe¹. Für das Pāñcarātra, auf dessen Literatur sich BHATTACHARYA dann im ersten Teil seiner weiteren Ausführungen beschränkt, läßt sich eine Fülle von terminologischen Entlehnungen aus der vedischen Literatur nachweisen. Als Beispiel führt BHATTACHARYA u. a. die Identifizierung der Teile des Körpers Viṣṇus mit den Bestandteilen des vedischen Opfers im 37. Kapitel der Ahirbudhnyasamhitā an². Nach BHATTACHARYAS Urteil ist es jedoch nicht gerechtfertigt, in den von ihm untersuchten Fällen von einem „wirklichen Vedismus“ zu sprechen; der Vedismus der Pāñcarātrins sei, so BHATTACHARYA, lediglich als eine Art oberflächlicher Anstrich zu beurteilen, während seine eigentliche Orientierung ganz anders geartet

* Dieser Aufsatz ist die überarbeitete Fassung eines am 30. 8. 1990 auf der VIII. World Sanskrit Conference in englischer Sprache gehaltenen Vortrages: „On the Use of Vedic Mantras in the Ahirbudhnyasamhitā“. Für wertvolle sachliche Hinweise zu meinen Ausführungen bin ich Herrn Dr. Ch. H. Werba sowie Herrn Prof. Dr. O. von Hinüber zu Dank verpflichtet.

¹ JAs 255 (1967) 199–222, S. 200.

² A. a. O., S. 200f.

sei³. Das zitierte vedische Ritual besitze in diesen Werken nur einen allegorischen Wert⁴. Von allen vedischen Mantras sei die Literatur der Pāñcarātrins ausschließlich an RV 1,22,20 *tād viṣṇoḥ paramām padām* ... und dem Puruṣasūkta (RV 10,90) interessiert⁵. Ähnlich urteilt BHATTACHARYA auch über die Adaption vedischer Termini in den śivaitischen Āgamas: „Encore une fois, l'ancienne typologie n'est donc pas abandonnée. Mais, en fait, l'idéal est tellement différent que cette fidélité à la tradition n'apparaît que comme une affaire de pure forme“⁶.

Von einer oberflächlichen und künstlich hergestellten Verbindung zu vedischen Mantras wird man auch im Falle der Ritual-Texte der Vaikhānasas sprechen können, die J. GONDA in seinem Artikel „Some Notes on the Use of Vedic Mantras in the Ritual Texts of the Vaikhānasas“⁷ untersucht hat. Obwohl die Vaikhānasas eine ganz besondere Hinwendung zur vedischen Tradition bekunden und von einer Fülle vedischer Mantras Gebrauch machen, trifft doch auch hier in den allermeisten Fällen das Urteil zu, daß die benutzten vedischen Texte Ritualen überlagert werden, mit denen sie ursprünglich nichts zu tun hatten⁸.

Neben der viṣṇuitischen und śivaitischen tantrischen Literatur haben sich aber auch ganz andere sektarische Texte der oben in Umrissen geschilderten Adaptionstechnik bedient. So haben R. SALOMON (in seinem 1986 im Adyar Library Bulletin erschienenen Artikel „The Śvetāśvatara and the Nāsadīya: Vedic Citations in a Śaiva Upaniṣad“) und TH. OBERLIES (Die Śvetāśvatara-Upaniṣad: Eine Studie ihrer Gotteslehre [Studien zu den „mittleren“ Upaniṣads I]. WZKS 32 [1988] 35–62) gezeigt, daß die Kompilatoren der Śvetāśvatara-Upaniṣad häufig Mantras aus RV und YV (zusammengestellt in OBERLIES' App. I „Die ‚vedischen‘ Zitate der ŚU“, a. a. O., p. 55–57) zitieren oder paraphrasiert wiedergeben, um so ihre Lehre von Śiva als höchstem Gott zu untermauern.

Im Lichte dieser Ergebnisse erscheint es nun besonders interessant, einige Kapitel der bereits oben erwähnten, der anonymen Pāñcarātra-Literatur zuzurechnenden Ahirbudhnyasaṃhitā (= AS) zu untersuchen, die v. a. durch die im Jahre 1916 erschienene Arbeit F. O. SCHRADERS mit dem Titel „Introduction to the Pāñcarātra and the

³ A. a. O., S. 206.

⁴ A. a. O., S. 200.

⁵ A. a. O., S. 206.

⁶ A. a. O., S. 211.

⁷ IJ 14 (1972) 1–31.

⁸ A. a. O., S. 22.

Ahirbudhnyasaṃhitā“ zu den bekanntesten Texten der viṣṇuitischen tantrischen Literatur gerechnet werden kann. Ein Blick auf das vorletzte Kapitel dieser Saṃhitā, Kap. 59, scheint BHATTACHARYAS Urteil, was die Benutzung vedischer Mantras durch die Pāñcarātrins angeht, zu bestätigen: In immerhin fast 40 Versen wendet sich der AS-Redaktor dort dem Puruṣasūkta zu, das er im Sinne der für den Pāñcarātra-Viṣṇuismus charakteristischen Lehre von den *vyūhas* genannten Manifestationen des höchsten Gottes Viṣṇu-Nārāyaṇa interpretiert⁹. Sowohl SCHRADER als auch BHATTACHARYA, der verschiedentlich aus der AS zitiert (s. o.), ist es jedoch offensichtlich entgangen, daß die AS in den Kapiteln 57 und 58 eine Reihe weiterer vedischer Mantras aufgreift und im Sinne ihrer viṣṇuitischen Theologie interpretiert. Im einzelnen handelt es sich dabei um die Gāyatrī (ṚV 3,62,10; behandelt in den Versen AS 57,1–19ab); den Mantra ṚV 1,99 an Jātavedas (behandelt in den Versen AS 57,29–51); die an Rudra gerichtete Strophe ṚV 7,59,12, die an den Hymnus 7,59,1–11 an die Maruts angehängt ist (behandelt in den Versen AS 57,64–78), sowie die sog. Hotṛ-Formeln (behandelt in AS 58).

Diese vedischen Mantras werden jedoch nicht, wie in tantrischer Literatur sonst i. a. üblich, in ihrem Wortlaut zitiert, sondern der Verfasser der AS setzt ihre Kenntnis voraus und beginnt umgehend, jedes einzelne Wort des jeweiligen Mantra als diesen oder jenen Bestandteil des von ihm – nicht nur in den hier besprochenen Kapiteln 57 und 58, sondern auch an anderen Stellen der Saṃhitā – gelehrten theologischen Systems zu interpretieren. Dabei zeigt sich, daß sich die Interpretationen des jeweiligen Mantras auf drei Bereiche konzentrieren: den höchsten Gott Viṣṇu-Nārāyaṇa, seine Śakti bzw. deren verschiedene Aspekte (s. weiter unten) sowie den Adepten, der durch seine Hingabe zu Gott nach Erlösung strebt.

II. Hauptteil

Im zweiten Teil dieses Aufsatzes soll anhand von insgesamt fünf besonders prägnanten und charakteristischen Beispielen – drei aus dem 57., zwei aus dem 58. Kapitel – das oben beschriebene Verfahren näher erläutert werden¹⁰.

⁹ SCHRADER, Introduction to the Pāñcarātra and the Ahirbudhnyasaṃhitā, Madras 1916 (künftig abgekürzt als IP), S. 144, hat daraus geschlossen, daß sich die Idee der *vyūha*-Spekulation aus dem Puruṣasūkta ṚV 10,90 entwickelt habe. Wie ich in einer demnächst erscheinenden größeren Publikation zu zeigen versucht habe, kann man dieser Beurteilung jedoch aus textgeschichtlichen Gründen nicht länger zustimmen.

¹⁰ Die Interpretation der vedischen Mantras in diesen Kapiteln ist, wie alle anderen Stoffe des Gesamttextes der AS auch, in der Form einer Belehrung

1. **RV 7,59,12**¹¹: zum ersten Wort dieser Strophe, *tr,yāmbakam*, heißt es in AS 57,64cd–65:

icchā jñaptiḥ kriyā ceti tisro lokasya mātaraḥ ||
tisras tu yasya vidyante jagadbhāvinya ūrjitāḥ |
tryambakaḥ sa tu vijñeyo jñānaśaktikriyānviṭaḥ ||

“Wollen, Erkenntnis und Handeln, so (heißen) die drei Mütter der Welt.

“Bei wem die drei Mächtigen [eben diese drei Mütter] vorhanden sind, die die Welten fördern, der ist als der mit Erkennen, Kraft und Handeln ausgestattete Tryambaka zu erkennen.”

Erläuterungen: Im Vergleich zu anderen ähnlichen Textstellen der AS, die von der bzw. den Śaktis des Gottes Viṣṇu-Nārāyaṇa sprechen, nimmt die oben zitierte Aussage eine Sonderstellung ein. Den Ausführungen des Anfangskapitels der AS zufolge gibt es zum einen zwei Aspekte der höchsten Śakti des Gottes: die als *causa instrumentalis* verstandene, die Schöpfung in Gang setzende *kriyāśakti* und die als *causa materialis* zu begreifende *bhūtīśakti*¹². Zum anderen kennt die AS die sich während der Phase der sog. reinen Schöpfung (*śuddhasṛṣṭi*) zu den *vyūhas* formierenden sechs Attribute (*guṇa*) des höchsten Gottes, die als *jñāna*, *śakti*, *aśvarya*, *bala*, *vīrya* und *tejas* bestimmt werden¹³. Mit dieser in den Anfangskapiteln und anderen Passagen der AS gelehrt Auffassung ist der Halbvers 57,64cd kaum zu vereinbaren: Zwar gilt die genannte *kriyāśakti* ihrem Wesen nach auch als Wollen (z. B. 3,30c *icchātmā*), jedoch ist 57,64cd, soweit ich sehe, die einzige Stelle in der AS, an der *icchā* als eine selbständige Entität auftritt. Erklärbar ist diese Abweichung gegenüber der sonst in der AS mehr oder minder recht einheitlich vertretenen Lehre hinsichtlich der beiden Aspekte der Śakti und der sechs *guṇas* mit einem Rückgriff auf Vorstellungen, wie sie im Śaktismus und im kaschmirischen Śivaismus zu finden sind. Dort werden 1. *icchā*, 2. *jñāna* und 3. *kriyā* als drei Aspekte der mit Śiva verbundenen Śakti gelehrt, zu denen sich noch die weiteren Aspekte *cit* und *ānanda* gesellen. *icchā* ist der Wille zur Schöpfung, *jñāna* bezeichnet alle mentalen und psychischen Vorgänge, die die Beziehung zwischen

gehalten, die Ahirbudhnya (= Śiva) dem Weisen Nārada erteilt. Besonders deutlich wird dies in AS 57,2ab mit *tasya* (gemeint ist das *sāvitrī* genannte Licht; s. dazu S. 80f.) *vyākhyām imāṃ samyag gadato me nīśāmaya |*.

¹¹ Der Text lautet: *tr,yāmbakam yajāmahe sugāndhim puṣṭivārdhanam | urvārukām iva bāndhanān mṛtyōr muktīya māmṛtāt ||*; zur Beurteilung dieses Verses s. H. OLDENBERG, *Rgveda. Textkritische und exegetische Noten*. Siebentes bis zehntes Buch, Berlin 1912 (Unv. Nachdruck Göttingen 1970), S. 47.

¹² Vgl. dazu SCHRADER, IP, S. 30f.

¹³ AS 2,56–61ab; vgl. SCHRADER, IP, S. 32–34.

Subjekt und Objekt herstellen, während die *kriyā* die Aktivitäten zwischen den konkreten Formen der wahrgenommenen Außenwelt ausführt¹⁴. Die in AS 57,65d innerhalb des Kompositums *jñānaśakti-kriyānvitaḥ* genannte Reihe scheint sich hingegen wiederum an den in den genannten Anfangskapiteln gegebenen Verhältnissen zu orientieren, wenn auch die Zusammenstellung – *jñāna* und *śakti* als zwei der sechs Attribute, *kriyā* als ein Aspekt der höchsten Śakti – ungewöhnlich ist.

Während das zweite Wort der ersten Hälfte von RV 7,59,12 – *yajāmahe* – als die Hingabe eines (Opfer-)Gegenstandes an eine Gottheit definiert wird¹⁵, erfolgt die Erklärung zu dem dritten Wort – *sugāndhim* – in mehreren Schritten. Zunächst werden zwei allgemeine Erklärungen vorgelegt, die jeweils einen der beiden Bestandteile dieses Kompositums, d. h. *su*° und °*gandhi*, deuten sollen. Während jedoch die erste ohne weiteres einsichtig ist – *śobhano yasya gandho 'sti sa sugandhir itīryate* // „Wessen Geruch schön ist, der wird als ein Wohlriechender bezeichnet“ (57,66cd) –, bietet die zweite eine recht phantasievolle „etymologische Deutung“ an, die vorgibt, daß sich die Partikel *su* von der Wurzel *sūc* herleitet: *śobhanam sūcayan sarvaḥ sugandhir iti śabdyate* / „Jeder, der Schönes (an sich?) kenntlich macht, wird ein Wohlriechender genannt“ (67ab). Beiden allgemein gehaltenen Erklärungen folgt nun eine dritte, die auf den höchsten Gott bezogen wird (57,67cd–69):

yaḥ suṣṭhu sarvatattvāni gandhayaty ātmatejasā //
gandhayaty anuvadhena svasvarūpīkaroti yaḥ |
gandhādīni prthivyādibhūtāny evākhilāni ca //
śobhanam yasya tiṣṭhanti vaśe devasya śāsituḥ |
sa sugandhiḥ samākhyāto jñānātmā sarvavid vaśī //

„Der, der auf gefällige Weise alle Elemente durch den Glanz seines Selbstes mit (seinem) Duft versieht,

“(d. h.) der alle (feinstofflichen Elemente), den Geruch etc., (und grobstofflichen) Elemente mit der Erde am Anfang, indem er sie durchdringt, duften und (so) zu seiner je eigenen Gestalt macht,

„der Gewalt dessen, des Gottes (und) Gebieters, sie trefflich unterstehen, dieser Herrscher, der Erkenntnis zu seinem Selbst hat und allwissend ist, wird *sugandhi* genannt.“

¹⁴ Vgl. LOUISE M. FINN, *The Kulacūdāmaṇi Tantra and the Vāmakeśvara Tantra with the Jayadratha Commentary*, Wiesbaden 1986, S. 66; vgl. auch H. BRUNNER, *Un Tantra du Nord: Le Netra Tantra*. BEFEO 61 (1974) 125–197, S. 129 mit Anm. 4.

¹⁵ AS 57,66ab: *yajatir dravyasaṃtyāgaḥ kām cid uddiśya devatām* /.

Das erste Wort des Kompositums *puṣṭivārdhanam* wird ebenfalls im Sinne der Theologie der AS interpretiert. In AS 57,70–72ab heißt es:

puṣṭir bhūtiḥ samākhyātā yā sā sadasadātmikā |
śaktir viṣṇumayī viṣṇoḥ sa tām vardhayati svayam ||
saṃkalpena samudbhāvyā vitatya vividhātmanā |
saṃdhārya saṃniyamāyātha pratisaṃharate ca tām ||
tato 'sau bhagavān viṣṇuḥ kathyate puṣṭivardhanah |

“Welche die als *bhūti* bezeichnete ‚Fülle‘ ist, das ist die aus Viṣṇu bestehende Śakti Viṣṇus, die ihrem Wesen nach sowohl seiend als auch nicht-seiend ist. Er selbst (d. h. der Gott) läßt diese gedeihen.

“Nachdem er sie mit seinem *saṃkalpa* hat entstehen lassen, sie mit seinem mannigfachen Selbst ausgebreitet, sie getragen und dann gebändigt hat, reabsorbiert er sie wieder.

“Deshalb wird jener erhabene Viṣṇu *puṣṭivardhana* genannt.”

Erläuterungen: Das Wort *puṣṭi* wird als die oben (S. 74) erwähnte *bhūtiśakti*, ein Teil des kosmogonischen Systems der AS, gedeutet. Die Darstellung des hier übersetzten Textes läßt sich mit dem 3. Kapitel der AS vergleichen: Die Aussage in AS 57,71ab, wonach die durch den Sudarśana Viṣṇus symbolisierte und mit dessen *saṃkalpa* gleichgesetzte *kriyāśakti* die *bhūtiśakti* entstehen läßt, entspricht AS 3,31–32ab¹⁶. Ebenso deckt sich die Bemerkung in 71c, daß der Gott mit dem – mit der *kriyāśakti* identischen – *saṃkalpa* die *bhūtiśakti* reguliere (*saṃniyam*), sachlich mit AS 3,44cd–45, wonach die als Teil der höchsten Śakti des Gottes aufgefaßte *bhūtiśakti* die Entstehung der Welt bedeutet, die durch die *kriyāśakti* reguliert wird¹⁷. Keine Entsprechung im sonstigen Text der AS hat allerdings, soweit ich sehe, der in 70d zum Ausdruck gebrachte Gedanke, daß Viṣṇu die *bhūtiśakti* wachsen lasse¹⁸.

Über die Interpretation der einzelnen Worte hinausgehend bietet AS 57,72cd–74 eine zusammenfassende Deutung der ersten Hälfte des RV-Mantra 7,59,12, in die neben den beiden Komponenten des Gottes und seiner Śakti der diese verehrende und nach Erlösung strebende Adept einbezogen wird:

icchājñānakriyākāraṃ śobhanākhyam jagatpriyam ||
svākārajñāpitaisvaryaṃ śuddham saṃvinmayaṃ param |

¹⁶ *unmeṣo yaḥ saṃkalpaḥ sarvatrāvyaḥataḥ kṛtau | avyaktakālapuṃrūpām cetanācetanātmikām || bhūtiṃ lakṣmīmayīm viṣṇoḥ śaktim saṃbhāvayaty asau |*

¹⁷ *tadīyaikā kalā bhūtir jagadbhavanasaṃjñitā || vyāpāro vāstavas tatra [gemeint ist die höchste Śakti] jaganniyamanātmakah | niṣkalā yā kriyāśaktir lakṣmyāḥ saudarśanā kalā ||*

¹⁸ Ein ähnliches Bild wird jedoch in AS 6,13 gebraucht: Der *vyūha* Pradyumna übergibt die beiden Entitäten *puruṣa* und *śakti* dem *vyūha* Aniruddha mit dem Auftrag, diese beiden wachsen zu lassen.

*īśānaṃ sarvalokānāṃ puruṣaṃ puṣkarekṣaṇam ||
devatāṃ svām samuddiśya svātmākhyadravyam uttamam |
yajāma iti mantrasya pūrvabhāgārtha īdṛśaḥ ||*

„Dem lotusäugigen Puruṣa, dem Herrn aller Welten, dessen Gestalt aus Wollen, Erkennen und Handeln besteht, der als das Heil bezeichnet wird, der die Welten liebt, der seine Herrlichkeit durch (die Vielzahl) seiner Gestalten erkennen läßt, dem reinen, aus Bewußtsein Bestehenden, dem Höchsten,

„dem wollen wir unter Aufweis der eigenen Göttlichkeit¹⁹ den höchsten, ‚eigenes Selbst‘ genannten Opfergegenstand opfern: solchermassen ist die Bedeutung des ersten Teiles des Mantras.“²⁰

Der bereits in der zweiten Hälfte von RV 7,59,12 vorgegebene Sinn – Erlösung vom Tode – wird von dem AS-Redaktor aufgegriffen und ebenfalls für seine theologischen Anschauungen verwendet. AS 57,75–78 lautet:

*nirukto mṛtyuśabdo 'tra mṛtyumṛtyunirūpaṇe |
svātmāsvātmīyasamnyāsī deve 'dya paramātmāni ||
mṛtyor mucyeya saṃsārān nānāduḥkhamahodadheḥ |
urvārukaṃ yathā pakvam akleśena svabandhanāt ||
mucyate mṛtyutas tadvad ahaṃ mucyeya bandhanāt |
saṃnyāse sthairyam āśāste kṛte 'smiṇ māmṛtād iti ||
amṛtād brahmaṇas tasmād yasmai māṃ dattavān ahaṃ |
jātu cin mā sma mucyeya kṣemībhāvo bhaven mama ||*

„Das Wort ‚Tod‘ wird hier im Hinblick auf die Bestimmung des Todes Tod²¹ erklärt. Indem ich mein eigenes Selbst und das zu diesem Selbst Gehörige nun dem Gott, dem höchsten Selbst anvertraue, möchte ich vom Tod, dem *saṃsāra*, freikommen, der ein großer Ozean der mannigfachen Leiden ist.

„Wie ein reifer Kürbis ohne Mühe von seinem Stiel gelöst wird, so möchte ich vom Tod, von der Fessel (des *saṃsāra*) erlöst werden.

„(Der, der solche Worte spricht oder dieses denkt,) wünscht sich, wenn er die Hingabe (an den Gott) vollzogen hat, Dauerhaftigkeit (im Hinblick auf eben diese Hingabe); (dies bedeuten die Worte) ‚nicht vom Nicht-Tod‘;

¹⁹ *devatāṃ svām samuddiśya*; gemeint ist, daß der Adept die göttliche Natur seiner Seele erkannt hat, nachdem er sie von all dem, was nicht zu ihr gehört – Körper, Sinnesorgane, Intellekt – gesondert hat (vgl. die Interpretation von RV 1,99, S. 78).

²⁰ Zu *icchā*, *jñāna* und *kriyā* s. S. 74f.

²¹ Ein Ausdruck, der in der Nṛsimhapūrvatāpanī und Nṛsimhottaratāpanī Upaniṣad mehrfach vorkommt (vgl. die bei G. A. JACOB, A Concordance to the Principal Upaniṣads and Bhagavadgītā, S. 754 verzeichneten Stellen).

“(d. h.) niemals möge ich von diesem unsterblichen *brahman*, dem ich mich übergeben habe, loskommen; mir möge ein Zum-Frieden-Gelangen zuteil werden.”

2. Das Bild, das aus der Untersuchung der durch den AS-Redaktor geleisteten Interpretation von RV 7,59,12 gewonnen werden konnte, trifft in ähnlicher Weise auch für die Auslegung der Strophe RV 1,99²² in AS 57,29–51 zu. Auch hier werden die einzelnen Worte im Sinne der theologischen Vorstellungen der AS gedeutet, indem sie auf den höchsten Gott, seine Śakti sowie die von dem Gläubigen erstrebte Erlösung bezogen werden. Als Beispiele seien die Erklärungen der ersten drei Worte *jātavedase*, *sunavāma* und *sómam* angeführt. Jātavedas gilt dem Verfasser des Textes als der höchste Gott, Soma als die Individualseele (57,32cd–33):

sarvajñāḥ sarvaśaktiś ca sarvakṛt puruṣottamaḥ ||
jātavedāḥ samuddiṣṭa ātmā somaḥ samṛitaḥ |
sa hy avidyāvaśāt sarvayonisthaḥ sūyate sadā ||

“Der allwissende, allmächtige, alltätige Höchste Puruṣa

“wird als Jātavedas bestimmt, der *ātman* wird als *soma* bezeichnet. Dieser wird, infolge seines Nichtwissens in die Schöße aller (Wesen) eingegangen, stets (wieder)geboren/gepreßt^{22a}.”

Beide, Gott und Seele, werden mittels der Deutung von *sunavāma* zueinander in Beziehung gesetzt (57,36–38):

somaṃ yathābhīṣuṇvanti hy adhware jātavedase |
dītsamānas tathātmānam ṛṣiḥ svaṃ paramātmāne ||
dehendriyamaṇaḥprāṇadhīguṇebhyaḥ svarūpataḥ |
vivinakti prasamkhyānaiḥ sāmjavaiṣamyahetujaiḥ ||
evam vivicya dattvāsmāi svātmānaṃ jātavedase |
tatsthaḥ sa tanmanā bhūtvā svenātho samvivitsate ||

“Denn wie man beim Opfer für Jātavedas Soma preßt – wenn der Weise so sein (eigenes) Selbst dem höchsten Selbst übergeben möchte –,

“(so) sondert er durch Betrachtungen, die sich auf der Gleichheit (seiner eigenen Seele mit der höchsten Seele bzw. dem Gott) und der Verschiedenheit (seiner Seele von seinem Körper, seinem Intellekt etc.) gründen, (dieses sein Selbst) in seinem wahren Wesen von Körper, Sinnesorganen, Denkorgan, Atem, Intellekt und den Eigenschaften der Urmaterie; “und nachdem er sein eigenes Selbst so (von diesen) gesondert und es Jātavedas übergeben hat, will er ihn, auf ihn gerichtet, an ihn denkend, durch sein Selbst erkennen.”

²² *jātavedase sunavāma sómam arātīyató ná dahāti védaḥ | sá naḥ parṣad āti durgāṇi viśvā nāvēva síndhuṃ duritāt, y agnīḥ ||*

^{22a} *sūyate* ist als *śleṣa* sowohl auf *ātman* als auch auf *soma* zu beziehen.

Für die Auslegung der zweiten Hälfte von RV 1,99 gilt das gleiche wie für die zweite Hälfte von 7,59,12: Auch hier bot sich die bereits vorgegebene Aussage – Hinwegführen über alle Schwierigkeiten – an, sie im Rahmen der Viṣṇu-Theologie der AS im Sinne der Erlösung des Adepten aufzufassen (vgl. S. 77). Während in AS 57,40 der feindselig Gesinnte (*arātīyat*) als die durch falsche Erkenntnis verursachte Bindung (der Seele) interpretiert wird²³, heißt es zu der zweiten Strophenhälfte (57,46–50):

atra nāveti drṣṭāntaḥ sindhur nāma mahodadhiḥ |
taṃ yathā nāviko nāvā nausthitaṃ pārayen naram ||
duritādīpadadvandvāt pārāṇe duritātyayaḥ |
duritaṃ gaditaṃ dauḥsthyaṃ vātavarṣādisaṃbhavam ||
atīty atītya duritā duritānti varṇyate |
duritaṃ vātavarṣādyam pariḥṛtya yathākhilam ||
nāvikaḥ pārayen nāvā sāgaraṃ nausthitaṃ naram |
evam sa bhagavān agnir jātavedā hariḥ svayam ||
duritaṃ kleśasaṃghātaṃ apavargavighātakaṃ |
sarvaṃ pariḥaran durgam pārayet tattvapaddhatim ||

“Hierbei (wird) mit dem Wort *nāvā* ein Beispiel (ausgedrückt), die Bezeichnung *sindhu* (bedeutet) ‚der große Ozean‘: wie ein Bootsmann mittels eines Bootes einen in (eben diesem) Boot befindlichen Menschen über diesen (d. h. den Ozean) hinüberführt.

“Durch das mit *durita* beginnende Wortpaar (wird) die Überwindung einer beim Überqueren (eintretenden) Gefahr (ausgedrückt); Gefahr wird eine durch Wind, Regen etc. entstehende mißliche Lage genannt; “*ati* bedeutet ‚überschreitend‘, *duritā* sind die Gefahren; so wird es dargelegt. Wie ein Bootsmann unter Vermeidung von Gefahr – Wind, Regen etc. – mit seinem Boot einen auf (eben diesem) Boot befindlichen Menschen über den Ozean führen kann,

“ebenso kann dieser erhabene Agni-Jātavedas, Hari selbst, indem er jede Gefahr, (nämlich) das Konglomerat von Übeln, das der Erlösung entgegensteht, vermeidet, (einen Menschen) über den unwegsamen Pfad der (die Bindung der Seele an den *saṃsāra* verursachenden) Elemente führen.”

3. Als drittes Beispiel für die Art der Interpretationen von Mantras aus der Rksamhitā sei die Passage 57,2–19ab angeführt, die die *Gāyatrī* RV 3,62,10²⁴ zum Gegenstand hat. Die Verse AS 57,1–5 bieten zunächst allein eine Erklärung des Wortes *tad*:

²³ *arātīyān sa tu prokto yo hy arātivad ācaret | sa ca bandhaḥ samākhyāto mīthyājñānanibandhanaḥ ||*.

²⁴ *tāt savitūr vāreṇ, yaṃ bhārgo devāsya dhīmahi | dhīyo yó naḥ pracodáyāt ||*.

*yat tu jyotiṣṭrayaṃ pūrvam jyotiṣcakre nidarśitam |
 sāvitram nāma yaḥ jyotiṣ tat sāvitṛsamāhvayaṃ ||
 tasya vyākhyāṃ imāṃ samyag gadato me niśāmya |
 saṃkalpaḥ kathito yaḥ sa sudarśanasamāhvayaḥ ||
 yā sā bhūtī mahāśakter vaiṣṇavyāḥ koṭībhāgaḥ |
 śuddhāśuddhamayaḥ bhāvaiḥ tanute viśṛṇāti tām ||
 pratisaṃcaravelāyāṃ tāmayaṭy²⁵ eva tām punaḥ |
 tāyate tatra-tatraiva bhūtyaṃśe dhārakātmanā ||
 pramāṇatvena bhūyaś ca tattadarthatayā punaḥ |
 atas tad iti saṃkalpaḥ procyate vaiṣṇavaḥ paraḥ ||*

“Die drei Lichter, die zuvor in dem Lichter-Diagramm gelehrt worden sind – dasjenige (davon), das die Bezeichnung ‚dem Sāvitr zugehörig‘ trägt, das heißt Sāvitrī;

“dessen Erklärung höre hier in rechter Weise von mir, der ich (zu dir) spreche. Derjenige, der *saṃkalpa* genannt wird, der heißt (auch) *sudarśana*.

“Die *bhūti*(śakti), die als ein Zehnmillionstel der großen Śakti Viṣṇus entstanden ist, die breitet er mit ihren aus Reinem und Unreinem bestehenden Zuständen aus (und) entfaltet sie (so).

“Zur Zeit der Reabsorption läßt er sie wieder unbeweglich werden. Er breitet sich in diesem und jenem Teil der *bhūti* als Träger,

“sodann als regulierendes Prinzip, weiterhin als dessen jeweiliger Zweck aus. Deshalb wird das Wort *tad* der höchste Wille Viṣṇus genannt.”

Erläuterungen:

a) 57,1ab: Zurecht verweist der Herausgeber der AS zu diesem Halbvors auf Kapitel 23, Vers 44cd–69ab, wo das sog. *jyotiṣcakra* mit einhundert Speichen (*śatārajyotiṣcakra*) – es handelt sich dabei wie auch bei den weiteren im 23. Adhy. gelehrt *cakras* um verschiedene magische Diagramme²⁶ – beschrieben wird. Es wird nach Auffassung der AS aus drei „Lichtern“, d. h. Mantras, gebildet, nämlich der mit dem Wort *tad* beginnenden Gāyatrī, der mit dem Wort *jātavedase* beginnenden Triṣṭubh (= RV 1,99) und der mit *tryambakam* anhebenden Anuṣṭubh (= RV 7,59,12). Es handelt sich dabei also um die Mantras, die Gegenstand

²⁵ Die Form ist offenbar als Kausativum zu *tam*ⁱ „ersticken“ (intr.); „erschöpft sein“ zu verstehen, obwohl sie korrekt *tāmayaṭi* (ved. *tamāy*) heißen und dann die Bedeutung „ersticken“ (tr.), „der Luft berauben“ haben müßte. Wie es scheint, ist *tāmayaṭi* eine *ad hoc* gebildete Kunstform, deren Silbe *tām* das folgende Objekt *tām* anklingen lassen soll (vgl. auch unten, S. 82).

²⁶ Es kommen im 23. Adhy. außer dem *śatārajyotiṣcakra* zur Sprache: das zwölfspeichige *cakra* (1–14ab), das *ajitacakra* und das *nārasimhacakra* mit je 52 Speichen (14cd–29ab und 29cd–44ab), das *brahmacakra* (69cd–73) sowie das *mātṛkācakra* mit eintausend Speichen (74–111).

der Interpretationen des 57. Kapitels sind. Offenbar in Analogie zu der im Vedischen bestehenden Vorstellung von den drei personifiziert als Feuer, Wind und Sonne gedachten Lichtern in den drei Weltgegenden werden in AS 23,46 und 47 die als Mutter der Veden bezeichnete Gāyatrī als Licht am Himmel (d. h. die Sonne) und die „Triṣṭubh-Strophe“ (RV 1,99) als das im Feueropfer enthaltene Licht, das das Geopferte befördert (= das Feuer), identifiziert²⁷, während es von der Anuṣṭubh (= RV 7,59,12) heißt, daß sie die Welten mit Säften nähre und die Augen erfreue²⁸.

b) 2cd: Der *saṃkalpa* ist in der AS Viṣṇus Wollen, sein Entschluß zu werden²⁹; er ist nach zahlreichen Stellen der AS mit dem ihn symbolisierenden, *sudarśana* genannten Diskus Viṣṇus sowie mit dessen *kriyāśakti* (s. unten) identisch³⁰.

c) 3ab: Die *bhūti(śakti)* bildet, wie bereits angedeutet, zusammen mit der *kriyāśakti* zwei verschiedene Aspekte der einen höchsten Śakti des Gottes Viṣṇu-Nārāyaṇa. Nach der überwiegenden Anzahl der Stellen in der AS (z. B. 3,27–28; 8,36 und 14,7–8) sind beide, *kriyā-* und *bhūtiśakti*, ein winziger Bruchteil dieser höchsten Śakti; an anderen Stellen (z. B. 5,8cd) wird dies jedoch nur von der *bhūtiśakti* im Hinblick auf ihr Verhältnis zur höchsten Śakti gesagt³¹. Dem letzteren Standpunkt scheint der hier besprochene Halbvers zu entsprechen.

d) 3cd: Gemeint sind die beiden Schöpfungsphasen der reinen, das Zustandekommen der *vyūhas*, *vyūhāntaras* und *vibhavas* umfassenden³² und der nicht-reinen, mit der Erschaffung der drei Entitäten *puruṣa*, *kāla* und *guṇas* einsetzenden Schöpfung³³. Beide gehen von der Grundlage der *bhūtiśakti* aus³⁴, die von der *kriyāśakti* angetrieben wird³⁵. Aus einem spezifischen, weiter unten noch zu erläuternden Grunde ist in dem hier besprochenen Halbvers jedoch von Ausbreitung (*tan*; *vi-stṛ*) die Rede.

²⁷ *yad etat prathitaṃ jyotir divi pratyakṣam uttamam | eṣā tad iti gāyatrī vedānāṃ jananī parā || yad etad agnihotrasthaṃ jyotir vahati vai hutam | jātavedasa ity eṣā triṣṭubh agnimayī tanuḥ ||*.

²⁸ *rasaiḥ puṣṇāti yad viśvaṃ jyotir nayanānandanam | tat triyambakam ity eṣānuṣṭubh indumayī tanuḥ ||*, AS 23,48.

²⁹ Vgl. AS 2,7cd: *tasya syām iti saṃkalpo bhāvato 'bhāvato 'pi vā ||*.

³⁰ Vgl. z. B. AS 8,30cd: *yā kriyā nāma saṃkalpaḥ sa sudarśananāmavān ||*; ebenso 5,7.

³¹ Vgl. auch SCHRADER, IP, S. 29, Anm. 6 und S. 30, Anm. 6.

³² Beschrieben im 5. Kapitel.

³³ Beschrieben ab Kapitel 6, Vers 8.

³⁴ Vgl. auch 5,9.

³⁵ Z. B. 5,13–15ab; 14,8cd.

e) 4cd–5ab: Inhaltlich sind diese Aussagen zu den Kapiteln 8–10 zu stellen, nach denen der *sudarśana* = *saṃkalpa* Viṣṇus während der Erschaffung und Reabsorption der Welt als „Stütze“ (*ādhāra*) fungiert, hingegen während der Phase der Erhaltung als regulierendes Prinzip (*pramāṇa*), durch das jedes Ding sein (festes) Maß (*iyattā*) erhält³⁶.

Erst bei näherem Hinsehen wird deutlich, daß der AS-Redaktor in den oben übersetzten Versen versuchte, seine Deutung des ersten Wortes der Gāyatrī, *tad*, als der *saṃkalpa* Viṣṇus formal auf dem Wege einer Anhäufung von Worten mit gleichem oder ähnlichem Anlaut – *tām*, *tāmayati*, *tāyate* – zu erreichen, um so eine – in Wirklichkeit natürlich nicht bestehende – etymologische Verbindung zu suggerieren. Ähnlich künstlich ist die Erklärung weiterer Worte des Gāyatrī-Mantra, wie sich etwa am Beispiel des Wortes *bhargas* in 9–11 erhellt, das ebenfalls als der *saṃkalpa* gedeutet wird (57,9–10ab):

bhargas tejah samākhyātam prabhāvaḥ karṣṇrūpatā |
bharatīdam jagat kṛtsnam saṃbharaty api ceśvarān ||
ramayaty api tat sarvaṃ rāti cārtham abhīpsitam |

“*bhargas* wird das *tejas* (des Gottes) genannt; es ist (seine) magische Macht, sein Dasein (in) Gestalt des Agens. Es trägt diese ganze Welt und unterstützt auch die (weltlichen) Herrscher;

“es ergötzt all dieses und gewährt das gewünschte Ziel.”

Hier sind es die Silben *bhar*, *sar* und *ar* in den Worten *bharati*, *saṃbharati*, *sarvaṃ* und *artham*, die die Lautgestalt des zu erklärenden Wortes *bhargas* anklingen lassen und so offenbar suggerieren sollen, daß die Bedeutung der Worte *bharati* etc. zugleich die Bedeutung des Terminus *bhargas* erhellt.

4. Den im 58. Kapitel der AS folgenden Ausführungen liegen ebenfalls vedische Mantras zugrunde, die jedoch nicht, wie in AS 57, aus der *Ṛksamhitā* stammen, sondern den zum Schwarzen Yajurveda gehörigen Texten zuzuordnen sind. Es handelt sich um die u. a. vom Adhvaryu bzw. dem Opferveranstalter bei der Feuerreibung gesprochenen fünf **Hotṛ-Formeln**, die in der *Kaṭha*- (9,8–9;11–12; vgl. auch 9,13–16), *Maitrāyaṇīya*- (1,9,1;4–5; vgl. auch 1,9,3;6–7) und *Kaṣṭhalakāṭha-saṃhitā* (8,11–12) sowie dem *Taittirīyāraṇyaka* ([TĀ] 3,1–6) bezeugt sind und auf die auch im *Taittirīyabrāhmaṇa* (2,2–3), *Āpastambaśrautasūtra* (14,13,1–2;4–8;13; 14,14,2;5;7–9;11–13; 14,15,1–5; 21,10,6–7; 21,11), *Śāṅkhāyanaśrautasūtra* (10,14,1–2;4; 10,15,1–2;4; 10,16,1–2;4; 10,17,1–2;4; 10,18,1–2;4) und *Aitareyabrāhmaṇa* (5,23 = 24,4 und

³⁶ 10,14cd–15ab; vgl. SCHRADER, IP, S. 103–108.

5,25 = 24,6) Bezug genommen wird³⁷. Die Formeln im einzelnen lauten nach dem Wortlaut des TĀ nebst Übersetzung:

a) die Zehnhotr-Formel – *cītiḥ srūk | cīttām ājyam | vāg védih | ādhūtam barhiḥ | kēto agniḥ | vījñātam agnīt | vākpatir hōtā | maña upavaktā | prāṇo haviḥ | sāmādhvaryūḥ* | „Der Opferlöffel ist die gedankliche Absicht; die Butter ist das Gedachte (Beabsichtigte); die Vedi ist die Sprache; die Opfergrasstreu ist das sehnsüchtig Erschaute (durch Meditation erzeugte Objekt); das Feuer ist der Wille; der Agnīdh ist das Erkannte (Wissen); der Hotar ist der Herr über die Sprache; der Upavaktar (Aufforderer) ist der Geist; die Opfergabe ist der Lebensatem; der Adhvaryu ist das Sāman (als aktivierende Melodie)“ (TĀ 3,1,1)³⁸

b) die Vierhotr-Formel – *prthivī hōtā | dyāur adhvaryūḥ | rudrō 'gnīt | bṛhaspātir upavaktā* | „Der Hotar ist die Erde, der Adhvaryu der Himmel, der Agnīdh Rudra, der Upavaktar Bṛhaspati“ (TĀ 3,2,1)

c) die Fünfhotr-Formel – *agnir hōtā | āśvinādhvaryūḥ | tvāṣṭāgnīt | mitrā upavaktā* | „Der Hotar ist Agni; das Adhvaryu-Paar sind die (beiden) Āśvin; der Agnīdh ist Tvaṣṭar, der Upavaktar Mitra“ (TĀ 3,3,1)

d) die Sechshotr-Formel – *sūryam te cākṣuḥ | vātam prāṇāḥ | dyām prṣṭhām | antārikṣam ātmā | āṅgair yajñām | prthivīm śārīraiḥ* | „Zur Sonne (geht ein) dein Augenlicht, in den Wind dein Lebensatem, zum Himmel dein Rücken, zum Luftraum (dein) Selbst, mit den Gliedern ins Opfer, mit den Gebeinen in die Erde“ (TĀ 3,4,1 [Eine Variante dieser Formel lautet: *vāg ghōtā | dīkṣā pātnī | vāto 'dhvaryūḥ | āpo 'bhigarāḥ | máno haviḥ | tāpasi juhomi* | „Der Hotar ist die Sprache, die Gattin die Weihe, der Adhvaryu der Wind, der Preisende die Wasser, die Opfergabe der Geist; in asketische Glut opfere ich“ (TĀ 3,6,1)])

e) die Siebenhotr-Formel – *mahāhāvīr hōtā | satyāhāvīr adhvaryūḥ | ācyutapājā agnīt | ācyutamanā upavaktā | anādhṛśyās cāpratidhṛśyās ca yajñāsyābhigarāu | ayāśya udgātā* | „Der Hotar ist der mit der großmächtigen Opfergabe; der Adhvaryu ist der mit dem Wahren als Opfergabe; der Agnīdh ist der, dessen Kraft unerschütterlich ist; der Upavaktar ist der, dessen Geist unerschütterlich ist; die beiden Preiser (d. h. der Preiser und Schmäher) des Opfers sind der Unangreifbare und der,

³⁷ Vgl. H. KRICK, Das Ritual der Feuergründung, Wien 1982, S. 287–290; zu ihrer selbständigen Anwendung zur Erreichung bestimmter Wünsche und bei Beschwörungen s. A. HILLEBRANDT, Ritual-Literatur. Vedische Opfer und Zauber, Strassburg 1887, S. 166.

³⁸ Diese wie auch die Übersetzungen der anderen Hotr-Formeln basieren auf den von Krick, a. a. O., S. 287, Anm. 719 und S. 289f., Anm. 727 gegebenen, ohne jedoch deren Verwechslung von Subjekt und Prädikatsnomen – „die gedankliche Absicht ist der Opferlöffel“ usw. – zu übernehmen, auf die mich Herr Dr. Werba freundlicherweise aufmerksam machte.

dessen Angriff unerwiderbar ist; der Udgātar ist der Unermüdliche“ (TĀ 3,5,1).

Bekanntlich repräsentiert jede dieser Formeln ein bestimmtes Opfer: die Zehnhotr-Formel das Agnihotra, die Vierhotr-Formel das Neujahrs- und Vollmondopfer etc., weswegen sie auch *yajñakratu* oder *iṣṭi* heißen³⁹. Folgt man ihrer von HILLEBRANDT gegebenen Deutung, dann handelt es sich somit um im Geiste vollzogene, nicht wirklich dargebrachte Opfer; sie besitzen den magisch-spekulativen Charakter von Upaniṣads⁴⁰. Es kann nun keinem Zweifel unterliegen, daß der Wortlaut der Hotr-Formeln, den die AS bei ihrer Interpretation erkennen läßt, dem TĀ-Text am nächsten steht:

- die AS enthält in den Versen 58,49cd–59 eine Auslegung beider Varianten der Sechshotr-Formel. Von allen Saṃhitā-Texten sind diese beiden Varianten allein im TĀ (3,4,1 und 3,6,1) enthalten.
- im Falle von zwischen dem TĀ und den anderen Saṃhitās unterschiedlichen Lesarten folgt die AS stets der ersteren⁴¹.
- die AS interpretiert auch den zu jeder Formel gehörigen Graha-Teil. Dabei folgt sie der in der TĀ bezeugten Anordnung, die sich von der in den drei übrigen Saṃhitās gegebenen z. T. unterscheidet⁴².

³⁹ HILLEBRANDT, *Ritual-Literatur*, S. 165.

⁴⁰ HILLEBRANDT, a. a. O., S. 166; P. ROLLAND, La litanie des quatre oblateurs (Maitrāyaṇī Saṃhitā I,9). JAs 258 (1970) 261–279. D. BHATTACHARYA, The Hotr-Formulae in the Agnyādheya and the Model Myth of the Vedic Sacrifice. Vishveshvaranand Indological Journal 16 (1978) 10–17, deutet unter Verwendung von Sāyaṇas Kommentar zum TĀ sowie Textstellen aus dem Śatapathabrāhmaṇa die Zehnhotr-Formel als Opferung des eigenen Lebens im *brahman* und Aufstieg zu höherer Daseinsebene (S. 13f.). Die (erste Variante der) Sechshotr-Formel, die er in einem Zusammenhang mit dem Puruṣa-Hymnus RV 10,90 sieht, legt er als ein Wiedereingehen der Glieder des Opferers in die entsprechenden Teile des kosmischen Puruṣa aus, während er in den Vier- und Fünfhotr-Formeln Modelle für Opfer sieht, die von Sterblichen bzw. Göttern ausgeführt wurden (S. 14f.). Diese Deutung der Hotr-Formeln übernimmt im wesentlichen F. M. SMITH, The Vedic Sacrifice in Transition. A Translation and Study of the Trikāṇḍamaṇḍana of Bhāskara Miśra, Poona 1987, S. 16ff., während ROLLAND in der Reihenfolge der einzelnen Hotr-Formeln verschiedene Etappen erkennen möchte, die in eine Eschatologie münden (a. a. O., S. 263).

⁴¹ Beispiele: 32c *rudrah* stimmt mit dem Wortlaut der Vierhotr-Formel in TĀ gegenüber *tvāṣṭā* in MS, KS und KapS überein; ebenso 33c *brhaspatih* mit dem Wortlaut der Vierhotr-Formel in TĀ gegenüber der Lesart *mitrāh* in MS, KS und KapS; 62d *acyutatā* und 63b *acyutih* entsprechen dem Wortlaut der Siebenhotr-Formel in TĀ gegenüber den abweichenden Lesarten *ácitta*- (statt *acyuta*-) *pājāh* bzw. *ácittamanāh* in MS, KS und KapS.

⁴² Die in TĀ nach der Zehnhotr-Formel folgende *graheṣṭikā* steht in MS, KS und KapS nach der Fünfhotr-Formel zusammen mit deren Graha-Teil; letztere

Die sich aus diesen Beobachtungen ergebende Schlußfolgerung, daß der AS-Redaktor offensichtlich Zugang zu demjenigen Wortlaut der Hotṛ-Formel hatte, wie er im TĀ bezeugt ist, läßt die Annahme verlockend erscheinen, daß die Schlußkapitel der AS im südindischen Raum verfaßt wurden; denn bekanntlich ist das Hauptsiedlungsgebiet der Taittirīyakas seit ca. 650 n. Chr. bis auf den heutigen Tag Südindien, vor allem Kerala⁴³. Obwohl die Übereinstimmung zwischen der AS und dem TĀ für sich genommen sicherlich noch nicht ausreicht, um die südindische Herkunft des ersteren Textes zu beweisen, so sei doch in diesem Zusammenhang in Erinnerung gerufen, daß bereits vor einiger Zeit W. E. BEGLEY⁴⁴ auf der Grundlage bestimmter ikonographischer Partien der AS argumentiert hat, daß Südindien der Ort der abschließenden Redaktion der AS sei⁴⁵. Zumindest scheint es lohnend, nach weiteren Indizien, die für eine solche Annahme sprechen könnten, Ausschau zu halten.

Wie nach den Ausführungen des AS-Redaktors zu den aus der Rksamhitā stammenden Mantras zu erwarten, werden auch die aus dem TĀ übernommenen Hotṛ-Formeln auf die Weise „gedeutet“, daß einzelne Worte mit Bestandteilen der in der AS gelehrt Theologie identifiziert werden. Als Beispiel möge die Behandlung der Vierhotṛ-Formel dienen (die daraus entnommenen Worte sind gesperrt [58,31–33]):

jagatprathanarūpā sā pṛthivī prakṛtiḥ smṛtā |
puruṣo dyaur iti prokto dyotate sa svayā citā ||
ruṇaddhi pralaye tau dvau drāvayaty udaye 'pi ca |
rudra ity uditāḥ kālāḥ saṃyojakaviyojakaḥ ||
bṛhat sā śaktir uddiṣṭā yato bṛṃhayate 'kḥilam |
bṛhaspatiḥ patis tasyā devadevo janārdanaḥ ||

“Die Erde, die die Gestalt des Ortes der Ausbreitung (alles) Lebenden besitzt, heißt Urmaterie. Der *puruṣa* wird Himmel genannt; (denn) er leuchtet mit seinem Geistlicht.

wird in den genannten drei Samhitās nicht nur dort, sondern ein weiteres Mal nach der Vierhotṛ-Formel zusammen mit deren Graha-Teil gebracht.

⁴³ Vgl. M. WITZEL, Regionale und überregionale Faktoren in der Entwicklung vedischer Brahmanengruppen im Mittelalter (Materialien zu den vedischen Schulen, 5), in: Regionale Tradition in Südasien, hrsg. v. H. KULKE und D. ROTHERMUND, Wiesbaden 1985, S. 45; 50 mit Karte auf S. 51.

⁴⁴ Viṣṇu's Flaming Wheel. The Iconography of the Sudarśana-Cakra, New York 1973.

⁴⁵ BEGLEY, op. cit., S. 27f. Dies schließt natürlich, wie BEGLEY sehr richtig bemerkt, nicht aus, daß einzelne Teile der AS einer früheren Kompilationsschicht angehören.

*keto jñānam iti proktam uccāryasyāvadhāraṇam ||
 vijñātam yat tad uccāryam avadhāraṇagocaram |
 yat tad vāgindriyaṃ proktaṃ tadvyāṅgyā yā sarasvatī ||
 sā vāk tāṃ subruvan pāti yaḥ sa vākpatir ucyate |
 uccāraṇapravṛtter yaḥ prayatno hetur ucyate ||
 sa prāṇaḥ sāma tat proktaṃ yad uccāraṇasausthavam |*

„Das (Organ) namens ‚gedankliche Absicht‘ wird als Erkenntnisorgan gelehrt, die Ursache einer Entscheidung. Das Ichbewußtsein jedoch soll ‚das Gedachte‘ sein, die Ursache des Selbstgefühls.

„Das Organ namens ‚Geist‘ – das ist die Ursache des Vorstellens und des Zweifelns. ‚Sprache‘ werden die Worte genannt, die die Form ‚So soll es sein‘ haben.

„Sehnsüchtig Erschautes‘ heißt die Tätigkeit der Stimme, die das Erlernen (und Rezitieren des Veda) genannt wird. Der ‚Wille‘ wird Erkenntnis genannt, die genaue Bestimmung der (durch die Sprache) ausgedrückten (Bedeutung).

„Welches das ‚Erkannte‘ ist, das ist die Bedeutung, deren Bereich ihre genaue Bestimmung ist. Die Rede, die durch das wahrnehmbar gemacht wird, was das Organ des Sprechens genannt wird, das ist die (tatsächliche) sprachliche Äußerung; wer diese schützt, indem er sie gut artikuliert, der wird der ‚Herr über die Sprache‘ genannt.

„Die (artikulatorische) Anstrengung, die als die Ursache des Vorstattengehens des Aussprechens bezeichnet wird, das ist ‚der Atem‘. Als ‚Melodie‘ wird das bezeichnet, was als Vortrefflichkeit der Artikulation gilt.“ Nachdem in 16cd–17 die am Ende der Äußerung „So möge es sein“ sich einstellende richtige Erkenntnis (*miti*) als Funktion des dreiteiligen Innenorgans Erkennen, Ichgefühl und Denken bestimmt wurde, werden in 18cd–22ab diese sowie die weiteren in 8–13ab aufgezählten Funktionen einschließlich der tatsächlichen sprachlichen Äußerung und der Melodie mit den jeweils zweiten der in der Zehnhotṛ-Formel einander zugeordneten Begriffen – also Opferlöffel, Butter, etc. – identifiziert. Die ganze „Deutung“ der Zehnhotṛ-Formel wird, bevor dann in 24cd–30 der zugehörige Graha-Teil interpretiert wird, mit der Feststellung beendet: *itthaṃ jagadvidhānākhyo daśopakaraṇānvitaḥ || yo yajño vaiṣṇavo vṛttas tam adyatve vicintayet |* „An das Opfer, das (in früherer Zeit) so mit der Bezeichnung ‚Anordnung der Welt‘ mit den zehn Werkzeugen für Viṣṇu stattgefunden hat, daran möge man auch in heutiger Zeit denken“.

III. Zusammenfassung der Ergebnisse

1. Aus den auf S. 76, 81f. sowie 86 gemachten Erläuterungen geht hervor, daß die den hier untersuchten Kapiteln der AS zugrundeliegenden theologischen Anschauungen – die Vorstellung der Śakti des höch-

sten Gottes unter den beiden Aspekten *kriyā-* und *bhūtiśakti*; die herausragende Stellung des *sudarśana* genannten Wollens (*saṃkalpa*) Viṣṇus, seinerseits mit der *kriyāśakti* identifiziert; die Konzipierung der Weltentstehung in den beiden Phasen der reinen und nicht-reinen Schöpfung; die drei Entitäten *puruṣa*, *prakṛti* und *kāla* als Ausgangspunkt der nicht-reinen Schöpfung – mit denen anderer Passagen innerhalb der AS, besonders mit den Kapiteln 4–7, im wesentlichen übereinstimmen. Diese Beobachtung legt die Annahme nahe, daß sich hinter der AS in ihrer gesamten uns heute vorliegenden Gestalt die Hand eines Redaktors verbirgt, der die zum Teil recht unterschiedlichen, aus verschiedenen Quellen adaptierten und kompilierten Stoffe, die in die AS Eingang gefunden haben⁴⁸, mit dem Rahmen seiner eben genannten theologischen Vorstellungen, die das ganze Korpus der AS wie ein roter Faden durchlaufen, verknüpft hat.

2. Vergleicht man die Interpretation vedischer Mantras in jenen Kapiteln der AS, die wir soeben betrachtet haben, mit den Texten, die bisher von BHATTACHARYA und GONDA untersucht worden sind (s. S. 71f.), so wird ein beträchtlicher Unterschied zwischen der AS und anderen Samhitās bzw. Āgamas deutlich: Im Falle der Schlußkapitel der AS werden die jeweiligen vedischen Mantras nicht dazu benutzt, um ein bestimmtes Ritual zu erklären; stattdessen werden sie im Sinne der theologisch-philosophischen Vorstellungen der AS neu interpretiert. Es ergibt sich somit der bemerkenswerte Befund, daß die AS mit ihrer Interpretation vedischer Mantras ein Verfahren praktiziert, das bereits aus der Brāhmaṇa-Literatur bekannt ist; denn auch dort werden vedische Mantras fernab einer wortgetreuen Interpretation mit neuen, symbolhaften Deutungen versehen, die ihnen ursprünglich fremd sind. In dieser Hinsicht nimmt die AS eine Sonderstellung sowohl innerhalb der tantrischen Literatur im allgemeinen als auch zumindest unter denjenigen Werken der anonymen Pāñcarātra-Literatur wie der Pauṣkara-, Jayākhyā- und Sātvata-Samhitā im besonderen ein, für die ein relativ frühes Kompilationsdatum angenommen wird⁴⁹. Im großen und ganzen entspricht der Gebrauch vedischer Mantras in diesen zuletzt genannten Texten BHATTACHARYAS Beobachtungen: in ihnen werden die vedischen Mantras Ritualen übergestülpt, mit denen sie ursprünglich nichts zu tun hatten. Nirgends jedoch ist in diesen Samhitās ein vedischer Text so in den Kontext der Pāñcarātra-Theologie integriert wie im Falle der oben untersuchten AS-Passagen.

⁴⁸ Siehe die bei SCHRADER, IP, S. 99–146 gegebene Inhaltsangabe.

⁴⁹ Vgl. D. SMITH, A Descriptive Bibliography of the Printed Texts of the Pāñcarātra Āgama, Vol. 1, Baroda 1975, S. 113, 296, 535.

Die Frage bleibt, wie diese Beobachtungen im Kontext der Religion des Pāñcarātra zu interpretieren sind. Eine erste Antwort scheint sich abzuzeichnen, wenn man in Betracht zieht, daß eine deutliche Beziehung zwischen den hier untersuchten Schlußkapiteln der AS und den vorangehenden Kapiteln 51–56 besteht. Diese Kapitel befassen sich nämlich mit nicht-vedischen Mantras wie dem Tārā-Mantra (Adhy. 51) oder dem Jitanta-Mantra (Adhy. 53), zu deren Erklärung der AS-Redaktor genau wie im Falle der vedischen Mantras mit theologischen Konzepten der AS operierte. In diesem Licht betrachtet scheint die Verwendung vedischer Hymnen in den Schlußkapiteln 58 und 59 der AS mehr als nur eine außergewöhnliche vedische Tendenz in einer Pāñcarātra-Saṃhitā zu sein. Sie bezeugt möglicherweise den gezielten Versuch, zu einer Integration sowohl der tantrischen als auch der vedischen Tradition auf der gemeinsamen Grundlage der Pāñcarātra-Philosophie zu gelangen, eine Annahme freilich, deren Haltbarkeit es in künftigen Untersuchungen zur AS erst noch zu erhärten gilt.

ÜBER DEN INDIREKTEN BEWEIS BEI LITERATURHISTORISCHEN FRAGESTELLUNGEN

Von Michael Hahn, Marburg

Seit den Tagen der Antike wird in der Mathematik das Verfahren des indirekten Beweises als eine willkommene Ergänzung bei einer Reihe von Fällen hoch geschätzt, die sich nicht durch einen direkten Beweis klären lassen. Der indirekte Beweis wird in der Regel dann verwendet, wenn bei einer bestimmten Fragestellung nur zwei logisch kontradiktorische Antworten, A oder $\neg A$, möglich sind. Lassen sich weder A noch $\neg A$ direkt beweisen, dann hilft oft das folgende Vorgehen weiter: Man nimmt an, es gelte A . Nun überprüft man die Konsequenzen, die sich aus A ergeben. Wenn man zeigen kann, daß sich aus der Annahme A ein logischer Widerspruch ableiten läßt, dann schließt man daraus, daß die Annahme A falsch sein muß, daß also $\neg A$ die richtige Antwort auf das Ausgangsproblem ist.

Das klassische Beispiel für den indirekten Beweis ist die Widerlegung der Annahme, die Wurzel aus 2 sei eine rationale Zahl, also eine durch einen Bruch darstellbare Zahl. Angenommen, die Wurzel aus 2 sei durch einen nicht mehr weiter kürzbaren Bruch p/q darstellbar, dann folgt daraus, daß p^2/q^2 gleich 2 ist. Dies ist gleichbedeutend mit $p^2 = 2q^2$. Hieraus folgt, daß p^2 gerade ist, und damit auch, daß p eine gerade Zahl sein muß, also etwa $2r$. Für q folgt daraus, daß es ungerade sein muß, denn wir waren ja von einem nicht mehr weiter kürzbaren Bruch ausgegangen. Wir ersetzen nun p durch $2r$ und erhalten die Gleichung $4r^2 = 2q^2$ oder $2r^2 = q^2$. Aus dieser Gleichung folgt aber, daß q^2 gerade sein muß und damit auch q . Damit haben wir bewiesen, daß q sowohl ungerade wie auch gerade ist, was einen Widerspruch darstellt. Damit gilt unsere zugrunde liegende Annahme, die Wurzel aus 2 sei eine rationale Zahl, als widerlegt, und dies hat dann die Einführung der Klasse der irrationalen Zahlen zur Folge. Mit ähnlichen Mitteln läßt sich dann weiter die Existenz der transzendentalen und der nicht abzählbaren Zahlen beweisen.

Es wäre schön, wenn sich dieses Verfahren mit der gleichen Stringenz auch in den Geisteswissenschaften anwenden ließe, aber leider können wir davon nur in einer angenäherten Form Gebrauch machen, etwa nach dem folgenden Muster: die aus der Annahme A abzuleitenden

Konsequenzen sind deutlich unwahrscheinlicher als die sich aus der Annahme 7A ergebenden Folgen. Nichtsdestoweniger scheint mir ein solches Vorgehen manchmal doch sinnvoller zu sein als der reine Zweifel an einzelnen Schritten einer vorgetragenen Argumentation. Dabei werden nämlich oft Prioritäten verwischt: ich kann zwar zeigen, daß ein Detailschluß von A auf B nicht auf allzu festem Grund steht und daher eher als eine Hypothese zu betrachten ist; ich kann es mir aber dabei ersparen, die Konsequenzen der Nichtgültigkeit von B zu bedenken.

Die oben angestellten Überlegungen kamen mir in den Sinn, als ich kürzlich den Abschnitt 1.2.6: Ist Candragomin der Verfasser des Lokānanda-Nāṭaka und anderer literarischer Werke? in der Dissertation von THOMAS OBERLIES¹ las. In dem genannten Abschnitt geht OBERLIES auf die Frage ein, ob dem Grammatiker Candragomin auch literarische Werke zugeschrieben werden können. Bekanntlich habe ich mich hierzu mehrfach geäußert und dabei die Auffassung vertreten, daß wenigstens das Schauspiel Lokānanda und ebenfalls der Brief Śiṣyalekha dem Grammatiker Candragomin zuzuschreiben seien, ggf. auch noch einige der literarisch anspruchsvolleren Stotras, die in tibetischer Übersetzung im Tanjur vorliegen². Bei den vielen kleineren Schriften tantrischen Charakters hatte ich mich gegen eine Autorschaft des Grammatikers und Schauspielers ausgesprochen, und bei dem philosophischen Werk Nyāyasiddhyāloka war schon von SATIS CHANDRA VIDYABHUSHANA, die Auffassung vertreten worden, daß es sich um ein Werk aus dem 10. Jh. handle³, womit der Grammatiker und der Schauspieldichter für die Verfasserschaft aus chronologischen Gründen nicht in Frage kommen. Auch wenn ERNST STEINKELLNER jüngst die Lebenszeit des Logikers sogar in das 8. Jh. setzen konnte⁴, ist das ebenfalls zu spät, um für unsere Überlegungen in Betracht zu kommen.

Für die Dissertation von OBERLIES war die Frage, ob der Grammatiker und der Schauspieldichter eine Person sind, eigentlich ohne Belang. Von Bedeutung hingegen war für ihn das Hauptindiz, das ich für die Identität dieser beiden Candragomins angeführt hatte, da dieses wie-

¹ THOMAS OBERLIES, Studie zum Cāndravāyākaraṇa. Eine kritische Bearbeitung von Candra IV.4.52–148 und V.2, Stuttgart 1989 (ANIS 38).

² Man vgl. hierzu Candragomins Lokānandanāṭaka. Nach dem tibetischen Tanjur herausgegeben und übersetzt. Ein Beitrag zur klassischen indischen Schauspieldichtung von MICHAEL HAHN, Wiesbaden 1974 (Asiatische Forschungen 39), S. 1–13.

³ Satis Chandra VIDYABHUSHANA, A History of Indian Logic (Ancient, Mediaeval and Modern Schools), Calcutta 1920, S. 336.

⁴ In seinem Artikel: Miszellen zur erkenntnistheoretisch-logischen Schule des Buddhismus IV. WZKS 28 (1984) 177f.

derum die Echtheit einer Maṅgala-Strophe zu Beginn der Vṛtti zum Cāndravyākaraṇa und am Anfang des Adhikārasaṅgraha implizieren könnte. Da nun aber die Vṛtti von einem Dharmadāsa stammen soll und der Adhikārasaṅgraha wahrscheinlich aus der Vṛtti exzerpiert wurde⁵, wäre es anscheinend störend, wenn beide Werke mit einer Strophe Candragomins eingeleitet würden. Dies scheint das Motiv dafür zu sein, daß OBERLIES die Annahme zweier verschiedener Autoren für Grammatik und Schauspiel sympathischer ist. Hierzu sind jedoch bestimmte Hilfsannahmen erforderlich, auf die ich gleich noch zu sprechen kommen werde.

Da nun auch meine eigene Auffassung nur unter Bildung bestimmter Hilfsannahmen zu rechtfertigen ist, könnte man die Angelegenheit auf sich beruhen lassen und sie der nicht geringen Zahl von offenen Fragen der indischen Literaturgeschichte zuweisen, bei denen eine Beantwortung zwar äußerst wünschenswert wäre, bei denen man aber bisher über die Aufstellung bestimmter Grundpositionen nicht hinausgekommen ist. Ärgerlicherwise hat die Beantwortung der Frage in dem einen oder anderen Sinne die Konsequenz, daß damit auch das Verhältnis von Candragomin und Harṣadeva festgelegt wird, denn im Falle der Identität von Grammatiker und Schauspielautor käme Candragomin ganz deutlich (um wenigstens anderthalb Jahrhunderte) die Priorität zu, während er im Falle der Nicht-Identität wohl einige Dekaden nach Harṣadeva anzusetzen wäre. Das zeitliche Verhältnis dieser beiden Dichter kann aber nicht unberücksichtigt bleiben bei der noch vorzunehmenden vergleichenden Bewertung ihrer beiden so eng miteinander verwandten Schauspiele Lokānanda und Nāgānanda. Auch für das Verhältnis von Kālidāsa und Candragomin⁶ ist es nicht ganz gleichgültig, ob beide Dichter nur durch wenige Jahrzehnte oder aber durch mehr als zwei Jahrhunderte voneinander getrennt sind. Und schließlich bin ich der Meinung, daß wir im Falle des Schauspieldichters über ein besonders kostbares – weil aus seinem eigenen Munde stammendes – Zeugnis verfügen, das man nicht ohne zwingende Gründe als unecht abtun sollte. Allein diese Gesichtspunkte – also die Konsequenzen der jeweiligen Auffassung für die indische Literaturgeschichte – haben mich bewogen, mich mit der Kritik von OBERLIES auseinanderzusetzen. Für

⁵ Vgl. hierzu OBERLIES, op. cit., S. 2 und 17.

⁶ In einem unveröffentlichten Vortrag, den ich im November 1982 anlässlich des Silberjubiläums der Kālidāsa-Akademie in Ujjain gehalten habe, konnte ich 15 Episoden aus dem Abhijñānaśakuntala und dem Lokānanda einander gegenüberstellen, die die gegenseitige Abhängigkeit beider Werke mehr als deutlich machen; ich gehe zur Zeit noch davon aus, daß es Candragomin war, der bei Kālidāsa Anleihen machte.

die Bewertung des Schauspiels selbst ist es (fast) unerheblich, wann es verfaßt wurde; es wird weder durch eine frühere Abfassungszeit besser noch durch eine spätere Abfassungszeit schlechter – wenn man einmal von dem Gesichtspunkt der Originalität absieht.

Bei der Behandlung der Frage der Identität bzw. Nicht-Identität will ich versuchen, mich nur auf die wenigen in diesem Zusammenhang wesentlichen Argumente zu konzentrieren. Im Zusammenhang mit der Person, dem Werk und der Lebenszeit des jeweiligen Candragomin ist uns eine Fülle von Details von ganz und gar unterschiedlicher Zuverlässigkeit in den verschiedensten Quellen überliefert. Hier jeder gedanklichen Verzweigung nachzugehen bringt gar nichts, sondern lenkt nur von dem wirklich wichtigen Gedankengang ab⁷. Ich setze voraus, daß der an den entsprechenden Einzelheiten interessierte Leser sich im Bedarfsfall in den bei HAHN und OBERLIES genannten Arbeiten informieren kann; ich verweise der Vollständigkeit halber noch auf zwei Bücher und zwei Aufsätze von MARK TATZ, in denen dieser sich mit Werk, Leben und Datum des Candragomin auseinandersetzt: Candragomin's Twenty Verses on the Bodhisattva Vow and its Commentary by Sakya Dragpa Gyaltsen⁸, Difficult Beginnings. Three Works on the Bodhisattva Path⁹, On the Date of Chandragomin¹⁰ und The Life of Candragomin in Tibetan Historical Tradition¹¹.

Für unsere Fragestellung sind nun nur die folgenden Fakten von Bedeutung:

1) Es gab einen Grammatiker Candragomin, von dem wenigstens das Sūtra des unter seinem Namen gehenden grammatischen Systems stammt. Seine Heimat lag – vielleicht – im Osten Indiens¹².

⁷ So kann man etwa fruchtlos darüber diskutieren, ob die Strophe über das Verhältnis von Gift und Sinnesgenüssen, die I-ching Candragomin in den Mund legt (siehe weiter unten unter Punkt 8), im ursprünglichen Śiṣyalekha stand oder nicht (es ist ziemlich sicher, daß diese auch im ältesten – und *de facto* einzigen – Śiṣyalekha-Manuskript zu findende Strophe dort interpoliert ist; vgl. hierzu die Anm. 14) und ob sie somit überhaupt von Candragomin stammt. Daß Candragomin den Śiṣyalekha geschrieben hat, wissen wir auch ohne die eindeutige Beantwortung dieser Frage mit größter Sicherheit aus anderen Quellen.

⁸ Transl. with an introduction by MARK TATZ, Dharamsala 1982.

⁹ Boston-London 1985.

¹⁰ In: Buddhism and Jainism, edd. H. CH. DAS, CH. DAS, S. R. PAL, Cuttack: Institute of Oriental and Orissan Studies 1976, S. 281–297.

¹¹ The Tibet Journal 7 (1982) 1–22.

¹² Dies wird nicht durch die Primärüberlieferung der indischen Handschriften bestätigt, sondern die diesbezüglichen Angaben stammen aus den Werken der sehr viel späteren Doxographen Buston und Tāranātha. Diese haben aber bekanntlich die tibetischen Übersetzungen indischer Werke wie auch deren Kolophone ausgebeutet, so daß ihr Zeugnis theoretisch auch auf Quellen zu-

- 2) Der Grammatiker Candragomin hat nach allgemein akzeptierter Auffassung nicht später als 470 n. Chr. gelebt.
- 3) Es gab einen buddhistischen Dichter Candragomin, der ein Schauspiel Lokānanda „Die Freude für die Menschen“ geschrieben hat. Dieses Werk ist nur in einer schlechten tibetischen Übersetzung erhalten, die aus dem Anfang des 14. Jh. stammt. Der Schauspieldichter Candragomin sagt von sich im Prolog (Strophe 5), daß er aus dem Osten Indiens stamme.
- 4) Es gab einen buddhistischen Dichter Candragomin, der einen poetischen Lehrbrief Śiṣyalekha „Der Brief an einen Schüler“ verfaßt hat. Dieses Werk ist im Sanskrit-Original wie auch in einer aus dem Anfang des 9. Jhs. stammenden tibetischen Übersetzung erhalten. Neun Strophen des Śiṣyalekha finden sich auch im Lokānanda wieder; dies spricht für die Identität von Schauspiel- und Briefautor.
- 5) Der Schauspieldichter Candragomin sagt im Prolog (Strophe 6) durch den Schauspieldirektor von sich, er habe auch eine Grammatik geschrieben, die knapp und völlig klar und dabei doch umfassend sei.
- 6) Eine Strophe, die die Grammatik des Candragomin als ‚knapp und völlig klar und dabei doch umfassend‘ (*laghuviśpaṣṭasampūrṇam*) charakterisiert, findet sich zu Beginn der Vṛtti und des Adhikārasaṃgraha zum Cāndravyākaraṇa.
- 7) Der chinesische Pilger I-ching wußte von einem Dichter aus dem Osten Indiens, der „Mond-Beamter“ hieß. Dieser hatte ein Schauspiel über den Prinzen Viśvantara geschrieben, das in ganz Indien aufgeführt wurde.
- 8) Wenig später berichtet I-ching von einem großen Mann aus Ostindien, einem Bodhisattva namens „(Sonne-)Mond-Beamter“, der auf die Frage, ob Gift (*viṣa*) oder Sinnesgenüsse (*viśaya*) schlimmer seien, geantwortet habe: „Zwischen Gift und Sinnesgenüssen gibt es in der Tat einen riesengroßen Unterschied: Gift tötet, wenn es genossen wird, Sinnesgenüsse schon dann, wenn man nur an sie denkt“¹³. Die Strophe wird in der Subhāṣitāvalī des Vallabhadeva einem Candragopin zugeschrieben¹⁴. I-ching sagt von diesem Mann, daß er noch gelebt habe, als er „jenes Land“ (Indien oder der Osten Indiens?) besucht habe.

rückgehen kann, die mit unserem Punkt 3 identisch oder verwandt, also nicht unbedingt unabhängig sind.

¹³ *viśasya viśayāṇām ca dūram atyantam antaram | upabhuktaṃ viṣaṃ hanti viśayāḥ smaraṇād api* // No. 3368 der Subhāṣitāvalī.

¹⁴ Im Śiṣyalekha-Manuskript aus Cambridge (und entsprechend in den beiden in St. Petersburg und London aufbewahrten Abschriften) ist sie nach einer Strophe ähnlichen Inhalts interpoliert, in der tibetischen Übersetzung fehlt sie. Das Versmaß dieser Strophe (Anuṣṭubh) kommt sonst im Śiṣyalekha nicht vor.

Es muß betont werden, daß die unter 1–4 und 6–8 genannten Fakten alle bereits seit langem bekannt sind. Mein einziger eigener Beitrag bestand in dem Hinweis auf das unter 5 genannte Indiz und seine Verknüpfung mit 6. Seit LÉVI und LIEBICH hat man sich weitestgehend darauf beschränkt, diese Fakten (und ihre Belegstellen) zu wiederholen und sie durch die Verbindung mit anderen, meist unwesentlichen Details anders zu gewichten.

Wenn wir nur die Aussagen 1, 3, 5 und 6 miteinander verknüpfen, dürfte die natürliche Folgerung die sein, daß nichts gegen die Annahme spricht, der Grammatiker und der Schauspielauteur seien ein und dieselbe Person. Nehmen wir nun die Aussagen 2, 7 und 8 hinzu, so tritt eine kardinale Schwierigkeit auf. Zunächst dürfen wir davon ausgehen, daß I-ching an beiden Stellen von derselben Person spricht. Zwar ist der Name an der zweiten Stelle um den Bestandteil „Sonne“ erweitert, aber hier scheint doch wohl ein Überlieferungsfehler vorzuliegen, denn in drei anderen Punkten sprechen externe Argumente für die Identität beider Personen: aus den Aussagen 3 und 4 wissen wir, daß ein Candragomin, der aus dem Osten Indiens stammte, sowohl ein Schauspiel als auch einen Lehrbrief geschrieben hat, welche beide eine Strophe enthalten, die sinngemäß der Candragomin von I-ching in den Mund gelegten entspricht¹⁵. In diesen drei Punkten bestätigt I-ching also das, was wir aus den in 3 und 4 genannten Primärquellen wissen bzw. erschließen können. Seine Behauptung, die in 8 genannte Person – der Dichter des Śiṣyalekha (und damit der des Lokānanda) – habe noch im vierten Viertel des 7. Jhs. gelebt, läßt sich nicht mit der unter 2 angeführten Lebenszeit für den Grammatiker Candragomin vereinbaren. Dieser Punkt ist weitaus gravierender als die zweite Diskrepanz, die in dem Namen des Helden des Schauspiels des Dichters „Mond-Beamter“ liegt, der nach I-ching Viśvantara lautet, während der Held des Lokānanda doch Mañicūḍa heißt.

Wenn wir hier einen Augenblick einhalten, so können wir resümieren, daß I-ching die Angaben der Primärquellen 3 und 4 in drei wesent-

Deshalb und wegen der inhaltlichen Gemeinsamkeit mit der vorangehenden Strophe ist ihre Echtheit hinreichend sicher ausgeschlossen.

¹⁵ Śiṣyalekha 75 = Lokānanda II.20: *kāmaṃ viṣaṃ ca viṣayāś ca nīrūpyamāṇāḥ, śreyo viṣaṃ na viṣayā viśamasvabhāvāḥ | ekatra janmani viṣaṃ viṣatām prayāti, janmāntare 'pi viṣayā viṣatām prayānti ||* „Wenn man jedoch Gift und Sinnesgenüsse genauer miteinander vergleicht, dann (sieht man), daß Gift besser ist als die von Natur aus bösartigen Sinnesgenüsse: Gift wird nur in einem Leben zu Gift, während die Sinnesgenüsse sich auch in anderen Leben als giftig erweisen.“

lichen Punkten bestätigt (Candragomin hat die Werke Lokānanda und Śiṣyalekha geschrieben und stammt aus dem Osten Indiens), während zwei seiner Aussagen (Name des Helden des Schauspiels und Lebenszeit des Grammatikers, der durch 3 mit dem Schauspieldichter verknüpft ist) nicht mit dem übereinstimmen, was wir aus der Quelle 3 bzw. den unter 2 genannten Forschungsergebnissen wissen. Die Frage des Namens des Helden hat niemand bisher als sonderlich schwerwiegend betrachtet, sondern man war stets bereit, dies auf das Konto der großen Ähnlichkeit der beiden Legenden von Mañicūḍa und Viśvantara zu schreiben. I-ching hätte dann – sei es absichtlich, sei es unabsichtlich – den bekannteren der beiden Heroen genannt. Was I-chings Bemerkung zur Lebenszeit des Schauspieldichters angeht, so stellt sie uns vor die folgenden beiden Möglichkeiten:

- a) Wir vertrauen I-chings Angabe; dann muß es sich in der Tat bei dem Schauspieldichter um eine von dem Grammatiker verschiedene Persönlichkeit handeln, denn die Datierung des Grammatikers läßt sich nicht umstoßen.
- b) Wir rechnen mit der Möglichkeit, daß I-ching eine falsche mündliche Information erhalten oder Einzelheiten in der Erinnerung durcheinandergeworfen hat; dann besteht wegen der Selbstaussage des Schauspieldichters kein Anlaß dazu, an der Identität beider Persönlichkeiten zu zweifeln.

Ich war und bin weiterhin der Meinung, daß die zweite Annahme sich zwangloser in das Gesamtbild fügt. Dabei habe ich es aber versäumt, mich der Mühe zu unterziehen, einen Teil meiner „subjektiven Evidenz“ zu objektivieren. Nun ist das allerdings meist ein hoffnungsloses Unterfangen, weil ein beträchtlicher Teil der dabei anzuführenden Argumente für einen anderen oft nicht zwingend erscheint. In diese Kategorie fällt etwa die für mich spürbare Nähe von Abhijñānaśakuntala und Lokānanda. Selbst wenn es gelänge, einen anderen davon zu überzeugen, daß die Übereinstimmungen zwischen den beiden Schauspielen von ihrer Zahl wie von ihrer Qualität her kaum zufällig sein können, so kann der Skeptiker immer noch zu Recht fragen: „Und was bedeutet das für das Alter des Lokānanda?“ Oder man betrachte das Verhältnis des Lokānanda zum Nāgānanda. Vielfache Lektüre beider Schauspiele wie auch anderer im weitesten Sinne zeitgenössischer Werke lassen es mir unmöglich erscheinen, daß das Lokānanda das spätere Werk ist; aber dies läßt sich nicht durch stilistische oder dramaturgische Kriterien erweisen, da Harṣadeva ja im Gegensatz zu den bald auf ihn folgenden Neuerern stark den älteren Vorbildern verhaftet ist. Hier lassen sich nur zwei Plausibilitätsargumente anführen: 1) Weshalb sollte Harṣadeva, der bei seinen anderen beiden Schauspielen

Ratnāvalī und Priyadarśikā Originalität allenfalls im Detail, nicht jedoch in der Gesamtkonzeption bewiesen hat, ausgerechnet beim Nāgānanda, das ihm stoffmäßig am fernsten stehen mußte, eine originelle Schöpfung zustande gebracht haben? 2) Wieso nimmt sich ein Buddhist wie Candragomin ausgerechnet das Werk eines Nicht-Buddhisten zum Vorbild und erlaubt es sich zudem noch, seine Nachahmung im Prolog (Strophe 4) als „völlig neuartiges Werk“ zu bezeichnen? Eine solche Behauptung – hätte sie nicht den Tatsachen entsprochen – wäre von den zeitgenössischen Kennern mit Sicherheit als Anmaßung kritisiert worden¹⁶.

Wollte ich meine Auffassung mit derartigen Argumenten untermauern, so stünde die hierdurch zu erzielende Überzeugungsleistung in keinem Verhältnis zu dem dazu erforderlichen Aufwand. Einfacher wäre es, darauf hinzuweisen, daß OBERLIES in einem anderen Fall das chronologische Zeugnis I-chings ohne Bedenken oder Diskussion beiseite wischt, nämlich bei der Datierung Bhartṛhari¹⁷. Dieser soll nach I-ching um 651/2 n. Chr. gestorben sein¹⁸, was jedoch nicht zu den angenommenen Lebenszeiten von Dignāga und anderen buddhistischen Autoren paßt, die Bhartṛhari zitieren. Wenn man an dieser Stelle bereit ist, die Möglichkeit einer – aus welchen Gründen auch immer – falschen Angabe bei I-ching einzuräumen, dann sollte es eigentlich auch bei jener Passage möglich sein, die die Lebenszeit des Schauspielers Candragomin betrifft. So hatte ich bereits 1974 argumentiert¹⁹.

Nachdem dieser Versuch, die Hypothese, die sich für mich aus den Punkten 1, 3, 5 und 6 ergab, durch Plausibilitätsargumente gleichsam direkt zu beweisen, bei OBERLIES nicht auf Gegenliebe gestoßen ist, möchte ich nun eine Art indirekten Beweis nachliefern, indem ich zeige, welche Schwierigkeiten sich aus der Annahme der Nicht-Identität des Grammatikers und des Schauspieldichters ergeben. Nehmen wir also versuchsweise an, I-chings Angabe, daß der Schauspieldichter noch gegen Ende des 7. Jhs. gelebt habe, sei zutreffend. Wie ist nun die in

¹⁶ Man muß allerdings einräumen, daß *apūrva* gelegentlich auch stereotyp verwendet wird. Dies ist z. B. in den drei Harṣadeva zugeschriebenen Schauspielen der Fall, die im Prolog alle als *apūrvavasturacanālamkṛta* charakterisiert werden. Allein die Tatsache, daß die drei Prologe bis auf die Namen bzw. Titel identisch sind, beweist aber schon, daß dieses *apūrva* anders zu bewerten ist als der von Candragomin gebrauchte Ausdruck (Hinweis meines Schülers Roland Steiner).

¹⁷ Op. cit., S. 12.

¹⁸ So mit TAKAKUSUS Interpretation der Stelle; vgl. A Record of the Buddhist Religion as Practised in India and the Malay Archipelago (A.D. 671–695) by I-Tsing. Transl. by J. TAKAKUSU, Oxford 1896, S. 180.

¹⁹ Op. cit., S. 9.

Punkt 5 enthaltene Aussage zu bewerten, der Autor des Lokānanda habe auch eine Grammatik geschrieben? Da nichts von einem zweiten Grammatiker namens Candragomin bekannt ist, der nur gut zwei Jahrhunderte nach dem ersten Candragomin gelebt hat, muß diese Aussage irgendwie eliminiert werden.

Hierfür gibt es zwei Möglichkeiten: entweder ist der gesamte Prolog unecht, oder aber die betreffende Passage ist gefälscht. OBERLIES ist bereit, beide Möglichkeiten in Betracht zu ziehen. Zunächst denkt er daran, daß die Übersetzer den Prolog geschrieben haben könnten: „Auch wenn sich die Tibeter in ihren Übersetzungen stets genauestens an die Vorlage hielten, ist es denn von der Hand zu weisen, daß der Prolog und damit die dort vorgenommene Identifizierung des Schauspielautors mit dem Grammatiker nicht doch erst vom Übersetzer stammt?“²⁰ Ich bin mir nicht sicher, ob sich seit der Veröffentlichung der kritischen Ausgabe des tibetischen Textes des Lokānanda schon irgendein Fachkollege die Zeit und Muße nehmen konnte, diesen zusammen mit der kommentierten deutschen Übersetzung in seiner Gesamtheit zu lesen. Wenn das, wie ich vermute, nicht der Fall ist, dann wird auch niemand so recht die Ungeheuerlichkeit nachempfinden können, die in dieser Annahme steckt, denn denken kann man sich ja schließlich alles: ausgerechnet dieses Übersetzergespann, das von der Form und dem Geist eines indischen Schauspiels wirklich gar nichts verstanden hat, das versucht hat, technische Hinweise wie *āmukham* „(Ende der) Überleitungshandlung“ oder *praveśakāḥ* „(Ende des) Zwischenspiels“ als infinite Verbformen zu übersetzen, soll auf die Idee gekommen sein, einen nicht vorhandenen Prolog selbständig zu ergänzen und dies dann auch noch durch eine Art höherer Eingebung in der denkbar vollkommensten Form durchgeführt haben, indem es nicht nur die formale Aufteilung in *nāṇḍī*, *prastāvanā* und *āmukha* auf das genaueste beachtete, sondern auch die übrigen geschriebenen und ungeschriebenen Konventionen indischer Prologe? Wenn Kīrticandra und Grags-pa rgyal-mtshan dazu in der Lage waren, dann hindert uns eigentlich nichts daran, ihnen gleich das ganze Lokānanda zuzuschreiben. Ich muß es mir versagen, diesen Punkt durch die Erfindung weiterer absurder Konsequenzen auszuwalzen; diese Annahme ist eine Verirrung, die durch die Unkenntnis des indischen Schauspiels und des speziellen Charakters dieser tibetischen Übertragung bedingt ist.

Die nächste, etwas weniger aberwitzige Möglichkeit, die störende Passage im Prolog des Lokānanda zu eliminieren, bestünde in der Annahme, der gesamte Prolog sei bereits in Indien einmal verlorenge-

²⁰ Op. cit., S. 17.

gangen und dann von einem sachkundigen Bearbeiter neu geschrieben worden. Dieser Bearbeiter hätte dann allerdings nicht nur die Biographie des Grammatikers Candragomin gut kennen müssen, um auf seine Tārā-Verehrung und seine Herkunft aus Ostindien anspielen zu können, sondern außerdem das Nāgānanda neben sich liegen haben und auf die glorreiche Idee kommen müssen, dessen *nāṇḍī* *in toto* zu imitieren, da ja anders die Übereinstimmung der beiden *nāṇḍīs* nicht zu erklären wäre. Auch die Absurdität dieser Annahme braucht nicht weiter ausgeführt zu werden.

Es bleibt schließlich die dritte Annahme einer Fälschung, die nur noch einen Teil von Strophe 6 betrifft und die OBERLIES mit diesen Worten in Erwägung zieht: „Und selbst wenn der Prolog bereits in der vom Tibeter verwendeten Sanskrit-Vorlage stand, so lag doch zwischen der Abfassung des Nāṭaka und seiner Übersetzung (etwa Mitte des 14. Jh.) eine lange Zeitspanne, die der Grund dafür gewesen sein kann, daß man besagte Identifizierung im Prolog nachträglich vornahm.“²¹ Hier kann ich nicht mit ganz so schweren Geschützen kontern wie im Falle der vorherigen beiden Annahmen; aber es bleiben immer noch zwei kaum lösbare Fragen. Erstens, was war das Motiv des unbekannten Fälschers, der ja einige Zeit nach Candragomin II gelebt haben muß²², ein Werk aus eigener Feder und mit nicht unbedeutenden literarischen Verdiensten durch die nachträgliche Zuschreibung an den Grammatiker Candragomin aufzuwerten? Zweitens, welcher Zufall hat es gefügt, daß dieser Fälscher auf die Idee kam, ausgerechnet jene drei Charakteristika für die Grammatik des Candragomin einzubauen, die nach OBERLIES gerade nicht vom Grammatiker selbst stammen, aber trefflich dazu geeignet sind, uns Nachgeborene in die Irre zu führen? Wie wahrscheinlich ist eine derart gezielte und punktuelle Fälschung? Man wird zugeben müssen, daß auch diese Annahme nicht die einfachste und zwangloseste Möglichkeit darstellt, die durch I-chings Angabe (Punkt 8) geschaffene Schwierigkeit zu beseitigen. Mir kommt sie jedenfalls wie ein letzter verzweifelter Versuch vor, das Offensichtliche, nämlich den vorhandenen Wortlaut, zu leugnen, nachdem der umfassendere Versuch, die Echtheit des Prologs insgesamt anzuzweifeln, gescheitert ist.

Zusammenfassend möchte ich festhalten, daß die Kritik von OBERLIES an meiner Identifizierung des Schauspielautors Candragomin mit

²¹ Op. cit., S. 17 f. – OBERLIES beruft sich bei der Datierung der Übersetzung auf mich. Er hat allerdings übersehen, daß ich von einer Zeit vor 1322 ausgehe; op. cit., S. 32.

²² Bei einer zu großen zeitlichen Nähe wäre die Fälschung zweifellos sofort als solche erkannt worden.

dem Grammatiker Candragomin nur auf der Grundlage einer ungleichen Bewertung der Zuverlässigkeit von I-chings Angaben (bei der Lebenszeit des Bhartṛhari irrt er, bei der des Candragomin nicht) und einer absurden bzw. einer sehr unwahrscheinlichen Annahme hinsichtlich der Fälschung des Prologs zum Lokānanda bzw. eines Teiles davon zu retten ist. Ich bin damit nur auf den Einwand eingegangen, den OBERLIES unter Punkt 3) seiner Liste bringt. Sein Punkt 4)²³ kann hier außer acht bleiben, weil er darin lediglich feststellt, daß die in meiner Liste der einem Autor Candragomin zugeschriebenen Werke nicht alle von dem Grammatiker Candragomin stammen – was sich natürlich mit meiner eigenen Beurteilung dieser Liste deckt – und dies für unsere spezielle Verfasserfrage ohne Belang ist. Auf die Punkte 1) und 2), in denen er sagt, daß die Maṅgala-Strophe mit dem Kompositum *laghuvi-spaṣṭasampūrṇam* nicht vom Grammatiker selbst stamme, werde ich gleich noch eingehen.

An dieser Stelle möchte ich auf eine grundsätzliche Frage hinweisen, nämlich auf die nach der Beweispflicht. Wenn man z. B. die Behauptung aufstellt, die und die anonymen buddhistischen Legenden im Campū-Stil stammten von jenem Gopadatta, der auch das Saptakumārikāvadāna verfaßt hat, dann liegt die Beweislast bei demjenigen, der diese Behauptung aufgestellt hat. Ein absolut schlüssiger Beweis hierfür ist deduktiv kaum zu liefern. Man kann zwar eine Reihe von Gründen für eine solche Annahme liefern, wie etwa ein ähnlicher Gebrauch der Versmaße, übereinstimmende Bilder, Wendungen oder Strophen, eine übereinstimmende Struktur in der Gesamtanlage der Legenden wie auch bei den spezifischen Teilen des Anfangs und des Schlusses oder schließlich solche Äußerlichkeiten wie das blockweise Auftreten dieser Legenden in den verschiedenen Zusammenstellungen älterer Quellen zu einem neuen Gesamtwerk. Für sich genommen ist keines dieser Indizien beweiskräftig, und selbst wenn man auf einige besonders schöne Übereinstimmungen verweisen kann, dann wird der kritische Kollege immer noch die Ergänzung durch das ausschließende Verfahren verlangen: nämlich den Nachweis, daß die angeführten Parallelen nicht auch in den Werken anderer Autoren in vergleichbarer Häufigkeit zu finden sind. Der Skeptiker wird außerdem immer noch die Möglichkeiten des direkten Plagiats, der freieren Nachahmung oder schließlich der Abhängigkeit von einer gemeinsamen Quelle in Betracht ziehen, und man wird ihm diese Skepsis kaum nehmen können, es sei denn durch den Glücksfund eines externen Belegs – wenn etwa ein mittelalterlicher Kommentator eine Strophe aus einer Legende, die man diesem Gopadatta zu-

²³ Op. cit., S. 19f.

geschrieben hat, mit dem ausdrücklichen Hinweis *iti gopadattah* zitiert. Einen solchen Fund macht man aber weder häufig noch in der Regel dann, wenn man ihn gerade zur Untermauerung einer Hypothese benötigt. Im Fall der eben behandelten Frage der Identität zwischen dem Schauspieldichter und dem Grammatiker Candragomin verhält es sich aber umgekehrt: da der Schauspieldichter *expressis verbis* von sich sagt, er sei auch ein Grammatiker, liegt hier die Beweislast bei dem Skeptiker, und dieser muß seine Zweifel schon sehr handfest begründen.

Nachdem ich versucht habe zu zeigen, daß auch das indirekte Beweisverfahren in die Richtung deutet, die ich bereits mit meinen direkten, auf Plausibilität beruhenden Argumenten meiner früheren Veröffentlichungen eingeschlagen hatte, möchte ich hier doch noch einmal ganz kurz zusammenfassen, wie sich mir der Autor Candragomin aus seinen Werken darstellt. Der Schauspielauteur präsentiert sich als ein außerordentlich selbstbewußter Dichter, der seinen eigenen Wert kennt und dies nicht verschweigt. Das spiegelt sich vor allem in den fünf zusätzlichen Aktschlußstrophen wider, in denen er sich mit durchaus starken Worten preist. Diese Praxis ist aus der Schauspieldichtung vor Candragomin nicht bekannt²⁴, was für den Skeptiker schon wieder ein Anlaß sein dürfte, an der Echtheit dieser Schlußstrophen zu zweifeln. Dieser Skeptiker müßte dann allerdings auch die erste und die letzte Strophe des Śiṣyalekha tilgen, da diese ebenfalls das Wort *candra* „Mond“ enthalten. Selbst der Deśanāstava „Preislied in Form eines Sündenbekenntnisses“, der nun durch die oben genannte englische Übersetzung von MARK TATZ zugänglich ist, ist durch das Wort „Mond“ in der Schlußstrophe markiert, was auch ihn in die Nähe von Lokānanda und Śiṣyalekha rückt. Bei einem derart selbstbewußten, unter keiner falschen Bescheidenheit leidenden Autor ist es mir nun psychologisch umso wahrscheinlicher, daß er im Prolog seines Schauspiels lobend auf die Werke hinweist, die er außerdem noch verfaßt hat.

In diesem Licht scheinen mir die drei Epitheta, mit denen der Schauspieldichter seine Grammatik charakterisiert, nicht nur „echt“ zu sein – ich beurteile ja ohnehin den gesamten Prolog als echt –, sondern auch mit der Grammatik selbst verbunden zu sein. Wir können davon ausgehen, daß Candragomin seinen Fachkollegen und Schülern wiederholt eine Begründung dafür geliefert hat, weshalb er es wagte, nach Pāṇini noch eine eigene Grammatik zu schreiben. Was er geleistet hat,

²⁴ Wir finden dies eher auf dem Gebiet der *mahākāvya*s, wo die Praxis der ‚Markierung‘ (*aṅka*) der einzelnen Gesänge durch ein glückverheißendes Wort oder den eigenen Namen (vgl. Ratnākaraś Haravijaya oder Śivasvāmins Kapṇiñābhyudaya), das bzw. der in der Schlußstrophe eines jeden Gesanges wiederholt wird, üblich ist.

ist ja im wesentlichen eine neue Organisation des Stoffes, und daß er dabei danach gestrebt hat, seine Darstellung „kurz, ganz klar und dennoch vollständig“ zu machen, liegt auf der Hand und eignet sich zudem ausgezeichnet als Rechtfertigung. Ist es daher nicht doch wahrscheinlich, daß die Maṅgala-Strophe nicht nur ihrem Sinn, sondern auch ihrem Wortlaut nach von Candragomin selbst stammt, ganz ungeachtet der Frage der Verfasserschaft von Vṛtti und Adhikārasaṃgraha? Wäre sie von Schülern oder einem Kommentator in Anlehnung an eine mündlich vorgetragene Charakterisierung durch Candragomin selbst verfaßt worden, wäre dann die Nennung des Autors dieses neuen *śabdalaṅkāra* nicht geradezu eine bindende Pflicht gewesen? Spezialisten auf dem Gebiet der Grammatik des Candragomin wie OBERLIES sollten dies noch einmal überdenken.

KUḌAKAS SAMANVAYADIŚ UND DIE FOLGELITERATUR

Materialien zu einer vergessenen lokalen Tradition der einheimischen
indischen Grammatik

(Miscellanea zu den Wiener Sanskrit-Handschriften 2)*

Von Walter Slaje, Graz

Unter jenen Manuskripten, die Marcus Aurel Stein im Jahre 1894 in Srinagar für die Hofbibliothek in Wien erworben hatte¹, befinden sich auch drei Texte zur einheimischen Grammatik, die alle in ihrem Titel als Vorderglied Samanvaya° tragen: Die Samanvayadiś (SD) eines Kuḍaka/Chuddaka, der Samanvayapradīpa (SP) nebst einem dazugehörigen Autokommentar – Samanvayapradīpasaṅketa (SPS) – des Devaśarman.

Bislang haben weder diese beiden Autoren noch auch eines ihrer Werke in die Geschichtsschreibung einheimischer grammatischer Literatur Aufnahme gefunden. Mein eigenes, langes Zögern vor dieser Veröffentlichung war von der steten Hoffnung auf Bekanntwerden weiteren Materials bestimmt, das eventuell geeignet wäre, den historischen Hintergrund dieser Textgruppe besser zu erhellen. Allein, diese Hoffnung hat sich trotz intensiver Nachforschungen bislang nicht erfüllt, und somit komme ich nun der Aufforderung wohlmeinender Kollegen nach, mit der Herausgabe von Kuḍakas Samanvayadiś nicht länger zuzuwarten, sondern anderen anhand des hier dargebotenen Materials die Möglichkeit zu geben, die Spur aufzunehmen und vielleicht einmal mehr Licht auf die Frage dieser ‚Tradition‘ werfen zu können.

* Abkürzungen: A/W – Briefliche Mitteilung von Prof. Dr. A. N. Aklujkar (Vancouver) an Prof. Dr. A. Wezler (Hamburg), vom 8. 2. 1988 (Für die freundliche Beratung habe ich den Genannten herzlich zu danken!); N – Nāgarī-Version von SP/SPS = Ms. 327/1875–76 (Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona; vgl. Descr.Cat.BORI, Nr. 353); Ś – Śāradā-Version = SP/SPS; SD – Samanvayadiś = Ms. ‘Sanskrit 4’ (Österr. Nationalbibliothek, Wien; vgl. SLAJE 1990: Nr. 50); SP – Samanvayapradīpa = Ms. ‘Sanskrit 5 [Text 2–3]’ (Österr. Nationalbibliothek, Wien; vgl. SLAJE 1990: Nr. 51 und Nr. 73); SPS – Samanvayapradīpasaṅketa (wie SP). – Miscellanea 1 sind erschienen in WZKS 29 (1985) 151–154.

¹ Vgl. zu diesen Handschriften SLAJE 1990. Über Steins Sammlung *ibid.*, p. 17–20.

1. Kuḍaka/Chuḍḍaka

Als ‚Chuḍḍaka‘ erscheint der Verfasser der Samanvayadiś (SD) nur einmal, und zwar im Kolophon der einzigen bekannten Handschrift: *iti samanvayadik samāptā || kṛtī rājānapaṇḍitacchuḍḍakasya ||*

Demgegenüber wird im Samanvayapradīpa (SP) und im Samanvayapradīpasāṅketa (SPS) des Devaśarman der Verfasser der SD übereinstimmend Kuḍaka genannt: (SP:) *samanvayapradīpo* [']*yaṃ kuḍakoktādhvanā mayā / darśito*; (SPS:) *kuḍakah* [=] *paṇḍita ekaḥ*, ...

Unter demselben Namen finden sich auch Eintragungen in den Handschriftenkatalogen. Gemäß AUFRECHT ist Kuḍaka allerdings Verfasser eines Samanvayasampradāya, und soll als solcher in Abhinavaguptas Dhvanyālokalocana zitiert werden². Von SASTRI wird irrtümlich Kuḍaka anstatt Devaśarman – wohl aufgrund der mißverstandenen Schlußschrift von SP und SPS – als Verfasser des Samanvayapradīpa angegeben³.

Nach den existierenden Handschriftenverzeichnissen zu urteilen, ist Kuḍakas Samanvayadiś nur in einer einzigen Abschrift überliefert, nämlich als ein Papiermanuskript („Sanskrit 4“) in der Österreichischen Nationalbibliothek. Es handelt sich dabei allerdings um ein Fragment; denn die Blätter 1–10 und 13 der gemäß Originalzählung ursprünglich 19 Blatt umfassenden Handschrift fehlen.

2. Devaśarman

Devaśarman führt ‚Gaṅgādhara‘ als Namen seines Lehrers an⁴. Er ist Verfasser mehrerer Werke, wovon zumindest zwei, nämlich der Samanvayapradīpa und der Samanvayapradīpasāṅketa, erhalten geblieben sind.

2.1. Samanvayapradīpa

Der SP hat die Form von Kārikās⁵ und orientiert sich⁶ hinsichtlich Anordnung und Inhalt des Stoffes völlig an Kuḍakas SD. Der Unter-

² CatCat 1:108: „Kuḍakācārya: Samanvayasampradāya. Quoted in Dhvanyālokalocana.“ – Diese Zitierung allerdings nicht verifizierbar! Auch die annotierte, sorgfältig bearbeitete Übersetzung durch INGALLS (1990) erbringt für eine solche Bezugnahme durch Abhinavagupta keine positive Evidenz.

³ SASTRI 1895: 125 (Nr. 1555); vgl. auch NewCatCat 4: 176. Dieser Irrtum weitergetragen von EIP 526.

⁴ SPS (28^v): *praṇamya ... gaṅgādharaḥgurum ...* /; SPS (25^r): *... śrīgaṅgādharaśvāmināḥ śiṣyeṇa paṇḍitadevaśarmaṇā ...*

⁵ SPS (28^v): *svakārikāṇāṃ saṅketaḥ kriyate devaśarmaṇā* /.

⁶ „Ich habe diesen Samanvayapradīpa veröffentlicht, [indem ich] dem von Kuḍaka [zur Erreichung des Lehrziels] gelehrten Weg [gefolgt bin]“ (SP 25^r: *samanvayapradīpo* [']*yaṃ kuḍakoktādhvanā mayā / darśito*; SPS erklärt dazu: *kuḍakah* [=] *paṇḍita ekaḥ*; *tena ukto yo* [']*dhvā* [=] *mārgaḥ*).

schied zwischen Kuḍakas SD und Devaśarmans SP besteht – entsprechend der Aussage Devaśarmans – allein in der Form der Darstellung, weil der SP nichts als eine metrische Umgestaltung von Kuḍakas Prosatext sei⁷.

Der SP wird im SPS mittüberliefert. Neben der vollständigen Wiener Birkenrindenhandschrift ‚Sanskrit 5‘ existiert von beiden Texten auch noch eine Kopie (N) in Poona, die in einem kaschmirischen Devanāgarī-Derivat geschrieben ist⁸.

Der SP beginnt:

*iha hi vyavahāro [']yam śabdādhīnaḥ pradṛśyate |
vākyam vinā sa śabdasya kevalasya na vidyate ||
tam jñātum lakṣaṇam tasmā jñātavyam tasya paṇḍitaiḥ | |
tadartham ādau vākyasya lakṣaṇam kriyate mayā || |
sakārakam sāvyayam ca viśeṣaṇasamanvītam |
tasya lakṣaṇam ākhyātam⁹, na brūyād anṛtam vacaḥ || //*

und endet:

*yatra vākyārthaviśrāntiḥ ślokenaikaena drśyate |
muktakam tatra, yugmena yugalam, tilakam tribhiḥ || |
caturbhiḥ ca cakkalakam, pañcabhiḥ kulakam smṛtam | |
mahākulakam ācāryāḥ kathayanti tataḥ param ||¹⁰
samanvayapradīpo [']yam kuḍakoktādhvanā mayā |
darśito; vibudhair atra kāryā skhalitayojanā ||.*

2.2. Samanvayapradīpasāṅketa

Ergibt sich die Verfasserschaft Devaśarmans für den SP nur indirekt aus dem Einleitungsvers in den SPS, wo er selbst von den zu erklärenden *svakārikās* spricht, so kommt es im SPS zweimal zur ausdrücklichen Selbstnennung sowohl am Anfang als auch am Ende seines Kommentars:

*praṇamya viṣṇum lokeśam, gaṅgādharaḥ gurum tathā |
svakārikānām saṅketāḥ kriyate devaśarmaṇā ||*

⁷ SPS (25^r): *samanvayadigākhya granthaviśeṣa ity arthah; sa tu gadyarūpeṇa sthito, [']yam* (scil. *samanvayapradīpah*) *tu padyarūpenaitāvān eva viśeṣaḥ*. Bei EIP 520 Verwechslung von SP und SPS, wo SPS als „metrical recast of Kuda[!]ka’s work (NCat 4.176)“ bezeichnet wird.

⁸ Deser.Cat.BORI, Nr. 353. Vgl. auch NewCatCat 9: 124.

⁹ Vgl. Vārtt. 9 ad Pāṇ 2.1.1: *ākhyātam sāvyayakāraḥ kavīśeṣaṇam vākyam*.

¹⁰ Diese Stelle wird leicht modifiziert wiedergegeben in Fußnote 1 (p. 39) zu Maṅkhakas Śrīkaṇṭacarita: *sambaddham ślokaḥ caturbhiḥ syāt tilakam punaḥ || caturbhiḥ syāt cakkalakam pañcabhiḥ kulakam tataḥ | mahākulakam ity arthāḥ kathayanti tataḥ param ||*.

samāpto [']*yam samanvayapradīpasāṅketaḥ vibudhasamūhavandita-pādapaḍmasya śrīgaṅgādharaśvāmīnaḥ śiṣyeṇa paṇḍitadevaśarmaṇā iti bhadram* ||.

Im SPS werden neben Kuḍaka und Gaṅgādhara namentlich noch Kālidāsa, Mammaṭa (11. Jh.) und Rucakācārya (12. Jh.) genannt. Für die erhaltenen Handschriften des SPS gilt das oben sub SP Gesagte.

2.3. Samanvayadiksaṅketa

Daß Devaśarma noch vor der Abfassung des SPS bereits einen Kommentar zu Kuḍakas SD mit dem Titel Samanvayadiksaṅketa verfaßt hatte, ergibt sich aus einem diesbezüglichen Hinweis im SPS: *etac ca samanvayadiksaṅkete* [']*smābhir nirṇītam ity alam*. Dieser Text scheint verloren zu sein; von erhaltenen Handschriften ist nichts bekannt.

Das gilt auch für ein anderes Werk, als dessen Verfasser Devaśarma sich ein weiteres Mal unter Verwendung des Personalpronomens nennt, nämlich für seine

2.4. Liṅgānuśāsanaṭṭikā

Auch sie wird nur im SPS erwähnt: *liṅgānuśāsanaṭṭikāyām as-mābhis tatra tatra liṅgaviṭāro vihita eveti neha pratanyate*.

3. Die Tradition

Berücksichtigt man nun die Aussagen Devaśarmas im Zusammenhang mit der Gruppe der bekanntgewordenen Samanvaya-Texte, so läßt sich bereits von einer zumindest von Kuḍaka (eventuell über Gaṅgādhara) bis Devaśarma reichenden Tradition sprechen, zumal letzterer ausdrücklich betont, daß er in seiner Darstellung des Stoffes der Lehre Kuḍakas folgt. Der gesicherte Bestand dieser Überlieferung stellt sich demnach in folgender Weise dar:

- a) Kuḍaka: Samanvayadīś (Fragment)
- aa) Devaśarma: [Kommentar] Samanvayadiksaṅketa (verloren?)
- b) Devaśarma: Samanvayapradīpa (erhalten)
- bb) Devaśarma: [Kommentar] Samanvayapradīpasāṅketa (erhalten).

Die Frage, ob auch die anonyme, ebenfalls von M. A. Stein in Kaschmir erworbene und aufgrund ihres Titels in diesem Zusammenhang verdächtige Anvayakālikā¹¹ einen Teil dieser ‚Samanvaya-Tradition‘ repräsentiert, muß bis zu einer genaueren Untersuchung dieser Handschrift noch offen bleiben.

Bis zu einem möglichen Bekanntwerden des vermutlich verlorenen Textes wird sich auch die hypothetisch immerhin aufzuwerfende Frage

¹¹ Bodleian Library in Oxford, Ms. Stein Or.d.67; vgl. CLAUSON 1912.

einer Antwort entziehen, ob die von Devaśarman verfaßte *Līṅgānuśā-sanaṭṭikā* nicht eventuell sogar ein Kommentar zu einem ‚schuleigenen‘ *Līṅgānuśāsana* war.

3.1. Grammatische Terminologie

Unklar ist, wie die – zwar nur marginalen aber dennoch bestehenden – Abweichungen der Samanvaya-Texte von der pāṇineischen Terminologie zu erklären sind. Bedenkt man die Tatsache, daß die Handschriften aller drei Texte (SD, SP und SPS) – also einschließlich der metrischen Umformung der SD – die betreffenden modifizierten Termini völlig übereinstimmend wiedergeben, so fällt es schwer, an einen bloßen Überlieferungsfehler zu glauben¹². Eher ließe sich an eine teilweise Beeinflussung durch andere Systeme der einheimischen Grammatik denken, wofür bislang die Belege allerdings fehlen. In Betracht zu ziehen wäre möglicherweise auch eine innerhalb der ‚Samanvaya-Tradition‘ entstandene und dort dann gebräuchlich gebliebene Modifikation der pāṇineischen Terminologie.

3.1.1. Die terminologischen Abweichungen von der pāṇineischen Tradition

	‚Samanvaya-Tradition‘	Pāṇineische Tradition
<i>kr̥tya</i>	<i>ghyaṇ</i>	<i>ṇyat</i> (3.1.124)
<i>niṣṭhādi</i>	<i>kvasu</i> <i>kāna</i> <i>śanṭṛṇ</i> <i>ānaś</i> <i>yus</i> <i>ānaṇ</i> <i>tṛṇ</i> <i>vuṇ</i> <i>ṇin</i>	<i>kvasu</i> (3.2.107) <i>kānac</i> (3.2.106) <i>śatṛ</i> (3.2.124) <i>śānac</i> (3.2.124) <i>yuc</i> (3.2.148) <i>śānan</i> (3.2.128) <i>tṛṇ</i> (3.2.135) <i>vuṇ</i> (3.2.146) <i>ṇini</i> (3.1.134)
<i>ghaṇādi</i>	<i>vuṇ</i> <i>yuṭ</i> <i>kti</i>	<i>ṇvul</i> (3.1.133) <i>lyuṭ</i> (3.3.113) <i>ktin</i> (3.3.95)
<i>kriyā</i>	<i>ṇam</i>	<i>ṇamul</i> (3.4.24)

¹² Der bei Kuḍaka für (Pāṇ 3.4.24:) *ṇamul* verwendete Terminus lautet *ṇam*. Läge hier bloß ein Fehler in der Überlieferungslinie der SD vor, so wäre die

4. Lokalisierung

Was die regionale Zuordnung der Samanvaya-Texte betrifft, so gibt es formale und terminologische Indizien, die auf eine in Kaschmir beheimatete Tradition deuten.

Das formale Indiz: Die erhaltenen Handschriften (SD, SP, SPS) stammen alle aus Kaschmir und sind in Śāradā-Schrift geschrieben¹³, was auf die Anvayakālikā ebenfalls zutrifft.

Das terminologische Indiz: Eine vier Verse umfassende syntaktische Einheit wird von Kuḍaka als *cakkaḷaka* bezeichnet¹⁴, worin Devaśarman ihm folgt¹⁵. Der Gebrauch dieses Terminus wird von den Herausgebern von Maṅkhakas Śrīkaṇṭhacarita nun aber als eine typisch kaschmirische Eigentümlichkeit bezeichnet¹⁶. Diese Beobachtung läßt sich auch anhand der von M. A. STEIN für die Ausgabe der Rājatarāṅgiṇī herangezogenen Codices bestätigen¹⁷.

Schließlich wird Chuḍḍaka im Kolophon der SD als Rājānapaṇḍita bezeichnet. Nun war Rājāna/°ka ein in Kaschmir vom Herrscher – im besonderen an Hofgelehrte und -dichter – für Verdienste verliehener Ehrentitel¹⁸.

All diese Indizien verweisen die ‚Samanvaya-Tradition‘ m.E. doch sehr deutlich in die Region von Kaschmir.

5. Charakter

Kuḍakas Samanvayadiś und die im Anschluß an sie entstandenen Werke unterscheiden sich von anderen Grammatiken – wie etwa von

Tatsache nicht erklärbar, weshalb auch Devaśarman in seiner metrischen Bearbeitung (SP) die zweite Silbe des pāṇineischen Terminus einsparte: (SD:) *tasyām* (scil. *pūrvakālākriyāyām*) *niyamena ktvāpratyayo naṃpratyayaś ca bhavataḥ*; (SP:) *mukhyakriyāyāḥ pūrvam yā nirvartayitum iṣyate | pūrvakālākriyā sāsyāḥ ktvāṇamau bhavato, yathā ||*.

¹³ N in einem für Kaschmir typischen Duktus der Devanāgarī: ‚Devanāgarī characters of the Kāśmīrian type‘. Vgl. Descr.Cat.BORI, Nr. 353.

¹⁴ *atra caikena ślokena vākyārthaparisaṃpṛāptau muktakam, ... caturbhiś cakkaḷakam, ...* (SD 18^v, 8–19^r, 3).

¹⁵ Vgl. zum Zitat oben s.v. 2.1 (Samanvayapradīpa).

¹⁶ *cakkaḷakaśabdas tu prāyaḥ kāśmīradeśaprasiddha eva*. Vgl. Maṅkhaka, loc. cit. (n. 10).

¹⁷ STEIN 1: 75 (= Anm. ad Rājatarāṅgiṇī 3.21–24): „The combination of these four verses into a syntactical unit is marked in the MSS. by the word *cakkaḷaka*. The latter is apparently formed in analogy of the terms *yugalaḷaka* and *tilaka*, and is explained in the Samanvayadiś of *Rājānaka Chuḍḍaka* (see MS. deposited by me in the Imperial Library, Vienna [= Ms Sanskrit 4])“. Für eine weitere derartige syntaktische Markierung durch *cakkaḷaka* vgl. z. B. auch RT 7.193.

¹⁸ Vgl. STEIN 1: 244 (= Anm. ad RT 6.117).

der von ökonomischen Prinzipien geleiteten linguistischen Darstellungsweise Pāṇinis – durch den Gegenstand (*lakṣya*) ihrer Beschreibung, die Darstellungsweise und schließlich durch die Anordnung, da sie die Sanskrit-Grammatik nach inneren Zusammenhängen geordnet präsentieren¹⁹.

Es handelt sich hierbei um praktische Lerngrammatiken, die zu einem korrekten Gebrauch der flektierten Wörter im Satze anleiten wollen. Insoferne wird in diesen Werken allerdings nur ein Teilbereich der Grammatik behandelt; einerseits deshalb, weil sie bloß den für ihren Zweck erforderlichen Inhalt aus Pāṇini heranziehen, und andererseits, weil sie anhand eines Regelsystems beschreiben, wie mit diesem Inventar von Grundelementen korrekte Sätze gebildet werden²⁰. Dieser behandelte Teilbereich der Grammatik läßt sich somit als Syntax oder – in Anlehnung an den Titel Samanvayadiś – als ‚Richtlinie (°*diś*) für [die Bildung eines] korrekten [grammatischen] Zusammenhanges (*samanvaya*°) [der flektierten Wörter im Satze]‘ bestimmen.

6. Inhalt

Der ursprüngliche Inhalt der SD, von der nur die zweite Hälfte erhalten ist, läßt sich aus Devaśarmans vollständig überliefertem SP (nebst SPS) erschließen. Soweit das erhaltene Material nämlich einen Vergleich zuläßt, zeigt sich, daß Devaśarman sowohl mit Hinblick auf den Aufbau als auch auf den Inhalt seines Werkes der SD des Kuḍaka mit bemerkenswerter Treue folgt.

¹⁹ Die Klassifizierung von SP/SPS als „a disquisition on the philosophy of grammar“ (Descr.Cat.BORI, Nr. 353) oder als „a treatise on the philosophy of Vyākaraṇa“ (ABHYANKAR 1977: 414, s.v. *samanvayapradīpasaṅketa*) ist klärlieh falsch!

²⁰ A/W: „The Samanvaya-diś, Samanvaya-pradīpa, and Samanvaya-pradīpa-saṅketa belong to an apparently sizable body of literature that spans the distance between grammars like Pāṇini’s dominated by non-pedagogical principles of linguistic description and grammars written principally for the purpose of teaching Sanskrit as a language. . . . is closer in terms of intent and form to grammars such as Kātantra or Vopa-devīya. . . . they belong to the category formed by Ṣaṭ-kāraka-vivaraṇa, Kāraka-saṅgraha, Kāraka-cakra, Prayogaviveka-saṅgraha . . . , etc. associated with the names of Vara-ruci, Rabhasanandin, Vidyānanda, etc. and found in the Pāṇinian as well as non-Pāṇinian traditions of Sanskrit grammar“.

6.1. Vergleichende Rohanalyse

SD		SP/SPS
—	2 Programmverse	1 ^r (N 1)
—	Vākyalakṣaṇa	1 ^v (N 1)
—	1. Viśeṣaṇa	2 ^r –9 ^r (N 1–8)
—	1.1. Samānādhikaraṇa	2 ^r –3 ^v (N 2–3)
—	1.2. Vyadhikaraṇa	3 ^v –6 ^r (N 3–5)
—	1.3. Samāsa	6 ^v –9 ^r (N 5–8)
—	2. Kriyā	9 ^v –19 ^r (N 8–17)
—	2.1. Kartṛkarmabhāvanīṣṭhā K°	9 ^v –15 ^v (N 8–13)
—	2.1.1. Parasmaipadin	10 ^r –12 ^r (N 9–10)
—	2.1.2. Ātmanepadin	12 ^r –12 ^v (N 10–11)
—	2.1.3. Ubhayapadin	12 ^v –13 ^r (N 11)
—	2.1.4. Dvikarmakadhātu	13 ^r –15 ^v (N 11–13)
11 ^r ,1–15 ^r ,4	[3. Kṛt]	15 ^v –17 ^v (N 14–15)
11 ^r ,1–12 ^r ,3	3.1. Kṛtya	15 ^v –16 ^r (N 14)
12 ^r ,3–14 ^r ,1	3.2. Niṣṭhādi	16 ^r –17 ^r (N 14–15)
12 ^r ,6–12 ^v ,6	3.2.1. Kta	16 ^r –16 ^v (N 14)
12 ^v ,6–[—]	3.2.2. Ktavantu	16 ^v –17 ^r (N 15)
14 ^r ,1–15 ^r ,4	3.3. Ghañādi	17 ^r –17 ^v (N 15)
14 ^r ,3–14 ^v ,4	3.3.1. Vuṇ-Ṭṛc	17 ^r (N 15)
14 ^v ,4–15 ^r ,3	3.3.2. Ghañ-Yuṭ-Kti	17 ^r –17 ^v (N 15)
15 ^r ,4–17 ^v ,4	4. Pradhānaguṇakriyā	17 ^v –19 ^r (N 15–17)
15 ^r ,8–15 ^v ,3	4.1. Pradhānakriyā	17 ^v (N 15)
15 ^v ,3–17 ^r ,1	4.2. Guṇakriyā	17 ^v –19 ^r (N 15–17)
15 ^v ,4–16 ^v ,3	4.2.1. Pūrvakālakriyā	18 ^r –18 ^v (N 16)
16 ^v ,4–17 ^r ,1	4.2.2. Samakālakriyā	18 ^v –19 ^r (N 16–17)
17 ^r ,1–17 ^v ,4	4.3. Kriyādhyāhāra	19 ^r (N 17)
17 ^v ,4–19 ^r ,5	5. Vākyasambandha	19 ^r –5 ^v [Text 2] (N 17–22)
18 ^r ,1–18 ^v ,5	5.1. Charakter	19 ^r –4 ^v (N 17–22)
18 ^v ,5–18 ^v ,8	5.2. Kārakādhyāhāra	4 ^v –5 ^r (N 22)
18 ^v ,8–19 ^r ,5	5.3. Vākyārthaparisaṃāpti	5 ^r (N 22)

6.2. Feinanalyse der Samanvayadiś
(= Systematische Notation der Edition)

[3. Kṛt]	4. Pradhānaguṇakriyā
3.1. Kṛtya	4.1. Pradhānakriyā
3.1.1. Akarmaka	4.2. Guṇakriyā
3.1.2. Sakarmaka	4.2.1. Pūrvakālakriyā
3.1.3. Kartṛ	4.2.1.1. Bhāva
3.1.4. Pañcamyārtha	4.2.1.1.1. Kartṛ (Tṛtīyā)
3.1.4.1. Anumati	4.2.1.1.2. Kartṛ (Prathamā)
3.1.4.2. Vidhi	4.2.1.1.3. [Udāharāṇa]
	4.2.2. Samakālakriyā
3.2. Niṣṭhādi	4.2.2.1. Guṇapradhānabhāva
3.2.1. Kṛta	4.3. Kriyādhyāhāra
3.2.1.1. Akarmaka	4.3.1. Astikriyā°
3.2.1.2. Sakarmaka	4.3.2. Viśiṣṭakriyā°
3.2.1.3. Kartṛ	
3.2.2. Kṛtavantu	5. Vākyasambandha
	5.1. Charakter
	5.1.1. Yat-Tat
3.3. Ghañādi	5.1.1.1. Śābda
3.3.1. Vuṇ-Ṭṛc	5.1.1.2. Ārtha
3.3.1.1. Akarmaka	5.1.1.2.1. Tat
3.3.1.2. Sakarmaka	5.1.1.2.2. Yat
3.3.2. Ghañ-Yuṭ-Kṛti	5.2. Kāraḥādhyāhāra
3.3.2.1. Akarmaka	5.3. Vākyārthaparisaṃāpti (Nomenklatur)
3.3.2.2. Sakarmaka	
3.3.2.3. Bhāva	6. Schlußschrift

KUḌAKAS SAMANVAYADIŚ

Vollständige Edition der erhaltenen Teile

Zu Vergleichszwecken sind alle damit korrespondierenden Abschnitte aus SP nebst Auszügen aus SPS beigegeben. Eine vollständige Ausgabe von SP/SPS, die jedenfalls eine monographische Behandlung erforderlich machte, muß anderen Bearbeitern überlassen bleiben.

[3.]

SD

—

SP

kṛtpratyaṃyās triprakārāḥ²¹ kṛtyā niṣṭhāghaṇḍādayaḥ |

²¹ N: *tī°*.

(SPS:) *kṛtyāḥ kṛtyapratyayāḥ*²² *niṣṭhādayaś ca*²³ *ghaṇādayaś ca, dvandvāt paro*²⁴ *hi śabdaḥ pratyekam abhisambadhyate* ||

[3.1.]

SD

—
SP

*prāyaḥ kṛtyāś ca pañcaiva tavyānīyayakypaghyaṇaḥ*²⁵ ||

(SPS:) *yady api tavaikenkenyatvā*²⁶ *ity ete 'pi kṛtyāś, tathāpi*²⁷ *lakṣye prayogādarśanān naivaite*²⁸ *kṛtyā ity etadartham uktaṁ*²⁹ *prāyaḥ pañcavi*
veti ||

[3.1.1.]

SD

(11^r:) *[bhā]ve utpadyante. bhāvasya dhātvarthamātrasya sāmānyarū-
patvād ekatvāc ca bhāve prathamaikavacanam eva bhavati, yathā 'tena,
tābhyām, taiḥ, tvayā, yuvābhyām, yuṣmābhiḥ, mayā, āvābhyām, asmābhiḥ
vā, bhavitavyam'. evaṁ liṅge kartari, napuṃsakaliṅge ca, sākalīyād bhe-
dāḥ.*

SP

*ete cākarmakād dhātor utpadyante yadā, tadā |
dhātvarthaikatayā teṣām ādyaikavacanam bhavet |
'bhavitavyam tvayā, tena, tābhyām, tair vā, tayā' yathā* ||

[3.1.2.]

SD

27^{29a} *sakarmakāt tu kṛtyapratyayāḥ karmaṇi bhavanti. tadā karmaṇaḥ
kriyāyāś ca parasparasambandhe sati, karmābhihitaṁ bhavati | abhikṛte
karmaṇi liṅgārthamātre, prathamā bhavati | tadā ca karmānusāreṇa tri-
liṅgatvam 27, [yathā]*³⁰ *27 'tena grāmo gantavyaḥ, tena nagaram gān-
tavyam 27, tena nagarī gantavyā' 27* ||

SP

*sakarmakād amī dhātor utpadyante yadā, tadā |
teṣām karmānusāreṇa liṅgasamkhyā vibhaktayāḥ* ||

²² N: °*pratya*° s.m. in margine.

²³ N: °*ś ca* s.m. in margine.

²⁴ N: *pu*°.

²⁵ Ś: Nach °*kya*° 2 Akṣaras zerstört. N: Nach °*kya*° ein Akṣara getilgt, s.m. in margine: °*paghya*°.

²⁶ Pāṇ 3.4.14: *kṛtyārthe tavaikenkenyatvanāḥ.*

²⁷ Ś: Nach *tathā*° ca. vier Akṣaras zerstört.

²⁸ Ś: °*yoge darśanan naivetye*; N: *naivete*.

²⁹ Ś: Nach *uktaṁ* sechs Akṣaras zerstört.

^{29a} So im Ms.

³⁰ Ms.: *te(11°)na*.

*‘gantavyo bhavatā grāmo, gantavyā nagarī twayā /
gantavyaṃ nagaraṃ tenety’ udāharaṇayojanā ||*

[3.1.3.]

SD

krtyapratyayānām kartari kadācit śaṣṭhī bhavati, kadācit tṛtīyā bhavati, yathā ‘tasya, tena vā, bhavitavyam | tasya, tena vā, grāmo gantavyaḥ’.

[3.1.4.]

SD

tavyānīyau [~ Pāṇ 3.1.96], svarād yaḥ [~ Pāṇ 3.1.97], vṛ-dṛ-juṣi-iṇ-śasu-stu-guhām³¹ kyap [~ Pāṇ 3.1.109], ṛvarṇavyaṇjanāntād ghyaṇ [~ Pāṇ 3.1.124], bhāvakarmaṇoḥ krtyakhalarthā [~ Pāṇ 3.4.70] ity ete pratyayāḥ bāhulyena vartamāne kāle pañcamyarthē, [’]numatau vidhau vā, bhavanti |

[3.1.4.1.]

SD

anumatih praśnapūrvako [’]ṅgīkārāḥ, yathā ‘kim ahaṃ grāmaṃ gacchāmi, na vā’. sa(12^r:)mpraty ucyate³², ‘tvaṃ grāmaṃ gaccha, twayā grāmo gantavya’ iti vā.

[3.1.4.2.]

SD

vidhir ajñātajñāpanaṃ, yathā ‘tvaṃ grāmaṃ gaccha, twayā grāmo gantavya’ ity uktāḥ krtyapratyayāḥ.

[3.2.]

SD

niṣṭhādaya ucyante || ktaktavantū niṣṭhāsaṃjñau [~ Pāṇ 1.1.26], kvansu[~ Pāṇ 3.2.107]-kāna[~ Pāṇ 3.2.106]-śantrñ-ānaś[~ Pāṇ 3.2.124]-ki[~ Pāṇ 3.2.171]-u[~ Pāṇ 3.2.168]-ukañ[~ Pāṇ 3.2.154]-iṣṇu-[~ Pāṇ 3.2.136]-ktvā[~ Pāṇ 3.4.18]-khal[~ Pāṇ 3.3.126]-yus[~ Pāṇ 3.2.148]-ānañ[~ Pāṇ 3.2.128]-trñ[~ Pāṇ 3.2.135]-vun[~ Pāṇ 3.2.146]-nin[~ Pāṇ 3.1.134]-ityādayo niṣṭhādayaḥ |

SP

*niṣṭhādayaḥ ktaktavantū³³ kvansukānādayaḥ³⁴ smṛtāḥ /
(SPS:) ādinā³⁵ śantrññādyāḥ³⁶.*

[3.2.1.]

[3.2.1.1.]

SD

³¹ Ms.: °juṣīṇ°.

³² Ms.: āc°.

³³ N: °ktarvan°.

³⁴ N: °nsu° s.m. in margine.

³⁵ Ś: ā° zerstört.

³⁶ N: °ññā° in margine.

tatra ktapratyayas sarvadhātūnām akarmakāṇām atīte kāle bhāve utpadyate. tatra napuṃsakaliṅgaṃ prathamai kavacanam eva bhavati, yathā 'tenāsitam' 27.

SP

*atīte 'rihe 'karmakāṇām bhāve³⁷ ktapratyayaḥ smṛtaḥ ||
dhātvarthaikatayā tasya pratha[maikava]co³⁸, yathā³⁹ /
'āsitaṃ tena, tābhir vā, tābhyām, tair vā, tvayā, mayā' ||
(SPS:) prathamai kavacaḥ prathamavibhaktiekavacanam.*

[3.2.1.2.]

SD

sakarmakāṇām dhātūnām (12^v:) ktapratyayo [']tīte kāle karmaṇy eva bhavati, na tu bhāve, tatra karmābhīḥitaṃ bhavati | karmānusāreṇa ktapratyayāntasya triliṅgatvam, yathā 'tenaudanaḥ⁴⁰ bhuktaḥ 27, tena 27 śikhariṇī bhuktā, tena bhuṭitraṃ⁴¹ bhuktam' iti.

SP

*yadā sakarmakāṇām ktaḥ⁴² karmaṇy utpadyate, tadā /
tasya karmānusāreṇa liṅgasamkhyā vibhaktayaḥ |
'bhuktā drākṣā, phalaṃ bhuktaṃ, bhuktas tenaudano' yathā⁴³ ||*

[3.2.1.3.]

SD

niyatānām eva dhātūnām ktapratyayaḥ kartari bhavati || gatyarthākarmaka⁴⁴ -śliṣa-śīṇ-sihāsa-vasa-ruha-jana-jīryatibhyaś [Pāṇ 3.4.72] ceti | 2.

SP

'maitro grāmaṃ gata' iti prathamokte 'tra kartari |

[3.2.2.]

SD

³⁷ Ś: °ve kta° zerstört.

³⁸ Ś: Nach *pratha*° drei Akṣaras zerstört.

³⁹ N: om. *dhātv*° bis *yathā*.

⁴⁰ Ms.: *tenoda*°.

⁴¹ Ist hier *bhaṭitraṃ* (pw: „am Spiesse gebacken“, Bhāvaparakāśa 2.20) zu lesen? – A/W: „The word is obviously a Sanskritization. It could be that it refers to *bhaṭurā*/*baṭurā* (from *bhaṭṭhā*/*bhaṭṭhi* ‘kiln, oven’ which, in turn, may be from *bhrasj*), a type of *nān*/bread commonly used in the Punjab-Jammu area, and that MW, etc. have not understood the nature of the eatable exactly. The same dictionaries explain *śikhariṇī* as a dish made of curds, sugar, and spices, but the obvious cognate *śikaraṇ* current in Marathi stands primarily for crushed bananas or plantain fruits mixed with milk and sugar“.

⁴² Ś: *a*° (statt *ktaḥ*).

⁴³ Ś: om. *bhuktā* bis *yathā*.

⁴⁴ Ms.: °*ākarmā*°.

ktavantupratyayo [']*karmakebhyas sakarmakebhyo vā dhātubhyo* [']*tīte kāle kartary eva bhavati* | *na kadācid bhāvakarmaṇoḥ ktavantupratya* (– [Bl. 13 fehlt]).

(14^r.) *rthā ity uktās saṃkṣepeṇa niṣṭhādayaḥ* ||

SP

*kartary*⁴⁵ *eva ktavantuh*⁴⁶ *syān, na kvacid bhāvakarmaṇoḥ* ||
*tasya kartranusāreṇa liṅgasaṅkhyā vibhaktayaḥ*⁴⁷ |
*'bhuktavān*⁴⁸ *odanaṃ caitra, nārī bhuktavatī, kulam* |
bhuktavat, puruṣā bhuktavanta' ityādinirṇayaḥ ||

[3.3.]

SD

ghaṇḍādaya ucyante || *vuṇ-ṭṛc* [~ Pāṇ 2.1.133]-*ghaṇ* [~ Pāṇ 3.3.16]-
yut [~ Pāṇ 3.3.115]-*kti* [~ Pāṇ 3.3.95]-*ity evamādyā ghaṇḍādayaḥ*.

SP

*ghaṇḍādisaṅgrahas tv eṣa*⁴⁹ *uktvaitān vakṣyate 'dhunā* |
 (SPS:) *etān niṣṭhādīn*⁵⁰.

[3.3.1.]

SD

vuṇṭṛcāv akarmakebhyas sakarmakebhyo vā dhātubhyo vartamāne kāle
kartary evotpadyete, na bhāvakarmaṇoḥ.

SP

yau vuṇṭṛcau pratyayau, tau kartary eva, na cānyayoḥ ||
 (SPS:) *anyayoḥ bhāvakarmaṇoḥ*.

[3.3.1.1.]

SD

*anayor akarmakatvam*⁵¹ *utpannayōḥ kartary evābhikṛite prathamā* |
*yathā bhavatīti 'bhāvako*⁵² *devadattaḥ, devadatto bhavitā'* |

SP

*'bhāvako*⁵³ *maitra' ityādaḥ prathamānuktakarmaṇi*⁵⁴ |
 (SPS:) *evaṃ ṭṛco jñeyaṃ*.

[3.3.1.2.]

SD

⁴⁵ N: *kartayeva*.

⁴⁶ N: **vaktuh*.

⁴⁷ Ś: Vier Akṣaras nach **saṅkhyā* teilweise zerstört.

⁴⁸ Ś: Die folgenden 21 Akṣaras fast vollständig zerstört.

⁴⁹ N: *eṣā*.

⁵⁰ Ś: **ādīnām*.

⁵¹ Ms.: *anayōḥ karma*. Text gemäß Interlinearkorrektur.

⁵² Ms.: *bhāvuko*.

⁵³ Ś: *bhāvuko*.

⁵⁴ Ś: **kartari*.

anayor vuntṛcos sakarmakatvam utpannayoh kartari prathamā, karmaṇi śaṣṭhī, yathā 'devadattaḥ odana(14^v):sya pācakaḥ, devadattaḥ odanasya paktā' iti. vuntṛcoḥ ca kartranusāreṇa trilingatvam, yathā 'sa odanasya pācakaḥ, sā pācikā, tat kulam odanasya pācakam' iti | 'sa paktā, sā paktrī, tat kulam odanasya paktrī'.

SP

syāt karmaṇy anayoh śaṣṭhī, 'pācaka odanasya saḥ' ||

[3.3.2.]

SD

ghaṇ⁵⁵yuktipratyayā akarmakebhyas sakarmakebhyo vā dhātubhyo⁵⁶ bhāva utpadyante. eṣā sakarmakebhyo bhāva utpadyamānā kartari vā śaṣṭhī, karmaṇi nityaṃ śaṣṭhī.

SP

*bhāva eva ghaṇyudādyā utpadyante sakarmakāt |
tatra kartari⁵⁷ śaṣṭhī vā, nityaṃ karmaṇi kīrtitā ||*

[3.3.2.1.]

SD

akarmakebhyo, yathā 'devadattasya bhāvo, bhavanam, bhūtiḥ'.

[3.3.2.2.]

SD

saka(15^r):rmakebhyo, yathā 'devadattasya' kartur, 'devadattena' kartrā vā, 'odanasya' karmabhūtasya 'pākaḥ, pacanam, paktiḥ'.

SP

'annasya pāko maitrasya, devadattena vā', yathā⁵⁸ |

(SPS:) annasya karmabhūtasya | evaṃ yudādayo vicāraṇīyāḥ. pūrvam akarmakasya nirūpaṇāvasare saty api, karmaśaṣṭhīprasaṅgenākarmakasya karmābhāvāt sakarmakam nirṇīya <|>⁵⁹ paścād akarmakam nirūpayati ||

SP

akarmakāḥ⁶⁰ jñeyam eva⁶¹, 'bhāvo maitrasya, tena vā' ||

(SPS:) bhāva iti ghaṇantā kriyā.

[3.3.2.3.]

SD

yudanto bhāva utpadyamāno napuṃsakaliṅga eva. uktās saṃkṣepeṇa ghaṇādayaḥ ||

⁵⁵ Ms.: *ghaṇ*°.

⁵⁶ Ms.: °*tutubhyo*.

⁵⁷ Ś: *karmaṇi*.

⁵⁸ Ś: *α*° [3 Akṣaras zerstört] °*ko maitreṇa devadatt*[zerstört bis]*yathā*.

⁵⁹ A/W.

⁶⁰ Ś: om. °*rmakāḥ*.

⁶¹ Ś, N: *eva*.

[4.]

SD

*kriyā dviprakārā, pradhānakriyā guṇakriyā ca. yatra vākyārtho vi-
śrāmyati, niṣṭhām bhajate, nirākāṅkṣatām labhate, sā pradhānakriyā | yā
tu pradhānakriyāyā aṅgabhāvam avalambate, upakaraṇatām gacchati, sā
guṇakriyā.*

SP

*mukhyagaṇavibhedena⁶² dvividhā sāpi kīrtitā |
(SPS:) sāpi kriyāpi. mukhyā kriyā, gaṇā kriyety⁶³ arthaḥ ||*

SP

*vākyasyārtho nirākāṅkṣām labhate yatra, sā smṛtā |
kriyā⁶⁴ pradhānā, 'he maitra, gām ānaya vrajād' yathā ||
(SPS:) ānayeti mukhyā kriyā.*

SP

tasyā evāṅgabhāvam⁶⁵ yālambate⁶⁶, sā guṇakriyā |

[4.1.]

SD

*tyādipratyaṅtā kriyā (15^v.) sarvathā pradhānakriyāiva bhavati. tyā-
dipratyaṅtāyāḥ kriyāyā asannidhāne satī, kṛipratyaṅtā kriyā vāk-
yārthaviśrāntyā pradhānakriyā sampadyate ||*

[4.2.]

SD

guṇakriyā ca dviprakārā.

SP

*pūrvakālakriyānyā⁶⁷ ceti sā dvaidham upāgatā ||
(SPS:) sā guṇakriyā.*

[4.2.1.]

SD

*yā tu pradhānakriyāyāḥ pūrvam nirvartya mānāt vāt, sā pūrvakāla-
kriyocyate. tasyām⁶⁸ nīyameṇa kṛvāpratyaṅyā [~ Pāṇ 3.4.21] naṃpra-
tyayaś [~ Pāṇ 3.4.22] ca bhavataḥ. tau ca kṛvāṇaṃpratyaṅyau kṛvāma-
sandhyakṣarānto [']vyayam [~ Pāṇ 1.1.39–40] ity avyayasamjñau.*

SP

⁶² N: °vibhāgena.

⁶³ Ś: kriyā ity.

⁶⁴ N: kriye.

⁶⁵ Ś: evā°[3 Akṣaras zerstört].

⁶⁶ N: yā labhate.

⁶⁷ Ś: yā | pūrvakā°[3 Akṣaras zerstört].

⁶⁸ Ms.: tasyā.

*mukhyakriyāyāḥ*⁶⁹ *pūrvam yā nirvartayitum*⁷⁰ *iṣyate* /
pūrvakālakriyā sāsyāḥ ktvāṇamau bhavato, yathā /
‘pūtvāmbho gacchati naraś, śrāvaṃ śrāvaṃ śṛṇoti’ ca //

[4.2.1.1.]

SD

avyayakṛto bhāve bhavantīti [Mbh ad Pāṇ 3.4.26] *vacanād bhāve dhā-*
tvarthamūtrau bha(16^r):*vataḥ*⁷¹. *tābhyāṃ ktvāṇampratyayābhyāṃ kartā-*
nabhihitas.

(SPS:) *codyam cikīrṣati* ||

SP

bhāve [']*vyayakṛtaḥ santīty ukter dhātvarthavācakai* /

(SPS:) *ukter vacanāt, dhātvarthavācakai ktvāṇamāv ity arthāt.*

[4.2.1.1.1.]

SD

tadabhiprāyeṇānabhihite kartari tṛtīyā prāpnoti |

(SPS:) *evam nirṇīya, codyam āha* |

SP

ābhyāṃ kartānabhihitas tṛtīyāviśayo na kim //

[4.2.1.1.2.]

SD

parasmaipadinām pradhānakriyayā yadā kartābhihitas, tatas tada-
bhiprāyeṇābhihite kartari liṅgārthamātre prathamā prāpnoti. pradhāna-
kriyāśaktyabhidhāne guṇakriyāśaktir abhihitavat prakāśate iti bhāṣyakā-
*ravacanaprāmāṇyāt*⁷² *pradhānakriyābhihite kartari liṅgārthamātre pra-*
*thamaiva*⁷³ *bhavati* |

(SPS:) *uttaram āha*⁷⁴

SP

maivam. pradhānakriyayābhihito vartate yataḥ /
prathamā tata evātra.

(SPS:) *atra pūrvokta udāharāṇe | atra yuktīm āha* ||

⁶⁹ Ś: °*kriyāḥ*.

⁷⁰ Ś: *nī*.

⁷¹ Ms.: *bhāvo °mātro bhavati*.

⁷² A/W: „The reference to the Bhāṣyakāra is most probably a reference to the concluding part of Kaiyaṭa on Bhāṣya 3.4.26 (*svādumi ṇamul*). The wording is anticipated in Trikāṇḍī/Vākyapadīya 3.7.82 as Helārāja’s introduction to the Kārikā indicates. The *iti* occurring in the line is clearly not intended as indicative of a direct quotation (anyone who has as much scholarship as is witnessed in the SD would know that the diction of the cited remark cannot be Patañjali’s), but of reasoning (as distilled by someone like Kaiyaṭa) implied in the Bhāṣyakāra’s remarks“.

⁷³ Ms.: °*maive*.

⁷⁴ N: *om*.

SP

*nirbalā hi guṇakriyā ||**mukhyakriyābhidhāne [']nyā cōktavad dṛśyate budhaiḥ ||*

(SPS:) *anyā*⁷⁵ *guṇakriyā || tathoktaṃ pradhānakriyāśaktyabhidhāne guṇakriyāśaktir anabhihitāpi abhihitavat prakāśyate iti. evaṃ yatrāpi guṇakriyāyāḥ*⁷⁶ *pradhānakriyāyāś ca ekam eva karma bhavati, tatra*⁷⁷ *pradhānakriyāivābhidhāyate*⁷⁸. *guṇakriyā tu guṇatvād eva pradhānakriyām anveti | yathā*⁷⁹ *'devadatta ānīya pūjyate'. yathoktaṃ guṇapradhānakriyayor dhātvor ekasya*⁸⁰ *karmaṇaḥ [']*⁸¹ *abhidhānaṃ pradhānena. pradhānānvayīno*⁸² *guṇāḥ [']* *iti. mukhyakriyayā*⁸³ *karmaṇaḥ śābdo [']nvayaḥ, anyathā*⁸⁴ *ārthaḥ | tathoktaṃ*

*evaṃ 'paktvaudano bhukto, bhujyate'*⁸⁵ *veti krttiṇoḥ [']**bhojyasya bhujinā śābda*⁸⁶, *ārthas tu pacinānvayaḥ [']*

[4.2.1.1.3.]

SD

*ktvā, yathā (16^v.) 'devadattaḥ snātvā bhuktvā pītvā, grāmaṃ vrajati'. naṃ, yathā 'pāyaṃ pāyaṃ pība pība payas, siñca*⁸⁷ *siñcāṅgam aṅgam' iti || 10 ||*

[4.2.2.]

SD

dvitīyā tu guṇakriyā yā pradhānakriyānīrvartanasamakālam eva nīrvartyate. tasyāṃ niyamena śāstrīnānāś-ityādayo bhavanti |

SP

⁷⁵ Ś: *anya*.⁷⁶ Ś: °*kri*[3 Akṣaras zerstört].⁷⁷ Ś: *atra*.⁷⁸ Ś: °*ābhi*°[5 Akṣaras zerstört].⁷⁹ Ś: *yathā*[7 Akṣaras zerstört].⁸⁰ Ś: zerstört; N: *akesya*.

⁸¹ A/W: „The citations in the last four lines are *anuṣṭubh* verses . . . the texts [like the Samanvayadiś] frequently contain citations and newly composed mnemonic verses which can be useful in determining relative chronology of the more important works of Sanskrit grammar. There is frequently no difference in spirit between the mnemonic verses of these texts and the (apparently popular grammar) verses cited in works such as the Kāśikā, Padamañjarī, and Śṛṅgāraprakāśa“.

⁸² Ś: Konsonant von °*no* unleserlich; N: °*anvayi*, s.m. in margine: *no*.⁸³ Ś: °*kriyā*; N: °*kriyā*, s.m. in margine: °*ya*°.⁸⁴ N: *anyayā*.⁸⁵ N: *mujyate*.⁸⁶ Ś: *śabda*.⁸⁷ Ms.: *paya sviñca*.

*nirvartyate*⁸⁸ *mukhyakriyāsamakālaṃ guṇakriyā* /
śantrādyantā dvitīyā sā. ‘*sa gacchati paṭhan*’ *yathā* ||
⁸⁹ *tyādyantaiva kriyā mukhyā tv. anyā mukhyāṅgatām bhajet* /
mukhyatulyā kṛdantāpi kācit, tasyā asambhave ||
 (SPS:) *kācin niṣṭhākṛtyakhalādyantā*⁹⁰, *yathā hi rājño* [']*sambhave*
*sacivādir eva pradhānas*⁹¹. *tadvad evety*⁹² *arthaḥ* ||

SP

*viśrāmyati*⁹³ *ca vākyārthas tasyām*. ‘*bhuktvā gato vanam*⁹⁴’ /
ktvādyantā tu kriyā tasyā guṇatām nātivartate ||
 (SPS:) *tasyā mukhyatulyāyāḥ kṛdantaguṇakriyāyāḥ, yathā hi guru-*
*samīpe jñānādinā*⁹⁵ *śiṣyebhyo*⁹⁶ *mukhyo* [']*pi śiṣyo* [']*pradhānaḥ*⁹⁷. *sa*
*evānyaśiṣyeṣu jñātanyūnatvādinā pradhāneṣu*⁹⁸ *gurvasambhave pradhā-*
nas. tadvad evety arthaḥ ||

[4.2.2.1.]

SD

guṇapradhānabhāvaś ca vaktṛvivakṣākālpito, na tu vāstavaḥ, yathā
‘*bhuktvā gacchati, gatvā bhuṅkte* | *pacan bhuṅkte, bhuñjānaḥ pacati. pa-*
ṭhan gacchati, gacchan paṭhati. gāyan gacchati, gacchan (17^r.) *gāyati*’ *ity.*
 [4.3.]

SD

etac ca kriyāpadam yatra svarūpenopāttam, tatra vicāryate.

[4.3.1.]

SD

*yatra tu kriyāpadam kiṃcit svarūpeṇa nopāttam*⁹⁹, *tatrāstir bhavan-*
tīparo [']*dhyāhriyata*¹⁰⁰ *iti bhāṣyakāravacanaprāmāṇyāt*¹⁰¹ *asti, bhavati,*
vidyate iti vā sattāsāmānyavāci kriyāpadam adhyāhṛtya, vākyārthapra-
*tiṣṭhāne[na]*¹⁰² *bhāvvyam. sattā hi sarvabhāvānām antaraṅgā, yathā* ‘*vrkṣa*’

⁸⁸ Ś: *ni*°.

⁸⁹ Vgl. SD oben, 4.1.

⁹⁰ Ś: °*kṛtya*° zerstört.

⁹¹ N: °*dhanam*.

⁹² N: om. *eva*.

⁹³ N: °*te*; Ś: °*śram*°.

⁹⁴ Ś: *dha*°.

⁹⁵ Ś: zerstört.

⁹⁶ N: °*ye*° s.m. in margine.

⁹⁷ N: *śiṣyo nyo mukhyo pi śiṣyebhyo pradhānaḥ*.

⁹⁸ Ś: *jñāta*° bis °*ādinā* zerstört.

⁹⁹ Ms.: °*rūpenopāttam*.

¹⁰⁰ Ms.: *dhyāhriyatīti*.

¹⁰¹ A/W: „Reference to [Mahā]bhāṣya 2.3.1, 2.3.46“.

¹⁰² A/W: „Something like °*pratiṣṭhāne[na]* *bhāvvyam* (bhāve construction meaning ‚Settling of sentence meaning should take place‘) is needed“.

iti kevalapade ukte, asti, bhavati, vidyate iti vā gamyate. (17^v:) atra vā astīti kriyāsāmānyavāci dhātūpalakṣaṇaparam.

SP

*astikriyā prayoktavyā yatra na śrūyate kriyā |
'prāpnoti sa naro mokṣaṃ, yasya bhaktir harau'¹⁰³ yathā ||*

[4.3.2.]

SD

kvacic ca prakaraṇānusāreṇa viśiṣṭāpi kriyādhyāhriyate, karṭṛrahitāyāḥ kriyāyā abhāvāt.

[5.]

SD

evam evaṃbhūtaṃ vākyam kvacin muktaka ekaṃ bhavati, kvacid dve vākye, kvacid bahūni vākyāni | prabandhe tu bahūny eva vākyāni bhavanti. teṣāṃ ca vākyānāṃ parasparasambaddhatopādeyā, na ced unmatta-vākyatvaprasaṅgāt, yathā 'kuṇḍam a(18:)jājinaṃ palalam sphaiyakṛtasya'¹⁰⁴ putra' iti¹⁰⁵.

SP

*evaṃbhūtaṃ kvacid vākyam ekaṃ, dve vā, bahūni vā |
vaktum arthaṃ samarthāni, sambandhaś cet parasparam |
anyathonmattatā 'kuṇḍam palālam' itivad bhavet ||*

[5.1.]

SD

parasparasambandhaś ca svaśabdanirdiṣṭārthamukhena¹⁰⁶ vā bhavati, sarvanāmaparāmṛṣṭārthamukhena vā.

[5.1.1.]

SD

svaśabdanirdiṣṭārthamukhena samanvaye bahavaḥ prakārāḥ, tathā hi yattador upakramopasaṃhārakramarūpo nityam abhisambandhaḥ. sa ca śābdāḥ, ārthaś ca.

[5.1.1.1.]

SD

dvayor¹⁰⁷ yattador upādāne sati, śābdāḥ.

SP

*upakramopasaṃhārakramarūpas tu yattadoḥ |
yaḥ sambandhaḥ, sa śābdo hi. dvayoḥ śābdena kīrtanam ||*

[5.1.1.2.]

SD

¹⁰³ N: *harer*.

¹⁰⁴ Ms.: *spheya°*.

¹⁰⁵ Vgl. Mbh. 1.1.1 (p. 38).

¹⁰⁶ Ms.: *°niṣṭārtha°*.

¹⁰⁷ Ms.: *dvayo*.

ekatarasyopādāne saty, ārthaḥ.

SP

*upādānaṃ bhaved yatra kevalasyaiva yattadoḥ /
ākṣepo nityasambandhād anyasyārthaḥ sa ucyate //*

[5.1.1.2.1.]

SD

*yadi tasyārthasāmarthyenākṣepāt tacchabdasya¹⁰⁸ kevalopādāne saty,
ārthaḥ (18^v;) triprakāraḥ, prasiddhaprakrāntānubhūtavastuviṣayeṇa ca,
yacchabdena tasya sambandhāt.*

SP

*ākṣepo [']rthād yado yatra nopādānaṃ¹⁰⁹, tadas tadā /
ārthaḥ prasiddhānubhūtaprakrāntaviṣayas tridhā //*

[5.1.1.2.2.]

SD

*yacchabdasya kevalasyopādāne sati, ārtho dvividhas samanvayaḥ, pra-
krāntavastuviṣayeṇa kalpitakarmādiviṣayeṇa ca, tacchabdena tasya sam-
bandhāt.*

SP

*yadā yada upādānaṃ, prakrāntaviṣayeṇa¹¹⁰ tat¹¹¹ /
ārtho dvidhā, kalpitatatatarmādiviṣayeṇa¹¹² ca //
ekavākyasthakartuś ca nirdiṣṭasyedamādibhiḥ /
tacchabdena parāmarśo na kāryaḥ kavibhiḥ kvacit //
ya ekasya yadaḥ pūrvam prayogo, duṣṭa eva saḥ /
tadabhinnārthedamādiprayogo hi yadā bhavet /
yadaḥ pūrvam prayoge ca, no doṣo, na¹¹³ guṇas tadā //*

[5.2.]

SD

*kvacic ca kevale kriyāpade 'dhyāhriyamāṇakāraśasambandhe sati,
vākyārthaparisaṃāptir dṛśyate | yathā 'āgaccha, āgaccha. cala, cala.
brūhi, brūhi. yāhi, yāhi. apasarpa, apasarpa. vada, vada'.*

SP

*adhyāhṛtakāraśasambandhaś ca kvacid bhavet /
ekakriyāprayoge¹¹⁴ [']pi, yathā 'brūhy, apasarpa, bhoḥ' //*

[5.3.]

SD

¹⁰⁸ Ms.: *tat tacchadśabdasya.*

¹⁰⁹ Ś: *tūpādānaṃ.*

¹¹⁰ N: *°viṣaye na.*

¹¹¹ SPS: *tat tadā.*

¹¹² N: *kalpitas tatarmādiviṣaye na ca.*

¹¹³ N: *na* in margine.

¹¹⁴ N: *°kriya°.*

atra cai(19^r:)kena ślokena vākyārthaparisaṁāptau muktakaṁ, dvābhyāṁ ślokābhyāṁ¹¹⁵ vākyārthaparisaṁāptau yugalakam, tribhiḥ tilakam, caturbhiḥ cakalakam, pañcabhiḥ kulakam, anantaraṁ mahākulakam || etair vyastais samastair vā prabandha iti śivam.

SP

*yatra vākyārthaviśrāntiḥ ślokenaika¹¹⁶ dṛśyate |
muktakaṁ tatra¹¹⁷, yugmena yugalaṁ, tilakaṁ tribhiḥ ||
caturbhiḥ ca cakalakam, pañcabhiḥ kulakaṁ smṛtaṁ |
mahākulakam ācāryāḥ kathayanti tataḥ param ||*

[6.]

SD

*dīnāmātram anvayasayedam bālānām saṁprakāśitam |
diśānayā pragalbhante bālās samyak samanvaye ||
pañcake daśake vāpi ślokānām yadi darśyate |
bālās caitat, tatas samyaganvayam¹¹⁸ prati muktadhīḥ ||*

i(19^v:)ti samanvayadik saṁāptā || || kṛtī rājānapaṇḍitacchuḍḍakasya || ||

SP

*samanvayapradīpo [']yam kuḍakoktādhvanā mayā |
darśito. vibudhair atra kāryā khalitayojanā¹¹⁹ ||*

(SPS:) *kuḍakah paṇḍita ekaḥ. tenokto yo [']dhvā mārgaḥ, samanvaya-digākhya¹²⁰ granthaviśeṣa ity arthaḥ. sa tu gadyarūpeṇa sthito, [']yam tu padyarūpeṇaitāvān eva viśeṣaḥ || saṁāpto [']yam samanvayapradīpasaṅketāḥ vibudhasamūhavanditapādapadmasya śṛigaṅgādharaśvāmināḥ śiṣyena paṇḍitadevaśarmaṇā iti bhadram¹²¹.*

¹¹⁵ Ms.: *vākyābhyāṁ*.

¹¹⁶ Ś: *padyenai°*.

¹¹⁷ N: *tatra* bis *cakalakam* in margine.

¹¹⁸ A/W: „Contextually, *samyak* could be joined to or separated from *anvayam*. The prefix *sa* in the title of the work favors joining. Metre favors separation. „His mind is opened to proper syntax“ or „His mind is properly opened to syntax“ “.

¹¹⁹ N: *°ryā khalita°*; Ś: *°ryaskhalita°*. A/W: „Separate *kāryā* from *°skha* ... What the author wishes to say is this: Filling in of what I have missed should be done by the wise/knowledgeable“.

¹²⁰ Ś: *°didig°*.

¹²¹ Ś: Nach *devaśarmaṇā* 4 Akṣaras unleserlich (*viracitaḥ*[?]), dann *ti śivam*. N und Ś: Es folgen Schreibersprüche.

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SUNDARĪNAKHAŚĪKHAVARṆANA —
AN INDIAN VERSION OF A UNIVERSAL LITERARY GENRE*

Preliminaries to a Typological Demarcation

By Alois Wurm, Vienna

The “physical portrait of the beautiful person” – Sanskrit *nakhaśīkhavarṇana* (“nail-to-top description”), *pādādīkeśāntavarṇana* (“from-foot-to-hair-end description”) or *keśādīpādāntavarṇana* (“from-hair-to-foot-end description”) respectively, Tamil *aṅkamālai* (“garland of limbs”), Arabic *wasf* (“descriptive song”) and thence in Orientalist nomenclature – is a universal literary genre or motif occurring both in ancient (cf. e.g. Ancient Egyptian¹, Babylonian², Jewish³, Classi-

* This is a revised version of a paper presented at the VIIIth World Sanskrit Conference of the International Association for Sanskrit Studies, Vienna August 27–September 2, 1990. – Note the following modifications in relation to quotes: (a) All characters set in spaced type are by the present writer; (b) An asterisk following a bracket indicates a personal annotation within a quotation; (c) In some of the quoted translations, the preceding original texts have been omitted.

¹ Cf. Papyrus Harris 500, 2/10–4/1; Papyrus Chester Beatty I, C¹/1–8; Louvre C 100, 16/1–4 (all translated by J. B. WHITE, A Study of the Language of Love in the Song of Songs and Ancient Egyptian Poetry. [Society of Biblical Literature Dissertation Series, No. 38]. Montana s.a., p. 169f.; 177f.; 189f.); Ostrakon Érémitage No. 1124 (translated by A. HERMANN, Altägyptische Liebesdichtung. Wiesbaden 1959, p. 129). For an interpretation of the “descriptive song” in Ancient Egyptian literature and its setting therein consult: A. HERMANN, Beiträge zur Erklärung der ägyptischen Liebesdichtung. In: Ägyptologische Studien H. Grapow zum 70. Geburtstag. Berlin 1955, p. (118–139) 124–134; id., Altägyptische Liebesdichtung, p. 124–130; W. HERMANN, Gedanken zur Geschichte des altorientalischen Beschreibungsliedes. Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft 75 (1963) 176–197; WHITE, op. cit., p. 114–116 & passim (esp. ch. II & III) as well as the literature cited therein.

² Cf. Assyrian Collection b = VAT 10251, II, ll. 7–12 & 13–18 (edited and translated by W. G. LAMBERT, Babylonian Wisdom Literature. Oxford 1960, p. 226f. & 230 resp.).

³ Cf. “Song of Songs” 4.1–7; 5.9–16; 6.4–7; 7.1–6; 7.7–10 (all translated and commented by O. LORETZ, Studien zur althebräischen Poesie 1: Das althebräische Liebeslied. Neukirchen – Vluyn, p. 26ff., 33f[f.], 38, 42[f.], 44; for an interpretation see also HERMANN, loc. cit., p. 183ff.; and, especially, WHITE, op. cit., p. 148ff. and ch. I & IV, with an exhaustive bibliography); Genesis Apocryphon 1 Q IV, col. XX, ll. 2–8 (translated and commented by J. A.

cal⁴, and other texts) and modern (cf. e.g. Ernst Hardt's description of Isolde in *Tantris der Narr*, Albert Ehrenstein's *Viola*, André Breton's "Free Union", František Halas' "Young Women", Pablo Neruda's "Ode to the Naked Beauty", etc.), tribal (cf. e.g. Tigrē, Hausa, Hottentott, Polynesian and Micronesian, Indian Ādivāsī, and Guaraní oral poems) and mundane, oral and written, simple and ornate, sacral and secular literature. It is a universal genre – both by phenomenological analogy and through diffusion. Yet, tracing the various lines of migration is a difficult task as the missing links by far outnumber the extant testimonies in any synchronical or diachronical unit. Hence, no effort is made in this paper to investigate intercultural influences⁵. Now,

FITZMYER, *The Genesis Apocryphon of Qumran Cave 1. A Commentary*. Rome ²1971, p. 63 & 119ff. [comm.]; see also HERRMANN, loc. cit., p. 194ff.); "Joseph and Asenath" 18.6–10 (translated by P. RIESSLER, *Altjüdisches Schrifttum außerhalb der Bibel. Übersetzt und erläutert*. Heidelberg ²1966, p. 522f.). – The survival of the "Egyptian-Jewish descriptive song" in Hellenistic, Early Christian and Muslim, as well as Medieval literature, is followed up by HERRMANN, loc. cit., p. 196; HERMANN, *Beiträge . . .*, p. 128ff.; id., *Altägyptische Liebesdichtung*, p. 129. Most of the quoted examples, however, seem to be basically independent – as are, indeed, many descriptions not mentioned therein.

⁴ Cf. G. E. LESSING, *Laokoon oder Über die Grenzen der Malerei und Poesie*. [Reclam Universal-Bibliothek, Nr. 271/71]. Stuttgart 1964, p. 146ff. & 153ff.; HERMANN, *Beiträge . . .*, p. 130f.; id., *Altägyptische Liebesdichtung*, p. 129.

⁵ It is obvious that the "descriptive songs" of the "Canticum", though definitely of independent origin, were influenced by motifs of the corresponding genre (and the love poetry in general) of Egypt (and Mesopotamia; cf. ST. LANGDON, *Babylonian and Hebrew Musical Terms*. JRAS 1921, 169–191), and, in turn, inspired "physical descriptions" of Hellenistic, Early Christian and Muslim, as well as Medieval literature (cf. n. 3). Persian "body portraits" reveal, beside original motifs of their own, impulses both from the above-mentioned complex, including the Arabian *wasf*, and the Indian *nakhaśīkha*. In the literary spheres of Greater India manifestly influenced by Indian art and folk poetry, the "physical portrait" tends to derive its structure from the Indian *nakhaśīkha*, while the elements of comparison are, for the most part, local. Cf. e.g. the "Portrait of the Beautiful Princess" in the Malayan rhapsodist (*pēnglipur-lara* = "solacer in sorrow") tale *Raja Muda* (translated by H. OVERBECK, *Malaiische Geschichten aus dem Malaiischen übertragen*. Repr. Düsseldorf 1975, p. 91: "Das Wasser, das sie trinkt, durchstrahlt ihr Glanz, Wie tausend Flitter strahlt es, ißt sie Betel; Der Schönheit sieben Zeichen sind ihr eigen. Schlank ist ihr Körper, nicht zu groß, zu klein, Oval das Antlitz, wie das Blatt der Sirih, Dem neuen Monde gleichen ihre Brauen, Geschweift die Wimpern wie des Kampfhahns Kunstsporn, Zart wie die Lotosknospe ist die Nase, Die Ohren weich wie welke Lotosblätter, Die Wange gleicht der durchgeschnittenen Mango, Der aufgesprungenen Pati gleich die Lippen, Die Zähne der geborstenen Granatfrucht: Fein zierlich, wie gedrechselt, ist der Hals, Die Brust ist breiter als der

although the motif in question is universal, it has nowhere developed such an extensive as well as intensive spectrum of multiformity and artistry as in India – superseding the noteworthy evidence in other Eastern (Arab, Persian, Chinese . . .) literatures. All in all, it has assumed manifold generic functions both in and outside India, the major of which (prescinding from overt contextual or situational transferences, amalgamations, as well as analogies, such as the “cult descriptive hymn”) may be outlined as follows:

- as a “lyrical song of praise” *ore admiratoris* or within the emotive spectrum of love and lust, mostly in love poetry
- as an “anticipatory” or “initiatory”, “irruptive” or “culminative”, “illuminative” or “elaborative” introduction or representation of a “heroine” or “hero of love” (*nāyikā* or *nāyaka*) or a beautiful person evoking sentiments of love or wonder, in epic and narrative lore, especially of the East (exuberantly so in Indian, Arab, Persian, Turkic, Mongol, and Chinese literature)
- as a type of *uddīpanavibhāvavarṇana*, “description of inflaming excitants”, according to *alaṃkāraśāstra* theory
- as a “descriptive” or “wooing song” on behalf of an ideal bride or bridegroom by a bard or a messenger (or some other communicant), or a “panegyric praise of a beautiful person” in various bardic and other poetical or ceremonial settings
- as an “astrophysiognomical description” of an ideal bride or bridegroom (woman or man) or a *mahāpuruṣa* (*śāmadrīka*) *lakṣaṇa* and *mahāpuruṣalakṣaṇa* description resp.) by or in lieu of an astrologer or connoisseur of marks (*lakṣaṇika*, *lākṣaṇa*, *lakṣaṇajña*, *lakṣaṇapāṭhaka*), a function practically restricted to Indian literature
- as a “descriptive song” on the bride or bridegroom (a maiden or a youth) within the hymeneals of the marriage ritual, like the *wasf* in Palestinian (Syrian, Egyptian, Yemenite) marriage ceremonies⁶

ganze Leib; Dem Blütentroß der Palme gleicht das Haar, Das lang und reich bis auf die Fersen wallt Und schwärzer glänzt als jeder schwarze Schreibsaft. Dem Bogen gleich der Unterarm geschweift, Die Finger wie des Citronellgras’ Spitzen; Der Daumen und der kleine Finger spannt Die Hüften; Schenkel denen gleich des Graßhüpfers; Die Wade schwellend wie das junge Reiskorn, Die Ferse wie ein Vögelei gerundet.”) and an eighteenth century Nevārī love poem of unknown origin (No. 27 in S. LIENHARD, *Songs of Nepal. An Anthology of Nevar Folksongs and Hymns*. [Asian Studies at Hawaii, No. 30]. Honolulu 1984).

⁶ Cf. J. G. WETZSTEIN, *Die syrische Dreschtafel*. Zeitschrift für Ethnologie 5 (1873) 270–302, ch. 4; id., *Bemerkungen zum Hohenliede*, in: F. DELITZSCH, *Biblischer Commentar über die poetischen Bücher des Alten Testaments*. IV: Hohes Lied und Kohelet. Leipzig 1875, p. (162–177) 170ff.; St. H. STEPHAN,

- as a “proof of recognition or identification”
- as a “song” or “message of compliments” or a “seductive cajolery”
- as a “nostalgic or melancholy reminiscence of love or beauty” (especially in the Arab *naṣīb*⁷ and the *viraha* scenes of Indian *kāvya* poetry), or a “commemorative song”
- as a “descriptive hymn” on a goddess or god, i.e. a divine idol or visualized image (*pādādikeśāntavarṇanastotra* or *keśādīpādāntavarṇanastotra* in Sanskrit terminology)
- as an “aesthetical” or “erotic model of beauty (poses)”
- as an “erotic study”
- as a “typologizing” or “typological description” of multivalent reference, in both poetical and scientific (e.g. erotological or iconographical) literature
- as a “metaphorical” or “allegorical symbol” in multifarious usage⁸.

Thus, the first principle in searching for the original function of the “descriptive song” can only be to adopt a universal perspective in probing the past so as to rule out the risk of overlooking motifs, which, in a single tradition, may have become obsolete through later superstructures. Hence, it is necessary to eliminate all such developments as can be shown to be secondary or specific and to focus on phenomenological (not cogently chronological) primaries.

Starting the probe, it can be said from the outset that the “head-to-toe-portrait” is no elaboration of any particular charms (or, to speak in *alaṃkāraśāstra* terminology, of single *uddīpanavibhāva*), for the – at least representatively – full or complete enumeration of bodily traits⁹ has its origin in the magical conception of perfection being the sum total

Modern Palestinian Parallels to the Song of Songs. The Journal of the Palestine Oriental Society 2 (1923) 199–278, Nos. VI & XVI; L. MARX, Das Lied der Lieder. In Deutsche Verse übertragen und erläutert. [Reclam Universal-Bibliothek, Nr. 8896]. Stuttgart 1964, p. 74ff. – Many Palestinian *auṣāf*, however, especially such as pertain to love and longing, are recited at various occasions, eventually also at marriage festivals: cf. G. H. DALMAN, Palästinischer Diwan. Als Beitrag zur Volkskunde Palästinas gesammelt und mit Übersetzungen und Melodien herausgegeben. Leipzig 1901, p. 100f., 110ff., 120ff., 130ff., 242f., 245ff. & passim; STEPHAN, loc. cit., No. XIX; A. SAARISALO, Songs of the Druzes. [Studia Orientalia IV/1]. Helsinki 1932, No. XVIII.

⁷ Cf. I. LICHTENSTÄDTER, Das Naṣīb der altarabischen Qaṣīde. Islamica 5 (1932) 18–96. Cf. also the “melancholy greeting songs” of the Tigrē (E. LITTMANN, Lieder der Tigrē-Stämme. Deutsche Übersetzung und Commentar. A–B. [Publications of the Princeton Expedition to Abyssinia IV]. Leyden 1913–1915, A, No. 55, vv. 9–15: p. 84; No. 339, vv. 29–44: p. 528f.; B, No. 573, vv. 1–23: p. 868ff.; No. 595, vv. 211–229: p. 912f.).

⁸ Some examples are mentioned by HERMANN, Beiträge . . . , p. 131ff.

⁹ This full-scale enumeration, of course, is often curtailed in purely poetical

of all individual potencies, as well as the idea that it is concentrated fullness alone that can ban the ominous void which threatens to expose the addressed object to the influence of malevolent forces. No doubt, there are earlier testimonies for particular charms than full-scale "beauty portraits" in almost all literatures, but they do not prove the typological priority of the former to the latter. This recognition also forestalls the supposition of a multivalent origin as there would be no unitary schematical structure.

Magic being one of the earliest driving forces of man, it is obvious that the search should start with such literary functions as are imbued with the clime of the same. This starting-point necessarily entails a preferential discussion of the astrophysiognomical types of description. Of these the mantic *mahāpuruṣalakṣaṇavarṇana* of the Buddhist tradition¹⁰ definitely "looks" the most archaic – while the Jaina ones¹¹ represent both more specialized and better organized models of the former by combining with the "more normal poetical" facets of the *nakhaśikha*, the Epic¹² and narrative ones, from the outset, being of a broader range and, as such, more or less the male equivalents of the female (*sāmudrika*)*lakṣaṇa* portraits.

Thus, the *mahāpuruṣalakṣaṇa* descriptions of the Dīghanikāya (XIV 1,32 and XXX 1,2), and their parallels, are representative of the most genuine type of an "astrophysiognomical portrait" (DN XXX 1,2):

"And what, brethren, are the Thirty-two Marks of the Superman, wherewith endowed two careers lie open to him and none other: – that of a Monarch, Turner of the Wheel ... that of Buddha Supreme?

- (1) He hath feet with level tread. That this is so counts to him as one of the marks of the Superman.
- (2) Moreover beneath, on the soles of his feet, wheels appear thousand-spoked, with tyre and hub, in every way complete and well divided. That this is so counts to him as one of the marks of the Superman.
- (3) He has projecting heels. That this is so, etc.
- (4) He is long in the fingers and toes. ...
- (5) Soft and tender in hands and feet. ...
- (6) With hands and feet like a net. ...

contexts where magical stringency is not felt or brevity is demanded for literary reasons.

¹⁰ Cf. M. E. BURNOUR, *Le lotus de la bonne loi*. Paris 1852, app. VIII, sect. I & III; F. EDGERTON, *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary*. II: Dictionary. New Haven 1953, s.v. *lakṣaṇa*; A. METTE, *Veḍhas in Lalitavistara and Divyāvadāna: Beschreibungen des schönen Körpers in Sanskrit und Prakrit*. WZKS 17 (1973) 21–42, and the literature cited therein.

¹¹ Cf. METTE, loc. cit.

¹² See e.g. the "Rāma portraits" of Rāmāyaṇa V 33,1–20 and I 1,7–11. Cf., however, the typologizing *śūralakṣaṇa* list of Mahābhārata XII 102,6–20.

- (7) His ankles are like rounded shells. . . .
- (8) His legs are like an antelope's. . . .
- (9) Standing and without bending he can touch and rub his knees with either hand. . . .
- (10) His male organs are concealed in a sheath. . . .
- (11) His complexion is like bronze, the colour of gold. . . .
- (12) His skin is so delicately smooth that no dust cleaves to his body. . . .
- (13) The down on it grows in single hairs one to each pore. . . .
- (14) The down on his body turns upward, every hair of it, blue black in colour like eye-paint, in little curling rings, curling to the right. . . .
- (15) He has a frame divinely straight. . . .
- (16) He has the seven convex surfaces. . . .
- (17) The front half of his body is like a lion's. . . .
- (18) There is no furrow between his shoulders. . . .
- (19) His proportions have the symmetry of the banyan-tree: the length of his body is equal to the compass of his arms, and the compass of his arms is equal to his height. . . .
- (20) His bust is equally rounded. . . .
- (21) His taste is supremely acute. . . .
- (22) His jaws are as a lion's. . . .
- (23) He has forty teeth. . . .
- (24) Regular teeth. . . .
- (25) Continuous teeth. . . .
- (26) The eyeteeth are very lustrous. . . .
- (27) His tongue is long. . . .
- (28) He has a divine voice like the karavīka bird's. . . .
- (29) His eyes are intensely blue. . . .
- (30) He has eyelashes like a cow's. . . .
- (31) Between the eyebrows appears a hairy mole white and like soft cotton down. . . .
- (32) His head is like a royal turban. . . ."¹³

Analysing these *lakṣaṇa* portraits, we find that they follow a clear sequence (ascending or descending), yet, at the same time, breach the directional order at several places in order to attend to another logical pattern in which symmetrical, numerical, and emblematic elements are more important than sequence. Now, we could concede that such a rupture is conditioned by the nature of the *lakṣaṇa* and justify the necessity of an intertwined system – had we not a less abstruse counterpart in a number of female portraits where such (hyper)technical astro-physiognomical elements conceptually breach (sometimes less, sometimes more, occasionally even to the point of smothering) an original (ordered, unordered, or epologically disordered¹⁴) aesthetical unit

¹³ Translated by T. W. & C.A.F. RHYS DAVIDS, *Dialogues of the Buddha*. Transl. from the Pali of the *Dīgha Nikāya*. Pt. III. [Sacred Books of the Buddhists, Vol. IV]. Repr. London 1977, p. 138ff.

¹⁴ Due to the oral pattern of improvised composition, small bardic or lyrical

(which, though, is not to be considered a-magical or “a-manaistic” either). Besides, in the majority of early Indian *nakhaśikha* descriptions, as well as practically in all such portraits outside India – which are exclusively aesthetical (not excepting the male ones inspite of idiosyncratic differences) –, (hyper)technical elements as indicated above virtually do not appear. Besides, in all vignette-like characterizations of beautiful persons both generic and specific denotations of charm are galore while references to detailed astrophysiological facets are rare. On the other side of the scale, there are some *(sāmudrika)lakṣaṇa* portraits which, like the Buddhist *mahāpuruṣalakṣaṇa* descriptions, are almost exclusively technical – proving this, too, by reference to terms like *(kanyā)lakṣaṇa*, *liṅga*, *cihna*, *(kanyā)lakṣaṇika*, etc. –, but, unlike the latter, display only vague signs of a bodily sequence¹⁵. In this respect, they resemble, in miniature, the numerous mantic lists of *puruṣa*- or *strī(sāmudrika)lakṣaṇa* (*narastrīlakṣaṇa*) and *kumārī*- or *kanyālakṣaṇa*¹⁶, to wit, the less sophisticated of them (as the complex ones, themselves, combine or amalgamate different generic traditions). In contrast to these, there are depictions of beautiful men with nil or only few astrophysiological features¹⁷.

poems containing catalogues (universally) tend to become disordered when being worked into large epics, especially if they are of a general pattern and their magical purport is not focussed upon.

¹⁵ Cf. the texts of Rāmāyaṇa VI 38, V 33, and Mahābhārata V 114 (see below).

¹⁶ Cf. e.g. Mahābhārata XII 102,6–20 (a *śūralakṣaṇa* list); Śārdūlakarṇāva-dāna, p. 129–132, 147–154, 172–175, 187–191; Gargasamhitā (CESS A 2, 116a–117b; A 3, 29b; A 4) XVIII & XLVIII; Bṛhatsamhitā LXVIII–LXX (along with the sources quoted by its commentator Bhaṭṭotpala); the physiognomical sections of the Aṅgavijjā and the Majjhimakhanda; Agnipurāṇa CCXLIII–CCXLIV; Garuḍapurāṇa LXIII–LXV; Sāmudrikatilaka (of Durlabharāja); Ratisāstra (of Nāgārjuna) IV–V (cf. R. SCHMIDT, Das Ratisāstra des Nāgārjuna. WZKM 23 [1909] 180–190, p. 181ff.); Anaṅgaraṅga VIII 10–33; Vīramitrodaya of Mitrāmīśra (physiognomical sections); etc. There is even a famous work written in Burma entitled Ithipurisāṅgavijjāpakinnakakyan, “A handbook of divination on the formation of the hands and other parts of the body”. For the various classificatory terminologies in the divination of the physical features and signs of the body, and its cultural significance (the idea is universal, and in India as old as the Atharvaveda – cf. I 18 & VII 115,3 – and embodied in the *numina* of Lakṣmī and Alakṣmī), see P. HORSCH, Die vedische Gāthā- und Śloka-Literatur. Bern 1966, p. 56ff., 60ff., 66ff., and D. PINGREE, Jyotiḥśāstra. Astral and Mathematical Literature. [A History of Indian Literature VI, 4]. Wiesbaden 1981, passim.

¹⁷ Like e.g. most of the male portraits in the Vasudevahiṇḍī (see below) and the Harṣacarita (Dadhīca, Śrī Harṣa, Kumāragupta, Skandagupta – while those of Bhairavācārya and Nirghāta represent “typologizing descriptions”).

To illustrate the above observations, we commence with a vista of the major pre-classical (mainly Epic¹⁸) “literary” descriptions, displaying fluctuating (from full to high to low to practically nil) rates of (hyper)technical astrophysiognomical traits:

- Mahābhārata V 114,1–4 (Mādhavī)
- Rāmāyaṇa V 33,1–20 (Rāma)
- Rāmāyaṇa VI 38,1–14 (Sītā)
- Mahābhārata IV 8,9–14 (Kṛṣṇā)
- Mahābhārata II 58,32–37 (Kṛṣṇā)
- Rāmāyaṇa II 9,27–39 (Mantharā)
- Rāmāyaṇa I 1,7–11 (Rāma)
- Buddhacarita VIII 51–58 (Prince Gautama)
- Buddhacarita V 26 (Prince Gautama)
- Mahābhārata I 155,41–45 (Kṛṣṇā)
- Mahābhārata I 157,6–7 (Kṛṣṇā)
- Rāmāyaṇa III 44,14–21 (Sītā)
- Rāmāyaṇa V 13,27–29 (Sītā)
- Mahābhārata III 60,31–32 (Damayantī)
- Mahābhārata III 61,61–63 (Damayantī)
- Mahābhārata III 112,1–11... (R̥ṣyaśṛṅga’s Seductress)
- Therīgāthā 252–270 (Ambapālī)
- Saundarānanda IV 3–6 (Sundarī)
- Rāmāyaṇa VII 26,9–16 (Rambhā)
- Nārīṇai 301 (The Beloved)
- Porunarārruppaṭai 5–62 (The Female Bard)

Looking further, the various descriptions in “doctrinal” Buddhist and Jaina literature are characterized by their respective *mahāpuruṣa-lakṣaṇa* type (the thirty-two-*lakṣaṇa* scheme of the Bodhisattva being more idiosyncratic than the Mahāvīra one), which also colours the depictions of the celestial females¹⁹. Besides, as METTE has discovered, a number of both less and more sophisticated descriptions – so the Buddhist portraits of Māyā (Lalitavistara 26,15–27,14)²⁰ and the Kinnarī (Divyāvadāna 30, p. 288, 21ff. VAIDYA = Gilgit Ms. III 1,136 DUTT)²¹, as well as the Jaina depictions of Mahāvīra (Aupapātikasūtra § 16 and Āvaśyakacūrṇi PTS I, p. 262–264)²², Queen Dhārīṇī (Aupapātikasūtra

¹⁸ Exclusive of appendix passages like Mahābhārata IV 14, App. I, No. 12 (Kṛṣṇā); III 45, App. I, No. 6, ll. 33–65 (Urvaśī); etc., which cannot be considered pre-classical.

¹⁹ See METTE, loc. cit., p. 21ff.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 23ff.

²¹ Ibid., p. 27ff.

²² Ibid., p. 21ff. & 30ff.

§ 12)²³, the “Man of the Golden Age” (Tandulaveyāliya, p. 8–10 SCHUBRING)²⁴ and the “Human Apsarases of Bharatavarṣa” or corr. (in Jambuddīvapaṇṇatti 108a, Jīvābhigamasutta 149b, and Paṇhāvāgarāṇa 79a: a common version of which is constructed by METTE²⁵), and Śrī (Kalpasūtra § 36)²⁶ – have a structural commonality in the metre of the *vedha*²⁷. While in the less sophisticated portraits specific astrophysiognomical details and aesthetical bodily traits (as also other features) are jumbled up, most of the sophisticated descriptions are both perfectly rounded and exhaustive portraits, harmoniously synthesized of mutually complementary hypertechnical, technical, and aesthetical features (though single astrophysiognomical elements, for reasons of coherence, are still kept outside the general frame). A very illustrative example is the above-mentioned picture of the “Human Apsarases of Bharatavarṣa”²⁸. The shorter depiction of Śrī, finally, is almost exclusively aesthetical, the few astrophysiognomical facets being harmoniously woven into the well-rounded portrait:

“Then she, with the face of the full moon, saw the goddess of famous beauty, Śrī, on the top of Mount Himavat, reposing on a lotus in the lotus lake, anointed with the water from the strong and large trunks of the guardian elephants. She sat on a lofty throne. Her firmly placed feet resembled golden tortoises, and her dyed, fleshy, convex, thin, red, smooth nails were set in swelling muscles. Her hands and feet were like the leaves of the lotus, and her fingers and toes soft and excellent; her round and well-formed legs were adorned with the Kuruvindā-varta, and her knees with dimples. Her fleshy thighs resembled the proboscis of an excellent elephant, and her lovely broad hips were encircled by a golden zone. Her large and beautiful belly was adorned by a circular navel, and contained a lovely row of hairs (black as) collyrium, bees, or clouds, straight, even, continuous, thin, admirable, handsome, soft, and downy. Her waist, which contained the three folds, could be encompassed with one hand. On all parts of her body shone ornaments and trinkets, composed of many jewels and precious stones, yellow and red gold. The pure cup-like pair of her breasts sparkled, encircled by a garland of Kunda flowers, in which glittered a string of pearls. She wore strings of pearls made by diligent and clever artists, shining with wonderful strings, a necklace of jewels with a string of Dīnārās, and a trembling pair of earrings, touching her shoulders, diffused a brilliancy; but the united beauties and charms of these ornaments were only subservient to the loveliness of her face. Her lovely eyes were large and pure like the water lily. She sprinkled about the sap from two lotus flowers which she held in her splendid

²³ Ibid., p. 30.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 21 ff. & 30 ff.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 32 ff. As such, the above-mentioned “Mahāvīra” and “Ideal Men/Women Portraits” are very close in text and metrical structure.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 30 ff.

²⁷ Ibid., passim.

²⁸ Translated *ibid.*, p. 38 ff.

hands, and gracefully fanned herself. Her glossy, black, thick, smooth hair hung down in a braid.”²⁹

Of a similar synthesized nature as the sophisticated Jaina descriptions mentioned above are most of the *anuvyañjana* lists of Buddhist literature³⁰, which complement the *mahāpuruṣalakṣaṇa* catalogue of the Bodhisattva.

At this juncture, it is highlighting to note that the narrative Vasudevahiṇḍī – which, purporting to project an elaborate model of Jaina universal history, on the one hand, is inspired by Jaina canonical lore and structure (e.g. the *veḍha* metre in most of the *varṇaka* portions³¹), on the other hand, heavily draws upon Bṛhatkathā material, and thus reflects the conventional bourgeois affinity to bardic literature – does show a similar fluctuation between more and less astrophysiognomy-based portraits as the Epics – though there is a marked progress of integration of the technical features into the over-all aesthetical picture. Hence, for comparison, another typological spectrum of some of the major descriptions from the Vasudevahiṇḍī is listed here:

- p. 123,1–13 (Sāmālī)³²
- p. 353,8–17 (Vasudeva)³³
- p. 204,9–24 (Vasudeva)³⁴
- p. 279,24–280,7 (Vasudeva)³⁵
- p. 226,19–29 (Vegavatī)³⁶
- p. 121,19–35 (Sāmā-Vijayā)³⁷
- p. 204,5–9 (Paumā)³⁸
- p. 349,4–12 (Keumatī)³⁹

²⁹ Translated by H. JACOBI, Jaina Sūtras. Translated from Prākṛit. Part I: The Ācārāṅga Sūtra. The Kalpa Sūtra. [Sacred Books of the East, Vol. XXII]. Repr. Delhi 1964, p. 232f.

³⁰ See BURNOUF, op. cit. (n. 10), app. VIII, sect. II & III; EDGERTON, op. cit., s.v. *anuvyañjana*.

³¹ Cf. L. ALSDORF, Der Vedha in der Vasudevahiṇḍī, in: Asiatica. Festschrift Friedrich Weller. Leipzig 1954, 1–11 (= Kleine Schriften. Wiesbaden 1974, p. 167ff.).

³² Translated by J. JAIN, The Vasudevahiṇḍī. An Authentic Jain Version of the Bṛhatkathā. Ahmedabad 1977, p. 200.

³³ Ibid., p. 522.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 356f.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 474f. Further male portraits are those of Rāma-Kesava, Pajjunṇa, Usabha, Vairajaṅgha, and Tivīṭṭhu-Acala; see A. P. JAMKHEDKAR, Vasudevahiṇḍī. A Cultural Study. Delhi 1984, p. 82/123.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 422ff.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 195f.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 356.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 512.

- p. 351,20–27 (Pabhāvatī)⁴⁰
- p. 354,30–355,12 (Bhaddamittā-Saccarakkhiyā)⁴¹
- p. 208,10–14 (Āsaseṇā)⁴²
- p. 132,20–25 (Gandhavvadattā)⁴³
- p. 280,9–14 (Bandhumatī)⁴⁴.

Comparing the Epic and the Vasudevahiṇḍī spectra, it is conspicuous that, while astrophysiognomical features continue to be referred to, they are less often specified, even in the male portraits, and more harmoniously integrated into a well-rounded aesthetical picture. This aspect is further reflected by a marked tendency – due to inherent overlappings – of stretching the positive⁴⁵ meaning of *lakṣaṇa* “auspicious marks on or of the body” to denote or connote “virtues or excellences of form or beauty” as are designed to constitute the “physical portrait” (*rūpaguṇa* etc.⁴⁶), and the resulting fluctuations between these meanings – a process which seems to have commenced in the Epics (or is it a subconscious return to poetic non-technicality?):

– Mahābhārata XIII 107,127: *lakṣaṇair anvitā yā ca praśastā yā ca lakṣaṇaiḥ | manoḥjñā darśanīyā ca tāṃ bhavān voḍhum arhati ||*

– Rāmāyaṇa V 33,28: ... *puruṣavyāghrau ... | rūpalakṣaṇasaṃpannau ... ||*

– Vasudevahiṇḍī, p. 204,7–8: *lakṣhaṇapāḍhagapasaṃsiyamuhanayanānāsāhoṭṭhapayoharakarakisalayamajjhadesajahaṇoruḥjuyalajaṅghācalaṇakamalāravindā* “Her face, eyes, nose, lips, breasts, tender hands, waist, buttocks, wide shanks and lotus-like feet are praised by the interpreters of marks.”⁴⁷

– Vasudevahiṇḍī, p. 361,25–362,2:

“There is a girl called Laliyasirī who is a prostitute’s daughter. Her body is furnished with the praiseworthy marks of a girl [**kaṇṇālakkhaṇapasamsiyasamāhiyaṅgī*]; on account of her delicate, measured and sweet words her speech is pleasant to ears and mind; by her charming gait she overcomes a female swan; she wears a dress befitting a respectable lady; in her scriptural knowledge she seems to follow the good sayings of the wicked people.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 518f.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 526.

⁴² Ibid., p. 366.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 222f.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 475.

⁴⁵ The neutral meaning “characteristic” cannot be at the base of this extension.

⁴⁶ Cf. e.g. Mahābhārata I 8,9c–10b: *vavrdhe sā varārohā tasyāśramapade śubhā || pramadābhya varā sā tu sarvarūpaguṇānvitā |*; Vasudevahiṇḍī, p. 280, 5f. (see below); or Maṇipaticarita (Anonymous) 1032 (see below).

⁴⁷ Translated by JAIN, op. cit., p. 356.

The people skilled in the sacred lores have declared that she would be the wife of the master of the earth."⁴⁸

– Vasudevahiṇḍī, p. 197,26–198,2:

"Once I asked an astrologer about the future of my daughter. After looking at her marks he said, 'She is going to be a wife of the Lord of the earth.' ... Then on an auspicious day, at the time of the wedding ceremony, Mittasirī was brought. Her body was as delicate as *śirīṣa* flowers, her face charming with eyes like beautiful lotuses, and her eyes graceful with their dark pupils as ornaments to the lotus-like face."⁴⁹

– In congruence therewith is the "mantic purport" of the largely aesthetical "bodily depiction" of Vegavatī and other characters (Vasudevahiṇḍī, p. 226,19–29 [Vegavatī]):

"I tried to look at her carefully. I noticed that she was asleep, and her gentle face bloomed like a lotus. Her glossy hair was even, ornamented with flowers, and curly; her forehead, measuring one-third of her face, was full and brilliant like the sun; her eyebrows were broad and long, resembling a bow and as black as a row of bumblebees. Her eyes extending to the ears were unsurpassed, dark-coloured and with curved eyelashes; her nose was curved like a bamboo, with nostrils ..., which appeared as if descended from the control of the forehead and now anxious to follow the arms. Her cheeks were broad, circular, and full; her ears were fleshy and possessing fine auditory passages, and her circular lower lip was guarded from the bite of her teeth and looked delightful due to the proper setting of her teeth ..., and it was juicy and ruddy like a *bimba* fruit; her chin (?) was just one-third the size of her face, was fleshy and emitted a brilliant lustre ... Such a woman should be a woman of character. A woman possessing such a beautiful face could not be moving about on her own free will. But who could it be? With these thoughts in mind, I looked at various parts of her body. When I examined her feet I found that their soles were charming, tender as a lotus ..., fleshy and marked with upward lines and covered with auspicious marks. Now I was certain that she must be some princess, so beautiful was she in every part of her body, that she could never be of wicked character."⁵⁰

The above-mentioned tendency tallies with the use of the term *<vivāhayogya>kanyā-* or *kumārīlakṣaṇa*, which, except for its application in the astrological *<sāmudrika>lakṣaṇa* lists or in theoretical works on the same⁵¹, on the one hand, tends to be no more than referred to – as in most of the early Grhya- and Dharmasūtra and related works⁵² –, on

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 536f.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 344.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 422ff.

⁵¹ See n. 16. Again, in a number of complex lists, which combine or amalgamate different generic (a.o. poetical and erotic) traditions, some sections reflect simple or poetical *nakṣaśikha* patterns.

⁵² Cf. R. SCHMIDT, Beiträge zur indischen Erotik. Das Liebesleben des Sanskritvolkes nach den Quellen dargestellt. Berlin ³1922, p. 453; SH. RAO

the other hand, to be illustrated by means of an extended “bodily portrait” (with occasional <sāmudrika>lakṣaṇa inserted therein) – as in most of the Kāmasāstra⁵³ (while the negative marks, in both categories, are specified in lengthy enumerations⁵⁴). In the Anaṅgaṅga, significantly, the category *kanyāśubhalakṣaṇāṇi* (VIII 2–3) is expressed in the form of an augmented poetical *nakhaśikha* (with only a few technical astrophysiognomical facets being included therein), while there is a separate category *strīśāmudrikalakṣaṇam* (VIII 22–33), as also *puruṣa-sāmudrikalakṣaṇam* (VIII 12–20), in the scientific style of the <sāmudrika>lakṣaṇa lists⁵⁵ (next to the extravagant *kanyāniṣṭhalakṣaṇa* repertory in VIII 4–6): *atha kanyāśubhalakṣaṇāṇi* –

*nīlāmbhoruhapatrakāntir atha vā svarṇaprabhāsundarī
 bhr̥ṅgīnīlāśīroruhā śāśimukhī sārāṅgaśāvekaṣaṇā /
 syād yasyāś ca tilaprasūnasadr̥śī nāsā sudantāvalī
 sūśrotrā pikabhāṣiṇī ca jalajagrīvātha bimbādharā || 2 ||
 cakrādyaṅkitaṣaṇapāṇicaraanā kṣāmodarī svalpabhug
 rambhāstambhamanoramoruyugālā śronyā bṛhatyānvitā /
 nābhyā caiva sunimnayā gajagatīḥ śāntālpanidrānvitā
 śīlādhyā sukumārikā naravaraiḥ kanyā vivāhyā sadā || 3 ||*

And a Grhyasūtra text, Bhāradvājagṛhyasūtra I 11 (11,12ff.), goes so far as to question the astrological significance of the <kanyā>lakṣaṇa, imbuing the same with a psycho-aesthetical valence: *atha khalu bahūni lakṣaṇāṇi bhavanti ślokaṃ tu lākṣaṇā udāharanti: yasyāṃ mano 'nura-mate cakṣuś ca pratipadyate / tāṃ vidyāt puṇyalakṣmīkām kiṃ jñānena kariṣyati ||*. This proves that in spite of the increasing integration of astrology into aesthetics, of science into poetry, their different heritage continued to be felt intuitively.

The Vasudevahiṇḍī portraits, further, reveal that it is not predominantly astrologers, but rather kings, ministers, merchants, door-keepers, maid-servants, messengers, etc., who – playing the role of communicants – carry out the actual *praśasti* (derivatives of this and

SHASTRI, Women in the Vedic Age. [Bhavan's Book University 10]. Bombay 1952, passim; R. B. PANDEY, Hindu Saṃskāras (Socio-Religious Study of the Hindu Sacraments). Delhi 1969, p. 191ff.; P. V. KANE, History of Dharmaśāstra (Ancient and Mediaeval Religious and Civil Law). Vol. II, Pt. I. Poona 1974, p. 431ff.; U. M. APTE, The Sacrament of Marriage in Hindu Society. From Vedic Period to Dharmaśāstras. Delhi 1978, p. 72ff. & 141f.

⁵³ Cf. SCHMIDT, op. cit., p. 454ff. Of course, there are exceptions, like e.g. the *kumārīlakṣaṇa* in the Ratisāstra of Nāgārjuna, *pāda* IV (s. n. 16).

⁵⁴ Cf. SCHMIDT, op. cit., p. 457–470; RAO SHASTRI, op. cit.

⁵⁵ Some astrological treatises, too, have separate *lakṣaṇa* and *sāmudrikalakṣaṇa* lists, which, though, differ from each other only in technical sophistication.

similar terms are frequent in such contexts) of a maiden's or youth's bodily virtues, and this, too, in most expressive delineations: cf. the descriptions of Vasudeva, Keumatī, Bhaddamittā-Saccarakkhiyā, Sā-malī, etc.

In classical literature, finally, "bodily portraits" are almost exclusively aesthetical, with sporadic, but well-embedded (*sāmudrika*) *lakṣaṇa*, except in cases where such technical features are required by function or context. Thus, all the *nakṣāśikha* depictions of the Daśakumāracarita (including the Pūrvapīṭhikā) are aesthetical (while formally and functionally variegated so as to form picturesque mosaics – a *gadyakāvya* principle) except for that of Gominī⁵⁶, who is described as being selected by a merchant in the guise of a *lakṣaṇajña* in search of a bride with all the auspicious marks (and the ability to cook a perfect meal with a *prastha* of rice). Again, this "deviation" is due to an intentional variegation in form and function. In general, it is the artistic spirit of the poet which, from now onwards, moulds the material handed over to him traditionally – at least in the more ingenious *kāvya* works. Nevertheless, side by side stereotyped conventional patterns persist through all the periods of Indian history, and both facets find their way into vernacular lore – where the "physical portrait", virtually, captures all genres of literature written and oral (like e.g. the Tamil *vilpāṭṭu*, "bow song"⁵⁷) and even creates (recreates) its own categorical dominion, to wit, in the Hindi *nakṣāśikh*, the principal genre of the *rīti-kāvya*⁵⁸, and the Tamil *aṅkamālai*, one of the numerous types of *pirapantam* (*prabandha*)⁵⁹.

For the concurrence of the various structural bipolarities illustrated above, there can be only one explanation: that an earlier non-technical "auspicious praise of full-bodily beauty features" by bards or messengers became – through the influence of astrological science – overlaid with (hyper)technical astrophysiological elements of divination and practically or nominally passed into the sphere of astrology or astrologers respectively. This is conceivable in view of the same magical spirit of unimpaired auspiciousness and numinous association (magical po-

⁵⁶ Uchhvāsa 6, p. 31,5–32,2 BÜHLER.

⁵⁷ Cf. St. H. BLACKBURN, *Singing of Birth and Death. Texts in Performance*. Philadelphia 1988, *passim*.

⁵⁸ Cf. K. SCHOMER, *Where Have All the Rādhās Gone? New Images of Woman*, in: J. St. HAWLEY – D. M. WULFF, *The Divine Consort. Rādhā and the Goddesses of India*. Delhi 1984, p. (89–115) 92ff.

⁵⁹ Cf. K. V. ZVELEBIL, *Tamil Literature. [A History of Indian Literature X,1]*. Wiesbaden 1974, p. 195.

tency lastly⁶⁰) innate to both the simple and the technical portrait, and the general passing of bardic lore into the hands of *brāhmaṇa* in India. In a reverse process, the technical astrophysiognomical elements became increasingly integrated in the *nakhaśikha* or neutralized, as the case may be. One aspect in the *⟨sāmudrika⟩lakṣaṇa*-dominated portrait, however, is decidedly archaic: its magical and “manaistic” outlook. But, what is true of so many other cultural spheres where simple magic turned into a specialized one, must apply also here. Thus, the logical question cogently ensuing from the above consideration can be couched in the probe: What is the functional type of *nakhaśikha* description directly preceding, i.e. underlying, the astrologically adulterated one? Here, homology itself tells the answer: that of a “bardic song of description” on behalf of an ideal bride or bridegroom (woman or man).

Though rarely extant in its original form, this genre displays its transparency from manifold angles. To prove this, we quote some salient examples from all over the world which, directly or through minor adjustment, betray – like the fore-mentioned clear samples from the Vasudevahiṇḍī – their original function as “bardic messenger poems” on behalf of an electable maiden or youth:

– The Aramaic Genesismidrash from Qumran (1 Q IV, col. XX, ll. 2–8) specifies the officers’ praise of Sarai to the Pharaoh in Genesis 12.14–15:

⁶⁰ All bodily features, and in a particular manner the feminine, being woven into a network of *bandhu* with cosmic forces, are more or less magically potent. In Tamil *akam* poetry, any woman who has come of age and is sexually attractive is imagined to be filled with *aṇaṅku*, “sacred power”. This sacred power is thought to reside generally in her breasts, but also in the loins and other parts of the body. Thus, in Kuruntokai 337 the hero exclaims: “The buds of her breasts have blossomed, and soft thick hair falls from her head. Her compact rows of white teeth are full, [having completely replaced] her baby teeth, and [on her body] spots have appeared [a sign of puberty] . . . I know her, so she afflicts [aṇaṅku, here used as a verb] me . . .” (G. L. HART, *The Poems of Ancient Tamil. Their milieu and their Sanskrit Counterparts*. Berkeley 1975, p. 98f.). – That unsophisticated denotation conjures no less auspiciousness is clearly brought home by a German folksong from the Altmark (to name one of countless examples): “1. Mein Glück blüht auf der Welt, Mein Glück blüht auf der Welt, Mein Glück blüht auf der Welt, Wie der Weizen auf dem grünen Feld, Wie der Weizen auf dem grünen Feld. 2. Meine Augen sind hell und schön, Wie die Sterne an dem Himmel stehn. 3. Mein Mund ist zuckersüß, Schönster Schatz, wenn du’s nur wüßt’st. 4. Meine Zähne sind wie Elfenbein, Schönster Schatz, und du bist mein. 5. Meine Händ, schneeweiße Händ, Liebe mich bis an mein End. 6. Meine Wangen sind rosenrot, Meine Wangen sind rosenrot, Meine Wangen sind rosenrot. Liebe mich bis in den Tod. Liebe mich bis in den Tod.” (I. WEBER-KELLERMANN, *Ludolf Parisius und seine altmärkischen Volkslieder*. Berlin 1957, No. 384). Compare also the Palestinianian *waṣf* quoted below.

“When Abram entered Egypt the Egyptians saw that the woman was very beautiful. And when the princes of Pharaoh saw her, they praised her to Pharaoh. And the woman was taken into Pharaoh’s house.”⁶¹

by way of a detailed “descriptive song of her bodily features”:

“2. [‘. . . .] how splen[did] and beautiful the form of her face, and how 3. [. . . .] and how soft the hair of her head; how lovely are her eyes and how pleasant is her nose and all the radiance 4. of her face []; how lovely is her breast and how beautiful is all her whiteness! Her arms, how beautiful! And her hands, how 5. perfect! And (how) [attrac]tive all the appearance of her hands! How lovely (are) her palms, and how long and dainty all the fingers of her hands. Her feet, 6. how beautiful! How perfect are her legs! There are no virgins or brides who enter a bridal chamber more beautiful than she. Indeed, her beauty 7. surpasses that of all women; her beauty is high above all of them. Yet with all this beauty there is much wisdom in her; and whatever she has 8. is lovely.’ When the king heard the words of Hirqanos and the words of his two companions – for the three of them spoke as one man – he coveted her very much.”⁶²

and thereby confirms the conjecture that as early as the composition of the Genesis the words “praised her to Pharaoh” contained the specific connotation of a “messenger song of praise”.

– In the first chapter of the Hor-glin section of the Ge sar-Epic, four birds are sent out by King Hor Gur dkar as emissaries to search a bride for the widower. In this context the raven commends to him Princess ‘Brug mo with the following words:

“Doch im östlichen *Khra bo gling* ist auf dem kostbaren, glänzenden Drachennusterpolster über der *g Yu rba mthing shog gong dgu* (Zeichnung) *Khya lo’s* Löwenprinzessin *aBrug mo* gleich der berühmten *rMa-Tochter* . . . Sie ist einer Rose gleich. Gleich weißer Seide ist ihr Fleisch. Gleich roter Seide ist ihr Blut. Die Augensterne sind gleich Sperberaugen. Die kleinen Zähne gleichen einem strahlenden Lächeln. In Feindschaft sind sie wie der Schlange Zischen. Soll sie nach hier (als Braut) kommen, ist es nur um den Preis von tausend Reitpferden. Außer ihr ist niemand mehr, der 1000 Reitpferde wert wäre. Gleich der *mKha agro ma* Tanzweise ist ihr Schreiten. Wenn sie nach hier kommen soll, ist es um den Preis von 100 Reitmaultieren. Außer ihr ist niemand 100 Reitmaultiere wert. Ihr Wissen um ihr Spiel ist gleichfalls ausgezeichnet. Dieses ergötzliche Spiel ist gleichfalls den Preis von 100 *mDzo* wert. Außer ihr ist keine mehr 100 *mDzo* wert. Jede einzelne Strähne ihres Kopfhaares erglänzt wie ein Perlenband. Ihre Tränen sind den Preis von 100 Glücksschafen wert. Außer ihr ist keine 100 Schafe wert. Auf ihrer Zunge ist ein *A* eingezeichnet, das von selbst entstand. Das eben genannte Mädchen ist von dieser Art. Unter *aDzam gling’s*

⁶¹ Translated in H. G. MAY – B. M. METZGER, *The Oxford Annotated Bible: The Holy Bible. Revised Standard Version containing the Old and New Testaments*. New York 1962, p. 15.

⁶² Translated by FITZMYER, op. cit. (n. 3), p. 63 (119ff. comm.). Cf. also HERRMANN, loc. cit. (n. 1), p. 194ff.

Töchtern ist sie der Erstling. Auf Erden ist sie der Mädchen einzigster Schmuck. Unter den *gLing-Töchtern* ist sie die Prächtigeste ...”⁶³

– In the Kitāb al-Aḡānī II 123, 3ff. we find an interesting story about the circulation of a written description of a perfect woman:

“Now the Persian kings possessed a written description of a perfect woman which they circulated in those countries, though they had never once thought to search with that description in the land of the Arabs also. One day the king wished again to have some women and sent out the written description into the countries. Then Zeyd appeared before him while the king was speaking of the matter, spoke first about the occasion of his appearance and then said: I saw that the king had issued a writ to seek women for him, so I read the description. Now I know the race of Al-Mundhir well, and can tell thee that in the house of thy servant Al-Nu‘mān are more than twenty women, daughters, nieces and other members of the family, who answer that description. So he said: ‘Thou wilt write for them.’ But Zeyd replied: ‘O king, the worst quality of the Arabs, and in particular of Al-Nu‘mān, is that they hold themselves in their presumption far better than the Persians; therefor I fear that he will conceal them and offer others. Of course, if I myself come to him he cannot do so; therefor send me thither and let a man of thy bodyguard accompany me, who understands Arabic, so that I may obtain what is desired.’ So he sent with him a strong intelligent person. Zeyd on the journey always treated this man very politely and amiably, till he came to Al-Hīra. There he went to the king, showed him great respect and said: ‘Kisra wants women for himself, his children and the people of his household, and wishes to distinguish thee by making thee akin to him by marriage, therefore he sends to thee.’ On Al-Nu‘mān asking, ‘What sort of women?’ he answered: ‘Such as are described here, in these words.’ That description, however, came originally from Al-Mundhir the Elder, who, in fact, had once made a present to Anoshirwan of a maiden whom he had captured in a campaign against Al-Hārith the Elder of Ghassan, the son of Abū Shamir, and in the accompanying letter had made that description. It ran as follows:

‘I send to the King a maiden of middle size, clear complexion and fine teeth; she is white, gleaming like the moon, has strong eyebrows, dark eyelids, deep, black, shining gazelle-eyes, a prominent curved nose, long soft lashes over her gleaming eyes, is smooth-cheeked, desirable where one kisses her, has rich hair, a big skull, so that the ear-projections are far from one another, has a long neck, a broad chest, swelling breasts. Her shoulders and armbones are stout above, her wrists are beautiful, her hands thin, her fingers long and delicate; she is of a thin belly, of a small figure, slender in the girdle, of broad hips, prominent backside, strong thighs, her seat is fleshy, also plump above; her calves are strong, so that the foot-ring sits quite firm thereon, the ankles and feet, however, delicate. She takes only small steps, is sleepy even in broad day, has a tender skin even in the exposed parts. She is obedient to her lord, not stump-nosed, not browned, not brought up in need, of noble soul, modest, capable, honourable, of noble origin on the mother’s side: her nobility shines forth already from her father’s name,

⁶³ Translated by M. HERMANN, Das Nationalepos der Tibeter Gling König Gesar. Aus dem Tibetischen übersetzt. Regensburg 1965, p. 466.

without considering her family, and again from her family without considering her whole tribe. Experience has inculcated in her fine behaviour. She thinks like the noble and works like the needy, is clever with her hands, restrains her tongue, and speaks slowly; she adorns the lord, and shames the enemy. Longest thou for her, she is desirous; leavest thou her, she is content. Her eyes stare out of the deep, and her cheeks redden, her lips quiver and she comes quickly to thee at the moment of embrace, when thou uprisest, and desists at thy mere command, when thou desistest.' This description Kisra had received and ordered to be preserved among his archives; after that the kings inherited it one from another and so it came to ʔisra the son of Hurmuz ..."⁶⁴

– In the "Arabian Nights" expansive descriptions of beautiful maidens or youths (more numerous than in any other literary work of the world) are frequently addressed by actual or potential "mediators" (who, though, not unoften regret their inability to do full justice to their task)⁶⁵:

"Dann fuhr er fort: 'Wisse, meine Gebieterin, ich komme heute nacht von den äußersten Inseln des Landes China; da ist des Königs el-Ghajūr Land, und er ist als Herr der Inseln und der Meere und der sieben Schlösser bekannt. Und dort sah ich eine Tochter jenes Königs, so schön, wie Allah keine zu ihrer Zeit erschaffen hat. Ich kann sie dir nicht beschreiben; denn meine Zunge vermag sie nicht so zu schildern, wie es sich gebührt. Trotzdem will ich dir etwas von ihren Reizen berichten und will der Wahrheit nahekommen versuchen. Ihr Haar ist dunkel wie die Nächte des Scheidens und Voneinandergehens, ihr Antlitz aber ist hell wie die Tage des seligen Wiedersehens; und schön hat der Dichter von ihr gesungen:

*Sie löste eines Nachts drei Locken ihres Haares –
Und zeigte mir, wie nun vier Nächte draus entstanden.
Sie blickte auf zum Mond am Himmel mit ihrem Antlitz,
Und zeigte mir, wie sich zwei Monde zugleich verbanden.*

Ihre Nase ist wie des gefegten Schwertes Schneide; ihre Wangen sind wie Purpurwein, ja, wie rote Anemonen sind sie beide. Ihre Lippen scheinen Korallen und Karneole zu sein; der Tau ihres Mundes ist lieblicher als alter Wein, und sein Geschmack löscht die Feuerpein. Ihre Zunge bewegt ein reicher Verstand; stets ist ihr eine Antwort zur Hand. Ihr Busen berückt einen jeden, der ihn erblickt – Preis sei Ihm, der ihn geschaffen und gebildet hat! – Und an ihn schließen sich zwei runde Arme an, deren Lob einst der verzückte Dichter kundgetan:

*Zwei Arme – hätten sie nicht an Spangen ihren Halt,
So flössen sie aus den Ärmeln mit eines Stromes Gewalt.*

Und sie hat zwei Brüste wie Kästchen aus Elfenbein, von deren Glanze Sonne und Mond ihr Licht entleihn; und einen Leib mit Falten so zart wie ein kopti-

⁶⁴ Translated by J. HOROVITZ, 'Adī ibn Zaid, the Poet of al-Ḥīra. Islamic Culture 4 (1930) 31–69, p. 60ff.

⁶⁵ Cf. E. LITTMANN, Die Erzählungen aus den Tausendundein Nächten. Vollständige deutsche Ausgabe in sechs Bänden zum ersten Mal nach dem arabischen Urtext der Calcuttaer Ausgabe aus dem Jahre 1839. Wiesbaden s.a., e.g. II/8f. & 372ff.

sches Gewebe von ägyptischer Art, gewirkt mit einer Faltenzier gleich dem gekräuselten Papier. Der schließt sich an einen schlanken Rumpf, undenkbar dem menschlichen Verstand, über Hüften gleich Hügeln aus Wüstensand; die ziehen sie nieder, wenn sie aufstehen will, und wecken sie, wenn sie schlafen will, wie der Dichter so trefflich von ihnen singt:

*Die Hüften hängen ihr an einem zarten Rumpfe,
Und diese Hüften handeln schlecht gegen sie und mich.
Sie halten stets mich fest, wenn ich nur an sie denke,
Und ziehen sie herab zum Boden, erhebt sie sich.*

Und diese Hüften werden getragen von zwei Schenkeln, rund und weich, und zwei Waden, Perlensäulen gleich. All dies wiederum ruht auf zwei zarten Füßen, schlank und scharf wie die Spitzen von Spießen, dem Werke Gottes, dessen Schutz und Vergeltung wir genießen. Und immer staune ich deswegen, wie sie in ihrer Kleinheit all das, was darüber ist, zu tragen vermögen. Ich habe meine Beschreibung kurz gemacht, weil ich fürchte, sie würde sonst zu lange dauern.“⁶⁶

– The same is true of Chinese novels and fairy tales as well as bardic songs and tales all over the world (like e.g. the Malayan *pēnglipur-lara* stories⁶⁷). In the seventeenth chapter of the Ming novel *Zhulin yeshi* Lady Jia commends the “Eighteenth Princess” to Ju Wu. The poet describes this act in the following words:

“Dabei flocht sie auch ein paar Bemerkungen über die Schönheit der Prinzessin ein, die seine Neugierde erregten. Er bat sie um eine ausführliche Schilderung, doch anstelle prosaischer Worte sang sie ihm ein kleines Lied vor. Es lautete:

*»Ihre weißen Händchen,
Bambussprossenzart.
Geschwungene Augenbrauen
nach Mottenflügel-Art.*

*Sandelholzduftend
ihr kirschrotes Lippenpaar.
Wie Firnis glänzend
ihr tiefschwarzes Haar.*

*Ihre winzigen Füßchen
kaum unterm Rocksäum zu sehn.
Ihre schwellenden Brüste
wie Paradiesäpfelchen schön.*

*Für süße Liebesspiele
hat, zwischen den Schenkeln versteckt,
sie ein köstliches Ding, dessen Anblick
jedes Mannes Sehnsucht erweckt.»*⁶⁸

⁶⁶ Ibid., II/372ff.

⁶⁷ Cf. H. OVERBECK, *Malaiische Erzählungen*. Jena 1925, p.91 & passim.

⁶⁸ Translated by F. K. ENGLER, *Dschu-lin Yä-schi*. Ein erotischer Roman aus der Ming-Zeit mit erstaunlichen taoistischen Liebespraktiken. Frankfurt 1980, p. 209.

– In a Kievan *bylina*, Prince Vladimir asks his heroes (*bogatyri*) about suitable brides, so one of them, Dunaj Ivanovič, describes to him, in the syncopal form of the ballad, the virtues of the daughter of the Prince of Polock:

“The eldest daughter is not young in age,
And her mind is very sensible,
The girl has been taught to read and write,
And her face is white as winter snow,
She is endowed with a falcon’s eyes,
And she possesses a sable’s brows,
She walks about like a little swan,
And when she glances, it’s the bright, bright day;
She will make your opposite.”⁶⁹

– In the Hausa song “Wooring Coy Mabrûka”:

“Mabrûka, Tochter unsres Landes,
Mit Augen voller Sternenglanz!
Ich ging nach Ghadâmes,
Ich wanderte nach Algier,
Ich wanderte nach Bona
Und werbe um Mabrûka . . .
Mabrûka, mein Fleisch und Blut,
Mein Herz, ich bin dir gut!
Mein Herz ist krank geworden
Um der Mabrûka willen.

Verkaufe deine Kamele,
Verkaufe deine Schafe,
Verkaufe deine Knaben
Zum Kaufpreis für Mabrûka.
Du Herr von Rind und Herden,
Soll ich dein eigen werden,
Schaff ich dir viele Mühe.
Du mußt mir tausend bringen,
Für hundert gibt’s keine Mabrûka.
Mabrûka ist ein Kamelweib
Mit ihrem schlanken Halse.
Ihre Zähne gleichen dem Golde,
Ihre Hände sind von Golde,
Ihr Fingerring von Golde,
Ihr Arm ist schlank wie ein Stab.
Ihre Nase gleicht der Rose,
Ihr Angesicht dem Spiegel,
Ihre Füße sind hennahrot.
Ihre Schuhe sind von Golde,

⁶⁹ Translated by P. D. Uxov, Fixed Epithets in the Byliny as Means of Creating and Typifying Images, in: F. J. OINAS – ST. SOUDAKOFF, The Study of Russian Folklore. The Hague – Paris 1975, p. (219–231) 228.

Ihr Kopftuch ist von Golde,
 Dem Golde gleicht ihr Haar.
 Ihr Hüfttuch ist mit Silber gestickt,
 Ihr Hemde ganz mit Silber gestickt,
 Ihre Hosen sind aus Seide.
 Ihr Haar macht einen Sessel . . .
 Ihre Brüste sind wie ein silbernes Gefäß –
 Betrachte ihren Busen:
 Er blendet dir die Augen!
 Schau nur ihre Gestalt,
 Sie wiegt sich gleich dem Rohrhalm!
 O falle nicht! Du gibst nicht acht
 Und läßt mich einsam weinen!”⁷⁰

Mabrūka answers the lovesick suitor with a “descriptive self-praise”, which, spoken in the third person, sounds like a song by a messenger wooing for her. Confer in this context also the Babylonian “courting duet” of Assyrian Collection b = VAT 10251, II, ll. 7–18:

“My eye is a lion, my figure is a protecting angel, my *hips* are absolute charm. Who will be my voluptuous spouse?

My heart is wisdom, my reins are counsel, my liver is lordliness, my lips speak pleasant things. Who will be my chosen spouse?”⁷¹

and the “beloved’s self-commendation” in a German folk-song from the Altmark⁷².

– On an ex-voto dedicated to Goddess Mut, King Rameni of Bubastis commends his daughter, the Hathor priestess Mutiridis, to the former with a “descriptive song” which is formulated like a conventional praise in favour of a living princess of extraordinary charms (Louvre C 100, 16,1–4):

“(16/1) Sweet, lovable (is) Hathor’s priestess, Mutiridis.

Sweet, sweet beloved by the king of Upper and Lower Egypt, Menkheperre, given life.

(16/2) [Sweet], lovable with all men.

A lady beloved by women,

She is the lovable princess,

fairest of women,

a girl (16/3) whose likeness has not been seen.

Blacker is her hair than the blackness of the night,

than the grapes of the *īdb*-vines.

[Whiter (are) (16/4) her teeth] than flakes of (white) stone at cutting.

(Two) wreaths are her breasts settled at her arm.”⁷³

⁷⁰ Collected by E. VAN SYDOW, *Dichtungen der Naturvölker. Religiöse, magische und profane Literatur*. Zürich 1954, p. 142f.

⁷¹ Cf. n. 2.

⁷² Cf. n. 60.

⁷³ Cf. n. 1.

– Numerous portraits figure as “tokens of recognition” (cf. e.g. Rāmāyaṇa V 33, 1–20 or Meghadūta II 19, but also scenarios in the Chinese novel⁷⁴ or in Palestinian folklore⁷⁵), “message songs” (in multivalent functions), and above all as “panegyric descriptions” in bardic (see also below) and other poetical or ceremonial settings, some of which are clearly reminiscent of a background of commissioned minstrelsy – as, e.g., a Palestinian folksong collected by S. LINDER⁷⁶ betrays (112. 41–48):

“Ein berühmter Dichter ist für die Kunst eingenommen.
O Heilmittel des Herzens, o Licht der Augen!
Ich preise die Freigebigen, die den Gast ehren;
ich beschreibe die Schönen bis zu den Fersen⁷⁷.

Ich beschreibe die Schönen, die schön sind wie du.
O Heilmittel des Herzens, o Licht des Morgens!
Wenn ein gelehrter Scheich dich erblickte, würde er verwirrt werden
und sagen: Die Liebe ist in allen Büchern erlaubt.”⁷⁸

In fact, J. G. WETZSTEIN has personally recorded the circumstances of such a commissioned recital, which, though being enacted within the frame of a rustic marriage festival, conjures, through its structural shift from the second to the third person, a much older, canvassing, atmosphere:

“Als vor etwa 40 Jahren der vorige Scheich von *Nawā* seine Tochter verheiratete, erklärte diese an ihrem Hochzeitstage, daß sie den üblichen Schwerttanz nur nach einer von einem namhaften Hauraner Dichter eigens für sie gedichteten Kaside tanzen würde. Dagegen ließ sie nichts thun, denn der Hauranier liebt den Stolz an seiner Tochter, weil man glaubt, er schütze sie vor Verirrungen und biete eine Sicherheit für die Familienehre. Der angesehenste Dichter der Gegend

⁷⁴ In the Ming novel *Rou bu duan* this function is part of a literary scenario.

⁷⁵ Cf. e.g. DALMAN, op. cit. (n. 6), p. 109f.: “Ich sattelte auf zwanzigen, als sie nachts aufbrachen, dass wir suchten den, dessen Nähe das Herz erfreut. Fünf, als zu der Gegend meiner Ahnen sie anlangten, waren gebogen die Knie von der Länge der Reise, und fünf, nach Russland gingen sie besonders, zu fragen nach der Beschreibung des Geliebten und seinem Preise, und fünf, nach Konstantinopel gingen sie, zu durchsuchen Konstantinopel und all seine Dörfer, und fünf, zu mir, o mein Freund, kehrten sie wieder, und sie brachten mir nicht von der Erwähnung des Vertrauten an ihn Erinnerung, und jene – auf dem Drahtwege kamen sie heran, und nicht erwähnten sie von meinem Freund irgend etwas von seiner Rede. Ich will senden ein Telegramm, dessen Stimme erklingt, und auf dem schönsten Papier beschreiben seine lieblichen Züge”.

⁷⁶ Cf. S. LINDER – H. RINGGREN, *Palästinische Volksgesänge*. Bd. II. [Uppsala Universitets Årsskrift 1955: 9]. Uppsala 1955, p. 49ff.

⁷⁷ A Druzan *wāsf* speaks of a girl “more beautiful than describers can describe” (SAARISALO, op. cit. [n. 6], No. XVIII, v. 1).

⁷⁸ LINDER-RINGGREN, op. cit., p. 51.

war damals *Kāsim el-Chinn*, welcher erst kurz vorher von einer Dichterfahrt nach Mesopotamien zum Phylarchen des *Gerbā*-Stammes königlich beschenkt zurückgekommen war. Er lebte in der von jeher durch ihre Dichter berühmten Ortschaft *Gāsim*, etwa eine Meile nördlich von *Nawā*. Ein reitender Bote ging dahin ab. Der Dichter hatte keine Zeit zu verlieren; er steckte Schreibzeug und Papier in den Gürtel, setzte sich auf seinen Esel und dichtete unterwegs, während der Bote vorauseilte, seine Ankunft zu melden. Als *Kāsim* kam, brannten schon die Feuer auf dem Anger, die Hochzeitsgäste warteten und die Tänzerin, im Brautschmuck und die Klinge in der Hand, stand bereit. *Kāsim* küßte ihr die Hand und machte den Vorsänger, da aus Mangel an Zeit Niemand das Gedicht einüben konnte; überdies hatte *Kāsim* eine schöne Stimme. Als der Tanz beendet war, nahm die Braut ihre *Kesmāja* vom Kopf, wickelte 20 *Gāzī* (etwa 30 Thaler) in dieselbe und warf sie dem Dichter zu, ein für die dortigen Verhältnisse großes Geschenk, denn die *Kesmāja* einer reichen Braut ist kostbar. Dagegen ließ sie sich das Gedicht ausliefern . . .

Da hast du deinen Schmuck, o Schöne, leg' an, es wurde nichts vergessen!

Leg' an und lebe, wenn der Feigling und wenn der Lügner längst gestorben.
Sie sprach: Nun sollst du mich besingen, von Kopf zu Fuß in Versen schildern!

Ich sage: Schöne, deine Reize vermag ich nimmer aufzuzählen,

Und nur das Wenige will ich schildern was mich die Augen sehen lassen:

Ihr Haupt ist dem Krystallpokale, ihr Haar der dunklen Nacht vergleichbar,

Ihr schwarzes Haar den sieben Nächten, dergleichen nicht im ganzen Jahre;
In Wellen schwankt es hin und wieder, den Seilen gleich der Schöpferinnen,
Und alle Wolgerüche athmen die Seitenlocken die mich tödten.

Der Neumond strahlt auf ihrer Stirne und matt erleuchtet sind die Waagen,
Und ihre Brauen sind die Bogen des *Nun's* von Künstlerhand gezogen.

Der Augen Zauber macht mich stöhnen als wärens Augen der Kuferinnen.
Der Dattel von Irāk, der Schneide der indischen Schwerter gleicht die Nase,
Ihr Angesicht dem vollen Monde, und Herzeleid sind ihre Wangen.

Ihr Mund ist ein krystallnes Reifchen und Perlenschnüre ihre Zähne,
Und Perlen streut die Zunge aus und, wehe mir, wie schön die Lippen!

Ihr Speichel lauter Honigseim und Heilung für den Biß der Natter.

Der zierlichen Schrift vergleichbar schlängelt der *Seijal* sich aufs Kinn herunter,

So zeichnen sich auf weißem Brote der duftgen *Kezḥa* schwarze Körner.

Den Hals herab zieht sich der *Māni* mit Zauberschrift in syrischen Zeichen;
Ihr Nacken gleicht dem Hals des Rehes, das aus dem Quell von *Ḳanawāt* trinkt,

Die Brust geschliffnen Marmortafeln, wie Schiffe sie nach *Ṣédā* (Sidon) bringen,

Darauf wie Aepfel der Granate zwei schimmernde Juwelenhäufen.

Die Arme sind gezogene Schwerter, geschälte Gurken – hätt' ich solche!

Und unvergleichbar schön die Hände im Rosenroth des *Hinnā*-Blattes;

Die glatten feinen Finger gleichen dem Schreibrohr, das noch ungeschnitten;

Der Nägel Schimmer dem Dura-Korne, das über Nacht in Milch gelegen.

Der Leib ist ein Baumwollenhaufen, den Meisters Hand zu Flaum geschlagen,
 Und ihre Beine Marmorsäulen im Gotteshaus der Omajaden.
 Da hast du, Schöne, deine Reize, nimm hin, es wurde nichts vergessen,
 Und leb' und blühe wenn der Feigling und wenn der Lügner längst gestorben!"⁷⁹

– Coming back to India, it is not in the Vasudevahinī alone that we find direct or indirect testimonies of a bardic background to the use of the *nakhaśikha*: For instance, when Śakuni asks Yudhiṣṭhira to stake Kṛṣṇā for a last throw and win himself back through her, Yudhiṣṭhira responds by singing a praise of Draupadī's physical and other virtues⁸⁰, as if to convince that she is worth the stake, as if to suggest that she is a maiden to be considered eligible for "sale". That such an eulogy is sounded by Yudhiṣṭhira at this macabre turn of events, shows the tenacity of a convention designed to conjure dramatic settings of the heroic age to highlight situational crises. The physical commendation in this context of the dice play has an archaic timbre of court elocution and thus constitutes an unmistakable proof of its bardic heredity.

A decisive signpost towards the bardic origin of the "descriptive song of the beautiful person" is the fact that the most genuine early *nakhaśikha* of the Tamil Bardic Corpus are primarily found (prescinding from some syncopal examples in *akam* poetry, as e.g. Nārīṇai 301⁸¹) in the very old rhapsodic genre of the *ārruppatai*, "guide poem" (in which a prosperous minstrel meets an indigent fellow bard and guides him – with the help of graphical, yet conventional, itineraries – to a patron of singers, whose generosity, virtues, and glories he abundantly extolls⁸²), as well as in the "descriptive idyll" (*pāṭṭu*, "song")⁸³, for which the former seems to have been one of the models. This genre (as also the "descriptive idyll"), actually, is made up of a chain of descriptions recalling all the various scenarios intimate to the fanciful vision and professional lore of an itinerant bard and, thus, constituting a "sentimental fiction" of the "naive genre" in the form of a lyricized "epic

⁷⁹ See WETZSTEIN in DELITZSCH, op. cit. (n. 6), p. 172ff.

⁸⁰ Mahābhārata II 58,32–37.

⁸¹ Transl. by A. MARIASELVAM, The Song of Songs and Ancient Tamil Love Poems. Poetry and Symbolism. [Analecta Biblica 118]. Rome 1988, p. 298.

⁸² Cf. M. VARADARAJAN, Literary Theories in Early Tamil – *ETTUṬṬO-KAI*. In: Proceedings of the First International Conference Seminar of Tamil Studies Kuala Lumpur – Malaysia, April 1966. Kuala Lumpur 1968–69, II/45–54, p. 50f.; ZVELEBIL, op. cit. (n. 59), p. 20f., 23f., 49ff., 196f.; J. V. CHELLIAH, Pattupattu, Ten Tamil Idylls. Madras 1962, p. 7ff. & passim.

⁸³ See ZVELEBIL, op. cit. (n. 59), p. 9 & 19ff.; CHELLIAH, op. cit., passim.

suite”⁸⁴. Among the numerous settings capturing the rhapsodic sentiment, there is the “physical portrait”, embedded in an aura of bardic nostalgia, most graphically expressed in the initial verses of the *Poru-narāruppatai* 25–62:

“Thy wife plays sweetly songs that tuneful are
And worded well. She now doth sweep the strings
With a single finger; now she slides o’er them
With her fore-finger and the thumb; and now
She sounds them back and forth; now twangs them sharp.
Her tresses dark are like black river sands.
Her eye-brows like death-dealing bows are arched.
Her cool eyes shaded are with graceful lids,
Her lips that utter tuneful words are red
Like petals of *ilava* blooms. Her teeth
Are white and faultless like a row of pearls.
Her ears on which her pendants dangling shine
Resemble well-shaped loops of scissors used
To trim the hair. Her shapely neck is bent
With modesty. Her shoulders wide look like
The waving bamboo smooth. Soft hair doth grow
Upon her hand. Her fingers slim are like
The petals of the *kanthal* blooms that grow
On tops of lofty hills. Like parrot bills
Her shining dainty fingernails appear.
Her heaving, young fair breasts are overspread
With beauty spots that agitate men’s minds,
And set so close that a nib could not them part.
Like water ripple is her navel fair.
Her slender waist could not it seems sustain
Her body, and is scarcely visible.
A belt of many beads adorn her hips
That seem the seat of bees. Her thighs are round
And closely set resembling thick-set trunks
Of huge she-elephants. Her small, fair feet
Resemble tongues of panting dogs and suit
Her smooth-haired ankles well. As, when she walks
On stony ground as red as vermilion,
Her feet are blistered much and seethe with boils
That look like *maral* fruits that are mature,
She does not travel in the noon-day sun.
These are the traits of the worthy female bard
Who has the pea-hen’s looks.”⁸⁵

⁸⁴ In fact, the Sanskrit *dūtakāvya* shows structural resemblances to the *ārruppatai*, but, as the bard has been replaced by a symbolical messenger, it has lost its genre-echoing character.

⁸⁵ Translated by CHELLIAH, op. cit., p. 63ff.

Further *nakhaśikha* of the Pattuppāṭṭu collection are: Paṭṭinappālai 162–174; Ćirupāṇārruppaṭai 10–41; Neṭunalvātai 155–175; Kuṛiṇṇicippāṭṭu 86–109; Maturaikkāñci 448–458; 778–792; Tirumurukārruppaṭai 20–60; 119–186 (iconographical description)⁸⁶.

The originally genre-portraying character of “bardic description” can also be gleaned from stylized *varṇana* units within narrative and epic literature⁸⁷, especially Indian – such as in the Vasudevahiṇḍī and the Jaina Canon (which, predominantly in the *veḍha* metre, form an independent structure set off from the rest of the body not only in theme⁸⁸, but also in tone, i.e. rhythm and style); in Old Indian *kathā*, like e.g. the Daśakumāracarita; or in medieval epic performances⁸⁹.

– Finally, the existence of a specific ⟨*rūpa*⟩*praśasti* or ⟨*rūpa*⟩*varṇana* type of bardic genre, or its equivalents, in India can be constructed from salient terminological reminiscences:

Śatapathabrāhmaṇa I 2,5,16 – “It (the altar) should be broader on the west side, contracted in the middle, and broad again on the east side; for thus shaped they praise [**praśāmsanti*] a woman: ‘broad about the hips, somewhat narrower between the shoulders, and contracted in the middle (or, about the waist).’ Thereby he makes it (the altar) pleasing to the gods.”⁹⁰

Rāmāyaṇa II 9,40 – *iti praśasyamānā sā kaikeyīm idam abravīt* / (concluding the euphemistic Mantharā portrait).

Rāmāyaṇa III 44,14 – *tām uttamām trilokānām padmahīnām iva śriyam* / *vibhrājamānām vapuṣā rāvaṇaḥ praśaśaṃsa ha* // (introducing the physical eulogy of Sītā).

Rāmāyaṇa V 33,5 – *evam uktas tu vaidehyā hanumān mārutātmajaḥ* / *tato rāmaṃ yathātattvam ākhyātum upacakrame* // (introducing the *lakṣaṇa* description of Rāma).

Mahābhārata III 50,15 – *tasyāḥ samīpe tu nalaṃ praśaśaṃsuḥ kutūhalāt* / *naiṣadhasya samīpe tu damayantīm punaḥ punaḥ* //.

Mahābhārata III 50,20 – *damayantīsakāśe tvām kathayīṣyāmi naiṣadha* / *yathā tvadanyaṃ puruṣaṃ na sā maṃsyati karkhicit* // (the wild goose to Nala).

Mahābhārata XIII 107,127 (see above, p. 137).

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 37 ff., 147 ff., 181 ff., 205 ff., 253 ff., 271, 341 ff., 345 ff.

⁸⁷ Outside India, cf. e.g. the Xiyu ji (“The Journey to the West”).

⁸⁸ Cf. ALSDORF, loc. cit. (n. 31), p. 8 f.

⁸⁹ Cf. ST. H. BLACKBURN – P. J. CLAUS – J. B. FLUECKIGER – S. S. WADLEY, Oral Epics in India. Berkeley – Los Angeles 1989, p. 107.

⁹⁰ Transl. by J. EGGLING, The Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa according to the Text of the Mādhyandina School. Pt. I. [SBĒ XII]. Repr. Delhi 1978, p. 63.

Sattasaī 478 – *vanṇavasie viatthasi saccam cia so tue na sambhavo / na hu honti tammi diṭṭhe sutthāvatthāim āṅgāim* || “O one fascinated by the description of (his) excellencies! You (only) brag, (but) truly he has not been favoured by you (with a visit). He having been seen (by others), nobody’s limbs remain in their normal condition.”⁹¹

Sattasaī 574 – *rūam siṭṭham cia se asesapurise ṇiattiaccheṇa / vāhol-
leṇa imīe ajampamāṇeṇa vi muheṇa* || “The beauty of the (beloved) man was (well) described by her face in which the eyes moved away from all other males and which was wet with tears, although it did not speak out (anything).”⁹²

Vasudevahiṇḍī, p. 204,7–8 (see above, p. 137).

Vasudevahiṇḍī, p. 204,9 – *ajja rāyā devisamīve parikahanto mayā
suo tubbham guṇapavitttharam* “I have heard the king praising your virtues to his queen.”⁹³

Vasudevahiṇḍī, p. 279–280 – cf. *praśamsa*- and other derivatives in this context (279,31 [thunāi], 280,4 & 6), but especially 280,5f.: *aho dhaṇṇā bandhumatī jise imo jaṇanayaṇavisāmabhūo bahukālavaṇṇaṇijjarū-
vāisao*° “Oh! how fortunate Bandhumatī is that she has got such a man who is a resting place to the eyes of the people and whose excellence of beauty will take a long time to be described!”⁹⁴

Paripāṭal VII 65–67 – “Seeing the tenderness of her eyes and beholding the lustre of the maiden, he sang exuberantly, donning the minstrel’s habit ...”⁹⁵

Maṇipaticarita (Anonymous) 1032 – *rūvagunaṇavīṇayavinnānadakkhin-
nasīlavayaṇāṇi / desantaresu tīe giṇṇanti ’negehi loehim* || “Descriptions of her beauty, high qualities [* better taken together as ‘the excellencies of her form’], good behaviour, intuition, accomplishments and virtues are sung by people in other lands.”⁹⁶

– Finally, the constant poetological reference to the “hearing about a beloved person” as one of the “inflaming excitants” (*uddīpanavibhāva*) of love (as early as Nāṭyaśāstra XXIV 157) seems to be some kind of

⁹¹ Transl. by R. BASAK, The Prākṛit Gāthā-Saptaśatī Compiled by Śātavāhana King Hāla. Edited with Introduction and Translation in English. Calcutta 1971, p. 105.

⁹² Ibid., p. 126.

⁹³ Transl. by JAIN, op. cit. (n. 32), p. 356.

⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 475.

⁹⁵ Translated by A. AMALADASS – through personal intimation.

⁹⁶ Transl. by R. WILLIAMS, Two Prakrit Versions of the Maṇipati-Carita. London 1959, p. 218.

a reminiscence of the bardic convention of “descriptive eulogy” – which Daśarūpa IV 61, in fact, does include among the various types of “hearing of praises about the beloved’s good qualities”: *śrutir vyājāt sakhīgītāmāgadhādiguṇastuteḥ* // “the hearing [may be] through some stratagem or through praise of the [loved one’s] good qualities by a female friend, or in a song, or by a professional bard, or the like”⁹⁷.

Thus, we can conclude that it is the bardic praise of perfect beauty which is one of the primary functions of the *nakhaśikha*. But is it the oldest? Considering the general archaism of hymnical poetry in devotion to gods, the so-called *pādādikeśāntavarṇanastotra* or *keśādīpādāntavarṇanastotra* seems to claim still greater antiquity and, thus, logical priority to the former. A closer scrutiny, however, will discard this proposition. As the idol is no more than a limited representation of a visualized entity, it can only form a secondary source of inspiration, the primary being the mythical image itself. More than the static idol, it is the ritual assemblage of cosmic elements real or symbolical in the process of ceremonies (like mumification, revivification, revitalization, etc.) and the dramatical symbolism of dance⁹⁸ which are designed to form the concomitant expression of “literary” evocation. Secondly, although it cannot be denied that idolic traits (and, more than that, art elements) have been strewn into both the general feature repertory of divine eulogies and the specific standards of comparison of the “body portrait”, the idol in its concretized structure holds too little inspiration to create an archetypical “literary” genre of its own⁹⁹. For, the representation of the highest potency features of the divine – the function of hymnical characterization – is rather thwarted than furthered by the strict foot-to-head cycle since a lot of phenomenal and the very essential inner and abstract qualities and mythemes can be covered only with difficulty, and very artificial devices, by such a narrow scheme (as, indeed, is the case in many *pādādikeśāntavarṇanastotra*). Thus, the

⁹⁷ Transl. by G. C. O. HAAS, *The Daśarūpa. A Treatise on Hindu Dramaturgy* by Dhanamjaya, now first translated from the Sanskrit with the text and an introduction and notes. Repr. Delhi 1962, p. 133.

⁹⁸ Significantly, Indian iconography owes its richness of formal expression, next to the rite, mainly to the dramatical symbolism of dance, which has influenced many cultural spheres.

⁹⁹ Praises of abstract or single beauty traits of goddesses – which, further, remain incorporated in a more general unit – cannot be considered as representative or even syncopal *nakhaśikha* descriptions or *auṣāḥ* – as HERMANN (loc. cit. [n.1], p. 177f., 182 & 193) does with regard to a number of Mesopotamian hymns and other texts.

“descriptive hymn” of an idol or art figure is not discernible in earliest times. In India, it appears no earlier than the fifth century A.D.¹⁰⁰ and, having recourse to the visualized image, is concretely inspired by the “physical portrait of the beautiful person”.

The scheme of bodily attribute sequence finds its primeval “literary” execution only in settings evoking functional (i.e. magical) potency. This applies to the so-called “cult descriptive hymn” (“kultische Beschreibungshymne”) in its four varieties: the “divinization hymn” (“Vergottungslied”), the “revivification / vitalization hymn”, the “protective charm” (“Schutzzauberspruch”), and the “identification chant”. In the “descriptive hymn” of the divinized king, i.e. the Pharaoh (later, other nobles and, finally, every mortal), each single limb of his is (conjured to be) equated or identified with the most potent or characteristic (limb of a) respective divinity or other (divine) entity. Since the most potent limbs and characteristic features of appearance are not found in one divinity, or one divinity alone does not represent all potentialities (even the Sun-God is thought to be made up of the limbs of all the other gods), the “divinizing hymn” contains optative equations with (the limbs or) the identities of the whole spectrum of divine (and other) entities – whilst mythico-magical considerations play an additional role and often it is mere wilfulness that determines the equations¹⁰¹. This hymn has its concrete life-setting in the ceremonial divinization of the king after his death, which originally was preceded by the magical dissection of his body before mumification, dismemberment being a logical antecedent to the construction of wholeness – a world-wide notion and, perhaps, also practice¹⁰². In some late “diviniza-

¹⁰⁰ Of the countless works being or containing *pādādikeśāntavarṇanastotra* (or their analogies), the most noteworthy are: Tirumurukāruppaṭai, Bāṇa’s Caṇḍīśataka, Mayūra’s Sūryaśataka, Mānatuṅga’s Bhaktāmarastotra, Vajradatta’s Lokeśvaraśataka, Buddhappiya’s Pajjamadhu, Līlāśuka’s Kṛṣṇakarmāmṛta, Mūkapañcāśatī (KM 5), Saundaryalaharī, Jagannātha’s Bhāminīvilāsa, Viṣṇu-pādādikeśāntavarṇanastotra (KM 2), Śivapādādikeśāntavarṇanastotra (KM 6), Śivakeśādipādāntavarṇanastotra (KM 6), Lakṣmaṇācārya’s Caṇḍīkucapañcāśikā (KM 9), etc.

¹⁰¹ Cf. H. RANKE, Die Vergottung der Glieder des menschlichen Körpers bei den Ägyptern. OZ 27 (1924) 558–564; W. R. DAWSON, Protection of Parts of the Body by Gods. Aegyptus 2 (1931) 26–27; O. FIRCHOW, Die Mischgestalt des Toten. MIO 1,3 (1953) 313–325; HERMANN, Beiträge ... (n. 1), p. 127 ff. – and the literature cited therein. A very illustrative example is Pyr. Hymn 539, §§ 1303a–1315c (translated by K. SETHE, Übersetzung und Kommentar zu den altägyptischen Pyramidentexten. Bd. V. Hamburg 1961, p. 232f.).

¹⁰² Cf. A. HERMANN, Zergliedern und Zusammenfügen. Religionsgeschichtliches zur Mumifizierung. Numen 3,2 (1956) 81–96. As for India, see B. K.

tion hymns", where potency features become subordinate to (nonetheless "potent") characterizing features, divinities tend to be replaced by "natural" entities, which, in part, seem to function, actually or symbolically, in the accompanying ceremonial rites, reflected very clearly in ch.172 of the "Book of the Dead" ¹⁰³. This tendency is even more outspoken in the more universal "revivification / vitalization hymn", as e.g. in a Babylonian hymn on Ninurta ¹⁰⁴, or in two Babylonian glorifications of the risen Marduk or Tammuz respectively ¹⁰⁵:

"..... Tamariske sein Haupthaar [
 seine ..., *sari*-Holz seine Lippen,
 sein Mund, ein Apfel seine Knöchel (?), eine Schlange sein Glied, ein *tanittu*-Instrument seine Hand,
 seine Flügel,
 Röstkorn (?) das Blut seines Herzens, ein Höhlenvogel das Tropfen seines Herzblutes,
 eine Dattelpalme seine Brustmitte (?),
 ein [Skor]pion seine Lippe, ein Schleifstein seine Zunge, Lauch sein Mähnenhaar,
 ... ein *manzû*-Instrument sein unteres Zahnfleisch,
 ein Löwe seine großen Eingeweide, ein Hund seine kleinen Eingeweide, ein Rabe seine Warze,
 ein Maulbeerbaum seine Gestalt,
 eine Pauke sein Herz, eine Dattelpalme sein Rückgrat, Rohrpflanzen seine Finger,
 Silber sein Schädel, Gold sein Samen,
 Dorn(en) das Haar seiner Brust, Rhamnusdorn das Haar seiner Lenden (?),
 der Schmutz seiner Ohren Antimon (?), ein Lotusbaum (?) sein Knochen,
 Fische sind seine Würmer, Feigen seine Brüste, Öl seine Tränen,
 [Stuß]holz[scherbet] das Tropfen seines Nasenschleimes,
 [Inneres] der grünen Dattel sein Fleisch, [seine] unteren (Teile).
 Rote [Anemone] die Röte (?) seines Blutes, Wein die Pupille seiner Augen." ¹⁰⁶

The latter type is also found in the Atharvaveda, e.g. in the *puṣṭikamantras* IX 4,11–17 and IX 7 extolling the bull and the ox respectively by identifying their outer and inner parts of the body with the manifold

SMITH, Reflections on Resemblance, Ritual and Religion. New York – Oxford 1989, p. 54ff.

¹⁰³ Cf. G. KOLPAKCHY, Ägyptisches Totenbuch. München ³1973, p. 273ff.

¹⁰⁴ KAR III No. 102 = VAT 9739 (transl. by A. FALKENSTEIN – W. VON SODEN, Sumerische und akkadische Hymnen und Gebete. Zürich 1953, p. 258f.).

¹⁰⁵ KAR No. 307, front page, ll. 1–18 and VAT 9946, second page, ll. 8–16 (transl. by E. EBELING, Tod und Leben nach den Vorstellungen der Babylonier. I: Texte. Berlin – Leipzig 1931, p. 31f. & 47).

¹⁰⁶ Cf. EBELING, op. cit., p. 31f.

divinities and entities of the universe – so as to state, and magically make, them to be *viśvārūpa* and *sārvarūpa* (IX 7,25–26).

Very close in schematic structure to the “divinization hymn”, is the “protective charm” (in some late “divinization hymns” the – latent – idea of protection is explicitly stated), in which every limb of a living person gets equated (identified) with, or entrusted to, a divinity or other entity for protection against, or exorcism of, demons of sickness etc.¹⁰⁷. The latter type is also found in India¹⁰⁸. Finally, the “corporeal identification chant” (one among countless types of “identificatory formulae”, often combined with units of a similar or different nature) is an esoteric specification (with or without ritual application) of cosmic wholeness in a small or large scale – differing from the “vitalization charm” only in its (connoted) “gnostic” purport. There are numerous examples in all archaic literatures, especially Indian (cf. e.g. *Ṛgveda* X 90 and its parallels and analogues; *Atharvaveda* IX 4,11ff.; IX 7; XI 3,1ff.; *Śatapathabrāhmaṇa* XI 5,2,1ff.; *Chāndogyaopaniṣad* V 18,1–2; and many instances in *Purāṇa* and *Jyotiṣa* literature as well as in tribal mythology¹⁰⁹), but also Babylonian, e.g. in a Cassite list of magical identifications¹¹⁰.

It is obvious that, like all litany forms of the religious or magical hymn of both an unspecified and specified type (such as would involve an enumeration of bodily limbs for reasons whatever – which are manifold), so, too, the “cult descriptive hymn” – all the more of the

¹⁰⁷ Cf. A. ERMAN, *Der Zauberpapyrus des Vatikan. Zeitschrift für Ägyptische Sprache* 31 (1893) 119–124; id., *Zaubersprüche für Mutter und Kind. Aus dem Papyrus 3027 des Berliner Museums. Philosophische und historische Abhandlungen der Königlich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* 1 (1901) 1–52; RANKE, loc. cit. (n. 101), p. 562f.; DAWSON, loc. cit., p. 26f. FIRCHOW, loc. cit., p. 316f.; HERMANN, *Beiträge* . . . (n. 1), p. 127ff. In Ptolemean, Greek and Latin texts it is the Signs of the Zodiac, in later Christian examples the Twelve Patron Saints of the Christian Calendar, who are entrusted with the various parts or regions of the body. Cf. DAWSON, loc. cit., p. 27.

¹⁰⁸ Especially in (secondary) passages of the *Pūtanāvadha* and in the *Gargasamhitā* (SBG 86) I 13, 15–21: cf. U. KURZ-GOLDENSTEIN, *Der Pūtanāvadha in der purāṇischen Kṛṣṇa-Legende. WZKS* 32 (1988) 77–90, p. 82ff. The genre may also be inferred from numerous references, in divinatory *lakṣaṇa* lists, to astric entities of physio-elementary protection.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. e.g. V. ELWIN, *Myths of Middle India. London* 1949, p. 10ff. passim; id., *Myths of the North-East Frontier. Shillong* 1958, p. 5ff. passim; etc.

¹¹⁰ Ni. 6060, reverse I, ll. 1–5: “1. White wine and bottle are his eyes. 2. The white fig is her breasts. 3. The *nur*-fig is his (her) knees. 4. The fig is his (her) loins. 5. Must is his (her) crotch.” (Ed. and transl. by ST. LANGDON, *Sumerian Liturgies and Psalms. [The University Museum Publications of the Babylonian Section X/4]. Philadelphia* 1919, p. 341).

type of the "vitalization hymn" and "identification chant" – must have influenced, in virtue of its schematic structure and associative imagery, formally and thematically (i.e. in the choice of the equivalents) the "descriptive song of the beautiful person". Nonetheless, it is evident that the latter neither owes its sets of body limbs nor its lists of associates to the former (howsoever similar they may be individually), for both are subtly idiosyncratic to their respective functions, reflecting altogether different life-settings. And it would be an underestimation of the ingenuity of human imagination to insist that, without the "cult descriptive hymn" as a model, the "descriptive song of the bride or bridegroom" would not have been invented. In view of the different settings, the relation of the latter to the former can only be one of inspired analogy, but not of "literary" descent. Besides, "nuptial praise of bridal beauty" seems to reflect as basic a life-setting as the "awakening eulogy" of the king, which, too, uses elements of "hymnical praise", but nevertheless has its own idiosyncrasy¹¹¹. As "oral poetry", universally, is rooted in life, it is essentially the innate setting supplying the impulse for the creation or re-adaptation of an archetypical genre, the "form" becoming an inspirational model only in highly reflective literature. Thus, in the idylls of the Tamil Pattuppāṭṭu¹¹², numerous types of songs are mentioned, each having its specific "Sitz im Leben"; in the Malaipaṭukaṭām alone nine of them. This "situational" character of "oral poetry" is reflected not only in "elementary", but also in many "traditional" societies, such as e.g. the Lithuanian¹¹³.

The commonality of a systematic bodily scheme woven into a cosmic network of associations is not reducible to modellic inspiration, but is due to a common magical perception of unimpaired auspiciousness: Firstly, representative fullness is required for both types to ban any ominous void resulting from "in-concentration". Secondly, the representative enumeration of all individual members, together with their cosmic equivalents, has its origin in the archaic conception of magical completeness being the combination of all single most perfect elements, i.e. the composite aggregation of multivalent singular-figural potencies to form a universal *totum* imagined to surpass monolithic wholeness. This conception of a *perfectio per summam membrorum potentissimorum* has its roots in the primeval "manaistic" idea that every single element

¹¹¹ See S. LIENHARD, Studien zur Eigenart indischer Kunstdichtung. Phil. Diss. Vienna 1949, p. 16f.

¹¹² See CHELLIAH, op. cit. (n. 82), passim.

¹¹³ See W. VON EINSIEDEL, Die Literaturen der Welt in ihrer mündlichen und schriftlichen Überlieferung. Herrsching s. a., p. 887. Cf. also BLACKBURN etc., op. cit. (n. 89), ch. 3–5 & passim.

of an aggregate composite (microcosm) has its own *numen* together with its associated cosmic forces – or, to speak in various terms of Vedic expression¹¹⁴, its own *āsu*, *prāṇā*, *indriyā*, *devā*, *devātā*, *pūruṣa*, *ātman*, together with the respective *bāndhu* (*rūpā*, *nāman*, *tanū*, *pratimā* . . .) – in the macrocosmic world¹¹⁵. It is thence that the idea results that the sum total of the most potent *numina* by far supersedes the solidity of a howsoever potent self-contained all. This archaic conception seems to be reflected in the Vedic-Brāhmaṇical notion of *sārva* and its equivalents¹¹⁶ (cf. e.g. the term *sārvarūpa* in Atharvaveda IX 7,25–26, conjured to describe the cosmic integration of corporeal wholeness). Many a complex theory was developed, in the wake of this conception, trying to explicate the constitutional structures of man and other entities (cf. e.g. Atharvaveda XI 8) – till, ultimately, aggregative wholeness lost its charm with the discovery of the absolute *ātman* or *eka* and its infinite *pūrṇatā*, or got devalORIZED by atomistic or voidistic ideas, as the case may be. Yet, archaic models have survived even the most thought-provoking innovations. Archaic magic has retained its hold world-wide in the ritual. For, if the latter is not to fade away into mere abstraction and therewith lose its existence, the element of composite fullness is indispensable. Thus, most of the rites of the world have preserved a representative kind of total enumeration in order to suggest completeness. No ritual of the Sioux-Osages could begin without all members of the worldhouse being representatively conjured to take part¹¹⁷. What is true of the rite, is also true of the litany and all forms of representation where highest potency is imagined to be required and the demoniac void resulting from neglect of the same is to be shunned.

It is not only ritualism, and everything connected therewith, being inimical to abstraction, but also traditional art – at least in such fields

¹¹⁴ Cf. R. V. DE SMET, The Indian Understanding of Man. Presidential Address to the History of Philosophy Section at the Forty-Fourth Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress under the auspices of the University of Poona, November 5–8, 1970. Poona 1970, p. 4ff.; J. GONDA, *bandhu*- in the Brāhmaṇa-s. ALB 29 (1965) 1–29; SMITH, op. cit. (n. 102), p. 47ff., 69ff. & passim – and the literature cited therein.

¹¹⁵ That is why magical identifications occupy an exorbitant range within all archaic (not only Indian) ritual literature. Cf. e.g. Ni. 6060 (LANGDON, op. cit. [n. 110], p. 336ff.), a Babylonian (Cassite) tablet which yields a large number of mystical equations of plants, metals, cult utensils, and sacrificial animals with deities.

¹¹⁶ Cf. J. GONDA, Reflections on *sarva*- in Vedic Texts. IL 16 (1955) 53–71; id., All, Universe and Totality in the Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa. JOIB 32 (1982) 1–17; SMITH, op. cit. (n. 102), p. 54ff.

¹¹⁷ Cf. W. MÜLLER, Indianische Welterfahrung. Stuttgart ²1958, p. 46f.

where each limb or element is to be fully and perfectly represented so as to preserve its *prāṇa*, which, magically, still has its separate existence as well as its *bandhu* and, thus, its highly potent and protective valency. Thus, all archaic art tends to be additive in its initial stages, as is proved by the compository techniques in the small-scale plastic arts of Ancient Egypt (here even the large-scale sculpture), Mesopotamia, and the Pre-Indus and Indus Valley Cultures, likewise the process of making terracotta figurines in all civilizations, and, last but not least, the creation of pleomorphic figures and the symbolism of iconographical art, especially Indian.

In India, the subconscious belief in the aggregative perfection of being and the magical fear of the void, concomitant with a thence-resulting interest in deductive casuistics, in addition, combined (mostly in poetry and art) with the joy in ornamental exuberance – provided, on the one hand, by the phantasmagoric web-structure of magical associations around individual elements and, on the other hand, by the flourishing imagery of tropical nature and its reflection in indigenous poetry respectively¹¹⁸. These various factors corroborated one another in a way that abundant ornamentation became an aesthetical ideal of the highest even though theorists and philosophers tried to superstrue unifying concepts of a poetical “soul” on the jungle of aggregative

¹¹⁸ We can gather from the marked differences, in poetical imagery, style, and conventions, between Vedic and (pre)classical poetry that the imagination of the latter came to be increasingly inspired by the exuberance of tropical nature, through the medium of indigenous minstrelsy, as we find it reflected in the aesthetics of early Tamil bardic poetry (cf. e.g. S. LIENHARD, *Palai Poems in Sanskrit and Prakrit*, in: K. A. Nilakanta Sastri Felicitation Vol. Madras 1971, p. 416ff.; id., *Bauern, Berge, Nacht und Winter*. In: *Festschrift for E. Śluszkiewicz*. Warsaw 1974, p. 137–141; id., *Tamil Literary Conventions and Sanskrit Muktaḥ Poetry*. WZKS 20 [1976] 101–110; VARADARAJAN, loc. cit. [n. 82]; ZVELEBIL, op. cit. [n. 59], ch. 1; id., *The Smile of Murugan*. On Tamil Literature of South India. Leiden 1973, ch. 4–6 & passim; id., *Literary Conventions in Akam Poetry*. Madras 1986; HART, op. cit. [n. 60], passim; A. K. RAMANUJAN, *The Interior Landscape*. Love Poems from a Classical Anthology. Bloomington – London 1976; MARIASELVAM, op. cit. [n. 81]) and in various indigenous forms of tribal lore (cf. e.g. W. G. ARCHER, *The Hill of Flutes*. Life, Love and Poetry in Tribal India: A Portrait of the Santals. New Delhi 1975, passim – and the books by V. ELWIN, passim). More conspicuous even than the immense stock of common poetical conventions and standards of comparison as well as generic motifs, is the comparability of aesthetical and also erotological classifications. Thus, V. ELWIN (*The Kingdom of the Young*. Oxford 1968, p. 115f.) describes the Muria system of “breast classification” – while ARCHER (op. cit., p. 109ff.) records the “classified standards of charm” of the Santal maiden and youth.

diversity. The outcome has been unique in the world: a maximum of abstraction has been conceived to subsume a maximum of concretions (continuing to devise a world of infinite finites).

Now that it is art which enacts the most vital forces of the magical subconscious in man, the question arises: Is it not art that represents most sensually the magical webs of associations of the human (especially female) body with nature and, thus, can illustrate the *perfectio per summam membrorum potentissimorum* best – better than poetry? Is it not the artistic realization of the above-mentioned motives that has provided the impulse to the poetical creation even of the “descriptive song”? Does the aesthetical creation of a beautiful womanly body not serve as a model for the poetical? Yes and no. Art is a model of the sensualization and mystification of all the salient manifestations of reality, to wit, in this context, principally of beauty, love and potency, yet art is limited (more than rite and dance) in its faculty to draw upon the totality of cosmic concretions beyond singular traits or symbolical allusions. Art is *a priori* active in the aesthetical visualization of bodily features, but it is not the source of their mythico-poetical creation, and thus no more than a homologue.

Concretely speaking, Indian art and poetry, though mutually influencing each other, follow their separate purports – which is reflected by the fact that the categories applied and theorized in their respective *śāstra* are initially separate (prescinding from certain natural areas of congruence). It is, however, illustrative of the depth of Indian imagination that soon attempts were made by art to translate poetical models, and vice versa.

Finally, it must be emphasized that the *nakhaśikha* is independent of the diverse *nāyikā* portraits of *kāvya*, *alaṃkāra*- and *kāmaśāstra* (some of which incorporate typologies *eiusdem generis*), erotic genre-pictures (like dancing, sport and toilet scenes, harem vistas, water games, promenades, flower-pluckings, trysts, love games, orgies, seductions, marriages, seasons, nature scenes, etc.) functioning, too, as *uddīpanavibhāva*, or descriptions of erotic facets of love. It is obvious though, that these various scenarios did influence the *nakhaśikha*, or vice versa. Thus, the *proṣitabhartṛkā* portrait tends to incorporate, wholly or partly, the *nakhaśikha* or to follow its structure. Instances of the former procedure are the portraits of the sorrowing Sītā in Rāmāyaṇa V 13,17–52, the lamenting consorts of Gautama in Buddhacarita VIII 21–23, or the grieving Yakṣī in Meghadūta II 19ff., an example of the latter we find in the Rāvaṇavaha (XI 39–50). A similar mutual relationship exists between the *nakhaśikha* and the *anuraktūlakṣaṇa*- or *anurāgiṇīlakṣaṇavarṇana* as well as sportive scenes of various types.

In terms of a conclusion, we record that the *nakhaśikha* portrait

- figures primarily as an “auspicious praise of perfect beauty”, having its original setting in commissioned minstrelsy
- has been more or less overlaid, in India, with (hyper)technical astro-physiognomical elements of divination
- shows a formal acquaintance with the litany forms of the religious hymn of an unspecified and specified type
- is conceptually linked with the notion of magical completion and the idea of a *perfectio per summam membrorum potentissimorum*, being rooted in the “manaistic” design of a universe of numinous associates
- is analogous in form and associative imagery to (and influenced by) the “cult descriptive hymn” (and its counterpart expressions in rite), but not derived from the same
- is homologous, in expression, to the artistic representation of a “beautiful body” and aesthetically (not notionally or *a priori* materially) inspired by the sensuo-mystical evocations of art and their counterpart expressions in dance
- and has been *a posteriori* influenced by various analogous literary and other motifs.

THE PLURIFORM ĀTMAN FROM THE UPANIṢADS TO THE SVACCHANDA TANTRA

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1. Introductory

The Svacchanda or Svatantra Tantra (SvT) is one of the largest and most influential specimens of early Tantric literature¹. It is one of the revealed texts especially revered by the so-called Northern School of Śaivism of which Abhinavagupta is the most famous representative. Since that philosopher flourished round about the year 1000 A.D., the Tantra itself must be considerably older. The text is commented upon by Kṣemarāja, Abhinavagupta's most distinguished pupil. The philosophical position of the SvT itself, although sometimes considered to be monistic, is not entirely clear. The text is often quoted, but has not yet been translated or subjected to a thorough general study. In the present article, the attention will be restricted almost entirely to the eleventh chapter which contains (vs. 82ff.) a remarkable presentation of a five-fold Ātman. Since the contents of the passage seem to be directly or indirectly based upon (or at least inspired by) earlier pronouncements on a pluriform appearance of the Self, we shall begin by succinctly pointing to some of these, especially statements which were made in the older Upaniṣads and in the Mokṣadharma of the twelfth book of the Mahābhārata. Although studies on the Ātman exist, its plural manifestations have – as far as I know – not yet been discussed as a specific subject.

It must be remarked at the outset that there are many terminological problems as well as inconsistencies among the different presentations in the texts. What are called "Ātmans" usually appear to be different temporal or secondary modifications, or states, of a unique Self or of an infinity of selves.

2. Pluriform Ātmanic Structure in the Older Upaniṣads

One of the most characteristic features of late Vedic speculation is the development of the concept of Ātman. Although the Ātman is usually introduced in the singular in Vedic as well as post-Vedic sources,

¹ Ed. M. K. SHASTRI (see the Bibliography). Survey of contents in GONDA 1977, p. 205f.

early Indian thinkers soon made a distinction between Antarātman or the individually realized manifestation of the Ātman as supreme principle, and Brahman or Paramātman, the Supreme in its supra-individual, transcendental purity. In fact, however, the distinction was only verbal and served to express the transcendental unity in understandable language. In some cases, this transcendental Self may have been implied rather than expressly mentioned, as in KāṭhUp 5,9 *agnir yathaiko bhuvanaṃ praviṣṭo, rūpaṃ rūpaṃ pratirūpo babhūva / ekas tathā sarva-bhūtāntarātmā, rūpaṃ rūpaṃ pratirūpo bahiś ca* || “just as Fire in its earthly presences adapts itself to different forms, in the same way the unique Self of all beings adapts Itself to different forms at the outside”; this is then followed by similar statements about Vāyu and Sūrya, and concluded by the well-known stanza *eko vaśī sarvabhūtāntarātmā* etc. (KāṭhUp 5,12). As one of the first clear expressions of the twofold nature of the Self one might consider TaiĀr 1,23, where it is said that Prajāpati “having created his Self (as the world), with his own Self entered into it”².

The preoccupation with the Ātman in the later Vedic period led to a rethinking of the relationship between the unique transcendental Self and its embodied manifestations. The problem could be approached from two angles of vision: philosophical, i.e. how to imagine and describe the stages of the process of involvement of the Self with individual existence, and, more practical, how to devise methods by which the individual Self could gradually realize its identity with the Supreme Self. In the Upaniṣads, we find several descriptions of such processes of self-realization which introduce even more than two states or manifestations of the Ātman. We mention:

1) The KāṭhUp (3,13) recommends a gradual resorting to more subtle, widening, supra-individual states called Ātmans:

yacched vānmanasī prājñas, tad yacchej jñāna ātmani /

jñānam ātmani mahati niyacchet, tad yacchec chānta ātmani ||

“The wise man should concentrate speech and mind; that (group) he should concentrate in the Self which is wisdom; the wisdom he should concentrate in the Large Self; that he should concentrate in the Tranquil Self.”

The stanza and its traditional exegesis offer some problems which will be passed over here, but for the time-honoured interpretation of the

² Reference in DASGUPTA 1922, p. 26. One can also point to the stanza *ṛtaṃ pibantau . . .*, KāṭhUp 1,3,1, and to BĀUp 4,3,9 *tasya vā etasya puruṣasya dve eva sthāne bhavataḥ, idaṃ ca paralokasthānaṃ ca*; but the BĀUp adds a third, intermediate, position, viz. that of the dream.

first *pāda*: “Let the wise subdue his speech by mind”³ which can be defended only by having recourse twice to *ārṣa* irregularities. The result of such a handling of the text is that a fivefold series is obtained: speech (and perhaps, by implication, other senses) – mind – wisdom⁴ – Large Ātman – Tranquil Ātman. This list is more or less in accordance with the passage which precedes in this chapter of the KaṭhUp. The word *niyacchet* in the third *pāda* is evidently a gloss, but has been retained out of respect to the constituted text. The term *śāntātman* is again used in MaiUp 5,1,4, but it probably functions there as a Bahuvrīhi: *namaḥ śāntātmane tubhyam* “Homage to Thee of tranquil Self”⁵.

2) The famous discussion between Prajāpati and Indra in ChUp 8,7–12, in which the Self is consecutively explained as the body (here, the Asura Virocana, Indra’s co-pupil, leaves his teacher in false contentment), the dream-state, the state of deep sleep, and at last the deathless and bodiless Self, which implies that the preceding stages did not really belong to the Ātman.

3) The preceding theory of the ever more subtle states of inward experience as stages of access to the Supreme Self has been elaborated in the MāṇḍUp⁶. Here, the three first states of experience (waking, dream, deep sleep) are described as characterized (and therefore: lower) forms of the Ātman called respectively *vaiśvānara*, *taijasa* and *prājña* “corporeal”, “energetic” and “intelligent”. In this way, a fourfold series is obtained, to be schematized as follows:

Ātman	State	Awareness	Sphere of Enjoyment
Vaiśvānara	waking	things external	gross objects
Taijasa	dream	things internal	subtle objects
Prājña	deep sleep	pure awareness	bliss
uncharact.	unmentioned	non-duality etc.	the Self

It may be noted that the lower stages of the Ātman are considered to be fiery in nature, in agreement with the leading Upaniṣadic conception⁷, while the higher reaches transcend that characterization; and

³ RÖER 1931, p. 75, echoing Śaṅkara.

⁴ Wisdom = Buddhi acc. to BELVALKAR-RANADE 1927, p. 264. HUME 1931, p. 353, wrongly connects Buddhi with the Large Ātman mentioned next. Cf. BUITENEN 1965, p. 103f.

⁵ Translation by BUITENEN 1962, p. 133.

⁶ Cf. BELVALKAR-RANADE, pp. 324f.

⁷ See FRAUWALLNER 1953, p. 60f.

further, that these stages or Ātmans have been conceived as a theoretical foundation of the natural experiences of waking etc.

4) Another progressive interiorization, presented as a kind of husking of sheaths, is expounded at TaiUp 2,1 ff. The Introduction (2,1) states that man (*puruṣa*) originates from Brahman, characterized as Truth, Wisdom, the Imperishable; and this by way of the elements, the plants and food as intermediary stages – a well-known realistic view of Brahman as the womb of the universe (cf. Bhagavadgītā 14,3). The text then proceeds by indicating five different layers, called Ātmans, within this Puruṣa. They consist of food, breath, mind, consciousness (*viññāna*) and bliss (*ānanda*). The last and most subtle layer has Brahman as its immediate support. The later Vedāntins discussed the question whether or not this *ānandamayakoṣa* should be admitted as the Supreme Brahman, but the general opinion is that it should not⁸. The progression towards the innermost core of the Self is from gross to subtle, from material to spiritual, from exterior to interior. Although the text, taken at its literal value, speaks of five “Ātmans”, the archaic conception is rather different from the theories of pluriform selves found in early Tantras. A fivefold Puruṣa is again mentioned at TaiĀr 10,79 (p. 544)⁹.

Another influential tradition of the twofold differentiation of the Ātman concentrates on its involvement in the world of sensory objects. According to this view, the second, embodied Ātman fully experiences the vicissitudes of individual existence, prolonged through the rounds of birth and death. The best known late Vedic expression of this position is probably the stanza found in MuUp 3,1,1 and ŚvetUp 4,6:

d_uvā suparṇā suyujā sakhāyā, samānaṃ vrkṣaṃ pariśasvajāte |
tayor anyah pippalaṃ svād_uv att_iy, anaśnann anya abhicākaśti ||

⁸ TaiUp, tr. A. M. SASTRI, p. 469f., 496, 593. This theory of the TaiUp seems to be based upon speculation around the Agnicayana ritual: BUITENEN 1962, p. 29–33; BUITENEN 1965, p. 110. The fourth and fifth layer would have been added later; the fourth is the *mahat ātman*, alias *mahas*. Cf. also Paingala Up. 2,4 (SASTRI 1921, p. 199). – The Śaiva Siddhānta tends to equate the *ānandamayakoṣa* with the unenlightened and unaware (*abudha*) state of the Pralayakevala souls (DEVASENAPATHI 1960, p. 226). In the Śaivaparibhāṣā (3,22), the five Koṣas are considered characteristic of the *sakala* state (p. 137).

⁹ It can hardly be called a coincidence, that the early Buddhists analysed the pseudo-Self into five constituents (*skandhas*), although the *skandha* theory is set up along a different line. The Buddha's polemic position towards the Upaniṣadic tradition is expressed very well by the contention ascribed to him that “the five Skandhas are not the Ātman”, which is not the same as to deny the Ātman altogether, as has been pointed out by Uddyotakara (BHATTACHARYA 1987, p. 214).

“Two birds, comrades joined together, attach themselves to the same tree; of these two, one eats the sweet fruit; the other, without eating, looks on.”

It is true that the stanza has directly been taken from the R̥gveda (1,164,20) where it functions quite differently, but the Upaniṣadic context seems to require the above explanation. The two birds are two forms of the Ātman; one of them is involved in saṃsāric experience, while the other, although present, remains free and unattached.

The same principle is worked out in a different way in MaiUp 2 and 3, where a new terminology is also introduced. Here, two forms of the Self are both related to individual existence, but one of them, called the “Knower of the field” (*kṣetrajña*), only sets the psycho-physical system in motion while remaining unattached himself. The other, who “being overwhelmed by the white and black results of actions, reaches good and evil rebirths, going round and round”, is the *bhūtātman* “Self of the Elements” or “Material Self”. The text itself maintains that *bhūta*° here stands for the five gross elements as well as the five subtle elements; but this explanation is part of an old commentary incorporated in the final redaction of this Upaniṣad¹⁰. The relationship of the *Kṣetrajña* with this material Self is described in MaiUp 6,10 as a process of eating (cf. the stanza *dvā suparṇā* discussed above). The foods are specified as the *buddhi*, called *adhyavasāya* “resolution”, and (by implication) *manas* and *ahaṃkāra*, respectively called “intention” and “misrepresentation”¹¹ as well as all the lower categories of Sāṅkhya. This mysterious tension between two or more aspects of the Self, whose differentiation is brought about by the attraction of objective experience, will continue to be described in later Sanskrit religious literature.

In MaiUp 6,31, a still different view is brought forward, perhaps expressive of a more positive evaluation of the Ātman’s involvement. It is said there that the Ātman (not specified) consumes the objects with five rays; he is therefore implicitly compared to the sun:

kimātmakāṇi vā etānīndriyāṇi pracaranti | ... ātmātmakāṇi | ātmā hy eṣām udgantā niyantā vā | apsaraso bhānavīyās ca marīcayo nāma | atha

¹⁰ BUITENEN 1962, p. 102, and his Chapter One, esp. p. 26f. One might compare the *bhūtātman* with the *pudgala* of some Buddhist schools (cf. BHATTACHARYA 1987, p. 215). – KAKAR 1978, p. 19, distinguishes the “composite self” (made up of the body, personality, and social roles) from the “I”, “which, as Hindus would say, is pure consciousness, the *ātman* ...”. The Ego of psychoanalysis is closer to the Observant Self or *kṣetrajña*; the self of Gestalt Therapy is more similar to the concept of the *bhūtātman* (PERLS 1973, p. 426f.).

¹¹ BUITENEN 1962, p. 139. On p. 133 he translates the same terms *saṃkalpa* and *abhīmāna* with “will” and “presumption”.

pañcabhī raśmibhir viṣayān atti "our sensory powers that are acting here, of what self are they? ... they have the Self as their self. For the Self sends them out and restrains them. And the Apsaras are what might be called his sunbeams. To be precise: he consumes the objects of sense with five rays" ¹².

Here, the Ātman's involvement is not acted out by a lower or secondary Ātman like the Bhūtātman, but by certain feminine powers emitted by the unique knowing (male) Subject. A most daring and original image of what one might call "proto-Tantric" character at the same time revealing an interesting aspect of social history.

The motif of the fivefold essence of Being has been introduced by the MaiUp already at the outset. The text begins with an allusion to the ritual of Agnicayana. The Yajamāna should meditate on the ritual fires (five in number) as being his Self: *yajamānaś citvaitān agnīn ātmānam abhidhyāyet*. As is well known, the five layers which are being constructed during the ceremony are to be equated with five "bodies" or "forms of existence" (*tanū*) of Prajāpati, the creator-god and prototype of the Ātman ¹³. The Upaniṣad itself refers to this fivefold nature of Prajāpati in 2,6. It is explained there that the god, weary of being all alone, had emitted many creatures (*prajāḥ*). But these, being without consciousness ([?] *aprabuddhāḥ*), remained motionless. He therefore decided to embody himself within them in the form of wind (breath), and to this end he divided himself into five (breaths) ¹⁴. The number five here seems to accentuate the Supreme Self's sovereign decision towards self-division as the power of maintenance in his creation.

3. Some Ātmanic Conceptions in the Mokṣadharmā

The so-called Mokṣadharmā in the twelfth book of the Mahābhārata (Mbh.) has a lot to say on manifestations of the Ātman ¹⁵. We shall, however, only deal with a few selected passages which are of special

¹² BUITENEN 1962, p. 115f. (text). My translation differs from that of BUITENEN on p. 147f.

¹³ GONDA 1960, p. 192, referring to Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa 10,1,3,4, and H. OLDENBERG, Vorwissenschaftliche Wissenschaft, p. 100. Cf. also GONDA 1986, p. 186.

¹⁴ BUITENEN 1962, p. 100 (text). Cf. also MaiUp 6,9 *prāṇo 'gniḥ paramātmā vai pañcavāyuh*.

¹⁵ We note in passing a statement of pluriform appearance of the Puruṣa or "twenty-fifth Tattva" (presumed subject; not directly mentioned) in MBh 12, 296, 2cd = Mbh. 12, 308, 1c) *ātmānam bahudhā kṛtvā, tāny eva pravacakṣate (tāni, viz. rūpāṇi; Nīlakaṇṭha)*. According to Nīlakaṇṭha, the manifold appearances are the *viśva*, *taijasa*, *prājña*, *virāj*, *sūtra* and *antaryāmin*. For him, the manifoldness comes about through Māyā.

relevance for the exposition of the Ātmans in the Svacchanda Tantra presented in Section Four.

At the beginning of MBh 12, 194, Yudhiṣṭhira poses a few questions to Bhīṣma, one of which concerns the nature of the *bhūtātman*. This term was introduced in the MaiUp, as we have seen, to denote the “involved self” closely attached to the material substrate and experiencing the karmic law. Bhīṣma, answering the question, in the first instance refers to Manu’s discourse to Bṛhaspati on the same subject¹⁶. In the exposition which follows, however, Manu prefers the term *antarātman* (in fact, *bhūtātman* recurs only – if I am not mistaken – in 231,11 where Vyāsa is the speaker). In accordance with MaiUp 6,31, Manu compares this Antarātman to the sun (MBh 12,197,13–15)¹⁷:

udyan hi savitā yadvat, sṛjate raṣmimaṇḍalam |
sa evāstam upāgacchamś, tad evātmani yacchati ||
antarātmā tathā deham, āviśyendriyaraṣmibhiḥ |
prāpyendriyaguṇān pañca, so ’stam āvṛtya gacchati ||
prañītaṁ karmanā mārgaṁ, nīyamānaḥ punaḥ punaḥ |
prāpnoty ayaṁ karmaphalaṁ, pravṛddhaṁ dharmam ātmavān ||

“Just as the sun on its ascending course emits a circle of rays, and again withdraws the same into himself at the approach of sunset, in the same way the Inner Self, having entered the body, takes hold of the five sensorial objects by means of the rays of the senses and again withdraws (these rays) at the time of demise¹⁸. Being impelled again and again on the way pointed out by Karman, he obtains the result of Karman, an increased state of merit, (remaining) true to himself.”

The passage implies a remarkable paradox about this vision of the Inner Self. Being solar in nature, this Antarātman partakes of (micro-) cosmic activity, even majesty; but at the same time he is subjected to the law of retribution and has to follow a prescribed course, experienc-

¹⁶ FRAUWALLNER 1953, p. 103f., gives a characteristic of the dialogue Manu – Bṛhaspati.

¹⁷ Also discussed by FRAUWALLNER 1953, p. 104. The MBh text looks very much like an explanatory amplification of MaiUp 6,31 quoted above. – The comparison of the Inner Self with the sun is also found in Bhagavadgītā 13,33. – In his commentary on MrgĀg, Kriyāpāda 3,4 (context: *deha-* or *ātmaśuddhi*), Bhaṭṭa Nārāyaṇa describes the Ātman as “dwelling in the heart-lotus, resplendent like a ray (or: with rays) of molten gold”: *’hṛtpuṇḍarīkavartinam taptacāmīkarakiraṇaruciram*. Cf. BRUNNER’s translation and commentary on p. 39. According to the Tantrasadbhāva (1,56f.), the Lord dwells in the heart-lotus, *hṛtśākaṇikākṛtiḥ* ... + *vidyotann* (mss.: *vidyotam*) *iva cārciṣā*.

¹⁸ The “rays” of the Self are also mentioned on other places in the Mokṣadharmā, e.g. 245,2; 292,28; but unlike in the MaiUp, nothing is said about their feminine character. They appear as just the (neuter) sense-organs.

ing the karmic results and ascending only gradually towards self-emanicipation. This experience is compared to a journey on which the Self has been forced to set out by another power, viz. Karman. It may be remarked that the second view which emphasizes the Ātman's subjection, is expressed only in the last stanza (15); nor does this stanza refer to final release, only to "merit" (*dharma*).

In a later passage of the Mokṣadharmā (294,19f.), the Inner Self is again characterized as being of solar and fiery nature. Here, Vasiṣṭha is the speaker. We follow the edited text¹⁹:

hṛdayasiho 'ntarātmēti, jñeyo jñas tāta madvidhaiḥ ||
vidhūma iva saptārcir, āditya iva raśmimān |
vaidyuto 'gnir ivākāśe, drśyate 'tmā tathātmani ||

"The knower . . . should be known by (*yogins*) like me as the Inner Self residing in the heart; comparable to a sevenfold²⁰ smokeless fire, emitting rays like the sun; the Self is visible within oneself²¹ as the fire of lightning in the sky."

During his karmic course, the Inner Self, who is the only leader of the body, and who knows and observes the fivefold reality of the objects of sense, is aware (*vetti*) of happy and unhappy experiences (180,19f.). This Inner Self should be identified with the Kṣetrajñā (180,24; in 294,19d quoted just above, *jñā* = *kṣetrajñā*), called *adhyātman* "Over-self" in 180,30 and in ch. 187.

In another exposition by Vyāsa (245,7f.), the experiences witnessed by the Antarātman are now connected with the Bhūtātman:

teṣāṃ nityaṃ sadānityo, bhūtātmā satataṃ guṇaiḥ |
saptabhis tv anvitaḥ sūkṣmaś, carīṣṇur ajarāmarah ||
manobuddhiparābhūtaḥ, svadehaparadehavit |
svapneṣv api bhavaty eṣa, vijñātā sukhaduhkhaḥ ||

"For these (adepts of *yoga*), there is continually (a vision of) the eternal Material Self, constantly provided with the seven subtle (qualities)²²; moving around, unaging, undying. Overwhelmed by Mind and Intelli-

¹⁹ Also quoted by FRAUWALLNER 1925, p. 65.

²⁰ "Sevenfold": probably composed of or fed by the five objects of the senses, *manas* and *buddhi*, in accordance with the exposition in 187,10f. or 197,10. The sacrificial fire is also sevenfold: its seven tongues are considered as separate powers of feminine nature in the MuUp and other texts; cf. GOUDRIAAN 1978, p. 208. – One should not, on this place, translate *saptārcis* with the dictionaries merely as "fire".

²¹ *ātmani*, glossed by Vidyāsāgara in his commentary Vyākhyānaratnāvali as *antahkaraṇe* "in the psychic organism".

²² These seven are presumably the same as the group called "seven Ātmans" in the text consulted by FRAUWALLNER 1925, p. 55. But the Poona Edition, numbering the stanza as 224,41a, prefers the reading *ete tu sapta puruṣā* instead

gence, aware of (a separateness of) the own body and other bodies; even in dreams, he knows of happy and unhappy experiences.”

We also translate vss. 9–11:

“On one occasion²³ he is confronted by sorrow, on another, by happiness; he then reacts to these with (feelings of) hate and desire and in this way falls into an evil state. But he may also be well pleased by obtaining large possessions; and in such circumstances, he creates merit (by good works), while making observations as in the waking state. This same Material Self of great splendour, residing in the heart, is not visible within the embodied individuals by those who are possessed by Indolence and Activity.”²⁴

Just as the Inner Self in the preceding passages, but with much more detail, the Material Self is here described as undergoing the incarnated state and its vicissitudes; he enjoys good and bad experiences, and by and by he accumulates merit which slowly leads to better insight (cf. Bhagavadgītā 14,16f.: the result of meritorious acts is of sattvic nature, and Sattva leads to insight). These experiences are connected with the dream, but this state only mirrors the experiences of the waking state.

The passage presented above might give the impression that Antarātman and Bhūtātman as described in them are really the same. Both are located in the heart (12,245,11b *bhūtātmanāṃ hr̥di sthitam*; 294,19c *hr̥dayastho 'ntarātmanā*). There seems to be a tendency to differentiation according to perspective²⁵: the term *antarātman* suggests the primeval

of *ete saptaavidhātmanō*, although the latter reading is supported by the Vulgate and about 15 mss.

²³ I.e., in the dream. Cf. BĀUp 4,3,9f. and ChUp 3,13,7f.; this dream doctrine seems therefore to be in the tradition of the Upaniṣadic “fire doctrine” (cf. FRAUWALLNER 1953, p. 65). It is not suggested in the Mokṣadharma passage that the Bhūtātman would leave the body during these experiences (FRAUWALLNER 1953, p. 68); nor in the similar description of dream experience ascribed to “Hari, the Lord of Yoga” in MBh 12, 209,1f. Although the soul “as it were” goes to another body, these experiences are described as an internal process.

²⁴ *tatrāpi labhate duḥkham, tatrāpi labhate sukham | krodhalobhau tu tatrāpi, kṛtvā vyaśanam ārchati || pr̥ṇitās cāpi bhavati, mahato 'rthān avāpya ca | karoti puṇyaṃ tatrāpi, jāgrann iva ca paśyati || tam evam atitejo'mśaṃ, bhūtātmanāṃ hr̥di sthitam | tamorajobhyām āviṣṭā, nānupaśyanti mūr̥tiṣu ||* (MBh 12,245, 9–11).

²⁵ FRAUWALLNER 1953, p. 106, notes such a tendency to distinguish “the Element-Ātman (*bhūtātman*) from the Supreme Ātman” (my trsl.). – Cf. STRAUSS 1925, p. 135: “Öfters wird der Element-Ātman ... von dem höheren absoluten unterschieden (vgl. Maitrāyaṇa); es lag ja sehr nahe, den verstrickten und den erlösten, absoluten Puruṣa mit zwei verschiedenen Namen zu belegen”. This simplifies matters a little because, as we saw, also the Antarātman is

state of purity, independence and sovereignty; the *bhūtātman* is not really different, but this term implies an emphasis upon its involvement with material existence. However, such involvement is also claimed for the *Antarātman* in 180, 19f. and in 197,¹⁵ discussed above. Similar things are said of the *Kṣetrajña* in 180,²⁶ the terminology is applied rather unsystematically. In 231,11, the *Bhūtātman* is said to rule over sense-organs and *manas*; just as a charioteer his horses, in the same way the *manas* holds the sense-organs in check. It is not clear whether the *Bhūtātman* is implicitly also compared to a charioteer, or to the warrior who is inactive during the journey:

indriyāṇi mano yuñkte, vaśyān yanteva vājīnaḥ |
manasā cāpi sadā yuñkte, bhūtātmā hṛdayāśritāḥ ||

In the preceding stanza (10) it was said that the sense-organs report on the objects of the senses to the *manas*. The latter therefore acts as an intermediary between the lower functions and the *Bhūtātman*. It even seems that in this chapter there is no difference between the *Bhūtātman* and the *Mahānt Ātman*, who, according to vs. 16, cannot be known by the sense-organs but only by *manas* (a doctrine described by FRAUWALLNER):

na hy ayaṃ cakṣuṣā drśyo, na ca sarvair apīndriyaiḥ |
manasā saṃpradīptena, mahān ātmā prakāśate ||

On the other hand, the *Antarātman* is described in 180,19f. as the leader of the body, who is aware of the objects of the senses, and of happy and sorrowful experiences, even without intervention of the *manas*: ... *śarīram eko vahate 'ntarātmā | sa vetti gandhāś ca ...* (and the other sense-objects) ... *duḥkhāni sukhāni cātra*.

It is clear that the *Ātmanic* terminology of the *Mokṣadharma* passages discussed above is close to that of the *MaiUp* and even suggests a direct continuity. In the *Upaniṣad*, the *Material Self* is in opposition and subordination to the *Kṣetrajña*. In the epic instances, however, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish the *Bhūtātman*, the *Kṣetrajña* (a *Sāṅkhya* term), the *Antarātman*, the *Adhyātman* (195,4; 225,11, a.o.) and the *Jñānātman* ("Self of Wisdom", cf. 197,10); these terms seem to represent only different angles of vision, preferred by different formulators who all contributed their share to the variegated edifice of the

described as involved in duality. STRAUSS also held "daß man die verkörperte Seele zusammen mit Prakṛti und ihren Umwandlungen dem reinen Geist gegenüberstellt". He refers on p. 136 to the doctrine of the twenty-sixth *Tattvas*, see below.

²⁶ FRAUWALLNER 1925, p. 60 (his stanza 187,23).

Mokṣadharmā. Even the Mahānt Ātman does not seem to escape this individually differentiated existence (231,16 mentioned above)²⁷.

We must, however, also consider 12,290,90ff., where the prominence of the Paramātman "Supreme Self" is succinctly described. The context is the destination of the spiritually emancipated. Here, we find the viewpoint of the MaiUp repeated and expanded (90):

*ātmā ca yāti kṣetrajñam, karmaṇ ca śubhāśubhe |
śiṣyā iva mahātmānam, indriyāṇi ca taṁ vibho ||*

The Ātman (which must here be equivalent to the Bhūtātman in the Upaniṣadic sense: the aspect of the Self directly connected with the psycho-physical system), accompanied by the karmic residue, approaches the Kṣetrajña as its superior (just as, if I am interpreting the stanza correctly, the senses the Ātman), as religious pupils their Guru. The Kṣetrajña in his turn (91f.)

*prakṛtiṁ cāpy atikramya, gacchaty ātmānam avyayam |
param nārāyaṇātmānam, nirdvandvaṁ prakṛteḥ param ||
vimuktaḥ puṇyapāpebhyah, praviṣṭas tam anāmayaṁ |
paramātmānam aguṇam, na nivartati bhārata ||*

transcends Prakṛti and goes to the Imperishable Self who is Nārāyaṇa, the Supreme Self. In this way, a theological dimension (intimately connected with an emphasis on soteriology) is superimposed upon the earlier speculations²⁸. It would seem, that in this passage the (Bhūt)ātman is bound to individual existence, while the Kṣetrajña continues its existence through the rounds of transmigration²⁹. But the theological exposition is also not without its contradictions, because a little earlier (74f.), Nārāyaṇa and the Supreme Self are distinguished, God being the

²⁷ On the Mahānt Ātman in the epic, cf. FRAUWALLNER 1953, p. 121 with n. 60 on p. 462 and p. 309. He characterizes this Ātman as "die irdische Seele" (p. 121) or "die Seele" (p. 309).

²⁸ This would be in keeping with FRAUWALLNER's conclusion that, in general, the later chapters in the Mokṣadharmā tend to be also the younger (FRAUWALLNER 1953, p. 100).

²⁹ FRAUWALLNER 1925, p. 53, notes that the Bhūtātman = *ahamkāra* according to 314,12. The Poona ed. (where this stanza is numbered 300,12) prefers, however, the reading *sarvātmā* for *bhūtātmā*. It will be clear that in the Mokṣadharmā much depends on the choice of variant readings. We are in need of a textual study which starts from the Poona edition without uncritically following it in all cases. The interpretations of the commentators also deserve attention even when they might be on the wrong track. – The Bhūtātman occurs in the Suśruta Saṁhitā 3,3,4 as the subtle body which animates the embryo (DASGUPTA 1932, p. 303). It is the eleventh and highest Prāṇa according to Suśruta (3,4,3). See again DASGUPTA 1932, whose n. 4 is, however, not in accordance with the text.

last and highest of a series of supernatural guides who conduct the perfected soul (*siddha*) to its definite resort, the Supreme Self.

4. The Svachchanda Tantra on the Five Ātmans

In its eleventh chapter (11,82–90), the SvT gives an interesting and systematically developed doctrine of a fivefold Self, presented as “Five Ātmans”. The doctrine is announced together with a comparable concept of five stages of awareness³⁰, but the two subjects can nevertheless be treated separately because the Tantra does not seriously try to harmonize them. The latter subject is treated much more elaborately by the SvT in the next passage (11,91–126).

The stanzas 82–83b and 84c–90 are translated below with the commentary by Kṣemarāja (who explains the Tantra in a monistic sense). The text of the Tantra only is given, exactly as presented in M. K. SHASTRI’S edition. For the text of the commentary, we have to refer the reader to that same edition.

SVACCHANDA TANTRA 11,82–90 (VI/58–62)

All these categories (*tattvāni*), the evolutionary series of which has been set forth above,

ātmopakārakāṇy eva, kathitāni yathārthataḥ |

‘They are subservient to the Ātman
and told according to reality.’

‘They are subservient’ in that they furnish ‘the Ātman’ ... with material and spiritual enjoyment, its means and bases; ‘according to reality’, viz. by creating purposes especially suitable for each of them³¹.

Then, the Ātman who is thus provided with a varied subservient apparatus, is also varied in form (*vicitrarūpa*), as he says:

ātmā caivāntarātmā ca, bāhyātmā caiva sundari ||82||

nirātmā paramātmaitān, kathayāmi samāsataḥ |

‘The Self and the Internal Self,
the External Self, O Beautiful One,
the Non-Self and the Supreme Self,
[these] I explain briefly.’

...

pradhānasāmyam āśritya, sukhaduḥkhaḥvivarjitaḥ ||84||

yadā tasmin sthito devi, tadātmā tu sa ucyate |

‘When he [, the Self], basing himself upon

³⁰ These have been discussed in a separate article; s. GOUDRIAAN 1992, p. 147 ff.

³¹ The commentator interprets *artha-* as “purpose” which may have been implied by the author of the SvT as a secondary meaning of the formulaic *yathārthataḥ*.

the equilibrium of the Substrate (*pradhānam*),
avoiding pleasure and pain, abides in that Substrate,
then he is called the Self.'

'Equilibrium of the Substrate' – which appears as Nature (*prakṛti*) – is the harmonious (*sāmarasyena*) situation of the [three] qualities in which they do not try to rule over each other. ['Avoiding' means] being without 'pleasure' etc. [This means:] deluded because he has immersed himself in Nature. [Compare stanza 283:] '... in the equilibrium of the Qualities, the whole world abides as it were in sleep'³². In this way, he, 'the Self', having only the Sheaths (*kañcuka*)³³ as his body, is immersed in Nature.

puryaṣṭakasaṁyogāt, paryaṭet sarvayoniṣu ||85||
antarātmā sa vijñeyo, nibaddhas tu śubhāśubhaiḥ |
'When, by a combination with the Eight Fortresses
he wanders around in all kinds of existences,
he should be known as the Internal Self
bound by good and evil [karmic results].'

The group of 'Eight Fortresses' (*puryaṣṭakam*) consists of the Five Subtle Elements (*tanmātra* [: Sound, Touch, Form, Taste, Smell]), Mind, Intelligence and Ego-faculty; [together,] they build up the fortress which consists of the 'internal' subtle body³⁴. By ['combination', i.e.] connection with these, being 'bound by good and evil [karmic results]' which have the form of mental impressions, and transmigrating from one 'existence' to another, he 'should be known as the Internal Self' because his position is in the interval (*antar*), i.e. in between (*madhye*), the Self and the External Self³⁵.

This same [subject of experience],
buddhikarmendriyair yukto, mahābhūtaiḥ samāvṛtaḥ ||86||
bāhyātmā tu tadā devi, bhuñkte 'sau viṣayān sadā |

³² *guṇasāmyam anirdeśyam, apratarkyam anaupamam | tasmīñ jagad aśeṣam tu, prasuptam iva tiṣṭhati ||*, SvT 11,283. Cf. Manusmṛti 1,5 quoted by HACKER 1961, p. 81. One might also refer to MaiUp 2,5; the Puruṣa comes to abide in the body in a state devoid of consciousness, *abuddhipūrvam*; also there, this state is implicitly compared to sleep.

³³ I.e. the five categories of cosmic particularization mentioned in descending order in SvT 11,63: *kalā – vidyā – rūpa – kālā – niyati* (usually, *kalā* comes last after *niyati*). Cf. DEVASENAPATHI 1960, p. 225.

³⁴ Strictly speaking, the Group of Eight Fortresses therefore denotes the eight constituents of the Fortress (i.e. the subtle body). Just as in the case of the "Five Ātmans", we have here a transference of the term for a collective notion to its partial manifestations.

³⁵ One might compare the position of the Sattvātman in MBh 12,245,6–7 (cf. BEDEKAR 1968, p. 50), and of the Kṣetrajña in MaiUp 2,5.

‘When combined with the senses of mental experience and action, enveloped by the [five] Cosmic Elements, then, as the External Ātman, that one constantly experiences the objects of sense.’³⁶

Which means that he is provided with a material body.

*bhūtabhāvavinirmuktas, tattvadharmakalojjhitaḥ ||87||
maladharmāikayuktātmā, māyādharmatiraskṛtaḥ |
nirātmā tu tadā jñeyah,*

‘Being released from elements and mental experience, free from categorial function and particularization, being connected with only the law of impurity, being obscured by the law of Māyā, he is to be known as the Non-Ātman’³⁷.

‘Being released’ from³⁸ ‘elements’ gross and subtle, and ‘mental experience’, i.e. the mental functions, ‘free’ from³⁸ the ‘categorial function’ (*tattvadharmā*), i.e. manifestation as the category of Person (*puruṣa* = *puruṣa*) and³⁹ from the sheath secondarily characterized as ‘particularization’ (*kalā*)⁴⁰, he is merely ‘connected with’ – his own nature contracted by – ‘only’, merely, ‘the law of impurity’, the nature of which is the primeval impurity constituted by the erroneous experience of being incomplete (*apūrṇaṁ manyatātmakāṇavamalāsvabhāvena*); because he is ‘obscured’ – his [natural] splendour being contracted – by the ‘law’, i.e. the form of non-illumination (*akhyāti*), ‘of Māyā’ which is a manifestation of the Śakti discussed earlier and which is of a non-categorial nature. In this position, the ‘Non-Ātman’, having exceeded (*niṣkrāntaḥ*) the [lower] nature characterized by the category of Person which is intertwined by hundreds of bounds of the Ātman described above, has developed a capacity for knowledge of the distinction between the Māyā and the category of Person as a result of the insight afforded by the teaching of the Supreme Lord; which means, he is [in the spiritual state of] a Vijñānākala⁴¹. As has been said in the Pūrva-

³⁶ Cf. the Bhūtātman in MBh 12,245,7f. and MaiUp 3,2. In the last instance, the Bhūtātman comprises the situations of both the Antarātman and the Bāhyātman of the SvT system.

³⁷ On the term *nirātmā*, see below, p. 180.

³⁸ The commentary explicates the relation between the parts of the Sanskrit compounds by means of an instrumental case.

³⁹ The particle *ca* is added as an explanation of the compound in the text as a copulative.

⁴⁰ *kalā* here functions as the highest of the *kañcukas*; cf. above n. 33 and PADOUX 1975, p. 251f.

⁴¹ According to Rāmakaṇṭha, comm. on Kālottara, p. 12, this even amounts to the state of final release: *paramā muktiḥ . . . mahāmāyāpuruṣavivekodayāt*. On

śāstra: '... the Being of Mere Wisdom, combined only with Impurity ...'⁴². [In our text,] the variant *malakarma*^o ["action and impurity", or "the action of impurity"] should be rejected.

When he flashes forth in his fullness (*pūrṇatayā*) by the effect of a most intense act of grace⁴³, then

paramātmātha kathyate ||88||

'The Supreme Ātman, is now told',

who does not appear, as in the preceding cases, as an unenlightened being (*paśu*), because:

*malakarmakalādyais tu, nirmuktaś ca yadā priye /
sarvādhvasamatītaś ca, māyāmohojjhitaś ca yaḥ* ||89||
*nirmalatvaṃ yadā yāti, padaṃ paramam avyayam /
paramātmā tadā devī, procyate prabhur avyayaḥ* ||90||

'When he is released, O Beloved,

from impurity, Karman, particularization etc.,

and when he has transcended the total spiritual course,

having also passed over the delusion of Māyā;

and attains the state of freedom from impurity,

the supreme position, imperishable –

then he is called the Supreme Ātman, O Goddess,

the Imperishable Lord.'

Because, as has been said, he is 'released' from the total mass of the threefold 'impurity' – of particularization etc. – which is the realm of Form limited by Samsāra, by that very reason he has duly⁴⁴ 'transcended' the 'whole spiritual course'⁴⁵ up to [the stage of] *samanā* ('with-mind') by the procedure of causing [the different stages] to dissolve into each other⁴⁶. Nowhere on this course does he imagine himself to be engaged ([?] *na kvāpy adhvaṇi grhītātmaḥhimānaḥ*). In this way, he has 'passed over' (that means: he is free from) 'the delusion of

the other hand, the Pauṣkarāgama (quoted in Śaivaparibhāṣā, p. 144) maintains that the Vijñānākala still exists in (the uppermost end of) Māyā.

⁴² MāVT 1,22f. *tatra vijñānakevalaḥ / malaikayuktaḥ*. Cf. Śaivaparibhāṣā 3,26–30, with quotations from Pauṣkarāgama, and BRUNNER 1977, p. V.

⁴³ *tīvratamānugraha*: more common is the combination of *tīvra*- with *śakti-pāta* which = *anugraha*, Parātrīśikāvivaraṇa by Abhinavagupta, p. 252, according to PADOUX 1975, p. 355, n. 2. – The term *pūrṇatayā* is also found in Īśvarapratyabhiññāvimarśinī 1,1,3 (NAGEL 1986, p. 138).

⁴⁴ *samyak*, traditional explanation of *saṃ*^o, in *samatīta*^o.

⁴⁵ *sarvam adhvānam*, explicitizing *sarvādhva*^o of the Tantra.

⁴⁶ This refers to the gradual fusion of the purest realm of Speech (manifested as the mystic core of the syllable *om*) into divine Consciousness. In this process, *Samanā* precedes the final stage of *Unmanā* "Transcending the Mind"; cf. PADOUX 1975, p. 83 and 326f.

Māyā', i.e. the delusion caused by Māyā. The Māyā has been characterized before⁴⁷: 'The Māyā exists in the form of Karman; below her is the coiled form of Śakti'. Delusion [should be understood as] the contraction caused by the cosmic Māyā, however subtle.

Having reached this state, when he has obtained the 'Supreme Position' which amounts to union with the Supreme Śiva, the 'state of freedom from impurity', then this Ātman is 'called' the 'Imperishable', i.e. not subject to destruction, 'Lord', i.e. master in all respects, the 'Supreme Ātman'."

5. The Svacchanda Tantra and the Mokṣadharma

A comparison of the doctrine of the fivefold Ātman in the SvT with the expositions about the Self's forms and modes of existence in the MBh (Mokṣadharma) leads to the following preliminary statements:

1) In the SvT we find a systematically presented, coherent teaching about the Ātman, mature and carefully formulated. The MBh, on the other hand, offers a collection of several lines of thought, mutually related but scarcely integrated into a system. Needless to say that the SvT firmly expresses a Śaiva viewpoint while the Vaiṣṇava sectarian affiliation in the MBh is much less pronounced.

2) Although the SvT and the MBh partly use the same terminology, there seems to be no epic description of a fivefold nature of the Ātman. Such instances can, however, be furnished by the Upaniṣads; they were listed above, p. 166f. These views of the forms of the Ātman had a naturalistic, experimental character and served as gradual approaches to spontaneous realization of the Self within one's own system. There was no question of soteriologically motivated distinction of stages in the unreleased self's spiritual course. Besides, the Upaniṣads as well as the Mokṣadharma usually present a twofold conception of the "bound" and the "released" (or: "individual" and "cosmic") Ātman, e.g. in the parable of the two birds (ŚvetUp 4,6 a.o.), which remained in use in the Śaiva tradition, as can be deduced from RudrahṛdayaUp 41, where the birds are interpreted as the individual soul (*jīva*) and Śiva⁴⁸. This dichotomy is of course not rejected in the SvT but elaborated in conformity with the development of the Śaiva theory of the soul (*paśu*) and its destination of final emancipation.

3) The perspective on the Ātman's "career" is characterized in the SvT by a clear conception of an original state of quiescence and total bondage. This results in the perspective of three main stages in the development of the Self: they proceed, in somewhat unwieldy termi-

⁴⁷ SvT 10,1263.

⁴⁸ SASTRI 1950, p. 153.

nology, from unembodied and bound over embodied to unembodied and released. The first stage, that of the Ātman in its restricted sense, is described in SvT 11,84c–85b as “the equilibrium of the substrate” (*pradhānasāmyam*). This is the situation during *pralaya* between two world-periods which is also known to the MBh; cf. 12,292,27: *prakṛtiḥ kurute devī, mahāpralayam eva ca | divasānte guṇān etān, abhyetyaikāvatiṣṭhati* ||⁴⁹ “Divine Nature is also the cause of the total dissolution; at the end of a (cosmic) day she takes hold of (?) the Guṇas and continues to exist alone”.

We can also describe this situation as “equilibrium of the Guṇas”, a term used by the SvT (*guṇasāmyam*, 11,287)⁵⁰. In the SvT this primeval, undivided shape of Nature has been connected with an equally “primeval” form of the Self, the originality of which has implicitly been recognized by means of the unspecified term Ātman (11,85ab *yadā tasmin sthito ... tadātmā ... ucyate*). This is in conformity with MBh 12,292,28 where the Self during *pralaya* is compared to the sun who withdraws his rays (*raśmijālam ivādityas, tatkālena niyacchati*); the image probably implicitly refers to the sun’s disappearance into the subterranean world or ocean. Cf. also 295,16 *guṇā guṇeṣu līyante, tadaikā prakṛtīr bhavet | kṣetrajño ’pi yadā tāta, tatkṣetre sampralīyate* ||, which describes a process of dissolution implying a loss of identity.

The SvT does not mention the Guṇas in this connection, but they are (albeit casually) brought in again by Kṣemarāja in his commentary on SvT 11,85. The commentator also speaks of an “immersion” in Prakṛti (*prakṛtilīnatvād vyāmūḍhaḥ*). Elsewhere, this primeval state is described as “dwelling in the womb” of Māyā (which, in the Śaiva perspective, is lower material Nature), e.g. Pauṣkarāgama, Paśupaṭala, vs. 6 *māyūdāv udare cānte, krameṇaiṣām vyavasthitiḥ*, quoted by Śivāgrayogin in his Śaivaparibhāṣā; the latter author explains that the three kinds of unreleased souls: Pralayākala, Sakala and Vijñānākala live in respectively the lowest part of Māyā, its middle (*udara*, lit. “interior”, “womb”) and its uppermost end⁵¹. The parallel is not as good as might be wished, because here the situation of the Sakala, i.e. the embodied soul, is described as living in Māyā’s *udara* and the Pralayākala in her lower reaches, but this extension of the image is secondary and under-

⁴⁹ In the fourth *pāda* of MBh 12,292, 27, we follow a variant of the Malayalam version. The edited text reads *’aiko ’vatiṣṭhati*. Several other mss. give other variants with feminine forms. – GELDER 1957 (influenced by Jung) writes on p. 17, commenting on BĀUp 1,4,4: “Das Weibliche ist für den Inder das unbewußte; es ist die Anima, die den Weltenraum füllt”.

⁵⁰ Cf. Vāyupur 1,5,8cd *guṇasāmye layo jñeyo, vaiṣāmye sṛṣṭir ucyate*.

⁵¹ Śaivaparibhāṣā, p. 144. For a definition, see p. 137.

standable. A microcosmic variant of the idea is found in Tantrasadbhāva 1,56f., where it is said that the Lord dwells in the lotus of the heart in the form of a fiery spark, being in Māyā's womb: ... *hṛtāsakaṇi-kākṛtiḥ* | *tiṣṭhate bhagavān īśo, kṛtpadme* ... || *māyodaragatas* (mss. °*gataṃ*) *tiṣṭhet*⁵². The development of this imagery deserves the attention of psychologically oriented interpreters of Hinduism.

4) There is a new set-up of ātmanic terminology. This is best illustrated by a short review of the terms for the five stages of the Self in the SvT. The specific sense of Ātman as the Self's primeval form has already been discussed sub 3. Antarātman is now used with more precision as the Self when combined with the subtle material body of the *puryaṣṭaka* (11,85c-86b). This is in partial accordance with MBh 12,197,14 quoted above: *antarātmā* ... *prāpyendriyaguṇān pañca*; see also 12,245,7 (where Bhūtātman is the subject): *saptabhis tv anvitaḥ sūkṣmaiḥ*.

Bāhyātman is the fully embodied Self; the term seems to be a substitute for the Bhūtātman of the MBh, which was sometimes, as shown above, rather loosely applied⁵³. The word *bāhyātman* has clearly been created after model of *antarātman* and denotes the total, but subsidiary, engagement of the Self "up to the nail tips", to speak with the BĀUp (1,4,7).

New is also *nirātman* as a term for one of the stages of the Self's emancipatory course. But the idea of a higher "Non-Self" occurs already in the TaiUp 2,7: ... *yadā hy evaiṣa etasminn adṛśye 'nātmnye 'nirukte 'nilayane 'bhayaṃ pratiṣṭhām vindate* "when surely this (Self) finds fearless support in That Which is invisible, selfless, undefined, without abode, ..." ⁵⁴. Śaṅkara remarks, sub *anātmya*, that "self-less" means "formless, having no body", which is not at all improbable in a Vedic context. Here again, the MaiUp proves to be an important link with its use of *nirātman* on four places⁵⁵, the two most important of which are 2,4 and 6,20 (both Vulgate). In 2,4 we read *sa vā eṣa śuddhaḥ pūtaḥ śūnyaḥ śānto 'prāṇo nirātmānanto 'kṣayyaḥ sthiraḥ śāśvato 'jah*

⁵² This unedited work repeatedly quoted by Abhinavagupta and other authors of "Kashmir Śaiva" orientation has been consulted from two Nepalese mss. (see the Bibliography). I am grateful to Dr. A. Sanderson for his cooperation in obtaining one of these. The numbering is my own.

⁵³ The Bhūtātman still occurs in Tsb 1,278c: just as space again becomes one when the pot has been broken; thus the Bhūtātman reaches its full splendour when the bond has been loosened.

⁵⁴ TaiUp, trsl. A. M. SASTRI, p. 591, followed in the quotation except for the change of "Him" into "That" and of "non-abode" into "without abode".

⁵⁵ JACOB 1963, p. 498; same information in VIŠHVA BANDHU's Vedic Word Concordance, III, s.v. *nirātman*.

svatantraḥ sve mahimni tiṣṭhati, where *nirātman* clearly functions as one of the designations of the disembodied, released state. BUITENEN 1962, p. 126, translates “without an embodied self” and supposes it to be a *lectio facilior*; the Southern Recension reads *anīśātmā* instead. But it seems more probable that the *nirātman* which may have looked strange to a Vedāntist was changed afterwards into another term (cf. also the occurrence of *śūnya* in the same series). Besides, in MaiUp 6,20 *nirātman* again occurs in a similar function: *yadātmanātmānam aṇor aṇīyāmsaṃ dyotamānam ... paśyati, tadā ... nīrātmā bhavati | nīrātmakatvāt ... mokṣalakṣaṇam iti* “... he becomes without *ātman*. From this fact, that he is without *ātman*, we must conclude that he is without thought, without source; it is the definition of release” (tr. BUITENEN)⁵⁶. In the same passage, this state is said to be reached by the *yogin* who practises the withdrawal of the tip of the tongue against the back of the palate (the well-known *khecari* *mudrā*).

We might compare the Buddhist tradition of pointing out what is “not the self” or “without self” which culminates in the allegorical Tantric goddess Nairātmyā, partner of Heruka.

In the Mokṣadharma, the term occurs in 12,292,37 in quite another sense: without the Self, i.e. not heeding the Self (we can also understand an adjective: *nīrātmātmaguṇair vṛtaḥ* “enveloped by one’s own qualities which are not the Self”).

We can conclude that there is an old tradition of the application of the term *nirātman* denoting a free, disembodied, supra-individual, released state. The same meaning is applied in the SvT. The implication is that *ātman* here refers to a lower, embodied state, perhaps still reflecting an old Vedic use of the word. By adopting this term, the Śaivas probably also wanted to incorporate the positively interpreted heterodox “non-Self” tradition, thus showing at the same time the absolute supremacy of their theistically coloured Paramātman/Śiva concept. Such an innovation may have been born out of the dialogue with Buddhists who defended the concept, or even with a view to accommodate the ideas of converted Buddhists within their fold. However this may be, the conception of the “freedom” of this supra-individual state has been emphasized by the author of the SvT (*bhūtabhāva-vinirmuktaḥ*, 11,87c) as well as by Kṣemarāja, who explains (on vs. 88c) the *nir°* of *nirātman* as *niṣkrānta* “having stepped out” and not by a

⁵⁶ In the view of BHATTACHARYYA 1987, *nirātman* might have to be interpreted as that Ātman which is outside the reach of our means of knowledge: on p. 222, referring to his earlier work *L’Ātman-Brahman dans le bouddhisme ancien*, Paris 1973.

negative concept suggested by the translation “non-Self”. One might therefore consider a translation of Nirātman in the Śaiva context as “Free Self”. The “stepping out” has, for that matter, probably been imagined after the model of the ascetic’s leaving home and family, as is suggested by SvT 11,115f.

The last of the five Ātmanic terms of the SvT, the Supreme Self (*paramātman*) needs little comment. As far as I know, the term is rare in the older Ups⁵⁷. Of the Mokṣadharmā passages discussed above, only 12,290,74f. contains it. The concept has clearly gained in importance in the course of history. It is, however, worthwhile to note that Kṣemarāja (on SvT 11,88d) associates the status of Supreme Self with “completeness”, *pūrṇatā* (which implies total freedom from Āṇavamala, cf. what he says in connection with vs. 88a). This reminds of TaiUp 2,5 where in connection with the *ānandamayakoṣa* we read: *tenaiṣa pūrṇaḥ*. It should further be noted that the SvT itself does not say that the Supreme Self is Śiva or is identical with Śiva. This identification is added by Kṣemarāja, the protagonist of Śivādvaita.

5) We may at last call attention to the view of the SvT that the lower categories of existence serve the Self, are helpful towards its release (11,82a *ātmopakāraṇāṇi*). Although this outlook is indeed not foreign to the Sāṅkhya (cf. Sāṅkhyakārikā 56), it is emphasized in Śaiva sources, e.g. MṛgĀg, Vidyāpāda 6,2–5, also cited in Śaivaparibhāṣā 3,39⁵⁸. This view illustrates the theistic-soteriological perspective of salvation by the grace of Śiva.

A few other features have been introduced by Kṣemarāja in his commentary, mainly precisions and extensions of the technical vocabulary. That he mentions the term *viññānākala* which was not given by the Tantra in 11,87f. should not be emphasized too much because this idea was well-known to the Āgamas; besides, even Kṣemarāja fails to explicitize the corresponding term *pralayākala* on SvT 11,84f. Of more consequence seems to be his introduction of the words *saṃkucita* “contracted” and *saṃkoca* “contraction” on vss. 88a and 89f. which have been developed in the Pratyabhijñā school⁵⁹. On vs. 89, he introduces the term *samanā*, which might be a reminiscence of the old doctrine that

⁵⁷ JACOB 1963, p.525, notes one occurrence in the BĀUp (3,1,1; faulty reference [?]), and two in the MaiUp.

⁵⁸ The same idea, perhaps also the term *upakāraka*, is found in Sureśvara’s Vārttika on Śaṅkara’s commentary to TaiUp 2,7, s.v. *anātmya*, alternative explanation: the “self” in “selfless” might here refer to the three *koṣas* of breath, mind and conscience “which are all subservient to the Self” (TaiUp, trsl. A. M. SASTRI, p.592). We could not consult the Sanskrit original of the Vārttika.

⁵⁹ See e.g. Kṣemarāja’s own work PraHṛdaya, Sūtra 4 *citiṣaṃkocātāmā cetano*

the Ātman can be experienced immediately by *manas* (cf. MaiUp 4,3; MBh 12,231,16). He further tries to lay a connection between the doctrines of the fivefold Ātman and of the five stages of awakening (mentioned above) which are discussed in direct sequence in the SvT. The Tantra itself does not try to accomplish this, as can also be concluded from 11,113f. (description of “awakened” states) where the experiencing subject is consistently mentioned in the singular. Kṣemarāja, while commenting on vs. 95, tries to harmonize by identifying (not without some degree of probability) the Unaware (*abudha*) and the Ātman, i.e. the first of the five Ātmans of 84f. But he does not pursue the point by trying to identify also the other items of the two groups with each other.

Resuming, it can be said that the author of the SvT has created (or secondarily formulated in polished language) an original Śaiva doctrine of a pluriform Ātman, or rather, of successive stages of spiritual development of the Ātman. The terminology has been developed from earlier, less coherent speculations, handed down in the Mokṣadharma and the Ups. (esp. the Maitrāyaṇīya). The Āgamic position emphasizes a teleologic primacy expressed already in the MBh: the embodiment of the Self, and man’s realization of the process, is conducive to, and of relevance only in the light of the final goal of salvation⁶⁰.

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⁶⁰ *’pi saṃkucitaviśvamayāḥ* (ed. J. SINGH, p. 55). – The idea is also known to the Pāñcarātra; cf. Lakṣmī-Tantra 13,24.

⁶⁰ Different statements on the pluriform Ātman exist in other early Tantras. Thus, five forms of the Ātman are described in the Kubjikāmata (Kulālikāmnāya), ch. 25. Cf. T. GOUDRIAAN, The Ātman as Charioteer: Treatment of a Vedic allegory in the Kulālikāmnāya, in: Id. (ed.), The Sanskrit Tradition and Tantrism. [Panels of the VIIth World Sanskrit Conference, Vol. I]. Leiden 1990, p. 43–55. There are sixfold, sevenfold and ninefold representations of the Ātman in other texts from India and Indonesia.

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ŚVETĀŚVATAROPANIṢAD 3.8–3.11 IN THE LIGHT OF VIŚIṢṬĀDVAITA*

(with special reference to the interpretation of Vātsya Varadaguru)

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The idea of considering the interpretation of Śvetāśvataropaniṣad (= ŚvetU) 3.8–3.11 from the stand-point of some Viśiṣṭādvaita-authors occurred to me when I was preparing a critical edition and translation of the Tattvanirṇaya of Vātsya Varadaguru¹, an author of the Viśiṣṭādvaita tradition who lived about 1300 A.D.

The text of the Upaniṣad runs as follows:

*vedāham etaṃ puruṣaṃ mahāntam, ādityavarṇaṃ tamasaḥ parastāt |
tam evaṃ viditvāti mṛtyum eti, nānyaḥ panthā vidyate a'yanāya ||
yasmāt paraṃ nāparaṃ asti kiṃcīt, yasmān nāñīyo na jyañīyo 'sti kaścīt |
vṛkṣa 'va stabdho divi tiṣṭhaty ekas, tenedaṃ pūrṇaṃ puruṣeṇa sarvaṃ ||
tato yad uttarataraṃ tad arūpam anāmayaṃ |
ya etad vidur amṛtās te bhavanty, athetare duḥkham evāpi yanti ||
sarvānanaśīrogrīvaḥ sarvabhūtaguhāśayaḥ |
sarvavyāpī ca bhagavāṃs tasmāt sarvagataḥ śivaḥ ||*

The interpretation of this passage occupies a prominent place in the Tattvanirṇaya which is solely dedicated to the question of the identity of the highest reality as found in the authoritative scriptures. The different *śruti*-texts speak of this highest reality in general terms as being the cause of the world and granting salvation, but also teach that this reality is to be identified with Rudra-Śiva, Brahmā-Hiraṇyagarbha or Viṣṇu-Nārāyaṇa. These apparently divergent *śruti*-texts form the centre of interest for Varadaguru in his Tattvanirṇaya, in which he attempts to prove that all these passages ultimately teach only Viṣṇu-Nārāyaṇa as the cause of the world and bestower of salvation.

Of the *śruti*-texts treated by Varadaguru in his Tattvanirṇaya ŚvetU 3.8–3.11 forms one of the crucial problems of the discussion, since it obviously teaches the supremacy of Śiva. The reason why the authors

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¹ S. STARK, Vātsya Varadagurus Tattvanirṇaya. Teil 1: Kritische Textedition. Teil 2: Übersetzung und Anmerkungen. [SbÖAW 570 = Beiträge zur Kultur- und Geistesgeschichte Asiens 4]. Wien 1990 (= TN).

of the Rāmānuja-school dealt with this passage seems to be the adoption of the Ṛgvedic *puruṣa*-concept by Śaivas, or, in other words, the attempt of the authors of the ŚvetU to identify Rudra-Śiva with the Ṛgvedic *puruṣa*, whom the Vaiṣṇava Viśiṣṭādvaitins later identified with Viṣṇu-Nārāyaṇa. Although Śaiva commentators on the Brahma-sūtras (Śrīkara and Appaya Dīkṣita) quote this passage or part of it as corroborating the supremacy of Śiva, I could not find a systematic exposition of ŚvetU 3.8–3.11 in any of these texts. The most evident explanation for this phenomenon seems to be that they found no ambiguity in this passage, since, according to them, it can only refer to Śiva as the supreme being. Nevertheless there must have been a controversy regarding the correct interpretation of this passage, since the forerunners and followers of the Rāmānuja-school refer in their works to the views held by Śaivas, but whether they refer to concrete, historical opponents or only to fictitious ones has to be left open.

Yāmuna most probably was the earliest traceable Viśiṣṭādvaita-author who seems to have dealt with this passage of the ŚvetU in his *Puruṣanirṇaya*. Since this work is no longer extant, we are solely dependant on references and doxographies in other Viśiṣṭādvaita-treatises. The most important doxography of the *Puruṣanirṇaya* can be found in one of Yāmuna's own works, i.e. the *Āgamaprāmāṇya*, in a passage where he deals with the question of the supremacy of Vāsudeva-Nārāyaṇa as it is found in *śruti*- and *smṛti*-texts and argues against the Śaiva view of Rudra being the highest *ātman*². At the beginning of this doxography Yāmuna solely quotes from *śruti*-texts which – according to his view – support the idea of Vāsudeva-Nārāyaṇa being the creator, preserver and destroyer of the world, or, in other words, of Vāsudeva-Nārāyaṇa being the omniscient, highest *ātman*. ŚvetU 3.9 (*yasmāt paraṃ nāparam asti kiṃcīt*) is quoted in this context, but not explained in detail³. Since the whole passage of the *Āgamaprā-*

² Cf. *Āgamaprāmāṇya* ed. by M. NARASIMHACHARY. [Gaekwad's Oriental Series 160]. Baroda 1976 [= ĀP (1976)], p. 84,5–90,14.

³ Cf. ĀP (1976), p. 85,1–9: *śrūyate hi sa vedānteṣv 'ātmā nārāyaṇaḥ paraḥ' 'satyaṃ jñānam anantaṃ' ca 'tad viṣṇoḥ paramaṃ padam' 'parā prakṛtir adhyakṣo vāsudevaḥ', tathā 'paraḥ' 'ekaḥ paratīd ya idaṃ babhūva' 'yasmāt paraṃ nāparam asti kiṃcīt' ity uktavākyaṇugunaṃ 'yato vā imāni bhūtāni' 'sad eva somya' ityādivākyaṃ ca. tatas sa viṣṇuḥ trayīśirassiddhaviśuddhabodhaḥ* "For he is taught [as the highest *ātman*] in the [following] Upaniṣad[-passages]: '[Nārāyaṇa is the Highest, the light] the *ātman*, Nārāyaṇa is the Highest', '[*brahman*] is truth, knowledge, infinite' and 'the highest abode of Viṣṇu', 'Vāsudeva is the highest *prakṛti*, the [highest] eye-witness'. Likewise [the passages] '[he is the] Highest' 'he is the only one who was beyond this [world]' 'there is nothing else that is higher than him' which are in accordance with the

māṇya under discussion is solely dedicated to the question mentioned above and apart from that ends with the words “and all this has been expounded in greater detail in the *Puruṣanirṇaya* und thus is not [further] explained here”⁴, we can draw the conclusion that this passage of the *Āgamaprāmāṇya* was a summary of at least a part of the *Puruṣanirṇaya*. A passage from Veṅkaṭanātha’s *Nyāyasiddhāñjana* tells us that Yāmuna in his *Puruṣanirṇaya* gave a detailed interpretation of the *Śvetāśvatara*- and the *Atharvaśiras-Upaniṣads*⁵. But since these two passages are the only ones mentioning Yāmuna in connection with our *Upaniṣad*-passage, it has to be left open whether Yāmuna gave a detailed interpretation of this *ŚvetU*-passage in his *Puruṣanirṇaya* or not. Rāmānuja dealt with the *ŚvetU* in a part of the *Vedārthasaṃgraha*⁶ and in the *Parādhikaraṇa* of the *Śrībhāṣya*⁷, as well as in the *Vedāntadīpa*⁸ and the *Vedāntasāra*⁹ (leaving aside the question of the authenticity of Rāmānuja’s authorship of these two works). The con-

passages quoted [above have to be understood] and [also] passage[s] [like] ‘from which verily these beings [originated]’ [and] ‘being alone my dear [was this at the beginning]’ and so forth. Therefore this Viṣṇu is pure knowledge established in the three Vedas”.

⁴ ĀP (1976), p. 90,13–14: *sarvaṃ caitat puruṣanirṇaye nipuṇataram upapāditam iti neha prapañcyate*.

⁵ Cf. *Nyāyasiddhāñjana*, in: *Vedāntadeśikagranthamālāyām* [vedānta-vibhāge 2] *Mīmāṃsāpādukā*, *Seśvaramīmāṃsā*, *Nyāyapariśuddhiḥ*, *Nyāyasiddhāñjanaṃ ca. paryavekṣakaḥ pariṣkaraś ca Śrīkāñcīpratīvādibhayaṅkaraḥ Aṅṅamaṅgarācāryaḥ*. Madras 1940, p. 225,20–22: *atharvaśiraśśvetāśvatarādīnāṃ nirvāhaḥ puruṣanirṇaye prapañcitāḥ śrībhāṣyakāraiś ca vedārthasaṃgraha-bhāṣyādiṣu. tadakhilānusandhāyibhir vātsyavaradagurubhis tattvanirṇayākhye prakaraṇe sarvo niṣkarṣaḥ saṃgrhītaḥ* “The interpretation of the *Atharvaśiras*- and the *Śvetāśvatara*[-*Upaniṣads*] etc. has been expounded in detail [by Yāmuna] in the *Puruṣanirṇaya*, as well as by the author of the *Śrībhāṣya* in [his] *Vedārthasaṃgraha*, [Śrī]bhāṣya and so on. Every single point [brought forward by Yāmuna and Rāmānuja] was summed up in the treatise named *Tattvanirṇaya* [written] by Vātsyavaradaguru, who has investigated all this”.

⁶ Cf. *Rāmānujapraṇītaḥ Vedārthasaṃgrahaḥ Sudarśanasūripranītātāparyadīpikākhyavyākhyayā saṃvalitaḥ. so ’yam DHARAṆIDHARAŚASTRIBHĪH prakāśitaḥ RĀMĀNUJĀCĀRYASVĀMIBHĪH saṃsodhitaś ca. Vṛndāvan 1921 [= VS (1921)], p. 184,11–188,2.*

⁷ Cf. *Bādārayanaḥpranītabrahmasūtrākhyasārīrakamīmāṃsābhāṣyam Rāmānujaviracitaṃ Śrībhāṣyam Sudarśanasūriviracitaśrutaprakāśikākhyavyākhyāsamudbhāṣitaṃ. [Ubhayavedāntagranthamālā]. Madras 1967, vol. 2, p. 453,14–454,15 ad Brahmasūtra 3.2.35.*

⁸ Cf. *Vedāntadīpa*, in: *Sri Bhagavad Ramanuja Granthamala*. Ed. P. B. ANNANGARACHARYA. Kancheepuram 1956, p. 82,21–83,2.

⁹ Cf. *Vedāntasāra*, in: *Sri Bhagavad Ramanuja Granthamala*. Ed. P. B. ANNANGARACHARYA. Kancheepuram 1956, p. 441,1–3.

text of that part of the Vedārthasaṃgraha mentioned above seems to be similar to that in the Puruṣanirṇaya summarized in the Āgamaprāmaṇya. It consists in a long passage solely dedicated to the question of the identification of the highest reality as Viṣṇu-Nārāyaṇa. At the beginning Rāmānuja refers to a Pūrvapakṣa which advocates the view that a number of śruti-passages, as e.g. ŚvetU 3.9–3.11, contradict the previously advanced teaching of Rāmānuja that Viṣṇu-Nārāyaṇa is the highest *brahman*¹⁰. In that very same context ŚvetU 3.8–3.12 is discussed, but neither the Vedārthasaṃgraha¹¹ nor the other works of Rāmānuja mentioned above give us a systematic exposition of the opponent's view. It is simply stated that this upaniṣadic passage does not teach the supremacy of another Reality different from the Puruṣa. The only more fully elaborated Śaiva Pūrvapakṣa can be found in Varadaguru's Tattvanirṇaya¹². There it is agreed by the Śaiva that the

¹⁰ Cf. VS (1921), p. 173,2–174,2.

¹¹ Cf. VS (1921), p. 184,11–186,5: *yad api 'tato yad uttarataram' ity atra puruṣād anyasya parataratvaṃ pratiyāta ity abhyadhāyī, tad api ... pratyuktam* "Also if it had been said, [namely] that here [i.e. in the passage] 'that which is higher than him' it is seen that someone different from the Puruṣa is higher [than him], then also it is refuted".

¹² Cf. TN 1, p. 62,16–64,4: *rudrasya nārāyaṇāt paratvaṃ mokṣapradatvaṃ ca śvetāśvataropaniṣady eva sāksāc chrūyate 'vedāham etaṃ puruṣaṃ mahāntam ādityavarṇaṃ tamasaḥ parastāt / tam evaṃ viditvāti mṛtyum eti nānyaḥ panthā vidyate 'yānyā || yasmāt paraṃ nāparam asti kiṃcid yasmān nāñīyo na jyāyo 'sti kaścit / vṛkṣa iva stabdho divi tiṣṭhaty ekas tenedaṃ pūrṇaṃ puruṣeṇa sarvaṃ || tato yad uttarataram tad arūpam anāmayam / ya etad vidur amṛtās te bhavanti athetare duḥkham evāpi yanti || sarvānanaśirogrīvaḥ sarvabhūtaguhāśayaḥ / sarvavyāpī ca bhagavāms tasmāt sarvagataḥ śivaḥ || iti. atra hi 'tenedaṃ pūrṇaṃ puruṣeṇa sarvaṃ' ityantena puruṣasūktoditaṃ paramapuruṣaṃ pratipādyā 'tato yad uttarataram' iti tasmāt paraṃ kiṃcid vastu nīrdiśya 'ya etad vidur amṛtās te bhavanti' iti tasyaiva mokṣapradatvaṃ nānyasyety abhidhāya 'tasmāt sarvagataḥ śivaḥ' ityantena viśeṣopādānaṃ kriyāta iti pratiyate* "It is directly stated in the Śvetāśvataropaniṣad that Rudra is higher than Nārāyaṇa and the bestower of salvation [when it is said:] 'I know this great Puruṣa with the lustre of the sun beyond darkness. Knowing him thus one goes beyond death; there is no other way to surpass [death]. There is nothing else that is higher than him. There is no one subtler or greater than him. Like a tree standing firm he rests as the only one in heaven. Therefore all this is filled by the Puruṣa. That which is higher than him, is without form and without suffering. Those who know this become immortal, the others find only misery. The venerable one is the face, the head and the neck of all; he dwells in the caves (i.e. in the innermost part) of all beings and is all-pervading. Therefore Śiva is omnipresent.' After having expounded the highest Puruṣa – proclaimed in the Puruṣa-hymn – by means [of that part of the sentence] which ends [with the words] 'therefore all this is filled by the Puruṣa', having indicated a certain reality higher than him [by the words] 'that which is higher than him' and having set forth this [reality] and nothing else as

mahāpuruṣa expounded in ŚvetU 3.8–3.9 is – as the Vaiṣṇavas believe – identical with Viṣṇu-Nārāyaṇa. ŚvetU 3.10 we find the statement *tato yad uttarataram tad arūpam anāmayam*. Concerning this statement the question arises as to how we are to understand the word *tato*. The Śaiva interprets *tato* as referring to the great Puruṣa mentioned above. Thus the meaning of this passage is “that which is higher than him (i.e. the great Puruṣa), is without form and without suffering”, i.e. there exists something which is still higher than the Puruṣa. This reality being even above this Puruṣa is to be identified with Śiva, as is taught by ŚvetU 3.11. Unluckily no further exposition of the Śaiva Pūrvapakṣa is given by Varadaguru.

To return to Rāmānuja and his interpretation of the ŚvetU in the Vedārthasaṃgraha and the Śrībhāṣya, we do not find an essential difference in their respective argumentative structures. The only difference lies in the fact that in the Vedārthasaṃgraha he is merely concentrating on the ŚvetU, while in the Śrībhāṣya he is extending the problem also to other similar passages. The discussion in the Vedārthasaṃgraha as well as in the Śrībhāṣya centres round the two crucial sentences of ŚvetU 3.8–3.11, i.e. *yasmāt param nāparam asti kimcit* and *tato yad uttarataram tad arūpam anāmayam*. I am not going into detail here, because we find – although mostly by adding new arguments and opening new perspectives – the same approach to this Upaniṣad-passage in Varadaguru’s Tattvanirṇaya which we shall now discuss.

Since we cannot draw any final conclusion on the structure of the Puruṣanirṇaya – although the references to it in other works hint at a similar structure or at least a similar subject as is found in the Tattvanirṇaya – the Tattvanirṇaya is the first Viśiṣṭādvaita-treatise which solely concentrates on the problem of the identification of the highest reality as Viṣṇu-Nārāyaṇa. In the Uttarapakṣa of the Tattvanirṇaya a long passage is dedicated to the correct interpretation of ŚvetU 3.8–3.11¹³. Varadaguru opens the discussion with the rejection of the Śaiva teaching that *tato yad uttarataram* teaches the supremacy of Rudra over Nārāyaṇa, since this would be in contradiction to the introduction of the Upaniṣad-passage under dispute. At the beginning of the passage the Puruṣa is hinted at by the words *vedāham etaṃ puruṣam mahāntam* (“I know this great Puruṣa”)¹⁴. With the sentence

bestower of salvation [by the words] ‘those who know this become immortal’, it is recognized that [that part of the sentence] which ends with ‘therefore Śiva is everpresent’ indicates a specific [reality]”.

¹³ Cf. TN 1 ed., p. 18,17–20,23.

¹⁴ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 18,20–21: *upakrame hi ‘vedāham etaṃ puruṣam mahāntam’ iti mahāpuruṣam abhidhāya ...*

tam evaṃ viditvāti mṛtyum eti nānyaḥ panthā vidyate 'yanāya ("knowing him thus one goes beyond death; there is no other way to surpass [death]") a twofold assertion is made, i.e. first, only the knowledge of the Puruṣa is the cause of salvation, second not the knowledge of another reality¹⁵. Immediately afterwards for the sake of substantiating that what has been taught before in the Upaniṣad it is said *yasmāt param nāparam asti kiṃcit*, which has to be understood as "there is no one equal or superior to him"¹⁶. Thus the sentence *tato yad uttarataram* cannot refer to anyone else than the great Puruṣa, because this would be in contradiction to the introduction of this Upaniṣad-passage¹⁷. Since according to the Mīmāṃsakas the introduction (*upakrama*) of a text-passage is more powerful in its expressive force than the summarizing conclusion (*upasaṃhāra*), the passage *tato yad uttarataram* cannot refer to any entity other than the Puruṣa because of the teaching in the introduction that the Puruṣa is superior to all. The discussion of this hermeneutical question can be found in the commentaries on MīSū 3.3.1–3.3.8, and Varadaguru in his Tattvanirṇaya dedicates a long excursus to the explanation of this question in relation to the Mīmāṃsā context¹⁸. Against the view that *tato yad uttarataram* refers to the Puruṣa the Śaiva opponent raises an objection, using the *gobalīvardanyāya* as an argument¹⁹.

In short the *gobalīvardanyāya* has to be understood as follows: If a generic (*sāmānyaśabda*) and a specific word (*viśeṣaśabda*) occur in one syntactical unit, the generic word is restricted in its meaning by the specific word. In case the meaning of the generic word is not restricted, the specific word is superfluous and unnecessary, since the *viśeṣaśabda* is already included in the *sāmānyaśabda*. If e.g. in the sentence *gām ānaya balīvardaṃ ca* the words *balīvardaṃ ca* are omitted, the word *gām* refers to both cow and bull. But if the sentence reads *gām ānaya balīvardaṃ ca*, the word *gām* has to be restricted in its meaning, i.e. to

¹⁵ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 18,22–25: ... '*tam evaṃ viditvāti mṛtyum eti nānyaḥ panthā vidyate 'yanāya*' iti tadvedanasyaiva mokṣaheturvaṃ nānyasety arthadvayaṃ pratijñātam.

¹⁶ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 18,25–19,1: *anantaram ca tadupapādanāya 'yasmāt param nāparam asti kiṃcit' ityādinā sa eva sarvasmāt paro nānya iti pratipāditam.*

¹⁷ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 19,24–26: *ata upakramavirodhāt 'tato yad uttarataram' iti vākyam paramapuruṣād anyasya paratvaṃ na pratipādayati.*

¹⁸ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 19,7–23. For the explanation of the Mīmāṃsā-background of this hermeneutical question cf. TN 2, p. 99–103.

¹⁹ Cf. TN 1 ed., p. 19,27–28: *sāmānyaśabdo hi viśeṣasaṃnidhau saṃkucitārtho dr̥ṣṭaḥ, yathā gām ānaya balīvardaṃ ceti* "For it is seen that a generic word is restricted in its meaning, [if it occurs] in [syntactical] proximity to a specific word, as e.g. [in the sentence] 'bring the cow and the bull'."

cow only, as otherwise the word *batīvardam* would be redundant. Thus the sentence has to be understood as “bring the cow and the bull”. According to this *nyāya* we have to interpret ŚvetU 3.8–3.10 as follows: The negative sentences of ŚvetU 3.8 and 3.9, i.e. *nānyaḥ panthā* (“[there is] no other way”) and *yasmāt paraṃ nāparam* (“[there is] nothing else that is higher than him”) in general negate the superiority of anything different from the Puruṣa. But if they are connected with ŚvetU 3.10 *tato yad uttarataram* (“that which is higher than him”), which – according to the *gobatīvardanyāya* – functions as the *viśeṣa*, these negative sentences are restricted in their meaning. Thus they negate the superiority of anything different from the Puruṣa except the entity brought forward by ŚvetU 3.10, which is higher than him and identified with Śiva in ŚvetU 3.11²⁰. To this Varadaguru advances the following counterargument: The *gobatīvardanyāya* cannot be applied here, since it serves the single purpose of avoiding the futility of the specific word by restricting the meaning of the generic one²¹. But even if the meaning of the two negative sentences of ŚvetU 3.8 and 3.9 is not restricted by ŚvetU 3.10, ŚvetU 3.10 does not become futile, because the two negative sentences can be understood as reasons for the concluding sentence *tato yad uttarataram*²². A more detailed version of this interpretation can be found in Rāmānuja’s *Vedārthasaṃgraha*, where it is declared: “Because only the reality, the Puruṣa, is superior [to all], therefore this reality, the Puruṣa, which is higher than this, is without form and without suffering [and] those who know this become immortal, the others find only misery. The assertion [of ŚvetU 3.8] that the knowledge of the Puruṣa is the cause of immortality and that another but him is

²⁰ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 19,28–33: *iha ca ‘tato yad uttarataram’ ityādīnā paramapuruṣavyatirikṭasya kasyacit paratvavacanāt ‘nānyaḥ panthā’ ‘yasmāt paraṃ nāparam asti kiṃcit’ iti sāmānyena paramapuruṣavyatirikṭasarvaviṣayatayā pratiyāmānaparatvaṇiṣedhas tadvyatirikṭaviṣayo bhavitum arhati* “Because here a specific highest entity different from the highest Puruṣa is mentioned by [the words] ‘that which is higher than him’, the negation of that highest entity, which [by the words] ‘[there is] no other way’ [and] ‘[there is] nothing else that is higher than him’ is generally realized as one which is related to everything different from the Puruṣa, refers to something different from that [entity referred to by the words ‘that which is higher than him’]”.

²¹ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 19,33–20,22: *tan na, na hy atra gobatīvardanyāyaḥ kramate. śabdāntaravaiyarthyauparihārāya padāntarārthasaṃkoco hi gobatīvardanyāyaḥ*.

²² Cf. *ibid.*, p. 20,3–6: *‘nānyaḥ panthā’ ‘yasmāt paraṃ nāparam’ ity anayor asaṃkoce ‘tato yad uttarataram’ ity asya na vaiyarthyaupasaṅgaḥ pratijñātasyaiva sahetukanigamanenārthāntarasamṭbhavāt*.

no way is concluded [in ŚvetU 3.10] by giving reasons [in ŚvetU 3.8 and 3.9]"²³.

After having solved all problems concerning the interpretation of ŚvetU 3.8–3.10, Varadaguru reaches a consistent interpretation of ŚvetU 3.11 without difficulty. In order to arrive at a correct understanding of the statement *sarvānanaśirogrīvaḥ sarvabhūtaguhāśayaḥ sarvavyāpī ca bhagavān* ("The venerable one is the face, the head and the neck of all; he dwells in the caves (i.e. in the innermost part) of all beings and is allpervading"), this statement has to be seen in connection with the Puruṣasūkta (R̥gveda 10.90 beginning with *sahasraśīrṣā puruṣaḥ sahasrākṣaḥ sahasrapāt* etc.) and the Nārāyaṇānuvāka (i.e. Taittirīyāranyaka 10.11–12 starting with *sahasraśīrṣaṁ devaṁ viśvākṣaṁ viśvaśambhuvam*), where it has already been stated that all these qualities are peculiar to the highest Puruṣa²⁴. The last obstacle in his interpretation, i.e. the concluding sentence *tasmāt sarvagataḥ śivaḥ* is overcome easily, when we understand the word *śiva* as an adjective qualifying the Puruṣa²⁵.

According to Varadaguru the passage of ŚvetU under dispute has to be understood as follows: "I know this great Puruṣa with the lustre of the sun beyond darkness. Knowing him thus one goes beyond death; there is no other way to surpass [death]. There is nothing higher, which is different from him. There is no one subtler or greater than him. Like a tree standing firm he rests as the only one in heaven. Therefore all this is filled by the Puruṣa. Therefore that which is higher [than everything else] is without form and without suffering. Those who know this become immortal, the others find only misery. The venerable one is the face, the head and the neck of all; he dwells in the caves (i.e. in the innermost part) of all beings and is allpervading. Therefore the auspicious one is omnipresent".

²³ Cf. VS (1921), p. 186,12–187,4: *yataḥ puruṣatattvam evottarataram tato yad uttarataram puruṣatattvam tad evārūpam anāmayam, 'ya etad vidur amṛtās te bhavanti ahetare duḥkham evāpi yanti' iti puruṣavedanasyāmṛtaketutvam tad itarasya cāpathatvam pratiḥjñātaṁ sahetukam upasamhṛtam.*

²⁴ Cf. TN 1 ed., p. 20,18–23: *īha ca pūrvasmīn vākye 'sarvānanaśirogrīvaḥ sarvabhūtaguhāśayaḥ / sarvavyāpī ca bhagavān tasmāt sarvagataḥ śivaḥ ||' iti puruṣasūktanārāyaṇānuvākādīṣu paramapuruṣāsādhāraṇadharmatvena prasiddhasarvānanaśirogrīvatvōdīdarśanāt sa eveti pratyabhijñāyate.*

²⁵ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 20,24–26: *tataś cāsmīn prakaraṇe paramapuruṣa eva prati-pādyata iti, 'tasmāt sarvagataḥ śivaḥ' iti śivaśabdo 'pi śucitvādiguṇayogena tasminn eva vartate.*

ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF PARĀRTHĀNUMĀNA*

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In the earliest explanations of the problem of proving something in the course of debate in Indian philosophy, we find a strict distinction between inference (*anumāna*) and proof. The Carakasamhitā, for example, defines *anumāna* in Vimānasthāna 8.40 as “rational deliberation being dependent on a consideration of connections”¹. Inference as one of the causes of cognition (*hetu* or *upalabdihikāraṇa*)² is employed in connection with debate (*vāda*), which consists in the dialectical proof of a proposition (*sthāpanā*) and the statement of an antithesis (*pratīṣṭhāpanā*). Both of them consist of a reason (*hetu*), example (*drṣṭānta*), application (*upanaya*) and conclusion (*niḡamana*)³. Nevertheless, in the Carakasamhitā, *sthāpanā* is neither a special form of inference (*anumāna*), nor could it metaphorically be called a means of cognition. The same loose relationship of proof and inference is also to be found for instance in the Yogācāra-school. The Śrutamayībhumī as well as Asaṅga’s Abhidharmasamuccaya explain *anumāna* as one of the means of proof (*sādhana*) together with the other two accepted means of cognition, which are perception (*pratyakṣa*) and verbal testimony (*āptāgama*), and five other means of proof⁴.

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¹ CarS vim 8.40: *anumānaṃ nāma tarko yuktyapekṣaḥ*. The correct meaning of *yukti*, translated as “consideration of connections” in this definition, is anything but clear. Within another context of the Carakasamhitā, in Sūtrasthāna 11.17, we find the notion *yukti* beside *āptopadeśa*, *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* as one of the four means of deliberation (*parīkṣā*). In CarS sū 11.25 *yukti* is defined as *buddhiḥ paśyati yā bhāvān bahukāraṇayogajān*. But it is indubitable that this passage belongs to another historical background than that of Vimānasthāna. Moreover *yukti* is treated in Sūtrasthāna 11.23–25 without any explicit reference to the definition of *anumāna* (cf. CarS sū 11.21f.).

² Cf. CarS vim 8.33: *hetur nāmopalabdihikāraṇaṃ tat pratyakṣam anumānam aitihiyam aupamyam iti. ebhīr hetubhīr yad upalabhyate tat tattvam*.

³ Cf. CarS vim 8.31: *sthāpanā nāma tasyā eva pratijñāyā hetudrṣṭāntopanayanigamanaiḥ sthāpanā*.

⁴ See for instance the list in AS 105, 2f.: *pratijñā, hetuḥ, drṣṭāntaḥ, upanayaḥ, niḡamanam, pratyakṣam, anumānam, āptāgamaś ca*. Cf. also ŚruBhū 336,

In the Nyāyasūtras inference is, on the one hand, dealt with as a means of cognition (*pramāṇa*). On the other hand, the five members of proof (*avayava*) are treated distinctly different as one of the sixteen topics of investigation⁵ without any direct relation to inference. Pakṣilasvāmin, the author of the oldest extant commentary on the Sūtras, when commenting on the *anumānasūtra* according to his definition, supports the following view: *anumāna* or inference is based on the perception of the mark (*liṅga*) and on the memory of the previously seen connection of the property to be proved (*sādhya*) and the proving property (*sādhana*, *hetu*)⁶. In interpreting the five members of proof as a whole – being one sentence or statement (*vākya*, *śabdasaṃūha*), the constituent parts (*avayava*) of which refer to one means of cognition (*pramāṇa*) respectively – he identifies only the function of the logical reason (*hetu*) with inference, not the proof-statement as a whole⁷.

However, the opinion that an inference might be verbally transmitted to others was stated as far as we know more than two centuries before Dignāga by the Sāṅkhya-teacher Vṛṣagaṇa for the first time. This form of transmission can be either indirect (*āvṛta*) or direct reasoning (*vṛta*); of these, the verbal form of direct reasoning (*vṛta*) is fivefold: proposition (*pratijñā*), reason (*hetu*), example (*dṛṣṭānta*), application (*upasaṃhāra*) and conclusion (*nigamana*).

This historical review could be continued for either the Brahmanic or Buddhist tradition. Among the Buddhists, it was the famous logician Dignāga who introduced a new terminology by dividing inference into that for oneself (*svārthānumāna*) and that for others (*parārthānumāna*). This distinction became decisive not only for the Buddhist school of epistemology and logic, but also for nearly all the Indian philosophical schools dealing with logic, such as the Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā, the Jiniistic tradition, and the Nyāya. Just to give one example for the time after Dignāga, I may quote here Praśastapāda's Padārthadharṃasamgraha: "The transmission of the object which has been ascertained by oneself, by means of the five-membered proof (*vākya*), is *parārthānumāna*"⁸.

26f.: *pratijñā, hetuḥ, udāharaṇam, sārūpyam, vairūpyam, pratyakṣam, anumānam, āptāgamaś ca*.

⁵ Cf. NSū 1.1.1.

⁶ Cf. NBh 16,8–10: *liṅgaliṅgiṇoḥ sambandhadarśanaṃ liṅgadarśanaṃ cābhisambadhyate. liṅgaliṅgiṇoḥ sambaddhāyor darśanena liṅgasamr̥tīr abhisambadhyate. smṛtyā liṅgadarśanena cāpratyakṣo 'r̥tho 'numīyate*.

⁷ Cf.: "The reason is inference, because the similarity [with the instance to be proved] is recognized in the example" (*anumānam hetuḥ, udāharaṇe sādṛśya-pratipatteḥ* [NBh 50,12–51,1]).

⁸ PDhS 577,6–9: *pañcāvayavena vākyaena svanīścitārthapratipādanaṃ parārthānumānam*.

To give some idea of the Buddhist understanding of this distinction, I may quote here, without going into details of the problem of interpreting the Buddhist view, Dharmakīrti defining *svārthānumāna* in his *Nyāyabindu* as “cognition (*jñāna*) of the object to be inferred (*anumeya*) by reason of the mark possessing the three characteristics [of a reason] (*trirūpāl līngāt*)”⁹ and *parārthānumāna* as “the communication (*ākhyāna*) of the mark possessing the three characteristics [of a reason]”¹⁰. In the wording of Dignāga’s *Pramāṇasamuccaya* III, *parārthānumāna* is defined as “the revealing of an object which has been ascertained by oneself”¹¹. ‘Object’ (*artha*) in this definition, as Dharmakīrti explains in the third chapter of his *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, is to be understood as *trirūpālīṅga*. That means, that Dignāga’s definition is to be understood as ‘the explication of the logical reason fulfilling the three characteristics’. According to Dharmakīrti’s *svārthānumāna*-chapter of the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, the difference between *svārtha*- and *parārthānumāna* is to be found in the function (*vyāpāra*) of each. The *svārthānumāna* makes known the object to be proved (*anumeya* or *liṅgin*) and the *parārthānumāna* makes known the correctness of the mark itself (*līṅga*) for the object to be proved¹². TOM TILLEMANS in discussing explicitly the problem of *parārthānumāna* in his recent article “Sur le *parārthānumāna* en logique buddhique” summarizes this problem by stating that *parārthānumāna* has to demonstrate the triply-characterized reason (*trirūpāhetu* or *trirūpālīṅga*) to another person, and is not just a verbal expression of an inference-for-oneself (*svārthānumāna*)¹³.

However, just to sum up and keep the main difference between these two kinds of inference in mind, following Dharmakīrti’s terminology, *svārthānumāna* is a cognition (*jñāna*) and *parārthānumāna* is a communication (*ākhyāna*) which is called an inference only metaphorically. So much for a short outline of the Buddhists’ understanding of *parārthānumāna*.

⁹ NB 2.3: *svārtham trirūpāl līngād yad anumeye jñānaṃ tad anumānam.*

¹⁰ NB 3.1: *trirūpālīṅgākhyānam parārtham anumānam.*

¹¹ Cf. PVV 363,9f.: *parārthānumānaṃ svadṛṣṭārthaprakāśakam.*

¹² Cf. ERNST STEINKELLNER, Dharmakīrti’s *Pramāṇaviniścaya*h. Zweites Kapitel: *Svārthānumānam*. Teil II, Übersetzung und Anmerkungen. [SbÖAW 358 = Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Sprachen und Kulturen Süd- und Ostasiens 15]. Wien 1979, p. 22f.

¹³ Cf. TOM J. F. TILLEMANS, Sur le *parārthānumāna* en logique buddhique. AsSt 38 (1984) 73–99, p. 92: “une inférence-pour-autrui est destinée à montrer, ou à rappeler à l’adversaire, le *trirūpāhetu*, et non pas la thèse” and p. 98: “an inference-for-others is not just a verbal expression of an inference-for-oneself”.

Now, how does a Nyāya-author of the 10th century like Bhāsarvajña approach this problem? He is put in the delicate situation of combining his own tradition supporting the view that there is an inference (*anumāna*) on the one hand and a five-membered proving statement (*pañcāvayavavākya*) on the other. The most simple solution for him, of course, would be to argue in the way Praśastapāda does and to identify *parārthānumāna* with the communication of the five members of proof. This is, in fact, what most of the philosophers did later on.

To begin with, before going into the details of the actual problem one has to know that Bhāsarvajña is defining *anumāna* in his Nyāya-sāra and the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa as “that which causes the cognition of [an object] beyond the range of sight through a proper necessary connection”¹⁴. The so defined inference, moreover, is to be understood as twofold, namely *svārtha* and *parārtha*¹⁵, of which *svārtha* is defined as “independent of an instruction by another [person]”¹⁶ and *parārtha* as “dependent on the instruction of another; and the instruction of another [person] is nothing but the five-membered statement”¹⁷. Accordingly, for Bhāsarvajña *parārthānumāna* is not the proof in form of the five-membered statement supported by the Naiyāyikas, but it is the inferential cognition by somebody who has cognized the right mark (*samarthaliṅga*) through the instruction of another (*paropadeśa*), which is the five-membered proof. The process of inferring therefore is completely the same in both *svārthānumāna* and *parārthānumāna*.

Decisive for his new definition of *parārthānumāna* was perhaps a discussion of the Cārvākas with the other schools, which is partly to be found already in Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, where the twofold distinction of inference has been doubted¹⁸. The objection of the opponent in the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa runs thus: “A twofold [classification of inference] is not right, because of the impossibility of [distinguishing inference] for oneself and for another, since in relation to the [person] formulating (*vaktr*) his [inferential cognition], it is a mere repetition [of his cognition] (*anuvāda*), whereas relating to the [person] listening, it is

¹⁴ NBhūṣ 194,1 (= NSā): *samyagavinābhāvena parokṣānubhavasādhanam anumānam*.

¹⁵ Cf. NBhūṣ 272,4 (= NSā): *tat punar dvividham – svārtham parārtham ca*.

¹⁶ NBhūṣ 272,4 (= NSā): *paropadeśānapekṣam svārtham*.

¹⁷ NBhūṣ 272,5 (= NSā): *paropadeśāpekṣam parārtham. paropadeśas tu pañcāvayavavākyaṃ*.

¹⁸ Cf. STEINKELLNER, loc. cit. [n.12], p.22: (Einwand:) “Weil sich [die beiden Arten von Schlußfolgerung] nicht unterscheiden, wird die verbale Form (*sgra*, **śabda*) [der Schlußfolgerung] nicht getrennt [von ihrer Erkenntnisform] angegeben”.

nothing but [an inference] for oneself (*svārtham eva*). And what makes the difference here [concerning the person listening] whether the mark is recognized by perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*) or by verbal testimony (*śabda*)?"¹⁹. Similar objections are found in the *Tat-tvasaṃgraha* of Śāntaraksita²⁰ and its commentary of Kamalaśīla²¹, where besides other refutations of the inferential process in general (*anumāna*), the possibility of *parārthānumāna* had been rejected by the same arguments. These refutations are ascribed by Kamalaśīla to heterodox philosophers, namely the followers of Bṛhaspati²². In Jayanta's *Nyāyamañjarī* nearly the same objection is also to be found, where the quoted passage is ascribed to *nātividaḥ*²³. The three argumentative steps against the possibility of *parārthānumāna* therefore are: firstly, with regard to the person formulating an inference, it could be nothing but a repetition of his own cognition, if we assume, that *parārthānumāna* is a kind of inference, and inference is a kind of cognition; secondly, with regard to the person listening, to whom the inferential mark and its logical connection has been transmitted, it could be again nothing but an inference for himself (*svārthānumāna*), and thirdly, even if we grant that the mark has been transmitted differently in the so-called *parārthānumāna*, it does not make any difference for the inferential cognition which of the three means of cognition has permitted the mark to be cognized. It could be grasped either by listening, inferring or through "word" (*śabda*) itself. We have therefore to start from the presupposition that the opponent is arguing above all against the Buddhists, who hold the view that *parārthānumāna* is only metaphorically a proof. But the Cārvāka seems probably to insist upon the definition of inference as a cognition (*jñāna*) of the object to be inferred for both the *svārtha*- and the *parārthānumāna*, which would follow compellingly if one persists in understanding that any kind of *anumāna* is nothing but a cognition.

As for Bhāsarvajña, he does not accept the first two arguments, and he answers simply by stating that the distinction between the two kinds of *anumāna* is not intended to be based either on a relation to a person proving something or to a person hearing this proof, but depends on the defining characteristic (*lakṣaṇāpekṣayā*)²⁴, namely that *svārthānumāna*

¹⁹ NBhūṣ 273,2–5: *naivam dvividhaṃ yuktam svārthaparārthāsambhavāt. vaktrapekṣayānūvadāḥ, śrotrapekṣayā tu svārtham eva. kaś cātra viśeṣaḥ pratyakṣeṇa vā anumānena vā śabdena vā anugataṃ līṅgam iti.*

²⁰ Cf. TS 1462–1467.

²¹ TSP 522,15–523,11.

²² Cf. TSP 520,13.

²³ Cf. NM 130,19ff.

²⁴ Cf. NBhūṣ 273,5–7: *tan na, lakṣaṇabhedāt tadupapatteḥ, drṣṭādibhedavat.*

does not depend on an instruction from another person (*paropadeśānapekṣa*) and *parārthānumāna* does depend on the instruction from another person (*paropadeśāpekṣa*)²⁵. But Bhāsarvajña goes one step further by stating that even under the assumption of the opponent's view, the inference could be *parārtha*: "[An inference] might [very well] be *parārtha* ('for others') in respect to the [person] speaking (*vaktrapekṣayā*); exactly because the [person] speaking is independent of the [inference] by reason of its being a mere repetition (*anuvāda*), this [inference] is for others (*pārārthya*) in so far as [the repetition] is brought forward by the [speaker] aiming to cause the cognition of the other [person]. Or, [the inference] might [just as well] be in relation to the [person] listening (*śrotrapekṣayā*); it is called *parārtha* ('which is aimed at by the other') in so far as a person who himself lacks the ability to remember the logical connection (*vyāpti*), etc., by reason of confusion, reaches the aim (*artha*), the purpose, the so-called inferential cognition (*prayojanam anumānākhyam*), by the other, [i.e.] by the person proving (*paramāt pratipādakāt*)"²⁶.

To reject the third argument, namely that it does not make any difference for the inferential cognition which of the three means of cognition enables the mark to be cognized, Bhāsarvajña, relating to *parārthānumāna*, refers to his definition of the instruction by another (*paropadeśa*) as five-membered proof (*pañcāvayavavākya*). Consequently it is the verbal testimony (*śabda*) by which the mark is cognized. But not every verbally transmitted mark causes a *parārthānumāna*, only that which is transmitted in the form of the five-membered proof, which he makes clear in his explanation: "For, [an inference] which is dependent on that word, which expresses the mark only according to its specific form, like 'eye' etc.²⁷, indeed, is nothing but [inference] for oneself. Because in this case the other (i.e. the speaker who communicates the logical reason) does not state [this] word with the aim of [causing] an inference, but with the [immediate] aim of the cognition of the smoke etc. not yet cognized [by the other]. And it also is not the case [here], that the hearer, who is confused in regard to the

ata eva na vaktrapekṣayetyādi yuktam. na hi vaktrapekṣayā śrotrapekṣayā vānumānam drṣṭam ucyate sāmānyatodrṣṭam vā kintu lakṣaṇāpekṣayā.

²⁵ Cf. the definition of the Nyāyasāra above.

²⁶ NBhūṣ 273,7–10: *bhavatu vā vaktrapekṣayā parārtham yata eva vaktus tadapekṣā nāsty anuvādatvād ata eva parapratiṭyartham tenopanyastam iti pārārthya* (NBhūṣ_m 66^f,14 *parārtham*) *tasya. astu vā śrotrapekṣayā svayaṃ vyāptismaraṇādau mūḍhatvāt sāmānyavikalāḥ paramāt pratipādakād artham prayojanam anumānākhyam prāpnotīti parārtham ucyate.*

²⁷ Cf. Bhāsarvajña's example in NSā 272,2f.: *rūpādijñānam cakṣurādeḥ.*

remembrance of the logical connection etc., is dependent on the other. Whereas a [person], even [after] having cognized the mark, [but who] is [still] confused in regard to the remembrance of the logical connection etc., is caused to know [the logical connection etc.] by the five-membered proof. The inference of this [person], being dependent on that proof, is called *parārtha*, because it is qualified by the abolition of this [person's] confusion" ²⁸.

Thus *svārthānumāna* and *parārthānumāna* in the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa are seen as having exactly the same structure. The difference only lies in the recognition of the logical connection (*vyāpti*), the proper inferential mark (*samarthalīṅga*) and so on, which on the one hand is gained by oneself (*svārtha*), and on the other hand gained with the help of another (*parārtha* – literally: 'which is aimed at by the other') by formulating the five-membered proof (*pañcāvayavavākya*). But this five-membered proof is a mere verbal communication, not an inference in the sense of the cognitive process. In this way, the third objection of the Cārvāka who argued from this that it is irrelevant whether the mark is known by perception, inference or by verbal testimony is also set aside inasmuch as *parārthānumāna* is to be seen as an inference according to its definition as a cognition. The logical mark and its logical connection (*avinābhāva* or *vyāpti*) with the object to be proved (*sādhya*), by contrast, is transmitted verbally by the proof and belongs therefore to the means of cognition *śabda*. But the transmission of the mark alone does not cause that what is called *parārthānumāna*. That has to be transmitted together with its logical necessity by the five-membered proof.

Therefore, the difference between the Buddhist view, that of Bhāsarvajña and that of his precursors is not to be found with regard to the communication of the right logical reason in the proof. The basic difference lies, above all, in Bhāsarvajña's understanding of *anumāna* as the cognitive process of inference also in the case of *parārthānumāna*. And, beyond that, the mere communication of the logical reason does not cause a *parārthānumāna*, but it is caused only when the logical mark with all its logical implications is transmitted by the five-membered proof.

²⁸ NBhūṣ 273,12–1 *yo hi śabdaś* (NBhūṣ_m 66^r,15; but *śabdam* in NBhūṣ) *cakṣurādivat svasvarūpamātreṇa liṅgaṃ brūte tadapekṣam* (NBhūṣ_m 66^r,16; but *vaktrapekṣam* in NBhūṣ) *svārtham eva. na hi paras tatrānumānārtham śabdam uccāritavān, kintv apratītatadhūmadipratītyartham, nāpi śrotā vyāptismaraṇādaumūḍhaḥ param apekṣate. yas tu liṅgaṃ pratipadyamāno 'pi vyāptismaraṇādaumūḍhaḥ pañcāvayavena vākyaena pratibodhyate, tasya tadvākyapekṣam anumānam parārtham uktam, tanmohanivartanaviśeṣeṇeti.*

Abbreviations

AS	Abhidharmasamuccaya: Abhidharma Samuccaya of Asanga. Crit. ed. and studied by PRALHAD PRADHAN, Santiniketan 1950.
CarS	Carakasamhitā: The Carakasamhitā of Agniveśa. Revised by Charaka and Dṛidhabala. With the Āyurveda-Dīpikā Commentary of Chakrapāṇidatta. Ed. by V. J. TRIKAMJI. Bombay 41981.
TS	Tattvasaṅgraha: Tattvasaṅgraha of Ācārya Shāntarakṣita. With the Commentary Pañjikā of Śrī Kamalashīla. Crit. ed. by Svāmī DWARIKADAS SHASTRI. 2 Vols. Varanasi 1981, 1982.
TSP	Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā: s. TS.
NB	Nyāyabindu: Paṇḍita Durveka Miśra's Dharmottarapradīpa. [Being a sub-commentary on Dharmottara's Nyāyabinduṭīkā, a commentary on Dharmakīrti's Nyāyabindu]. Deciphered and edited by D. MALVANIYA. Patna 1955.
NBh	Nyāyabhāṣya: Śrī-Gautama-mahāmuni-praṇītaṃ Nyāyasūtram (Nyāyasūtra of Gautama: A System of Indian Logic). Vātsyāyana-nīyaṃ Nyāyabhāṣyaṃ Vācaspatimiśrakṛta-nyāyasūcibandhasahitaṃ mahāmahopādhyāya GAṄGĀNĀTHAJHĀKṛtatippaṇyā samalāṅkṛtaṃ ca. Poona 1939.
NBhūṣ	Nyāyabhūṣaṇa: Śrīmadācārya-Bhāsarvajñapraṇītasya Nyāyasārasya svopajñam vyākhyānam Nyāyabhūṣaṇam. [Ed.] Svāmī YOGĪNDRĀNANDA. Vārāṇasī 1968.
NBhūṣ _m	Manuscript of the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa: Microfilm of the manuscript of the Śrīhemacandācārya Jaina Jñāna Maṃdira, Pāṭaṇa, Laheru Vakīla Jaina Jñānabhāṃḍāra, No. 10717.
NM	Nyāyamañjarī: Nyāyamañjarī of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa. Part II. With Notes by SŪRYANĀRĀYAṆA ŚUKLA. Ed. by A. MADHAVĀCĀRYA ĀDYA. Varanasi 21969.
NSā	Nyāyasāra: s. NBhūṣ.
NSū	Nyāyasūtra: Die Nyāyasūtra's. Text, Übersetzung, Erläuterung und Glossar von WALTER RUBEN. Leipzig 1928.
PDhS	Padārthadharma-saṅgraha: The Prasastapādabhāṣyam by Prasasta Devācārya with Commentaries (up to Dravya) Sūktī by Jagadīśa Tarkalāṅkāra, Setu by Padmanābha Miśra and Vyomavati by Vyomaśivācārya (to the end). Ed. by G. KAVIRĀJ. Benares 1930.
PVV	Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti: Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika with a commentary by Manorathanandin. Ed. R. SĀNKRṬYĀYANA. Patna 1938-1940.
vim	Vimānasthāna: s. CarS.
ŚruBhū	Śrutamayibhūmi: JĀGADĪŚVARA PANDEYA, Bauddhācārya Asaṅga kṛta Yogācārabhūmiśāstra meṃ Hetuvidyā, in: Homage to Bhikkhu Jagdish Kashyap (Commemoration Volume). General Editor P. N. OJHA. Ed. by DEBIDAS CHATTERJEE. Nalanda 1986, p. 315-349.
sū	Sūtrasthāna: s. CarS.

THE CONCEPT *UPĀYAKAUŚĀLYA* IN THE AṢṬASĀHASRIKĀ PRAJÑĀPĀRAMITĀ

By Jan A. de Breet, Leiden

1. Introduction

In an article published in 1984, T. E. VETTER makes a comparison between the soteriological teachings of the Aṣṭa- and Aṣṭadaśasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā on the one hand, and those of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikās on the other¹. In this important contribution to the understanding of the Prajñāpāramitā literature, VETTER mentions:

“It is obviously this proceeding cautiously with the means [= mysticism of voidness = perfection of insight] applied to one’s self in favor of others that is meant by the twentieth chapter of the Aṣṭa in particular ever again stressing that Perfection of Insight must be accompanied by *upāyakauśalya* – a term which, elsewhere², rather indicates the direct commitment of means to converting living beings.”

The aim of this proceeding cautiously is to avoid reaching Nirvāṇa before Buddhahood, which would mean that one would not be able to help others in their striving for salvation³. Now, it seems useful to examine, in response to this thesis, the meaning and use of the word *upāyakauśalya* in the entire Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra. This would place its use in the twentieth chapter in a wider context and would establish what the status of the term is in relation to perfection of insight, not only in the twentieth chapter but also in the other chapters of the Sūtra. In the course of such a thorough examination it might also be necessary to reconsider the meaning (or better, since a positive meaning is hardly given: the implications) of the term perfection of insight (*prajñāpāramitā*) in the various parts of the Aṣṭa.

In the following, the results of my own investigations of these points will be presented. In this investigation I considered not only the San-

¹ TILMANN E. VETTER, A Comparison between the Mysticism of the Older Prajñā Pāramitā Literature and the Mysticism of the Mūla-Madhyamaka-Kārikās of Nāgārjuna. Acta Indologica 6 (1984) 495–512.

² By this is meant, above all, the Lotus Sūtra and the literature dependent on it.

³ VETTER, loc. cit., p. 506.

skrit text of the Aṣṭa as it is handed down to us⁴, but I also took into account the Chinese translation of an older and less elaborated version of it, made by Kumārajīva (Chiu-mo-lo-shih) in A.D. 408 (T. 227)⁵. An attempt has been made to trace all the passages where (1) one of the words *upāyakaśālya*, (an)*upāyakūśala* and *upāya* occurs (e.g. in the Lotus Sūtra, the last of these words is used in the same meaning as *upāyakaśālya*⁶), or where (2) in Kumārajīva's version the character sequence *fang-pien*⁷, which is generally considered to correspond with *upāya(kāśālya)*, occurs. For the first item a list in LANCASTER's dissertation was used⁸; for the second item a similar list (app. E) in PYE's book about 'Skilful Means' was employed⁹.

2. Some Technical Remarks

It appeared that apart from *upāyakaśālya*, which means literally 'skill in method', the alternative formation *upāyakāśala* occurs in two passages (four times altogether)¹⁰. The related adjectives *upāyakūśala* and *anupāyakūśala* occur seventeen times¹¹. K. translates these sometimes with (*wei*) *shan chih fang-pien* ('understanding *fang-pien* [not yet]

⁴ The oldest ms. used by R.M. is Cambridge ms. Add. 866 from A.D. 1008 (see E. CONZE, *The Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines & its Verse Summary*, Bolinas ²1975, p. xi).

⁵ The reason that this translation was chosen and not the oldest one of *Lokakṣema from A.D. 180 (T. 224) is that the latter is very difficult to understand. It would therefore cause serious problems of interpretation and probably be of little help. K.'s translation on the contrary is transparent, clear and trustworthy, and it too represents a considerably earlier stage of development than the Sanskrit version does, which means that it allows some historical perspective. (For the dates of the various Chinese versions see R. HIRATA, *Suvikrāntavikrāmi-Paripṛcchā Prajñāpāramitā-Sūtra*, Fukuoka 1958, p. XV). I gratefully acknowledge the valuable assistance of Prof. E. Zürcher in translating the relevant passages of T. 227.

⁶ See M. PYE, *Skilful Means. A Concept in Mahayana Buddhism*, London 1978, p. 15.

⁷ See appendix, n.A. It must be remarked that, as indicated in n. 15, *fang-pien* may also represent Skr. *prakāra* or some other term from the same semantic sphere.

⁸ L. F. LANCASTER, *An Analysis of the Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitāsūtra* from the Chinese Translations, Madison, Wisc. 1968, p. 45–57. This list is fairly complete, but I have managed to improve it at some places.

⁹ M. PYE, *op. cit.*, p. 189–191.

¹⁰ V. 46.3 and 76.21–22 (R.M. 91 and 151).

¹¹ V. 6.27, 119.32, 144.12, 156.13–25 (3 ×), 173.26–174.20 (6 ×), 191.17, 193.7, 195.4 and 10, 204.25 (R.M. 12, 243, 288, 312–313, 349–50, 386, 389, 393, 413).

very well')¹², sometimes with *yu fang-pien* ('having *fang-pien*') or *wu (yu) fang-pien* ('not having *fang-pien*') respectively¹³. From this usage it appears that the binome *fang-pien* is only employed as a substantive and not as an adjective¹⁴. Quite obviously in the first case the meaning of it is 'method', whereas in the second case it is used in the sense of 'skill in (the) method', the more common meaning. There are four further passages in T. 227 where *fang-pien* is used in the meaning 'method'; here it is not even 'method of salvation' but simply 'means, manner, trick' for a cause, right or wrong¹⁵. From MATHEWS' dictionary¹⁶ one may derive that this is the more original meaning. *fang* may mean 'method', *pien* 'facile, handy' or 'facility, handy thing' from which one may deduce the meaning '(handy) method' for *fang-pien*. (We saw already that in the Aṣṭa *fang-pien* is only used as a noun).

The Chinese equivalent for *upāyakaśālya* in T. 227 is in most of the cases simply *fang-pien*. But in nine passages it is *fang-pien-(chih-)li*¹⁷. Since the primary meaning of *fang-pien* is 'method' it seems that in this context it is an abbreviation for *fang-pien-(chih-)li*, which means literally 'power of method'. One might suspect that in each case where T. 227 has *fang-pien*, the Skt. reading could originally have been *upāya* (or *prakāra*), whereas only *fang-pien-li* corresponds with an original *upāyakaśālya*. But in those cases in which *fang-pien* corresponds with an *upāyakaśālya* in the Skt. text, as it is transmitted, the context doesn't really allow for this interpretation. I can't detect any essential difference between the contexts using such a *fang-pien* and those using *fang-pien-li*. They all point to a meaning 'skill (in method)'. Only the assumption that, in the Skt. original which K. had before him, *upāya* was constantly employed as an abridgement for *upāyakaśālya*, as in Buddhist tantrism, could preserve the hypothesis. But this too appears improbable to me, because this usage occurs only twice (and close

¹² T. 227: 538a20, 567a4ff.; see app., n. B.

¹³ 556c9, 560b28, 570b9, 570c15, 571a15; see app., n. C.

¹⁴ Cf. E. ZÜRCHER, Late Han Vernacular Elements in the Earliest Buddhist Translations. Journal of the Chinese Language Teachers Association 12,3 (1977) 179 (under A).

¹⁵ 557b5-10, 557b27-28, 566a18-19 and 566c19-22. Here the Sanskrit text has an equivalent *prakāra* or *upāya* or employs another wording: V. 122. 24-123.11, 124.18-20, 170.23-24 and 173.6-10 (R.M. 248-249, 252, 342 and 347).

¹⁶ MATHEWS' Chinese-English Dictionary. Revised American edition, Cambridge, Mass. 1943.

¹⁷ 543c11, 567b26, 569b3-28, 579a1-2, 579a22-24, 580b25-27, 582a9, 582b29 and 583c21; see app., n. D.

together) in the Skt. text we have¹⁸, and K.'s silence suggests that this is a later addition.

PYE (op. cit. [n. 6], p. 15) concludes, probably on the basis of the Lotus Sūtra, that *fang-pien* and *fang-pien-li* are used interchangeably by K., because, in PYE's opinion, the distinction between *upāya* and *upāyakauśalya* in the Skt. text is also of little importance. K. allegedly means by *fang-pien*: 'means (such as Buddhas skilfully use)'. This is surely plausible for the Lotus Sūtra, and it is conceivable that K.'s translation of the latter has influenced his translation of the Aṣṭa on this point¹⁹. But the usage of *upāyakauśalya* (and *upāya*) in the Aṣṭa is in general quite different from that in the Lotus Sūtra²⁰.

It is also thinkable that the prose rhythm has often demanded the choice of a disyllabic term (*fang-pien*) rather than a trisyllable (*fang-pien-li*).

3. The Relation of *prajñāpāramitā* and *upāyakauśalya*

3.1 The meaning of *upāyakauśalya* in chapter XX²¹ of the Aṣṭa is, as VETTER (p. 506) already observed: the skill to apply the method [of salvation] (= the mysticism of voidness) in such a way that one does not reach Nirvāṇa before having become a Buddha oneself and thus being able to lead others to liberation, by instructing them in the right course (*dharma*)²². To be precise: it is not the compassion itself but it is the (skill in the) balancing act between entering emptiness and not deserting the world with its suffering beings.

¹⁸ V. 194.29–31: *prajñopāyamahākaruṇāvihāravihāriṇo*.

¹⁹ K.'s translation of the Lotus Sūtra is from A.D. 406 (see PYE, op. cit., p. 170; the information there has been borrowed from SAKAMOTO-IWAMOTO, Hokekyō ['Lotus Sūtra'] 1 [1962] 412), two years before his translation of the Aṣṭa (408: see HIKATA, p. XV).

²⁰ In the Lotus Sūtra, *upāya* refers to the doctrines preached by the Buddha, like the one about *nirvāṇa*, being considered as expedients to meet the spiritual weakness of people, and being ultimately without truth. *upāyakauśalya* is the power of the Buddha to skilfully apply these expedients, taking account of the different aptitudes of beings (see for instance PYE, op. cit., p. 38 and p. 20).

²¹ Chapter numbers always refer to chapters of the Sanskrit version (and the sections of T. 227 corresponding with these).

²² See above all V. 185.24ff. (R.M. 375): *yadā bodhisattvo mahāsattva evaṃ cittam abhinirharati, sarvasattvā mamāparityaktāḥ, mayāite parimocayitavyā iti, śūnyatām ca samādhivimokṣamukham abhinirharati, ānimittam ca samādhivimokṣamukham abhinirharati, apraṇihitam ca samādhivimokṣamukham abhinirharati, tadā upāyakauśalyasamanvāgato bodhisattvo mahāsattvo veditavyaḥ – nāyam antarā bhūtakotiṃ sākṣātkaṛiṣyaty aparipūrṇair buddhadharmaiḥ* (= T. 227: 569a.25ff.).

Now my contention is that, at least in the earlier layers of the Aṣṭa, this skill is not to be seen as something opposite to *prajñāpāramitā*, as a counterpoise to it. It is a necessary aspect of the true²³ *prajñāpāramitā*: without effective care for all beings there can be no question of real perfection of insight. The thesis in the first paragraph of chapter XX is (in free rendering): If a *bodhisattva* (someone striving for enlightenment) practises perfection of insight, he considers the *skandhas* as empty, but he shouldn't just realize emptiness [in the sense that he sinks away in it], he should become master of it²⁴. A few lines further on, too, the faculty which enables one not to realize (consummate) emptiness is simply called 'perfection of insight'²⁵. In T. 227 it is only much later on, in the latter part of the third parable, that the term *fang-pien* is first mentioned in connection with this faculty²⁶. The fact that this occurrence

²³ See for a reference to true and false perfection of insight e.g. V. 123.9–11 (R.M. 249): *punar aparaṃ subhūte māraḥ pāpīyān śramaṇaveṣeṇāgatya bhedaṃ prakṣepsyati. evaṃ ca navayānasamprasthītāḥ kulaputrā vivecayiṣyanti: naiṣā prajñāpāramitā yāṃ āyusmantāḥ śṛṇvanti. yathā punar mama sūtrāgataṃ sūtraparyāpannam, iyaṃ sū prajñāpāramitā* (= T. 227: 557b8–10).

²⁴ V. 183.1ff. (R.M. 370): *prajñāpāramitāyāṃ bhagavaṃś caratā bodhisattvena mahāsattvena kathaṃ śūnyatāṃ pariṇayaḥ kartavyaḥ, kathaṃ vā śūnyatāsamādhīḥ samāpattavyaḥ. bhagavān āha: iha subhūte bodhisattvena mahāsattvena prajñāpāramitāyāṃ caratā rūpaṃ śūnyam iti pratyavekṣitavyam. evaṃ vedanā saṃjñā saṃskārāḥ vijñānaṃ śūnyam iti pratyavekṣitavyam. tathā ca pratyavekṣitavyam avikṣiptayā cittasamṭatyā yathā pratyavekṣamāṇo rūpaṃ iti tāṃ dharmatāṃ dharmatayā na samanupaśyēt. tāṃ ca asamanupaśyaṇ dharmatāṃ na sāḥśāt-kuryād bhūtakotiṃ* (= T. 227: 568c13–17) "If, O Lord, a *bodhisattva* wishes to practise perfection of insight, how then should he master emptiness; how then should he enter the *samādhī* of emptiness? The Buddha declared: Subhūti, if a *bodhisattva* practises perfection of insight, he should consider form as empty. He should consider feelings, apperception, dispositions and perception as empty. With an undistracted mind he should observe the *dharma*s (conceived factors of existence), [but] there is nothing to see, nothing to realize." (for the Chinese text see app. n. E).

²⁵ V. 183.19 (R.M. 371): ... *paripākasya ayaṃ kālaḥ, nāyaṃ kālaḥ sāḥśāt-kriyāyā iti pratyavekṣate. prajñāpāramitayā ca pariṇhīto bhūtakotiṃ na sāḥśāt-karoti* (= T. 227: 568c23f.). "Now is the time to train, it is not the time to realize [i.e. to enter *nirvāṇa*]. For, I am acting to attain perfection of insight." (see app., n. F). Just before this (c21–22) one reads: "During the time [of concentration] the *bodhisattva* does not give up the qualities contributing to enlightenment, nor does he put an end to the defilements (*āsrava*s). And why? Because this *bodhisattva* has a deep wholesome root, consisting of great insight (i.e. perfection of insight)." (see app., n. G).

²⁶ 569a17f.: "In the same way, Subhūti, the *bodhisattva* practises perfection of insight. As he is protected by skill in method, he does not realize the highest ultimate truth (*bhūtakoti*), because [first] he wants to perfect his wholesome root(s) until the unsurpassed complete enlightenment." (see app., n. H) = V.

is in the context of a parable about a worldly skill (archery), suggests that the term is borrowed from daily life, where it was used in connection with such worldly skills. This suggestion is corroborated by the third parable of chapter XIV, where the term *anupāyakuśala* is directly used to describe the unskilfulness of a merchant and ship-owner²⁷. Another indication, outside the Aṣṭa, is Sn. 321 where a skipper is called *upāyaññū* and *kusala*²⁸. In this simile the wise teacher himself, who is equated with the skipper, is described in other terms. 'Skill in method' stresses the adroitness and mental flexibility which is characteristic of perfection of insight and associates perfection of insight with the adroitness necessary to be successful in the affairs of the world. But the word *prajñāpāramitā* itself may also refer to the verbal formulation of this higher principle and to the written form of the latter and as such it may be the object of veneration²⁹.

Already in chapter I it is mentioned as a twin aspect of the *bodhisattva*, the great being, which is the person practising *prajñāpāramitā*, that he realizes the fact that no beings, saving or saved, exist at all, but that nevertheless he should lead them to *nirvāṇa*³⁰. The term *upāyakaśalya* is not used in this context.

185.10: *evam eva subhūte bodhisattvo mahāsattvaḥ prajñāpāramitāyāṃ caran upāyakaśalyaparigrhītaḥ tāvāt tām paramāṃ bhūtakotiṃ na sāksāt karoti, yāvan na tāni kuśalamūlāny anuttarāyāṃ samyaksaṃbodhan paripakvāni suparipakvāni.*

²⁷ V. 144.11f.: *evam sa sārthavāho 'nupāyakuśalo dauṣṭprajñena mahatā arthaviyogena samanvāgato bhaviṣyati, mahataś ca ratnākarāt parihiṇo bhaviṣyati* (= T. 227: 560b28f.) "Because the merchant has no skill in method, he will lose many riches and cause his own sorrow and distress." (see app., n. I).

²⁸ Sn. 321 f.: *yathā pi nāvaṃ daḥḥaṃ āruhitvā, phīyen' arittena samangibhūto / so tāraye tattha bahū pi aññe, tatrūpayaññū* kusalo mutimā || evam pi yo vedagu bhāvitatto, bahussuto hoti avedhadhammo / so kho pare nijjhāpaye pajānaṃ, sotāvadhānūpanisūpappanne ||* (* Short *a* required here by the *tuṭṭubha* metre [see e.g. A. K. WARDER, Introduction to Pali, PTS, London 1974, p. 359]; v.l. *-upāya-*). Cf. PYE, op. cit. (n. 6), p. 120.

²⁹ For instance V. 76.22ff. (R.M. 150–151): *atra copāyakaśalaṃ sikṣitukāmena bodhisattvena mahāsattvena iyaṃ eva prajñāpāramitā abhīkṣṇam śrotavyā udgrahītavyā ... pariprasṇikartavyā*, and V. 29.19ff. (R.M. 58): *tasmāt tarhi kauśika yaḥ kaścīt kulaputro vā kuladukhita vā imāṃ prajñāpāramitāṃ likhitvā ... sthāpayet, enāṃ ca divyābhīḥ puṣpadhūpa° ... satkuryāt ...* (= T. 227: 542c1ff.); also V. 3.31ff., 46.1ff., 118.20ff. (R.M. 6f., 91, 239–240) etc.

³⁰ V. 10.25ff. (R.M. 20): *aprameyā mayā sattvāḥ parinirvāpayitavyā iti, asaṃkhyeyā mayā sattvāḥ parinirvāpayitavyā iti, na ca te santi yair ye parinirvāpayitavyā iti* (= T. 227: 538c29ff.).

In chapter three, perfection of insight is called the source of skill in method³¹. This is also indicative of skill in method and perfection of insight not being independent faculties (which need to be combined). Although in this passage, skill in method is associated with compassion (*anukampā*), there is no indication that a balancing act between emptiness and compassion is meant here. It is simply the skill to further a number of well known means to spiritual welfare in the world, such as the four *dhyānas* and the four 'immeasurables' (= the *brahmacāryas*).

In another passage, in chapter XVI, perfection of insight together with skill in method is placed in opposition to three *samādhis* (i.e. *śūnyatā*, *ānimitta*³² and *apraṇihita* [the wishless]), of which it is stressed repeatedly in chapter XX that one should not lose oneself herein³³. And

³¹ V. 38.2f.: *tac ca bodhisattvānām upāyakauśalyaṃ prajñāpāramitānirjātaṃ veditavyam* (= T. 227: 543c11f.).

³² This typically Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit word is identical with Pāli *animitta*. It possibly originated from the condition that *animitta* was more often than not preceded by *śūnyatā* (frequently in the same compound: e.g. V. 119.33 = R.M. 243), so that, as a result of *sandhi*, it was not immediately clear what was the quantity of the first *a* of the word. In the Aṣṭa it has completely replaced *animitta* (see for instance V. 184.22, 185.26, 176.21 [R.M. 373, 375, 356]). It designates a meditative state in which all *nimittas* have ceased. The CPD points out (referring in the first place to As. 223,12–13) that the technical meaning of *animitta* in the Pāli scriptures is "void of *niccaṃ*, *sukhaṃ*, *attā*, i.e. *Nibbāna*". As. 223, 20–21 (in keeping with Pj. II 343 on Sn. 342) further specializes it as (the fruit of) *aniccānupassanā*. In the Pāli Sūtra's the general meaning of *nimitta* is 'characteristic' or 'aspect' (cf. CPD s.v. *animitta*: "free from marks (attributes or characteristics)"). In a more specialized sense it refers to 'notions of judgement' (for instance in *subhanimitta*, for which see i.a. A.N. I.3, M.N. I.26 and Sn. 341–342). Because in the sections of the Aṣṭa examined by me, *nimitta* always points to abstract concepts (see e.g. V. 156 = R.M. 312), I render it with 'idea' (cf. VETTER, loc. cit. [n. 1], p. 499: "object of ideation"). However, in other texts, e.g. of the Yogācāra School, it rather seems to denote characteristics conceived as having independent existence and constituting the phenomenal world (see L. SCHMITHAUSEN, *Der Nirvāṇa-Abschnitt in der Vinīś-cayasamgrahaṇī der Yogācārabhūmiḥ*, Wien 1969, p. 120 [s.v. 67]; here the translation "Erscheinung" is used).

³³ T. 227 (563a2ff.): "Because they were not protected by perfection of insight and skill in method (or: the skill in method of perfection of insight), they do not grasp at the *dharma*s anymore, their defilements are gone, and their mind has attained liberation. Śāriputra, even if a *bodhisattva* practises the path of emptiness, idea-lessness, or 'non-action', if he is not protected by perfection of insight and skill in method [v. above], he realizes the ultimate reality and takes the vehicle of the disciples" (v. n. 37 and see app., n. J). – V. 155.9ff. (R.M. 310) has one 'perfection of insight' less: *te khalu punar ime prajñāpāramitayā aparigrhītā upāyakauśalyena ca virahitā abhūvan. kiṃ cāpi śāriputra eṭesaṃ bodhisattvānām asti mārgaḥ śūnyatā vā ānimittacaryā vā apraṇihitamanasikāratā*

in chapter XI the Perfection of Insight is placed in opposition to the 'deep Sūtras', which probably means Sūtras that teach the same *samādhis* of emptiness etc.³⁴. Thus it seems that these *samādhis* are not the same thing as perfection of insight.

Only in the Skt. version of chapter XX there are two clauses which more or less explicitly make the skill of combining emptiness with compassion a faculty apart from perfection of insight. In the first one it is stated that [to avoid an untimely consummation of emptiness] perfection of insight is to be kept in check and should not be 'realized'³⁵. However, a few lines further on, in a passage already discussed above³⁶, a statement close to the opposite is made: held in check by perfection of insight one does not consummate the ultimate truth. This time T. 227 has something which is equivalent to it.

The second clause relates that although the compassionate *bodhisattva* enters the *samādhi* of emptiness and the idea-less and wish-less *samādhis* (the 'doors of liberation'), he does not realize the ultimate truth, on the level of the disciples or *pratyekabuddhas*³⁷, because he has at his disposal [two] strong assistants in perfection of insight and skill in method³⁸. But it is not completely certain, even here, what the functional distinction is between perfection of insight and skill in method. It is probable that perfection of insight is meant to be responsible for the emptiness, and skill in method for the cautiousness guided by

vā, atha ca punar etair upāyakaṣaḥ śālyavikalatvād bhūtakotiḥ sākṣātkṛtā, śrāvaka-bhūmau nirjātāḥ, na buddhabhūmau.

³⁴ T. 227 (556c11): "Bodhisattvas having no skill in method reject the Perfection of Insight and choose these deep Sūtras" (see app., n. K). – V. 119.28ff. (R.M. 242–243) mentions the three *samādhis* explicitly (in 119.33f.): ... *kiṃ cāpi subhūte teṣu sūtrānteṣu śūnyatānimittāpraṇihitāni bhāṣitāni, na khalu punar upāyakaṣaḥ tatra bodhisattvānām mahāsattvānām ākhyātam.* ... In this passage *prajñāpāramitā* in the first place refers to the Sūtra. Therefore we can't be completely sure here that the faculty perfection of insight is placed in opposition to the three *samādhis*.

³⁵ V. 183.13f.: *prajñāpāramitā ca me parigṛhītā bhaviṣyati, na ca sākṣātkṛteti.*

³⁶ V. 183.19 (R.M. 371); see n. 25.

³⁷ In the Aṣṭa, *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas* are people who consider themselves enlightened, but have in the eyes of the adherents of the *prajñāpāramitā* school only a limited form of enlightenment, because they have deserted their fellow-beings (cf. e.g. V. 143.21ff. and V. 194.16ff. [R.M. 287f. and R.M. 392f.]). No distinction between the two can be detected in the Aṣṭa.

³⁸ V. 184.19ff.: *evam eva subhūte bodhisattvo mahāsattvaḥ sarvasattvāhitānukampī ... kiṃ cāpi śūnyatām ānimittam apraṇihitam ca samādhivimokṣamukhāny avatarati, na tv eva bhūtakotiḥ sākṣātkaroti, yad uta śrāvakabhūmau vā pratyekabuddhabhūmau vā. tat kasya hetoḥ, tathā hy asya balavattamā dṛḍhatamāś ca parigṛāhakāḥ, yad uta prajñāpāramitā upāyakaṣaḥ ca.*

compassion. However, it might also be that both are responsible for the cautiousness. It seems that the source for this latter addition is a simile in chapter XIV about an old and sick man. He is not able to rise from his bed and walk unless he is supported by two strong men. It's the same with a *bodhisattva*: he is not able to reach the 'unsurpassable complete enlightenment' [= Buddhahood] unless he is supported by perfection of insight and skill in method³⁹. This passage has, as opposed to the one in chapter XX, an equivalent in T. 227, so it seems to belong to the older layers of the Sūtra. But here, still more, the functional distinction between perfection of insight and skill in method is unclear. They are together the precondition for reaching Buddhahood, while a whole range of conventional Buddhist virtues such as faith (*śraddhā*) and tolerance (*kṣānti*), is said to be insufficient⁴⁰. However, the reason for this is not explicitly given here.

Still one may get the impression from chapter XX, even in K.'s version, that 'skill in method' is something special, distinct from 'perfection of insight'. For, in a long section⁴¹, skill in method is frequently mentioned as the faculty accounting for the *bodhisattva*'s compassion and cautiousness in practising emptiness, the idea-less and the wish-less. In contrast, perfection of insight is not mentioned in this section⁴².

³⁹ V. 145.18–31: *tad yathāpi nāma subhūte sa eva puruṣo jīrṇo ... , sa ca mañcād uttiṣṭhet. tam enaṃ dvau balavantaṃ puruṣau vāmadakṣiṇābhyāṃ pārs-vābhyāṃ svadhyālabhitam ... evaṃ vadetām: gaccha tvam bhoḥ puruṣa yenākāṅkṣasi ... evaṃ eva subhūte yasya bodhisattvasya mahāsattvasya asti śraddhā ... , sa ca prajñāpāramitayā anupariṣṭhito bhavati, upāyakaṣaḥalyasamanvāgataś ca bhavati. veditavyam etad subhūte nāyaṃ bodhisattvo mahāsattvo 'ntarā vyadhvani samsatsyati, na vyavasādam āpatsyate, pratibalo 'yaṃ bodhisattvo mahāsattvas tat sthānam anuprāptuṃ yad utānuttaraṃ samyaksaṃbodhisthānam iti (= T. 227: 560c22ff.).*

⁴⁰ V. 143.24ff.: *evaṃ eva subhūte kiṃ cāpi bodhisattvasya asti śraddhā, asti kṣāntiḥ, asti ruciḥ, asti chandaḥ, asti vīryam, asty apramādaḥ, asty adhimuktiḥ, asti adhyāśayaḥ, asti tyāgaḥ, asti gauravam, asti prītiḥ, asti pramodyam, asti prasādaḥ, asti prema, asty anikṣiptadhurātā anuttaraṃ samyaksaṃbodhim abhisamboddhum; sa ca prajñāpāramitayā upāyakaṣaḥalyena ca aparigrhīto bhavati, veditavyam etad subhūte ayaṃ bodhisattvo 'ntarā vyadhvani vyavasādam āpatsyati iti (≈ T. 227: 560b15ff.).* Note that this range does not include *maitrī* or *karuṇā* (or the like) nor a word for wisdom or insight.

⁴¹ T. 227: 569a22–c2. The corresponding V. 185.16–187.16 mentions perfection of insight twice.

⁴² In probably later texts such as the Daśabhūmikasūtra, *upāyakaṣaḥalya* has become an independent *pāramitā* (see Daśabhūmikasūtra, ed. J. RAHDER, p. 57 and 63). It is possible that this development was originally initiated by this section of the Aṣṭa.

3.2 There is another point I would like to bring to the fore: viz. that the term *upāyakaśālya* not only stands for the skill in the balancing act between emptiness and compassion, but, in a number of passages, also for other aspects of perfection of insight. This means that perfection of insight (as a faculty) and skill in method are practically interchangeable. In an important passage in chapter I, clarifying statements are made about what is real perfection of insight⁴³. The second half of this passage has already been discussed in the above mentioned article by VETTER (loc. cit. [n. 1], p. 502f.). Perfection of insight is contrasted with the old concept of *prajñā* in an argument dealing with the five *skandhas*, the elements into which the person was analyzed in early Buddhism. This analysis was called *prajñā* (insight) by the ancients. Somewhat later, when the *bodhisattva* ideal, and in connection with it the *pāramitā* doctrine, was developed (see VETTER, loc. cit., p. 504), one started to consider this *prajñā* as one of the *pāramitās*, i.e. as *prajñāpāramitā*. A difference conceived between this *prajñāpāramitā* and *prajñā* in the oldest phase of Buddhism, was possibly that the former was associated with a more intensive, more continuous form of analysis than was the latter. Now the position of the Aṣṭa is that the *skandha* analysis is not *prajñāpāramitā* (i.e. not perfection of insight), because it comprises a reasoning on the basis of *nimittas* (characteristics, ideas)⁴⁴. Of these the Buddha has said that one should not 'grasp' them⁴⁵, that is to say not hypostatize them nor consider them in any way, however subtle, as one's property. Whoever thinks that the *skandha* analysis really is perfection of insight, is *anupāyakaśāla*. Whoever really practises perfection of insight does not reason in terms of 'elements of the person' and

⁴³ V. 6.15ff. (R.M. 11ff.): *saced rūpe carati, ... saced rūpanimitte carati, ... saced rūpaṃ nimittam iti carati, ... saced rūpasyotpāde carati, ... saced rūpasya nirodhe carati, ... saced rūpaṃ sūnyam iti carati, nimitte carati. ahaṃ carāmiti carati, ... ahaṃ bodhisattva iti carati, nimitte carati; ahaṃ bodhisattva iti hy upalambha eva sa carati. evaṃ saced vedanāyāṃ, saṃjñāyāṃ, saṃskāreṣu, saced vijñāne carati, nimitte carati ... sacet punar asyaivaṃ bhavati, ya evaṃ carati, sa prajñāpāramitāyāṃ carati, sa prajñāpāramitāṃ bhāvayatīti, nimitta eva sa carati. ayaṃ bodhisattvo 'nupāyakaśālo veditavyaḥ ... saced ... bodhisattvo mahāsattvo na rūpe carati, na rūpanimitte carati ... evaṃ caran bodhisattvo mahāsattvas carati prajñāpāramitāyāṃ. sa hi carāṃś carāmiti nopaiti, na carāmiti nopaiti, carāmi ca na carāmi ceti nopaiti, naiva carāmi na na carāmiti nopaiti, ... tat kasya hetor nopaiti, sarvadharmā hy anupagatā anupāttāḥ (= T. 227: 538a13ff.).*

⁴⁴ See n. 32.

⁴⁵ I.a. M.N. I.269 (= M.N. I.180, D.N. I.70, III.226): *manasā dhammaṃ viññāya na nimittaggāhī hoti nānuyyāñjanaggāhī*; see also D.N. III.249: *animittā hi kho me cetovimutti bhāvitā bahulīkatā yānikatā vatthukatā anuṭṭhitā paricītā susamāradhā. atha ca pana me nimittānusāri viññānaṃ hotīti*.

does not think 'I am a *bodhisattva*' or 'I practise'. Likewise he does not think 'I do not practise' nor 'I do and I do not practise' nor 'I neither do nor do not practise'. In other words, one should put the idea of practising completely out of one's mind and be fully and continuously alive to the unreality of all supposed entities (*dharma*s).

From the passage, one may deduce that 'skill in method' is the skill to choose the right method of salvation, i.e. to know what is real perfection of insight. Thus here 'skill in method' means practically the same as 'perfection of insight'.

Now one might ask oneself if the *skandha* analysis is rejected altogether as a method of salvation, or only relativized. For this we may look at a passage in chapter IV⁴⁶. Here it is stated that perfection of insight is the guiding principle in practising the six *pāramitā*s. The sixth of these (the seeing through the *dharma*s) is explicitly mentioned as one of the *pāramitā*s that must be guided by *prajñāpāramitā*. The implication of this passage is that:

1. *prajñā*, as one of the six *pāramitā*s, here as in the aforementioned passage, is not considered to be the real *prajñāpāramitā* (probably the former is at least meant to include the *skandha* analysis) and that
2. this *skandha* analysis, just as the remaining five *pāramitā*s, is accepted as means of salvation but at the same time strongly relativized. For, by the remark that in the light of perfection of insight, there is no difference between the six *pāramitā*s, they vaporize as separate practices.

In chapter six, *upāyakaūśalya* is said to be the power to 'transform' the enormous quantity of merit accumulated by countless Buddhas and Bodhisattvas of all three times into 'unsurpassable complete enlightenment', by rejoicing over it, thereby transcending the oppositions and divisions (*nimittīkaroti* = *vikalpayati*) of our world, including those of

⁴⁶ T. 227 (545c24ff.): "The Buddha: Kauśika, a *bodhisattva* practises all six *pāramitā*s. [But] if he practises liberality, perfection of insight takes the lead. If he observes morality, if he exercises patience, if he is indefatigably energetic, if he enters meditative concentration (*dhyāna*), if he observes the *dharma*s, perfection of insight takes the lead. A simile: just as all kinds of shapes, all kinds of colours, all kinds of leafs, all kinds of flowers and all kinds of fruits of all species of trees on Jambudvīpa [India] do not differ at all in shadow, likewise the five [sic!] *pāramitā*s have no difference in the light of perfection of insight." (see app., n. L). In the corresponding V. 51.13ff. (R.M. 100f.) *upāyakaūśalya* is added as a kind of synonym of *prajñāpāramitā*: "... na ca kauśika āsām saṃnāṃ pāramitānām upāyakaūśalyaparigṛhītānām prajñāpāramitāpariṇāmītānām sarvajñatāpariṇāmītānām viśeṣaḥ, na ca nānākaraṇam upalabhyate.

Buddhism⁴⁷. Then it is claimed that to be able to practise this skill one must constantly study (the text of) the perfection of insight⁴⁸. In K.'s version, somewhat further on, the basis for the great transformation is at first referred to by 'skill in method' and then by 'perfection of insight'⁴⁹.

In another passage in T. 227 *pañjopolomi-fangpien* and *pañjo-polomi* are used alternately without distinction of meaning⁵⁰. Probably here as well as in 548b26–28 the compound must be interpreted as 'the skill in method of perfection of insight'.

A further example is found in chapter XXVII (Skt.)⁵¹. At first it is stated that it is in default of skill in method that some *bodhisattvas* stray away from the 'unsurpassed complete enlightenment'. But then it is said that thanks to perfection of insight, one can avoid straying away from it. This is also an implicit identification of perfection of insight and skill in method.

Against the tendency, apparently existing in the milieu producing the *prajñāpāramitā* texts, to separate skill in method from perfection of insight an express statement is made in chapter XXV: there the two are explicitly identified⁵².

For the remaining occurrences of 'skill in method', both points of the above interpretation are certainly possible, but they are not necessary within the context of those passages.

⁴⁷ See V. 75.4ff. (R.M. 147ff.). Cf. T. 227: 548b18–29 (corresponding with V. 76.10–27 [R.M. 150–151]).

⁴⁸ V. 76.22ff. (see n. 29). T. 227: 548b25–29 has no explicit differentiation between perfection of insight and skill in method of any kind.

⁴⁹ T. 227 (549a23ff.): "The transformation of this *bodhisattva* [may] be called a great transformation. Through skill in means it surpasses the merit from liberality of the *bodhisattvas* having notions. And why? Because the transformation of this *bodhisattva* is protected by perfection of insight." (see app., n. M).

⁵⁰ T. 227 (563a23ff.): "Śāriputra, because he is devoid of perfection of insight and skill in method (or: the skill in method of perfection of insight) his fate has to be like this. Lord, to my understanding of the Buddha's words, if a *bodhisattva* is devoid of perfection of insight, there is doubt, with regard to unsurpassed complete enlightenment, if he will ever fulfil it. For this reason a *bodhisattva-mahāsattva*, if he wants to attain unsurpassed complete enlightenment, must thoroughly practise perfection of insight and skill in method [see above]." (see app., n. N).

⁵¹ V. 232.9–19 (R.M. 469–470).

⁵² V. 211.20f. (R.M. 427): *tat punaḥ subhūte upāyakaṁśālyam bodhisattvasya mahāsattvasya katamat. yad uta iyaṁ eva prajñāpāramitā*. The corresponding passage in T. 227 (574b1) states only that skill in method originates from (the) perfection of insight.

4. Conclusion

It is true that in the Sanskrit version of the Aṣṭa handed down to us (especially in the twentieth chapter), there are some traces of a tendency to separate skill in method, in the sense of a balancing act between entering voidness and standing by compassion, from perfection of insight, as an extra requirement, an extra precaution.

In the relevant passages of Kumārajīva's version however, skill in method, in the above mentioned sense, almost exclusively appears to be an aspect of perfection of insight, just as another kind of 'skill in method' which is needed to arrive at a real insight in emptiness, at real gnosis (discussed above under 3.2). Even the vast majority of occurrences in the Sanskrit version must or at least may be interpreted in this way.

The most important difference between the terms 'skill in method' and 'perfection of insight', in the Aṣṭa, is probably that the former stresses the dynamic aspect of the latter, and that the former only designates a mental faculty while the latter may also designate a verbal text (the text of the Aṣṭa itself), be it written down or not.

Abbreviations

A.N.	Aṅguttaranikāya (PTS ed.)
As.	Atthasālinī (commentary on the Dhammasaṅgaṇī, PTS ed.)
Aṣṭa	Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā (It may also refer to T. 227)
CPD	A Critical Pāli Dictionary, begun by V. TRENCKNER. Vol. I, Copenhagen 1924–1948.
D.N.	Dīghanikāya (PTS ed.)
K.	Kumārajīva
M.N.	Majjhimanikāya (PTS ed.)
Pj.	Paramatthajotikā (PTS ed.)
R.M.	RĀJENDRALĀLA MĪTRA's ed. of the Aṣṭa, Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta 1887–1888.
Skt.	Sanskrit (version of the Aṣṭa)
Sn.	Suttanipāta (PTS ed.)
T.	Taishō edition of the Tripiṭaka in Chinese (followed by the number of the Sūtra in question)
T. 227	K.'s Chinese translation of an older version of the Aṣṭa.
V.	P. L. VAIDYA's ed. of the Aṣṭa, Buddhist Sanskrit Texts 4, Dharmabanga 1960.

Appendix

Each separate note is to be read from top to bottom and from right to left.

A
方便B
[末]善知方便C
有方便
and
無[有]方便D
方便[之]力E
世尊。若菩薩
欲行般若波羅蜜。云何應習空。云何應入空

三昧。佛告須菩提。菩薩行般若波羅蜜。應觀
色空。應觀受想行識空。應以不散心觀法。無
所見亦無所證。

F
今是學時非是證時。我爲得般若波羅蜜故。G
爾時菩薩不退助道法亦
不盡漏。何以故。是菩薩有大智慧深善根故。H
如是須菩提。菩薩
行般若波羅蜜。方便所護故。不證第一實際。
爲欲成就阿耨多羅三藐三菩提善根故。I
以是賣客無方便故。多失財物自致憂惱。J
不爲般

若波羅蜜方便所護故。今不受諸法漏盡心
得解脫。舍利弗。菩薩雖行空無相無作道。不
爲般若波羅蜜方便所護故。證於實際作聲
聞乘。

K
無方便菩薩捨般若波羅蜜。取是深經。L
佛言。橋尸迦。菩薩皆行六波

羅蜜。若布施時般若波羅蜜爲上首。若持戒
若忍辱若精進若禪定若觀諸法時般若波羅
蜜爲上首。譬如閻浮提種種樹種種形種種
色種種葉種種華種種果其。陰皆一無有差
別。五波羅蜜亦如是。入般若波羅蜜中無有差別。

M
是菩薩迴向名爲大迴向。以方便故。勝於有

所得菩薩布施福德。何以故。是菩薩迴向爲
般若波羅蜜所護故。

N
舍利弗。菩薩離般

若波羅蜜故法應當爾。世尊。如我解佛所說
義。若菩薩離般若波羅蜜。則於阿耨多羅三
藐三菩提。狐疑未了。是故菩薩摩訶薩欲得
阿耨多羅三藐三菩提。當善行般若波羅蜜
方便。

DOCTRINE AND ARGUMENT IN VIJÑĀNAVĀDA-BUDDHISM*

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I

By dealing in this paper with the special topic of Vijñānavāda-Buddhism and with one of the most important texts ascribed to this school, namely Vasubandhu's *Viṃśatikā*, in particular, I intend to introduce a genereal theoretical distinction which might improve our descriptive equipment for the exploration of philosophical traditions to a relevant degree. It appears that this distinction is rooted in the fact that intentions of rational beings often are complex and exhibit some kind of indeterminacy, the nature of which has yet to be explicated.

II

It has often been claimed that the Buddhist school of Vijñānavāda holds the tenet that the "external world" does not exist, or alternatively, that moments of consciousness – *viññapti*, *viññāna* – are the only fundamental entities which exist in the world. It is also ordinarily assumed that a short treatise, entitled *Viṃśatikā* and ascribed to the famous Buddhist writer Vasubandhu (the Younger), is representative of the philosophy of the Vijñānavāda-school. However, if one examines the argumentation and the train of thought exhibited in this text more closely it turns out that there is a difference between the tenet associated with Vijñānavāda-Buddhism on the one hand and the thesis which would best fit the sequence of arguments brought forward in the *Viṃśatikā* on the other. This difference appears quite subtle at first glance, but proves to be significant, as soon as one takes the philosophical implications into consideration.

The text of the *Viṃśatikā*, which comprises 22 *kārikās* in the edition of S. LÉVI (Paris 1925) and a *vṛtti* in the form of a prose-commentary on the *kārikās*, can be subdivided into five parts and three main sections: 1. Statement of the thesis – *kārikā* 1. 2. Establishment of the possibility of the truth of the thesis and refutation of arguments trying to show its impossibility – *kārikās* 2–10. 3. Positive arguments for the thesis –

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kārikās 11–15. 4. Demonstration of the accordance of the thesis with other tenets which are generally accepted in the world and in Buddhism – *kārikās* 16–21. 5. Concluding remark regarding the scope and the limitation of the treatise – *kārikā* 22. If we subtract the introductory and the concluding portions we obtain three sections which represent the argumentative part and comprise 20 verses.

III

The central portion of the work consists in the part which discusses the positive arguments for the thesis. It is introduced by a sentence in the *vṛtti* which is noteworthy and deserves to be cited. It runs: *katham punar idaṃ pratyetaṃ anenābhiprāyeṇa bhagavatā rūpādyaṭanāstītvam uktam na punaḥ santy eva tāni yāni rūpādivijñaptīnāṃ pratyekaṃ viśayābhavantīti* (6, 22) “But how can it be recognized that the Venerable One has spoken about the existence of the *āyatanas* colour-and-shape etc. with this intention, but that those entities which become one by one the objects of the cognition of colour-and-shape etc. do not exist in reality?”. If we take this remark literally we should expect that the following thesis is at stake:

(T) There are not entities which become the object of cognition.

The nature of the chain of arguments which follow in the text shows that this explication should be mainly correct and might only need an additional precision. For the text continues with the attempt to refute 1. the possibility that things which either are or consist of a plurality of entities become the object of cognition (6,25–8,10 [*kārikās* 11–14]) and 2. the possibility that things are cognized which are one in the sense that they neither are nor consist of a plurality of entities (8,11–8,21 [*kārikā* 15]). This is done in such a way that the argumentation proceeds in two consecutive steps, the first step consisting in the attempt at refuting the cognition of either atoms or things constituted by atoms and the second step consisting in the proof that it is impossible to assume that the objects of our experience are not divisible into atoms.

Now, it has to be noted that the argumentation in both parts contains references to our everyday experience. The proof of the impossibility of the non-divisibility of the objects of our experience refers to the following facts: a) a stretch of road is covered gradually, not at once, b) sometimes the front, but not the back of a material body is perceived, c) the elements of collections of things occupy different places, d) whether objects are visible or not does not only depend on their colour and shape, but also on their spatial extension (tiny water-insects, although possessing the same colour and shape as bigger visible ones, are not visible to the naked eye).

The refutation of the cognition of atoms or things constituted by atoms contains the following references to the world of our experience: (i) The atoms themselves are not singly perceived by us. (ii) It is not the case that all things of our experience possess the size of a single atom and there are seeming perceptions of things. (iii) The phenomenon of light and shade, that sometimes a part of a material body is in the light of the sun and another not, and the fact that not all accumulations of atoms have the same size as one single atom, which proves the existence of repulsion between atoms, entail that atoms must possess spatial parts.

Seen in the context of these references to ordinary experiences, a theorem which represents a specification of the above formulated thesis (T) would be the most fitting correlate to the argumentation, namely either:

(T1) There are no concrete particulars which are the objects of our experience.

or, even more restrictedly:

(T2) There are no material bodies which are the objects of our experience.

These theorems exhibit the formal scheme: "There are no F-things which are G" and since propositions of this form do not logically entail: "There are no G's" or "There are no F-things", both (T1) and (T2) do not strictly imply either that there are no objects of our experience at all or that there are no material bodies or other particulars of a world of physical things. In particular, (T1) and (T2) by themselves do not entail the impossibility of the existence of a physical world which is not the object of our experience, irrespective of whether at least some of the elements of this world are possible objects of the experience of some beings different from ourselves or not.

IV

From the philosophical point of view, the difference between theorems like (T1) or (T2) and the theses ordinarily associated with the Vijñānavāda-doctrine, namely that material objects do not exist or that moments of consciousness are the only particulars there are, is crucial. For a stringent derivation of those tenets from (T1) and (T2) one would need an additional premise which must be at least so strong that it entails:

(P) There are no (kinds of) non-mental particulars which are not objects of our experience, or:

(P)* There are no (kinds of) physical particulars which are not objects of our experience.

The difference is also crucial from the aspect of philosophical criticism. Since (T1) and (T2), in the same manner as our initial explication represented by (T), are compatible with the idea of a physical spatio-temporal world and even allow for the possibility of viewing moments of consciousness, the allegedly only fundamental particulars acknowledged in Vijñānavāda-Buddhism, as occupants of this world, granted that much of a materialism of the mind, we are able to face the problem of giving an account of what differentiates moments of consciousness ascribed to different subjects or on what principle streams of consciousness can be differentiated. Or rather, even if not resolvable, the problems of differentiation are at least reduced to a crucial degree, if we assume theorems which allow for the possibility of a physical world existing independently of our experiences instead of theorems which entail its absolute non-existence. For the possibility is open to us to base the differentiation between the elements of a plurality of streams of consciousness on the difference of spatio-temporal location within a world the existence of which is given independently of our experiences of this world. In view of the fact that the above explicated theorems (T), (T1) and (T2) entail that we do not have an experience of this world, it might still be difficult to explain, how we are able to discern between different streams of consciousness; but the problem of how it is conceivable that there are in fact different streams of moments of consciousness, as the author of the *Viṃśatikā* seems to have believed, does not appear to be as unsurmountable as it appears under the assumption of the total non-existence of a non-mental world. In any case, a philosophical criticism of the theorems matching the positive argumentation of the *Viṃśatikā* would have to proceed in a way which is quite different from the way that might be appropriate if the theses ordinarily ascribed to the Vijñānavāda-school of Buddhism were at stake.

V

Apart from the section which contains the positive arguments the remaining portions of the treatise seem equally dedicated to the issue as to whether what appears to us as experiences of things existing independently of our experiencing them really possesses the character it appears to have or not. The thesis of the non-existence of material objects or other physical particulars, on the other hand, is not made thematic in the treatise, or at least not in a direct way. The objections brought forward at the beginning of the *Viṃśatikā* are clearly directed against the thesis that our experiences are not experiences of independently existing objects. They point out certain features of our having experiences, like the local and temporal restrictions of the occurrence of

experiences of a particular kind, the diversity between the experiences of different subjects and the special causal efficacy of particular kinds of experiences, which all seem to point at the existence of objects which are experienced.

In one aspect, however, the thesis of the *Viṃśatikā* goes further than the theorem of the non-existence of non-mental objects. The tenet of the non-existence of objects of experiences existing independently of the occurrence of experiences involves, as the remarks in the *vr̥tti* on *kārikā* 10cd¹ and the remarks on *kārikā* 21² show, that even moments of consciousness do not function as objects of other moments of consciousness, although moments of consciousness of one stream can causally affect other streams of cognition according to *kārikā* 18ab and the comments thereon as well as *kārikā* 19 and the corresponding passages of the *vr̥tti*³. These propositions are not logically implied by the theorem that no physical world or not material bodies exist.

VI

Is it really important to distinguish between the above formulated theorems (T) and (T1) od (T2) and the alleged Vijñānavāda-tenets concerning the existence of an outer physical world in connection with the interpretation of the *Viṃśatikā* and other similar texts? I think it is.

Firstly, by making these distinctions it turns out that it is by no means obvious what the import of the treatise and the purpose of its author are. It is true that the statement made at the beginning of the *Viṃśatikā* that this world is nothing but mere cognition (*viññapti*) suggests that the writer of the work intended to deny the existence of any mind-independent entities. But on a second glance it emerges that even this is not so certain. For the statement could equally well be taken

¹ *evam viññaptimātrasyāpi viññaptiyantaraparikalpitenātmanā nairātmya-praveśāt viññaptimātravyavasthāpanayā sarvadharmāṇām nairātmyapraveśo bhavati na tu tadastitvāpavādāt | itarathā hi viññapter api viññaptiyantaram arthaḥ syād iti viññaptimātratvaṃ na sidhyetārthavātītīvād viññaptinām | (6,18–22).*

² *yathā tan nirabhilāpyenātmanā buddhānām gocaraḥ | tathā tadvijñānāt tad ubhayaṃ na yathārthaṃ vitathapratibhāsatayā grāhyagrāhakavikalpasyāprahñatvāt | (10,26–28).*

³ *anyonyādhipatitvena viññaptinīyamo mithaḥ | 18ab | sarveṣāṃ hi sattvānām anyonyaviññaptiyādhipatyena mitho viññapter nīyamo bhavati yathāyogam | ... ataḥ saṃtānāntaraviññaptiviśeṣāt saṃtānāntare viññaptiviśeṣa utpadyate nārthaviśeṣāt | (9,21–23). – maraṇaṃ paraviññaptiviśeṣād vikriyā yathā | smṛtilopādīkānyeṣāṃ piśācādīmanovaśāt || 19 || ... tathā paraviññaptiviśeṣādhipatyāt pareṣāṃ jīvitendriyavirodhinī kācid vikriyotpadayate yayā sabhāgasamītatīvicchedā-khyaṃ maraṇaṃ bhavatīti vedītavyaṃ | (10,8–9).*

in a sense according to which its scope is restricted to the world of our experience and would be equivalent to the tenet that we never have experiences of things existing independently of our having experiences of them.

However, it might be more realistic to assume that the author of the *Viṃśatikā* did not make his statement while being fully aware of the difference between this tenet and the one, often associated with the *Vijñānavāda*-school, which implies the non-existence of any mind-independent world. It is even conceivable that the writer of the treatise would have been prone to regard the proof regarding our experiences as an adequate means for establishing the thesis that no world of mind-independent things exists at all. But even if this would be so, the distinctions do not lose their relevance. For it is one thing to engage in the task of bringing forward arguments for the non-existence of a mind-independent physical world and another thing to adduce arguments aimed at proving that what appears to us as experiences of independently existing objects does not have the nature we assume of it and to believe that the former follows from the latter. Similarly, it is one thing to be aware of the difference between the theorems of the non-existence of a mind-independent physical world and the non-existence of experiences we have of such a world and seeing their non-equivalence and another thing not to be aware of the difference or to ignore the non-equivalence.

I do not see, why it should be of any advantage to blur such distinctions in the context of a description of a philosophical tradition. Vagueness and indeterminacy of beliefs or intentions should have the same right of being considered as constituting possible characteristics of a philosophical doctrine or a tradition and as falling within the scope of the description of the hermeneutical disciplines as what has been said, believed and intended or feared, hoped, desired etc. Therefore the consideration that the author of the *Viṃśatikā*, or the authors of similar texts, might not have had a clear grasp of the difference of the theorems distinguished by us above, does by no means provide a convincing argument in order to justify the description of the work as a treatise dedicated to establish the non-existence of the "outer-world" as adequate. Since the same description could equally fit cases where beliefs and intentions are not vague and indeterminate to the same degree, the acceptance of that description and of the argument for its adequacy would amount to accepting that differences in vagueness and determinacy should not be reflected in our descriptions, as it is usually the case in the conventional practice till now. But at least one possible way of making the description of philosophical doctrines or traditions sensitive

to differences of determinacy would be to distinguish between the different theses and theorems falling into the range of beliefs, intentions or other propositional attitudes. An advantage of this method lies in that it dissects different components and enhances the chances to discover and identify the most valuable ingredients of cultural traditions. If we proceed in this way in the case of Vasubandhu's *Vimśatikā* we should consider the theorem that our experiences are not experiences of independently existing objects as part of the objective pursued in and by this work in the same manner as the theorem that there are no experiences of independently existing objects at all and possibly the theorem that no world of mind-independent particulars exists.

VII

We might say that Vasubandhu in the *Vimśatikā* aimed at proving that our experiences are not experiences of material objects existing independently of our experiencing them. Surely, we do not find precisely this formulation anywhere in the text. Therefore it is necessary to get clear about the idiom 'to aim at proving something' and some remarks concerning the sentence-scheme 'X aims at Ø-ing Y' seem appropriate.

I want to claim that this phrase should be used in a way which exhibits two features that are peculiar to the non-metaphorical use of the verbal phrase 'to aim at'. Used non-metaphorically, 'to aim at' refers to the envisaging of a target when shooting. In this case, two features are involved which attain importance in our context.

Firstly, the fact that somebody envisages something as a target does not imply that he is able to give an adequate description of the object envisaged. Other subjects, which possibly do not have similar intentions at all, might be in a much better position to describe the thing aimed at correctly. Secondly, aiming at must not necessarily mean that just one particular object is envisaged. Apart from cases in which somebody consciously intends to "kill two birds with one stone", the aim might not be restricted to one particular object, because either the intentions of the aiming person waver or the aim is not clearly determined at all, only a particular group of objects or some region or direction being envisaged.

Transposed to the case of philosophical reasoning this would mean that we, when we describe something as being aimed at, do not have to expect that formulations synonymous with the ones we use in describing what is aimed at are to be found in the texts under investigation. We must not even demand that the subject to which we ascribe corresponding intentions would be in a position to give equivalent

descriptions. Nevertheless, the arbitrariness in this field is restricted by the net of beliefs, intentions and other propositional attitudes hypostatized for the respective subject which determine what he rationally could believe, intend etc. (for some further details on this point cf. GARETH EVANS, *The Varieties of Reference*, p. 129–132). It should, furthermore, not be regarded as certain that in cases of aiming at arguing for or proving something the object aimed at must always be exhaustively described by just one particular theorem. If we adopt the policy of mirroring indeterminacy or vagueness by using a plurality of propositions in the description, we would rather generally have to reckon with several theorems in order to cover the range of what is aimed at in a non-definitive manner.

Descriptions of what is aimed at in a text or by an author constitute a level of text-interpretation of its own. The stated characteristics of the sentence-scheme 'X aims at Ø-ing Y' imply that to classify something as being aimed at is not a purely psychological matter. Although text-interpretation can also consist in the identification of thoughts, intentions or other propositional attitudes which an author actually grasped, pursued or was aware of, investigations into what is aimed at do not belong to a field the statements of which possess a psychological backing of this kind. There are more indirect connections with psychological states in that features of descriptions might mirror features of psychological states, if e.g. the proposal were adopted that indeterminacies of intentions should be mapped on pluralities of propositions in the description; but, as expounded above, the propositions themselves must not be intentional objects of the subjects in question. The task of describing what is aimed at is also different from the task of exploring objective properties of theorems acknowledged by an author as true or of the doctrines of philosophical schools, explorations into what they logically entail, what is incompatible with them etc. Granted that questions of the latter kind are equally justified in the context of text-interpretation, we would have to distinguish investigations into what is aimed at from both identifications of psychological states or events and inquiries of objective, in particular logical, properties of what has been stated, believed, suggested etc. Accordingly, interpretations of texts can be pursued under a perspective which is neither purely "psychological", nor purely "logical", but constitutes a third, independent level of its own.

VIII

It should not be withheld, however, that the idea of a level of interpretation which aspires at describing the objective of intentions in

a way which might not have been accessible to the intending subject himself, is not free from philosophical intricacies. To be sure, there is no general problem with the description of intentional objects in a transparent manner. This is so, because *de-re*-descriptions of what is aimed at or intended by a subject are firmly rooted in our ordinary linguistic practice. In the case of non-metaphorical uses of 'aiming at' for example, descriptions of the object aimed at can be easily given from our own perspective or from a perspective (and involving informations) which might not be accessible to the subject concerned, because we might be in the possession of knowledge concerning some material body or some other spatio-temporal object which the other subject does not have.

The use of *de-re*-descriptions involving exclusive knowledge of the describing person appears intelligible as long as we are entitled to assume the existence of an object which possesses characteristics which are given independently of its functioning as the objective of some particular intentional acts. For on this condition surplus of knowledge of one subject with respect to another can be explained by the fact that there is an objective nature of some object which can be differently grasped by different subjects. But how do we have to understand the matter in cases of the metaphorical uses of 'aiming at'? The situation with respect to somebody's aiming at proving or disproving theses or theorems could surely be regarded as analogous to the case of somebody's aiming at hitting a tree, if we hypostatized objective entities with an objective nature as intentional objects in both cases. But it is equally obvious that this would urge us towards the acceptance of abstract entities like theorems, propositions or other kinds of things that can function as objects of intentions with corresponding ontological consequences. Otherwise, we should explore possibilities of making talk about the objectives of intentions which is based on our exclusive perspective intelligible without assuming a perfect analogy between all forms of 'aiming at'. In this way the philosophical problem of the existence of abstract entities attains a relevance for the theoretical foundations of hermeneutics and text interpretation.

BUDDHIST SIDDHĀNTA IN THE KĀLACAKRA TANTRA

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The hallmark of the last phase of Indian Buddhism is a synthesis of Vajrayāna mysticism with the philosophical theories of Madhyamaka and Yogācāra. Indeed, the Mahāyāna philosophers of this period practiced the Vajrayāna, and the Vajrayāna literature itself is permeated with Madhyamaka and Yogācāra ideas. Nevertheless, Buddhist tantric literature has been largely neglected as a source for the history of Indian philosophy.

Within the vast ocean of Indian Buddhist tantric literature the Kālacakra Tantra stands out as an especially worthwhile object of study. From the point of view of the history of philosophy the Kālacakra is best known as the main tantric canonical source for the Tibetan *gzan ston* theory elaborated by Dol po pa Śes rab rgyal mtshan. A study of the Indian Kālacakra literature in light of the Tibetan *gzan ston* / *rañ ston* controversy remains an important desideratum in the field of Indo-Tibetan Buddhist philosophy. However, such an extensive undertaking must be left for the future – here we are concerned with less ethereal matters.

The Śrī Kālacakra (ŚK) and its commentary the Vimalaprabhā (VP) are our two chief textual sources for the theory and practice of the Kālacakra system – together they form an esoteric encyclopedia¹. Although philosophical issues are dealt with in passing throughout these texts, the concluding portions of their second chapters are specifically devoted to Buddhist and non-Buddhist doxography.

VP II.7.161–180, which comments on ŚK II.161–180², is entitled *svaparadarśananyāyavicāramahoddeśa*, “A Logical Examination of Our

¹ For the mythology and history of the Kālacakra literature see: NEWMAN 1985 and 1987ab. In brief, the tradition says the Buddha taught the Paramādibuddha (the Kālacakra *mūlatantra*, also called the Ādibuddha) at the request of Dharmarāja Sucandra of Sambhala. Sucandra’s descendent Kalkī Mañjuśrī Yaśas condensed the *mūlatantra* into a *laghutantara* redaction entitled Śrī Kālacakra. Yaśas’ son Kalkī Puṇḍarīka wrote the Vimalaprabhā commentary on the Śrī Kālacakra. I believe all of these texts were in fact written in North India around the beginning of the 11th century. The ŚK and VP contain a year that can be calculated as 1012–13 or 1027 CE (NEWMAN 1987a: 100, n. 24).

² ŚK is cited according to *paṭala* and verse. VP is cited according to *paṭala*

Own and Others' Views". An outline of the contents of this portion of the Tantra will help to contextualize the discussion that follows:

161 – *tathāgatamata* (Buddhism)

162ab – *brahmamata* (Mīmāṃsā)

162cd – *vaiṣṇavamata*

163 – *śivamata*

164ab – *lokāyatamata*

164cd – *tāyīmata* (Islam)³

165 – *kṣapaṇakamata* (Jainism)

166–167 – Refutation of *brahma*-, *vaiṣṇava*-, and *īśvaramata*

168 – Refutation of *īśvaramata*

169 – Refutation of an independent creator

170 – *pratītyotpāda* (i.e., *pratītyasamutpāda*)

171 – Refutation of *ātman*

172 – Statement of the Buddha

173 – Refutation of *vaibhāṣika*-, *sautrāntika*-, and *yogācāramata*, i.e., *Bauddhasiddhānta*

174 – *mlecchatāyīn* (Muslim) rejection of *karman*

175 – Refutation of *cārvāka*, i.e., *lokāyatamata*

176 – Refutation of *kṣapaṇakamata*

177–179 – Precept of Ādibuddha Bhagavant Kālacakra

180 – Sūryaratha's homage.

This essay focuses on a series of quotations imbedded in VP II.7.173, the comment on ŚK II.173 that presents Buddhist *siddhānta*. The quotations consist of eight *kārikās* in the *anuṣṭubh* metre that can be divided according to subject matter into four pairs of verses. The pairs treat in sequence the four schools of Indian Buddhist philosophy: *Vaibhāṣika*, *Sautrāntika*, *Yogācāra*, and *Madhyamaka*. The eight verses are intended to serve as a brief mnemonic outline of the four schools' metaphysics, ontology, and epistemology. An edition of the Sanskrit and Tibetan texts of these verses as they appear in the VP is given at the end of this article.

In his annotations to VP (T) Bu ston Rin chen grub makes the following comment: *slob dpon ārya de bas mdzad pa'i grub mtha'i rnam dbye ye śes sñiṅ po kun las btus pa las grub mtha'i tshigs bcad 'di rnams gsuṅs snaṅ* "These verses on *siddhānta* appear to be taught from the

and *uddeśa* of VP, and verse of ŚK. Citations give the numbering of VP (S) U, which occasionally differs from some Indian manuscripts and the Tibetan version.

³ The *mlecchadharmā* (i.e., Islam) of the Tāyīn ("Tajiks") is frequently referred to in the Kālacakra literature. I am currently working on a study of this topic.

doxography composed by Ācārya Āryadeva – the Jñānasārasamuccaya”⁴. And in fact the eight verses are almost identical to Jñānasārasamuccaya (JSS) 21–28. The Tibetan text of JSS 21–28 and its commentary the Jñānasārasamuccayanibandhana (JSSN) of Bhadrabodhi⁵ have been critically edited and translated into French by KATSUMI MIMAKI (1976 : 183–207). Another text in the Kālacakra corpus, the Pradarśanānumatoddeśaparīkṣānāma (Pra), also contains these eight verses⁶. The same eight verses, with slight modifications, are styled the Sugatamatavibhaṅgakārikā (SMVK) and attributed to Jitāri in the Tanjur. Jitāri wrote a lengthy commentary on the SMVK entitled the Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāṣya (SMVBh), the Tibetan text of which has been edited by KENJŌ SHIRASAKI (1984–1987)⁷.

There are three significant *variae lectiones* among the different recensions of the eight verses (see the edition given below):

3a – *sākāra*° (JSS [T], SSN [T], VP [S] B & [T], Pra)

vs. *svākāra*° (VP [S] U, SMVK [T], SMVBh [T], TBh⁸)

6a – °*grāhakanīrmuktam* (JSS [T], SSN [T], VP [T], Pra, SMVK [T], TBh, SS)

vs. °*grāhakaṣaḍhuryāt* (VP [S], SMVBh [T])

7b – *pāramārthikam* (JSS [T], SSN [T], SMVK [T], TBh, SS)

vs. *paramārthasat* (VP [S] & [T], Pra, SMVBh [T]).

⁴ VP also quotes two other verses that appear in the JSS: (1) *tāpāc chedāc ca nikaṣāt suvarṇam iva paṇḍitaiḥ / parīkṣya bhikṣavo grāhyam madvaco na tu gauravāt / /* (JSS 31), VP (S) B 191b7 (comment on VP V.3.127); cf. NEWMAN 1987b: 473f. and YAMAGUCHI 1944: 327. The VP introduces this verse with *bhagavān āha*, so it is held to be *buddhavacana*. According to Bu ston’s annotations to VP (T), it is drawn from the Ghanavyūhasūtra. This verse also appears in Śāntarakṣita’s Tattvasaṅgraha 3587. N.B.: In VP (S) B *pāda* a reads: *tāpāc chedān nikaṣāt*; I have adopted the reading of the Tattvasaṅgraha. – (2) *yena yena hi bhāvena manaḥ saṃyujyate nṛṇām / tena tanmayatām yāti viśvarūpo maṇir yathā / /* (JSS 37), VP (S) U 256.4–5; YAMAGUCHI 1944: 339. This verse appears in the introduction to VP II.7. It is also quoted in Padmavajra’s Advayavivaraṇaprajñopāyavinīśayasiddhi 217.19–20. Saṃvarodaya 31.31 is identical except that it inserts *devī* between *pādas* c and d, against the metre.

⁵ Scholars generally refer to this author as “Bodhibhadra”. However, the colophons to P 2081, 4608, and 5004 all contain the form “Bhadrabodhi”.


⁶ Pra is attributed to Kalkī Mañjuśrī Yaśas, the redactor of the ŚK. It is related to the doxography in ŚK II.161–180 and VP II.7.161–180.

⁷ I am grateful to Prof. Shirasaki for kindly sending me a copy of his study of SMVBh.

⁸ Portions of the eight verses also appear in the Tarkabhāṣā (TBh) of Mokṣākaragupta, the Subhāṣitasāṅgraha (SS), and other texts – see the sources for the Sanskrit text below.

These variants show that authors felt free to subtly alter the text of the eight verses.

The relationships among the JSS, JSSN, VP, Pra, SMVK, and SMVBh can be diagrammed as follows:



The JSSN, VP, Pra, and SMVBh were all composed around the beginning of the 11th century, and their authors were all *vajrācāryas*. This indicates that the tantric masters of this period found JSS 21–28 to be a particularly authoritative and convenient outline of the four schools of Buddhist philosophy. It also shows that although they considered the Madhyamaka view to be the Buddha's *nītārtha*, they valued knowledge of the “lower” schools of philosophy as well. To assist in further study of this formulation of Buddhist *siddhānta* we offer an edition of the Vimalaprabhā version of these verses.

Vaibhāṣika

1. *ākāṣaṃ dvau nirodhau ca nityaṃ trayam asaṃskṛtam /*
saṃskṛtaṃ kṣaṇikaṃ sarvaṃ ātmaśūnyam akartṛkaṃ || (JSS 21)
/ nam mkha' dañ ni 'gog pa gñis / / 'dus ma byas gsum rtag pa ste /
/ 'dus byas thams cad skad cig ma / / bdag gis ston' zñ byed po med /
2. *akṣajā dhīr anākārā sākṣād vedāṇusañcayam /*
syāt kāśmīramatāmbhodhivaibhāṣikamatam matam || (JSS 22)
 [(b) VP (S) U: *vettyaṇusañcayam* – (c) VP (S) B 211b1: *satkāśmīramatāmbhodha°*]
/ dbaṅ skyes blo ni rnam med kyis / / phra rab bsags pa dños su rig /
/ kha che'i gzuñ gi chu gter gyi / / bye brag smra ba'i gzuñ 'dod 'gyur /
 [(a) P: *rnam med kyi* – (c) Pra: *kha che*]

Sautrāntika

3. *sākārajñānanakā dṛśyā nendriyagocarāḥ /*
vandhyāsūtasamaṃ vyoma nirodhau vyomasannibhau / / (JSS 23)
 [(a) VP (S) U, SMVK (T), SMVBh (T), TBh: *svākāra°*; JSS (T): */ śes pa rnam pa*
bcas pa skye / – (b) VP (S) U: *tendriya°*]
/ śes pa rnam bcas skyed byed ni / / dbaṅ po'i spyod yul snañ ba min /
/ nam mkha' mo gśam bu dañ mtshuñs /
/ 'gog pa dag ni nam mkha' bzin /
 [(a) D: *śes pa rnam bcas*; P: *śes pa rnam bcad*. Pra: *bskyed byed ni* – (c) Pra:
/ mo śam bu dañ nam mkhar mtshuñs / – (d) Pra: */ 'gog pa'ñ nam mkhar mtshuñs*
pa'o /]

4. *saṃskārā na jaḍāḥ santi traikālyānugamo na ca |*
asad apratiḥaṃ rūpaṃ iti sautrāntikā viduḥ || (JSS 24)

[(c) VP (S) B: *apratigha°*]

| 'du byed bems po yod ma yin | | dus gsum rjes 'gro dag kyañ med |
 | thogs pa med pa'i gzugs yod min | | zes pa mdo sde pa yis rig |

[(a) Bu: *bem po* – (b) Pra: | *dus gsum rjes su 'gro ba'n med* |]

Yogācāra

5. *na sann avayavī nāma na santaḥ paramāṇavaḥ |*
pratibhāso nirālambaḥ svapnānubhavasannibhaḥ || (JSS 25)

[(a) TBh 68.12: *āvayavī* – (b) TBh 68.12: *santi*]

| *yan lag can zes bya ba med* | | *phra rab rdul rnams yod pa min* |
 | *rmi lam ṅams su myoñ ba bzin* | | *dmigs pa med par rab tu snañ* |

[(a) Pra: *cha śas can* – (c) Pra: | *sgyu ma rmi lam ṅes mhoñ bzin* |]

6. *grāhyagrāhakavaidhuryād vijñānaṃ paramārthasat⁹ |*
yogācāramatāmbhodhipāragair iti gīyate || (JSS 26)

[(a) JSS (T), SMVK (T), TBh: °*grāhakanirmuktam*; SS: °*grāhakavinirmuktam*]
 | *gzūñ dañ 'dzin pa rnam grol ba'i* | | *rnam par śes pa don dam yod* |
 | *ces pa rnal 'byor spyod pa'i gzūñ* |

| *rgya mtsho'i pha rol phyin rnams sgrogs* |

[(d) P(a): *rgya mtsho*. Bu: *sgrog*]

Madhyamaka

7. *neṣṭaṃ tad api dhīrāṇāṃ vijñānaṃ paramārthasat |*
ekānekasvabhāvena⁹ viyogād gaganābjavat || (JSS 27)

[(b) JSS (T), SMVK (T), TBh, SS: *pāramārthikam* – (cd) cf. Madhyamakālāṅkā-
 rakārikā 1cd: *ekānekasvabhāvena viyogāt pratibimbavat* |]

| *rnam par śes pa don dam yod* | | *de yañ mkhas rnams mi 'dod de* |
 | *gcig dañ du ma'i rañ bzin dañ* | | *bral bas nam mkha'i padma bzin* |

[(ab) Pra: | *rnam śas de yañ don dam du* | | *yod par mkhas rnams mi 'dod de* |]

8. *na san nāsan na sadasan na cāpy anubhayātmakam |*

catuṣkoṭivinirmuktaṃ tattvaṃ mādhyamikā viduḥ || (JSS 28)

[(a) = Mūlamadhyamakakārikā I.7a, Acintyastava 9c, Śūnyatāsaptati 32c –
 (b) Sarvasiddhāntasaṅgraha III.7b: *na cobhābhyāṃ vilakṣaṇam* – (c) cf. Acintyastava 23a]

| *yod min med min yod med min* | | *gñis ka'i bdag ñid min pa'n min* |
 | *mtha' bzi rnam par grol ba yi* | | *de ñid dbu ma pa yis rig* |

[(b) P & Bu: *gñi ga'i*; Pra: *gñi ka'i* – (c) P: *rnam par gro ba yis*]

Sources for the Sanskrit Text

Verses 1–8: (1) VP (S) U 266–267 (vv. 1–8) – (2) VP (S) B 92b5–6 (vv. 1–4); 92b7–93a1 (vv. 5–6); 93a6 (vv. 7–8); 211b1 (v.2).

⁹ An interesting reworking of 6ab & 7c is found in the Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvali (p. 435), already noted by KAJIYAMA 1966: 147, n. 142: *grāhyagrāhaka-vaidhuryād vijñānaṃ paramārthasat | ekānekaviyogena vijñānasyāpi śūnyatā ||*

Verses 1, 3ab, 5, 6ab, 7: TBh 61.1–2, 63.15–16 (v. 1); 63.19 (v. 3ab); 68.12–13 (v. 5); 69.4 (v. 6ab); 70.4–5 (v.7) [all as cited by MIMAKI 1976: 186, 188].

Verses 6–8: SS 389.5–10 (vv. 6–8) [attributed to Sarahapāda].

Verse 8: Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā 174.11–12 and Sarvasiddhāntasaṅgraha III.7 [both as cited by MIMAKI 1976: 188]; Tattvaratnāvalī 19.21–22.

Sources for the Tibetan Text

D: Sde dge mtshal par bka' 'gyur, Dri med 'od Śrī 196b3–5, 197a1–2, 197b4–5 = Sde dge bstan 'gyur, Rgyud Da 25b3–5, 26a1–2, 26b4–5 [blocks are identical for text].

P: Peking bstan 'gyur, Rgyud 'grel Ka 221b2–5, 222a1–3, 223a2–4 [repeats text of vv. 5 & 6], 224a1–3.

Bu: Bu ston Rin chen grub Bka' 'bum, Kha 110a6–110b3, 110b7–111a2, 112a3–4 [see VP (T)].

Pra: Pradarśanānumatoddeśaparīkṣānāma, Peking bstan 'gyur, Rgyud 'grel Pu 41b3–42a1.

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- | | |
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| D | The Sde-dge mtshal-par bka'-'gyur vol. 102, Sde-dge bstan-'gyur Series vol. 12 (Delhi: Delhi Karmapae Chodhey Gyalwae Sungrab Partun Khang, 1977 & 1982). |
| JSS | Jñānasārasamuccaya: YAMAGUCHI 1944: 261–341 and MIMAKI 1976: 186–189. |
| JSSN | Jñānasārasamuccayanibandhana: MIMAKI 1976: 190–207. |
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- P DAISSETZ T. SUZUKI (ed.), *The Tibetan Tripitaka Peking Edition* (Tokyo-Kyoto: Tibetan Tripitaka Research Institute, 1955ff.).
- Pra Pradarśanānumatoddeśaparīkṣānāma, P 4610.
- (S) Sanskrit
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- ŚK Śrī Kālacakra
- SMVK Sugatamatavibhaṅgakārikā
- SMVBh Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāṣya
- SS CECIL BENDALL, *Subhāṣita-saṃgraha*. Le Muséon 4 (1903) 375–402.
- (T) Tibetan
- Tattvaratnāvalī HARAPRASAD SHASTRI, *Advayavajrasaṃgraha* (Barrackpore: Oriental Institute, 1927 [Gaekwad's Oriental Series 40]), p. 14–22.
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- TBh Tarkabhāṣā
- VP Vimalaprabhā
- VP (S) B Asiatic Society of Bengal MS G.10766; palmleaf; old Bengali script; dated 39th regnal year of Harivarman of Bengal (11th–12th century).
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Gonda, Jan: *Selected Studies*. Presented to the author by the Department of Indology, Utrecht University. Volume VI, Part 1–2. Leiden – New York – København – Köln: E. J. Brill, 1991. xxiv + 542p., x + 581p. Hfl. 550,-.

Zum siebzigsten Geburtstag von Jan Gonda (14. 4. 1905 – 28. 7. 1991 [s. den Nachruf von H. W. BODEWITZ, IJG 34 (1991) 281–286]) erschienen fünf Bände Kleiner Schriften, die Arbeiten bis in das Jahr 1970 enthalten (s. die Rezz. in JAOS 97 [1977] 242f., ZDMG 127 [1977] 216f. und OLZ 75 [1980] 68–70). Diese eindrucksvolle Reihe wird nun ergänzt und abgeschlossen durch zwei weitere umfangreiche Bände, die von der ungebrochenen Schaffenskraft des Verf. bis zu seinem Tode zeugen. Im Gegensatz zu den ersten fünf Bänden sind nun die Aufsätze, die überwiegend vedischen Themen gewidmet sind, nicht mehr nach Sachgruppen, sondern chronologisch geordnet. Zugleich wird die Bibliographie von J. Gonda, die in der Festschrift ‚India Maior‘ (Leiden 1972) erschienen ist, von D. Heilijgers vervollständigt. Zusammen mit den noch im Druck befindlichen Arbeiten ergeben sich immerhin insgesamt 720 Einträge. Dabei wird man bedauern, daß die Bibliographie nicht an einer Stelle vereinigt worden ist. Weitaus schmerzlicher vermißt man jedoch in allen Bänden Indizes, die als Wegweiser durch die nicht selten verschlungenen Pfade dieser Materialmasse ungemein hilfreich sein könnten. Vielleicht läßt sich das in einem siebenten Band, der auch die heute noch unveröffentlichten Schriften enthalten könnte, nachholen. Zunächst aber gebührt Henk W. Bodewitz Dank dafür, daß er, wie aus dem Vorwort ersichtlich, den vorliegenden Band gestaltet hat.

O. v. Hinüber

Roth, Heinrich: *The Sanskrit Grammar and Manuscripts of Father Heinrich Roth S.J. (1620–1668)*. Facsimile Edition of Biblioteca Nazionale, Rome, Mss. Or. 171 and 172 with an Introduction by Arnulf Camps and Jean-Claude Muller. Leiden – New York – København – Köln: E. J. Brill, 1988. 25p., 48 + 34 fol. Hfl. 140,-.

Hätte es trotz der Brüder Schlegel, Friedrich Rückerts, Franz Bopps und anderer noch eines weiteren Beweises dafür bedurft, daß der Same der indologischen Forschung in der deutschen Gelehrsamkeit schon früh einen besonderen Boden fand, so könnte man meinen, er wäre durch die bisher nur aus sekundären Berichten bekannte, nun aber als Faksimile reproduzierte Grammatik des deutschen Jesuiten Heinrich Roth aus Dillingen endgültig erbracht. R. war der erste Europäer, der eine Sanskrit-Grammatik verfaßte. Die Gelegenheit dazu hatte er als Missionar in Agra zwischen 1660 und 1662. Doch was nach dem Abschluß dieser Arbeit folgte, ist die aufregende Geschichte einer Handschrift, deren Drucklegung während mehr als 300 Jahren scheiterte, einer Handschrift, die, mehrmals verloren und wieder entdeckt geglaubt, über den Tod so manch eines bemühten Gelehrten hinaus sich stets ihrer Herausgabe entzog, bis es A. Camps in 20 schicksalhaften Jahren des Ringens schließlich doch gelang, die Widerspenstige (Ms. Orientali 171 der Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale in Rom) zu zählen.

Camps hatte R.s Manuskript im Jahre 1967, nachdem es seit 1800 als verschollen galt, in Rom aufspüren können. Dennoch mußte man bis 1988

warten, um dieses früheste Zeugnis der ersten gründlichen Durchdringung der Grammatik des Sanskrit durch einen Europäer in Händen halten zu können. Geschichte und Inhalt dieser Handschrift sowie zweier Sanskrit-Texte (Ms. Orientali 172) aus R.s Besitz beschreiben und dokumentieren drei in die Edition einleitende Essays sowie eine Bibliographie.

R., der – wohl auf der Grundlage des *Sārasvatavyākaraṇa*, zweifellos aber in einer einheimischen Tradition – sechs Jahre Unterricht bei einem Paṇḍit nahm, hatte sein Werk, die „*Grammatica Linguae Sanscetanae Brahmanum Indiae Orientalis*“, in fünf Kapitel gegliedert: „*Caput 1m De Orthographia*“ (fol. 3–11), „*Caput 2m De Declinationibus Nominum*“ (12–21), „*Caput 3m De Coniugationibus Verborum*“ (22–36^r), „*Caput 4m De Verbalibus seu kṛdām-tah*“ (36^v–41), „*Caput 5m De Syntaxi huius Linguae*“ (42–47^r).

Das zweite Manuskript von R. enthält *Veṇḍattas Pañcatattvapraṇāsa* und *Sadānandas Vedāntasāra*. Beide Texte sind ebenfalls als Faksimilia beigegeben (fol. 1–17, 18–34). Sie wurden von R. teilweise recht ausführlich glossiert, was deutlich macht, daß er es zu einem gründlichen Verständnis zumindest dieses *Kośa* und *Śāstra* gebracht haben mußte – wenn auch mit der Intention einer missionarisch erfolgreichen „Disputation mit den Heyden und Brachmännern“. Doch die Herausgabe auch dieser Texte empfahl sich nicht nur aus missions- und wissenschaftsgeschichtlicher Sicht, sondern auch deshalb, weil die beiden sehr genau kopierten Manuskripte eine beachtliche zeitliche Nähe zur Abfassung der Originale beanspruchen können (der Abstand zu *Veṇḍatta* beträgt nur ca. 16 Jahre, der zu *Sadānanda* etwa 170). Das vorliegende Werk birgt daher auch vorzügliches Quellenmaterial für künftige Editionen des *Pañcatattvapraṇāsa* und des *Vedāntasāra*.

W. Slaje

Bollée, Willem B.: *Materials for an Edition and Study of the Piṇḍa- and Oha-Nijjuttis of the Svetāmbara Jain Tradition*. [Beiträge zur Südasienforschung, Bd. 142]. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1991. XV + 160p. DM 38,-.

B. setzt mit diesem sorgfältig gearbeiteten, druckfehlerarmen Band sein hilfreiches Bemühen fort, durch die Bereitstellung von Pāda-Indizes (samt deren rückläufiger Anordnung) die philologische Untersuchung mittelindischer metrisch verfaßter Werke zu erleichtern. Geschlossene Wiedergaben der beiden hier vorgelegten, im wesentlichen auf der Grundlage der selten gewordenen indischen Pothī-Drucke (*ŚrīmadDroṇācāryasūtritavṛttibhūṣitā śrīmatī Oghaniryuktiḥ*. Surat 1957 und *ŚrīmadBhadrabāhusvāmipraṇītā sabhāṣyā śrīman-Malayagiryācāryavivṛttā śrīPiṇḍaniryuktiḥ*. Bombay 1918 = Surat 1958) erstellten Texte sollen als zweiter Teil folgen.

Es handelt sich um 1134 Strophen der *Ohanijjutti* (davon werden 322 in der Tradition als *Bhāṣya* gezählt) und 717 der *Piṇḍanijjutti* (davon 46 *Bhāṣya*), zu denen jeweils noch einige sog. *prakṣipta*-Strophen treten. Zwar dürften die *Oghaniryukti*, eine elaborierte Darlegung einer komplexen Mönchsregel, und die *Piṇḍaniryukti* mit ihren ganz besonders spezialisierten Speiseregeln als Einzelwerke nur die Aufmerksamkeit weniger beanspruchen; doch bilden sie im Gesamtzusammenhang der disziplinären Jaina-Schriften und der teilweise parallel laufenden Überlieferungen der beiden anderen indischen Hochreligionen wichtige Fixpunkte, die immer wieder das Interesse am direkten Textvergleich herausfordern werden.

Bisher standen zum Nachschlagen allenfalls der *Pratīka*-Index der *Āgama-daya Samiti* von 1928, der auch die Strophenanfänge von *Nandī*, *Anuogadārā*, *Āvassayanijjutti*, *Dasaveyāliya* und *Uttarajjhayaṇa* (jeweils mit *Nijjutti*) enthält, und die in Berlin angelegte Konkordanz der Strophen des Jaina-Kanons (s. CH. TRIPATHI, *The Jaina Concordance* in Berlin – A Bibliographical Report.

In: Studien zum Jainismus und Buddhismus. Gs. L. Alsdorf. Wiesbaden 1981, p. 301–329) zur Verfügung.

Abgesehen von seltenen Anuṣṭubh-Strophen, die als Zitate zu betrachten sind, liegt ausschließlich das Āryā-Metrum vor. Die regelmäßig auftretende Zäsur (d. h. Wortende oder Kompositionsfüge) nach dem 3. *gana* gestattet die Aufteilung der beiden Halbstrophen der Āryā in *pādas*. Während nur sehr wenige Halbstrophen scheinbar ganz zäsurlos sind, liegt jedoch manchmal die Zäsur wie in der alten Āryā hinter der ersten More des 4. *gana*. Die dadurch entstehenden ‚akephalen‘ b- und d-Pādas hätten abgetrennt und innerhalb der alphabetischen Ordnung aufgelistet werden können. Gelegentlich entsprechen sie einem ungeraden Anuṣṭubh-Pāda und weisen durch ihre Form möglicherweise auf einen älteren Text zurück (z. B. OBh 271cd *khālagadāruḡatāvaḡana-rakkhaṇaṭṭhā aho pehe*). Auch diejenigen Strophen, in denen die 1. More des 4. *gana* durch ein Enklitikon gebildet wird, gehören zu diesem Typus. B. läßt, wie es ja freilich üblich geworden ist, die betreffenden Pādas mit *ca*, *tu*, *pi* oder *hi* beginnen, begründet das aber auf p. XIV mit dem mechanischen Vorgang der Index-Erstellung. Dieser hat noch einige Sonderbarkeiten bewirkt, die sich wohl hätten redigieren lassen (s. bes. p. 160b u.), aber auch nicht zu sehr stören.

Auf eine möglichst konsequente Vereinheitlichung der Orthographie wurde leider verzichtet. Sie hätte, obwohl für den Hrsg. sicherlich mühevoll, dem künftigen Benützer manche Überlegungen ersparen können, etwa die, ob *khitta-* für *kṣipta-* oder für *kṣetra-* steht (in diesem Falle neben *khett°*, das ebenfalls vorkommt, aber durch eine Textseite von *khitt°* getrennt ist). Andererseits gibt bereits die Transkription – z. B. durch Bindestriche zwischen Kompositionsgliedern und richtige Worttrennung – wertvolle Verständnishilfen für den nicht immer klaren Sinn dieser Memorialstrophen, die oft des Kommentars bedürften.

Dem Autor dieses nützlichen Bandes gebührt unser Dank!

A. Mette

Vetter, Tilmann: *The Ideas and Meditative Practices of Early Buddhism*. Leiden – New York – København – Köln: E. J. Brill, 1988. XXXVII + 110p. Hfl. 42,50.

Dieses schmale Werk ist ohne Übertreibung einer der wichtigsten Beiträge zur Erkenntnis des ältesten Buddhismus und seiner ersten Entwicklungen seit langem zu nennen. Es ist ein Meilenstein im Gange unserer Wissenschaft bei aller Bescheidenheit, die es sich in Form, Umfang und in der Vorsicht beim Formulieren seiner Vorschläge gibt.

Aus einer Vorlesung entstanden, die ideengeschichtlich in den frühen Buddhismus einführen sollte, ist es eine in vielfacher Weise neue These zum Entstehen der wesentlichen Inhalte des ältesten Buddhismus geworden: was an ihnen dem Buddha selbst zuzurechnen ist, wie und warum Buddha selbst die Lehre fortbildet, wie und warum weitere sich an den Buddha anschließende Gruppen, durch ähnliche und durch abweichende Motive bewegt, diese Lehre fortbildeten oder erweitern.

V.s Arbeit ist eine logische Folge der Aufdeckung verschiedenartiger Widersprüche und Ungereimtheiten in den Quellen des ältesten Buddhismus, die in den letzten Jahrzehnten in mehreren Bereichen gelungen ist (vgl. dazu V., *Recent Research on the Most Ancient Form of Buddhism*. In: *Buddhism and its Relation to Other Religions*. Fs. Sh. Kumoi. Kyoto 1985, p. 67–85). BAREAUS Arbeiten zur Buddha-Biographie, FRAUWALLNERS und später SCHMITHAUSENS Beobachtungen zu bestimmten Lehrinhalten, zum ‚Abhängigen Entstehen‘ und zur Struktur des Erlösungsweges, und BRONKHORSTS Untersuchungen zum Bereich der Meditationspraktiken haben Widersprüche deutlich gemacht,

deren Erklärung immer dringender wurde. Die z. T. großen Divergenzen und in genauer inhaltlicher Analyse sich als heterogene Elemente enthaltend erweisenden Lehrkomplexe sogar in den ältesten Schichten der kanonischen Literatur haben, soweit sie sich auf die Lehre vom Entstehen des Leidens beziehen, schon FRAUWALLNER im ersten Band seiner ‚Geschichte der indischen Philosophie‘ (1956) zur Hypothese genötigt, der Buddha habe, teils verschiedene Bedürfnisse seiner Hörer berücksichtigend, teils im Laufe des langen Predigerlebens ältere Ideen weiter aus- und umarbeitend, ohne sich dabei gleichzeitig um ein System oder gar systematische Vollständigkeit zu bemühen, diese Divergenzen selbst verursacht. FRAUWALLNERS methodologischer Vorschlag, diese heterogenen Elemente als Ausfluß einer Entwicklung im Denken des Buddha selbst zu deuten, erwies sich in der Folgezeit durch die Aufdeckung weiterer Divergenzen und die breite Streuung der betroffenen Lehrbereiche einerseits und durch eine vertiefte Analyse der vorgegebenen Inhalte andererseits als nicht mehr haltbar.

V. geht nun den eingeschlagenen Weg konsequent weiter, indem er, von den als chronologische Unterschiede und verschiedene Milieus implizierend gedeuteten Divergenzen ausgehend, neuerlich die Frage stellt, welche Inhalte auf den Buddha selbst zurückgeführt werden können. Einem kurzen methodologischen Vorwort folgen eine Einführung über den historischen Buddha, die Legende und eine das Wesentliche zusammenfassende Darstellung der Inhalte und Ziele der nach V.s Ansicht ältesten Gestalt des Buddhismus.

Im Hauptteil, den im einzelnen vorzustellen wegen seiner inhaltlichen Fülle und Präzision der Rahmen dieser Besprechung verbietet, gliedert V. die Kapitel nach der Zugehörigkeit ihrer Themen zu den verschiedenen Erlösungswegen:

Zunächst stellt er den Weg der „Dhyāna-Meditation“ dar, der für V. als „mittlerer Weg“ die entscheidende Entdeckung des Buddha ist. Dann wird der Weg der „unterscheidenden Einsicht“ (*pañña*-) besprochen, das Thema der ‚zweiten Predigt von Benares‘ mit der Bestimmung des personalen Konstituenten als „Nicht-Selbst“ (*anattā*) im Zentrum. Hier hat auch die Analyse des ‚Abhängigen Entstehens‘ ihren Platz. Schließlich wird die sog. „Sphären-Meditation“ (*āyatana*-) als eine Ergänzung des Weges der „unterscheidenden Einsicht“ aus heterogenen Quellen besprochen. Der Schlußteil ist dem Begriff des Karma und seiner funktionalen Entwicklung gewidmet. Ein Appendix behandelt den besonderen, extrem apophatischen Mystizismus im Aṭṭhakavagga des Suttanipāṭa und das Entstehen dieser spirituellen Tradition (vgl. nun auch V., *Some Remarks on Older Parts of the Suttanipāṭa*. In: *Earliest Buddhism and Madhyamaka*, edd. D. S. RUEGG – L. SCHMITHAUSEN. Leiden 1990, p. 36–56).

Dazu zwei Anmerkungen:

(1) Die Interpretation des Wortes *sabbattatāya* in der Standardformulierung für die Übung der vier *appamāṇa*- als „identifying himself with everything“ (p. 27) scheint mir verfehlt, obwohl sie gerade durch Buddhaghosa gestützt scheint. Da das Wort von zwei weiteren Adverbien allgemein lokaler Bedeutung eingeschlossen ist und einer Gruppe von drei konkreten Ortsadverbien folgt, kann ich auch in ihm nur ein Ortsadverb sehen. Es ist wohl am einfachsten, es als Kasusadverb des Abstrakts von *sabbatta* (skt. *sarvatra*) zu deuten, das als Nebenform des gewöhnlichen *sabbattha* obsolet geworden war und zu Buddhaghosas Zeit nicht mehr verstanden wurde.

(2) Trotz der eindeutigen Gestalt der Texte der sog. ‚zweiten Predigt von Benares‘, die SCHMITHAUSEN (Gs. Alsdorf [1981] 219ff.) und V. veranlaßt haben, hier im Anattapariyāya den Reflex eines eigenen Erlösungsweges zu sehen, dessen Mittel in der „unterscheidenden Einsicht“ ohne Bezug auf eine „Dhyāna-Meditation“ besteht, habe ich Hemmungen dieser Deutung zu folgen. Für mich hat der Schlußteil mit seiner sekundär verwendeten formelhaften Beschreibung des Resultats dieses ‚Weges‘ elliptischen Charakter: die medita-

tive Einübung wäre zwar nicht erwähnt, aber damit auch nicht notwendig ausgeschlossen. Meiner Meinung enthalten die Anattapariyāya-Texte Übungsanweisungen für die Betrachtung der Konstituenten zum Zwecke der Beseitigung der Bindungen an ein ‚Ich‘ und sind ursprünglich eher als begleitende Übungen oder Ergänzungen für die „Dhyāna-Meditation“ anzusehen denn als einen Erlösungsweg eigener Art anbietend (vgl. auch SCHMITHAUSEN, loc. cit., p. 222).

Die entscheidende Frage für die Beurteilung des Wertes der Ergebnisse von V.s Arbeit ist wohl die methodologische. Daß die Methode, mit Hilfe des Textvergleiches der verschiedenen Überlieferungen zu einem ältesten Kern zu gelangen, Grenzen hat, ist in Anbetracht der Tatsache, daß wir letztlich an einer Periode mündlicher Überlieferung interessiert sind, nur natürlich, und daß bei einer mechanischen Vorgangsweise Gefahren lauern, ebenso. Welcher Methode kann man sich aber über eine historische hinaus noch bedienen? Ich darf die Antwort mit einer Anekdote geben:

Frauwaller hat einmal, befragt nach seiner besonderen Methode, gesagt, die Methode bestünde darin, die Augen aufzumachen und sich dabei etwas zu denken. Das heißt aber, daß nach jeder Bestandsaufnahme nichts anderes mehr bleibt, als sinnhaft zusammenhängende geistige Gestalten zu erkennen, in denen unpassende Elemente als solche bestimmt werden müssen und ihr Auftreten als Ergebnis eines Wandels zusammen mit den Motiven für einen solchen Wandel erkannt werden muß. Genau diese Arbeit des Durchdenkens der ältesten Überlieferung hat V. hier beispielhaft versucht.

Viele von V.s Gedanken und Interpretationsideen, die durchwegs in vorsichtig hypothetischer, aber dennoch immer deutlicher Sprache vorgetragen sind, werden in all ihren Konsequenzen für das Verständnis der ältesten Schichten der buddhistischen Quellen berücksichtigt werden müssen, und selbst wenn man ihnen nicht oder nicht in jeder Hinsicht folgen möchte, wird man sich mit ihnen auseinandersetzen und eine andere und bessere Erklärung anbieten müssen. Sie überhaupt nicht zur Kenntnis zu nehmen wird in Hinkunft sicher nicht möglich sein.

E. Steinkellner

Oberlies, Thomas: *Studie zum Cāndravyākaraṇa*. Eine kritische Bearbeitung von Candra IV.4.52–148 und V.2. [Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien 38]. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden, 1989. [7 +] 295p. DM 58,-.

This is the first book on the Cāndravyākaraṇa (CV) to appear outside India in more than half a century, and it constitutes a welcome addition to the study of this much-neglected grammar. O. studies some portions of this grammar, not only on the basis of LIEBICH's and CHATTERJI's earlier editions, but also of a number of thus far unknown manuscripts, discovered and filmed by the Nepal-German Manuscript Preservation Project.

The introduction announces (p. 22) an elaborate commentary on the translation of the *adhyāyas* which deal with nominal composition, viz., C II.2, IV.4.52–148, and V.2. On p. 26 this announcement is limited to some extent by explaining that C II.2 is not translated. The Skt. text of this section is however presented in an appendix (p. 265–292), along with *variae lectiones* of the mss. This same appendix presents also the texts of some portions of C V.2 which do not deal with nominal composition, viz., C V.2.106–112, 133–138, 140–143, and 146, again with vv.ll. (p. 293–295). The text of the remaining portions is presented in the main body of the book, along with their translation and commentary.

The removal of certain *sūtras* from C V.2 has the obvious disadvantage that it disrupts at times the continuity of the *sūtra*-text, and thus obscures the

anuvṛtti. C V.2.144 (*vahe*), for example, requires the *anuvṛtti* of *ikaḥ* from *sūtra* 142 which, however, has been removed from its context and placed in the appendix.

The introduction points out (p. 21) that five, in the case of C II.2 even eight, mss. underlie the text translated. P. 26 goes to the extent of speaking of "Textkonstituierung" as one of the aims of the present book. This suggests that O. has reedited the Skt. text presented here. However, this is not the case. The text has been reproduced from LIEBICH's edition, while variants found in the mss. have been added in notes. This means that the translation does not always translate the Skt. text presented (see, e.g., p. 63n. 23 and 26, 79n. 56–58, 97n. 89, etc.). Nor has a stemma been produced of the available mss., which reduces the amount of information that can be derived from these. The fact that all these mss. share occasionally the same error (cf. p. 72n. 43, 107n. 108, 113n. 122, 130n. 11, 132n. 17, 183n. 149) suggests that they all go back to an archetype which already deviated from the original CV.

A special feature of the book is the amount of space that has been reserved for a discussion of the examples, a large number of which could be shown to occur in Skt. literature. An equally considerable number, on the other hand, could not be traced. This, as O. points out in the introduction, will at least in part be due to the fact that only a small portion of Skt. literature is accessible through lexicons, indices, etc.

The first twenty pages of the introduction discuss research already done on the CV. Here (as well as in the bibliography) one searches in vain for a reference to ANNA RADICCHI's 'La teoria pāṇiniana dei Samāsa secondo l'interpretazione delle scuole grammaticali indiane dal quinto all'ottavo secolo d.C.', the first part of which (Firenze 1985) contains a chapter on Candā (p. 54–79), half of it dealing with his treatment of nominal composition.

This part of the introduction discusses questions such as authorship, date and geographical location of the CV, as well as its relationship to the Kāśikā Vṛtti. Unfortunately O. has proceeded here less cautiously than in the remainder of his book. Rather than dealing with these questions in this review, I shall discuss the issues concerned in a separate article (to be published in the Felicitation Volume for George Cardona).

J. Bronkhorst

Das, Rahul Peter: *Das Wissen von der Lebensspanne der Bäume*. Surapālas Vṛkṣāyurveda kritisch ediert, übersetzt und kommentiert. Mit einem Nachtrag von G. J. MEULENBELD zu seinem Verzeichnis 'Sanskrit Names of Plants and their Botanical Equivalents'. [Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien 34]. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden, 1988. ix + 589p. DM 148,-.

Présenté comme dissertation doctorale à l'Université de Hambourg, l'ouvrage comble à souhait une lacune dans la connaissance de la littérature āyurvédique, dont relèvent également les textes techniques d'arboriculture. En effet, la médecine indienne est conçue comme un savoir de longue vie (*āyurveda*), applicable au règne vivant tout entier, qu'il soit animal ou végétal. Cette conception nous autorise à rapprocher le «somatisme» philosophique (St. SCHAYER, A. KUNST) et les théories relatives aux rapports entre les trois règnes de la Nature, dont l'*ātman* représente le substrat ontologique.

Depuis la Chāndogyaopaniṣad jusqu'aux commentaires sanskrits tardifs, médicaux (Cakrapāṇi) ou philosophiques (Śaṅkaramiśra, Vijñānabhikṣu), on retrouve l'idée que les plantes sont pourvues d'une certaine sensibilité, voire conscience (Nīlakaṇṭha, glossateur du Mahābhārata; cf. A. MISRA, Consciousness in Plants. Indian Journal of History of Science 9 [1974] 178–184). Il n'y a

pas de solution de continuité entre les différents niveaux de la réalité, palpable ou subtile, qui apparaît ainsi comme un *continuum*. Ce sont justement ces conceptions anciennes, notamment upanishadiques, qui, au début du siècle, ont conduit le savant bengali Jagadish Chandra Bose (1858–1937) à ses expériences sur la physiologie végétale. Dans ce même sillage intellectuel, il est loisible de mentionner les travaux botaniques effectués dans l'Inde du Sud pour étudier l'influence stimulante des sons musicaux sur la croissance des plantes (voir notre ouvrage *Les conceptions psychologiques dans les textes médicaux indiens*. Paris 1978, p. 20–21).

Dans la courte introduction intitulée «Zur Landwirtschaft und zum Gartenbau im alten Indien» (p. 1–3), D. réserve une note à la matière āyurvédique (n. 2), sans vouloir apparemment s'éloigner du cadre strict du sujet. Les considérations philosophiques ou autres, évoquées ci-dessus, ne lui semblaient probablement pas pertinentes dans un ouvrage consacré à une branche technique du savoir indien. Quoi qu'il en soit, le propos, plus qu'une allusion fugitive (p. 2), aurait mérité quelques développements d'ordre historique ou culturel pour donner perspective et relief à la présence du végétal dans le monde indien. Les documents littéraires et les monuments d'art en témoignent d'une manière significative, comme vient de montrer une récente thèse munichoise, de peu ultérieure à l'ouvrage sous rubrique (RENATE SYED, *Die Flora Altindiens in Literatur und Kunst*. Diss. München 1990).

D. souligne avec raison la grande portée du sujet, qui, examiné attentivement dans la littérature lui appartenant en propre, est aussi mentionné ou traité dans certains textes d'un genre différent (architecture, administration, etc.) ou à caractère encyclopédique (Purāṇa, etc.). Les traités d'agriculture et d'horticulture conservés ainsi que les notations à ce sujet dans d'autres sources indiennes conduisent l'auteur à en déduire que les deux thèmes ont prêté matière à une ample littérature technique. L'intérêt pour ce domaine spécialisé semble fléchir au moyen âge finissant, puisque plusieurs documents techniques se sont perdus et ne survivent que par leurs titres connus grâce aux citations. Mais, en Inde, il y a d'autres raisons susceptibles d'expliquer cette disparition de sources manuscrites (conditions climatiques, vicissitudes de l'histoire).

Quoi qu'il en soit, à notre époque, on remarque un certain renouveau d'intérêt savant pour la littérature agro-horticole indienne, dont les textes sont pour la plupart en sanskrit. Dans ce canton, peu étudié, D. a fait un grand effort, afin de livrer aux spécialistes une première information, aussi substantielle que possible, sur l'état présent de la recherche, bien qu'une ample bibliographie en la matière reste toujours un des *desiderata* āyurvédiques. L'ouvrage contient plusieurs listes bibliographiques, dont la fragmentation, qui ne s'imposait pas forcément, rend moins aisé le maniement du volume. En effet, le «Verzeichnis» des sources pour l'édition du texte de Surapāla (p. 22–41), avec son complément (p. 42–46), est précédé de la littérature secondaire spécifique (agriculture et horticulture), divisée en deux listes: bibliographie de bibliographies (p. 4–6) et titres manquants à ces dernières (p. 6–16). Il s'y ajoute la bibliographie générale de l'ouvrage (p. 523–542) et les références complémentaires qui figurent dans les «Nachträge und Berichtigungen» (p. 502–522).

D'après la notice consacrée au Vṛkṣāyurveda (p. 17–18), l'auteur Surapāla, appelé aussi Sureśvara ou Sureśa, est originaire du Bengale, où il vécut au XI^e–XII^e siècle. Issu d'une famille de *vaidyas* princiers, Surapāla fut lui aussi médecin d'un roitelet, qui, en dépit de son nom de Bhīmapāla, n'appartenait pas à la dynastie Pāla, ou du moins sa branche principale, qui régnait à l'époque au Bengale. Écrit apparemment pour ce prince, le Vṛkṣāyurveda semble être, jusqu'à ce jour, le plus ancien traité sanskrit d'arbori-horticulture qui soit conservé en entier.

On doit au meme auteur un glossaire médico-botanique intitulé Śābdapradīpa et l'opuscule Lohasarvasva, qui traite de métaux, et non seulement du fer (p. 17), car *loha* est ici employé au sens large du terme comme souvent en Rasasāstra. Appelé aussi Lohapaddhati, cet ouvrage iatrochimique en 318 stances, qui cite Suśruta, Hārīta, Vyādi et Nāgārjuna (stances 6 et 23), est mentionné dans certains traités tardifs tels que le Rasakāmadhenu. Sureśvara, qui se réfère à huit sortes de métaux, en décrit seulement quatre, à savoir le fer (*tīkṣṇa*), le mica (*abhra*), l'or (*hema*) et le cuivre (*arka* [stances 7–8]). Il n'est pas inutile de préciser que jusqu'à présent le Lohasarvasva était rapporté au XVe siècle dans les manuels indiens de Rasasāstra (cf. S. N. MISHRA, Āyurvediya Rasashāstra. Varanasi – Delhi 1981, p. 41–42), dont la chronologie est toute relative. Une analyse du texte iatrochimique de Sureśvara pourrait contribuer à mieux situer dans le temps aussi bien ce document médiéval que l'auteur du Vṛkṣāyurveda.

En attendant, D. fournit l'édition critique du traité d'horticulture en 325 stances, parfois communs avec d'autres sources sanskrits, toutes répertoriées (p. 22–41). L'auteur joint à cette liste la concordance entre le manuscrit unique, sur lequel s'appuie l'édition, et les textes parallèles (p. 47–52). Ces *testimonia* de la tradition indirecte («Sekundärüberlieferung») ont été jugés, dans certains cas, préférables à la source manuscrite, dont le texte est corrompu par endroits. Le texte est établi avec un soin extrême. En effet, l'apparat critique signale toutes les variantes relevées dans le manuscrit bodléien et les témoignages secondaires, qu'ils soient antérieurs ou postérieurs à Sureśvara. La traduction allemande, aussi fidèle que possible sans être lourde, est accompagnée de notes massives (p. 53–424). Elles concernent pour la plupart l'identification des noms de plantes, qui entraîne des commentaires laborieux (cf. la discussion du *pañcamūla*, p. 217–221). Il s'y ajoute l'important appendice botanique de M., qui recouvre la majeure partie des phytonymes sanskrits du Vṛkṣāyurveda (p. 425–465).

En complément à l'édition du traité de Surapāla, D. a jugé utile, avec raison, de publier, sous forme d'appendices, quatre courts documents inédits (manuscripts uniques), qui présentent un intérêt particulier pour la littérature technique indienne d'arboriculture (p. 466–501). L'ouvrage se termine par quatre copieux index: *pādas* de Surapāla (p. 543–557), termes sanskrits (p. 558–570), nomenclature binaire des plantes (p. 571–580), sujets et noms propres sanskrits (p. 581–589).

Quelques remarques de détail sur cet ouvrage hautement philologique, dont les imperfections matérielles (coquilles, inadvertances, etc.) sont rares, mais humainement inévitables dans un livre de grande érudition et de volume imposant:

p. 3n. 9 – à propos de Gorakṣa, on doit noter que ce maître du mouvement Nātha, dont la biographie est légendaire et la date incertaine, est crédité de plusieurs textes tantriques, parmi lesquels une *saṃhitā* en deux parties, dont la seconde relève du Rasasāstra. Cet ouvrage est édité en 2 volumes par JANĀRDANA PĀNDEYA (Varanasi 1976–1977). Cf. T. GOUDRIAAN – S. GUPTA, Hindu Tantric and Śākta Literature. Wiesbaden 1981, p. 55, 87, 159.

p. 67, l. 7 – la Bhānumatī (sur Suśruta, Sūtra 45, 4, non 5) confirme la bonne leçon *saro divyakhātam*.

p. 116, stance 35: au sujet du *jāṅgalānūpa*, voir F. ZIMMERMANN, La jungle et le fumet des viandes. Paris 1982.

p. 217, A3 – le stance de Bhāvamiśra, cité de seconde main, ne figure apparemment pas dans le Bhāvaprakāśanighaṇṭu, publié avec commentaire en hindi par K. C. CHUNKEKAR et G. S. PANDEY (Varanasi 1979). Dans l'énumération des sept plantes, le *kharjūra* est omis.

p. 380, A2 – symbole de l'âme migrante, *hamṣa*, que J. Ph. VOGEL traduit par «oie», signifie pour d'autres «canard sauvage» (J. FILLIOZAT); cf. M.-Th. DE MALLMANN, Les enseignements iconographiques de l'Agni-Purana. Paris 1963, p. 230–231.

p. 502, l. 11–12 – *bheṣaja* (← *bhiṣaj* «médecin») veut dire «remède», non «Heilpflanze»; cf. J. JOLLY, *Medicin*. Strassburg 1901, p. 17, § 16.4 (ce titre manque à la bibliographie).

Ces observations minimes, même multipliées, ne sauraient diminuer la valeur documentaire de ce livre préparé avec le plus grand soin et scrupule scientifique. Même si sa lecture s'avère parfois ardue, la présente contribution de D. est un précieux instrument de travail, dont disposeront dorénavant les indianistes, en général, et les historiens de l'Āyurveda, en particulier.

A. Roṣu

Somadeva: Der Ozean der Erzählungsströme. Herausgegeben von Johannes Mehlig. Band 1–2. Leipzig – Weimar: Kiepenheuer, 1991. 1116p., 856p.

Die vorliegende Übersetzung von Somadevas großartigem Kathāsaritsāgara (KSS) stellt die erste vollständige Übersetzung dieses Meisterwerks der Sanskrit-Literatur in die deutsche Sprache dar. Grundlage der Übersetzung bildet die durch WĀSUDEV LAXMAṆ ŚĀSTRĪ PAṆŚĪKAR revidierte, von DURGĀPRASĀD und KĀŚĪNĀTH PĀNDURANG PARAB besorgte Edition (Bombay 1930), die der älteren Ausgabe von HERMANN BROCKHAUS (Bd. 1–3, Leipzig 1839–1866) – wie längst bekannt – deutlich überlegen ist.

Eine den verschiedenen Maßstäben, die man an eine solche bewundernswerte Bemühung – die ja immer auch ein Wagnis sein muß – anlegen kann, gerecht werdende Beurteilung ist keine leichte Sache. Vom indologischen Standpunkt aus betrachtet kommt man durchaus zu einem anderen Ergebnis als von der Warte des grundsätzlichen Erfordernisses aus, daß auch deutsche Übersetzungen von Sanskrit-Werken, die Bestandteil der Weltliteratur sind, eines Tages ja doch einmal einem breiteren Publikum vorgelegt werden müssen. Zwar will Somadeva, der sprachgewandte Meister erlesenen Geschmacks und gefälligen Stiles, selbstverständlich in seiner eigenen Sprache genossen sein; jeder aber, der des Sanskrit mächtig ist, wird M. Dank für die Einlösung dieser Verpflichtung der deutschsprachigen Indologie gegenüber der sie tragenden Gesellschaft schulden.

Was den wissenschaftlichen Gehalt der Übersetzung betrifft – über die Begründetheit des Anspruchs M.s, „einen bescheidenen Beitrag zur deutschen Übersetzungsliteratur beizusteuern“ (II/830), wird von der Literaturwissenschaft zu befinden sein –, so erfüllt er, wie mit wirklichem Bedauern festzuhalten ist, leider gar nicht die berechnete Erwartung, das derzeit Mögliche verwirklicht zu haben. So wurde die für die philologische Auseinandersetzung mit dem KSS wichtigste, immer noch maßgebliche Arbeit von J. S. Speyer (*Studies about the Kathāsaritsāgara*. Amsterdam 1908), der den KSS ja bekanntlich auch für seine Sanskrit Syntax (Leiden 1886) umfänglich ausgezogen hat – die demgemäß ein zusätzliches Hilfsmittel für die richtige Interpretation des KSS ist –, nur in der Bibliographie, doch beileibe nicht für die Übersetzungsarbeit berücksichtigt. Diese fatale Mißachtung der durch den wohl besten Kenner des KSS detailliert geäußerten und begründeten Kritik an H. BROCKHAUS' Ausgabe sowie an der englischen Übersetzung C. H. TAWNEYS (Vol. I–II, Calcutta 1880–1887), die besonders in den Abschnitten „List of corrections to be made in PW and PWK“ (SPEYER 1908: 76–87) sowie „List of passages, the text of which has been improved in [Ed.] D[urgāprasād]“ (ibid., p. 94–173; zu dieser Edition vgl. die von LOKESH CHANDRA in der Serie „Sanskrit Texts from Kashmir“, Vol. 3–4 [= Śata-Piṭaka Series, Vol. 305–306. Delhi 1982] neuerdings

bequem zugänglich gemachte Śārādā-Handschrift, die, zweifelsfrei zur selben Überlieferungslinie wie die genannte Ausgabe gehörig, eine Anzahl wichtiger, berücksichtigungswürdiger Varianten enthält) eine Fülle unschätzbarer Textverbesserungs- und Übersetzungsvorschläge bietet, nimmt der Arbeit M.s viel von ihrem fachwissenschaftlichen Wert. Ein paar wenige, vor allem der für die literaturgeschichtliche Einordnung des Werks wichtigen Einleitung in den KSS entnommene und von SPEYER ausführlich diskutierte Beispiele mögen zur Demonstration dieses Sachverhalts genügen:

KSS I 3cd *brhatkathāyāḥ sārasya, saṃgrahaṃ racayāmy aham* // „verfasse ich diese den wahren Kern der ›Brhatkathā‹ enthaltende Sammlung der Erzählungen“ (I/5). Die Fügung *brhatkathāyāḥ sārasya ... saṃgrahaḥ* erscheint auch am Ende des Werkes (in der 12. Strophe der *granthakartuḥ praśastiḥ* [p. 597]), wo sie als „Zusammenfassung des ... wertvollsten Kerns der Brhatkathā“ (II/769) übersetzt wird. Vgl. dazu SPEYER (1908: 9): „Summary of the quintessence of Brhatkathā“.

KSS I 10cd *granthavistarasaṃkṣepa, mātram bhāṣā ca bhidyate* // „Allein die Sprache ist hier gedrängter, um eine unnötige Ausweitung des Buches zu vermeiden“ (I/6). Bei Berücksichtigung von SPEYERS Paraphrase „he has only abridged it and made a Sanskrit poem of it“ (ibid.) hätte diese sinnentstellte ‚Übersetzung‘ (ähnlich TAWNEY I/2: „only such language is selected as tends to abridge the prolixity of the work“) nicht passieren können.

KSS I 11 *aucityānvayarakṣā ca, yathāśakti vidhīyate | kathārasāvighātena, kāvyāṃśasya ca yojanā* // „Nach besten Kräften habe ich mich bemüht, den schicklichsten Zusammenhang zu wahren. Weil ich die Grundstimmungen in den Erzählungen nicht gestört habe, kann man das Werk getrost zur Gattung der (sic!) Kāvya, der feinen Kunstdichtung, zählen“ (I/6). Nach einer ausführlichen Diskussion der Begriffe *aucitya*, *anvaya* und *kāvyaṃśa* gelangt SPEYER (1908: 23) zu folgender Übersetzung: „I have taken care to preserve the appropriateness (of description, diction etc. of the original work) and I have added to it some qualities proper to a kāvya, without, however, spoiling by this the flavour of the tales“.

Wenngleich M. vorgibt, der Edition Durgāprasāds zu folgen, so zeigt sich demgegenüber häufig, daß er sich bei seinen Übersetzungen mitunter allzusehr von TAWNEYS englischer Übertragung, die ihrerseits jedoch auf BROCKHAUS' verderbter Ausgabe beruht, leiten ließ:

KSS XCV 4c *saccakranandakah* „eine Quelle der Freude für die guten Menschen“ (II/341); vgl. TAWNEY II/342: „a source of joy to good men“. TAWNEYS Übersetzung aber geht auf BROCKHAUSENS Lesart *sajjana* zurück, die sich auf diese Weise in der M.schen Übertragung wiederfindet, und dies, obwohl die betreffende Stelle von SPEYER (1908: 137) ausführlich kritisiert wurde.

Auf vergleichbare Mißgriffe stößt man leider wiederholt. Daß derlei sogar zur Fehlinterpretation ganzer Erzählungen führen kann, zeigt sich schließlich an der „Geschichte vom standhaften jungen Brahmanen“ (II/101; vgl. TAWNEY II/184: „Story of the persevering young Brāhman“). Obschon SPEYER (1908: 172) gründlich darlegt, daß im fraglichen Abschnitt (KSS LXXII 278–282) in Wahrheit von Śivas Sohn Skanda die Rede ist und daß dieses Textstück von TAWNEY, der von der BROCKHAUSENSCHEN Lesart *skandhena* (282c) irregeleitet wurde, mißverstanden worden war, spricht M. in seiner Übersetzung – TAWNEY folgend – statt vom ‚Kriegsgott‘ (SPEYER, p. 173) von einem „Siddha-Prinzen“ (*siddhakumāra*-), der jemanden „auf seine Schulter“ (*skandhena*; TAWNEY ibid.: „upon his shoulder“) nimmt. Doch die Ausgabe, auf die M. seine Übersetzung gegründet wissen will, hat demgegenüber ganz richtig *skandena*.

Auch das ausführlich gehaltene, einen Überblick über die bei Somadeva als bekannt voraussetzenden Literaturen und Wissenschaften bietende Nach-

wort bringt nichts eigentlich Neues, sondern gibt einen zum Teil sogar veralteten Wissensstand wieder:

Die neben der kaśmīrischen (: KSS und Kṣemendras Bṛhatkathāmañjarī) und nepalischen (: Budhasvāmins Bṛhatkathāślokaśaṅgraha) Rezension existierende dritte, nämlich jainistische Bearbeitung von Guṇādhyaś Bṛhatkathā, die aus dem 5. Jh. stammende und in Jaina-Māhārāṣṭrī verfaßte Vasudevahiṇḍī des Saṅghadāsa, wird im Verlauf der Erörterung der überlieferten Bearbeitungen (II/773f.) nicht einmal erwähnt. Und die Paśācī, in der die Bṛhatkathā ursprünglich abgefaßt war, wird vermutungsweise im Nordwesten Indiens lokalisiert (II/773). Dies läßt vom gegenwärtigen Kenntnisstand, dem zufolge die Paśācī eine dem Pāli mit seinen „ostsprachlichen Zügen“ nahestehende, „aus dem buddhistischen . . . Mittelindisch ausgegliederte Literatursprache ist“ (O. v. HINÜBER, Das ältere Mittelindisch im Überblick. Wien 1986, p. 69 s.v. § 101), ebenfalls nichts erahnen.

Durch das Fehlen von Registern in M.s Übersetzung bleibt die zehnbändige, von N. M. PENZER edierte und durch Sachregister gut erschlossene Übersetzung TAWNEYS (London 1924–1928, repr. Delhi 1968) eine für die Arbeit mit dem KSS weiterhin unentbehrliche Hilfe.

Doch wäre es ungerecht, nur die Mängel dieses Werkes, die weniger auf das Unvermögen des Autors als auf seinen Umgang mit teilweise überholter Literatur zurückzuführen sind, zu beleuchten. Wem würden angesichts einer derart gewaltigen Übersetzungsleistung, wie M. sie hier vollbracht hat, keine Fehler unterlaufen? Vielmehr ist dem Übersetzer aufrichtig dafür zu danken, in zwei prächtigen Bänden und erstmals vollständig in deutscher Sprache die im KSS verarbeiteten Erzählstoffe, die auch kulturgeschichtlich von erster Relevanz sind, endlich auch breiten Kreisen zugänglich gemacht zu haben.

W. Slaje

Rückert, Friedrich: *Fürsten, Weiber und Schlingpflanzen*. Sanskritsprüche, übersetzt oder nachgebildet. Hrsg. von B. FORSSMAN unter Mitwirkung von J. MEHLIG. [Zwischen Orient und Okzident, Bd. 2]. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1991. 242p.

āsannam eva nṛpatir bhajate manuṣyam, vidyāvihīnam akuṭīnam asaṃgataṃ vā | prāyeṇa bhūmipatayaḥ pramadā latāś ca, yat pāśvato bhavati tat pariveṣṭayanti || R.s Wiedergabe der 2. Hälfte dieser von OTTO BÖHTLINGK dem Pañcatantra und Hitopadeśa für seine dreibändige Sammlung ‚I(ndische) S(prüche)‘ (St. Petersburg 1863–1865 [2. Auflage 1870–1873]) entnommenen Vasantatilakā (IS I/404 = 1066) lieferte die Titelzeile für einen Band, mit dem eines der letzten Manuskripte des „genialsten aller deutschen Übersetzer“ (so A. SCHIMMEL in der Einleitung zu ihrer Rückert-Jubiläumsausgabe. Insel 1988, I/9) der Öffentlichkeit zugänglich gemacht wird. Das wohl „größte Sprachgenie deutscher Zunge“ (A. J. GAIL in: Friedrich Rückert. Dichter und Sprachgelehrter in Erlangen, edd. W. FISCHER – R. GÖMMEL. Neustadt/Aisch 1990, p. 91), dessen Geburtstag sich am 16. 5. 1988 zum 200. Mal jährte, hatte bald nach seiner Berufung auf den Erlanger Lehrstuhl am 3. 10. 1826 mit seinen Sanskrit-Studien begonnen und seit 1828 Übersetzungen und Nachdichtungen altindoarischer Texte publiziert (s. A. SCHIMMEL, a. a. O., II/213ff.). Als Abschluß seiner Auseinandersetzung mit dem Sanskrit, von deren Intensität sein großteils in der Universitätsbibliothek Münster aufbewahrter Nachlaß reiches Zeugnis ablegt (s. 200 Jahre Friedrich Rückert 1788–1866. Dichter und Gelehrter, ed. J. ERDMANN. Coburg 1988, p. 390ff. und vgl. B. FORSSMAN in: Friedrich Rückert, a. a. O., p. 73ff.), übertrug R. in den Jahren 1864–1865 ca. 770 der über 3350 in IS I–II enthaltenen Strophen und schuf daraus etwa 730 Gedichte, die er in zwei Konvoluten mit dem Titel „Sanskritsprüche teils Übersetzung, teils

Nachbildung“ originalgetreu zusammenstellte. Der mit diesen in den Nachlaß eingegangene Entwurf eines Geleitwortes zeigt, daß R. ihre Veröffentlichung plante, woran ihn aber der Tod (31. 1. 1866) hinderte.

B. Forssman kommt das Verdienst zu, diesen Plan des greisen Dichters endlich in die Tat umgesetzt und die 724 im Ms. erhalten gebliebenen Gedichte, die 764 Sprichen bei BÖHTLINGK entsprechen (: Blatt 6 zw. IS I/185 und 230 ist verloren, so daß der 1. Teil nur noch 421 Einträge = 439 in IS I enthält), zeilengetreu ediert zu haben, wenn auch ohne den erwähnten Entwurf. Dafür wurden R.s meist nur sehr knappe Anmerkungen zu 34 der von ihm übertragenen *subhāṣitas* mitabgedruckt. Dem R.schen Text (p. 21–214) haben der Hrsg. und sein Mitarbeiter neben einem Vorwort (p. 7–9) und einer von J. Mehlig verfaßten Einführung zu R.s Vorlage (p. 13–15) noch vier Anhänge beigegeben: 2 Konkordanzen zu den beiden IS-Editionen (p. 217–227), 22 „Erläuterungen“ zu R.s Noten (p. 228–232) und ein Glossar aus der Feder M.s (p. 233–242).

Die genannten Beilagen richten sich mit Ausnahme der Konkordanzen an den gebildeten Laien; einen wissenschaftlichen Anspruch scheinen der Erlanger Indogermanist und sein indologischer Mitstreiter dabei weder im Sinne der Rückert-Forschung noch im Sinne der Sanskrit-Philologie verfolgt zu haben. Umso schwerer wiegt es, wenn hier noch falsch oder unzureichend informiert wird, wie etwa bei Brhaspati, dessen Name p. 242 mit „Herr der Geschöpfe“ übersetzt wird, oder im Fall der Āryā, die M. p. 18 als silbenzählendes Kunstmetrum beschreibt, wo es sich doch um eine auf dem Morenprinzip basierende Gebrauchsstrophe handelt, der „mit unseren unbestimmten Quantitäten nicht beizukommen ist“. Warum R. mit diesen Worten, die vermutlich seinem unvollendet gebliebenen Geleitwort entstammen (M. weist das Zitat nicht einmal aus!), von einer Nachbildung der Āryā im Deutschen Abstand nehmen mußte, wird so jedem mit der Prosodie dieses ‚Distichons‘ nicht Vertrauten unklar bleiben. Ein noch verheerenderer *lapsus stili vel memoriae* unterlief dem Indologen p. 17, wenn er dem Śloka nur eine „jambische Dipodie“ (als Kadenz des 4. Pāda) zuspricht (item im Nachwort zu seiner Übersetzung von Somadevas Kathāsaritsāgara [s. die vorausgehende Rez.], II/830; wußte er es etwa gar nicht besser!) und seine *pathyā*-Form zu beschreiben unterläßt; hat R. doch 309 der 724 Gedichte in *pathyā*-Ślokas (mit Substitution der leichten und schweren Silben der Skt.-Kadenz durch betonte und unbetonte im Deutschen (: 2 × × × × ◡ ◡ ×, × × × × ◡ ◡ ×) abgefaßt. Die Meisterschaft, die ihm darin eignet, wie auch die Lizenzen, die er zur Wahrung der Silbenzahl in 30 Fällen gewagt hat (z. B. „If“ für Elefant in 182d, „Genußgierde“ für -gier in 1377a oder „machtet“ für macht in 1929a), werden so nur wenige schätzen und verstehen können. Dazu kommt, daß drei R.sche Ślokapādas fehlerhaft ediert wurden: in 545d ist „Händ“ statt „Hände“ (p. 54) zu lesen, in 1809d „dränget“ statt „drängt“ (p. 148) und in 3283d das Asyndeton „redend’ hörende“ statt „redend’ und hörende“ (p. 210).

Wie M. p. 18 (mit „Śikhāriṇ“ für korrektes Śikhar*) richtig feststellt, gibt R. mit seinen Śloken nicht nur solche des Originals wieder, sondern substituiert sie auch für Āryā-Strophen und diverse *samarvṛttacchandāmsi* der jeweiligen Vorlage. Unerwähnt und wohl auch unerkannt blieb dagegen ein R.s Übertragen zugrundeliegendes Prinzip, nml. für wortgetreue Übersetzungen den Śloka zu verwenden und bei freien Nachdichtungen zu reimen. So überträgt er die Nominalsätze im Śloka IS I/482 (= IV/7012 in L. STERNBACHS Mahāsubhāṣitasamgraha, dessen erste 6 in Hoshiarpur 1974–1987 publizierte Bände mit ihren 11491 *subhāṣitas* von a-kau und exzellenten Appendizes [vgl. WZKS 30 (1986) 203] von F. und M. unverständlicherweise vollkommen ignoriert werden) ziemlich wörtlich als „Höchste (*paras*) Tugend (*dharma*) ist Dienstleistung (*upakāra*), höchster (*paras*) Reichtum (*arthas*) Geschicklichkeit (*karmanaiipu-*

nam), Höchster (*paras*) Genuß (*kāmas*) Geschenkspende (*pātre dānam*), höchster (*paras*) Himmel (*mokṣas*) Genügsamkeit (*vitṛṣṇatā*)“ (p. 51), während er den nicht minder nominalen epischen Śloka *sarve kṣayāntā nicayāḥ, patanāntāḥ samucchrayāḥ | samyogā viprayogāntā, maraṇāntaṃ ca | hi jīvitaṃ ||* (MBh XI 2,3; XII 27,29; 317,20; XIV 44,18; Ram. II 98,16; VII 51,10) zur folgenden wahrhaft kongenialen Strophe umformt: „Die sich finden, scheiden alle, Jedem Bande Trennung droht, Steigen endet mit dem Falle Und das Leben mit dem Tod“. Nur im Falle der Āryā IS I/272 (= MSS II/3540), die R. zwar wörtlich und ohne Reim, aber auch ohne Gebrauch seines Śloka übersetzt, scheint dieses Prinzip teilweise durchbrochen. Den Grund dafür könnte seine *nota critica* zum letzten Pāda liefern, den er als *yogyā bhavanti ayogyāś ca* (IS *bhavanti yogyā a. c.*, MSS *bhavanti ayogyāś ca yogyāś ca*) // zu lesen vorschlägt (p. 37). Diese Umstellung zerstört zwar die von R. offensichtlich nicht erkannte Āryā, ermöglicht es aber auch, die Strophe als eine Art Śloka (mit *ma-vipulā* in a und c und *ya-vipulā* in b und d) zu lesen, dessen zu Unrecht angenommene Unregelmäßigkeit R. zu seinem jambischen Vierzeiler (: 10 + 8 + 10 + 8 Silben) inspiriert haben könnte. F./M.s Erläuterung dazu (p. 228) läßt den Laien im Unklaren und den Spezialisten enttäuscht, wenn nicht sogar verärgert ob des Mangels an philologischem Sinn und linguistischem Geist. Und dies ist kein Einzelfall, sodaß sich die Frage stellt, ob es nicht sinnvoller gewesen wäre, R.s Text um den seiner Skt.-Vorlagen zu erweitern anstatt ihn mit fast 50 Seiten unkritischer und ungenauer Beigaben zu umrahmen. So wäre – jedenfalls dem Sanskritisten – auch unmittelbar klar geworden, daß R.s „Indische Sprüche“ – entgegen dem Urteil M.s (p. 19f.) – nicht nur dem Geist des Originals verpflichtete „Nachdichtungen“ enthalten, sondern auch zu einem Gutteil „Übersetzungen“, die es mit jedem Wort genau nehmen. Auch für dieses sein Spätwerk gilt, was R. 1833 in elegischen Disticha formulierte (s. Friedrich Rückert: Gedichte, ed. W. SCHMITZ. Reclam 1988, p. 137):

- „Wer Philolog und Poet ist in einer Person, wie ich Armer,
Kann nichts Besseres tun als übersetzen wie ich.
„Wenn du nicht zu philologisch, nicht überpoetisch es ansiehst,
Wird dich belehrend erfreuen, Leser, das Zwittergebild.
„Was philologisch gefehlt ist, vergibst du poetischer Freiheit.
und die poetische Schuld schenkst du der Philologie.“

Ch. H. Werba

Bautze, Joachim: *Drei „Bundi“-Rāgamālās*. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der rajputischen Wandmalerei. [Monographien zur indischen Archäologie, Kunst und Philologie, Bd. 6]. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden, 1987. 398p., 168 Abb., 1 Faltafel. DM 230,-.

The royal palace of Bundi, a Rajput princely state in eastern Rajasthan, whose wall paintings are the focus of this study, created a dramatic impression on many European travelers in the 19th c. Rudyard Kipling described it: “No one knows where the hills begin and where the Palace ends. Men say that there are subterranean chambers leading into the heart of the hills. . . . They say that there is so much room under as above the ground, and that none have traversed the whole extent of the Palace. Looking at it from below, the Englishman could really believe that nothing was impossible for those who have built it”.

The origins of Bundi painting have been identified in a Rāgamālā manuscript which was painted in 1591 at Chunar near Benares. The ms. is today in the Victoria and Albert Museum. The last folio is inscribed with the names of the Moslem painters demonstrating the close association between the painting of Bundi and Akbar's court. This intimate artistic economic and political association with the Moghul courts as well as with the other neighbouring

Rajput courts continued through the 18th c. Thus, the studies of the wall paintings of the Palace at Bundi are important for an understanding of north Indian painting during this long and creative period.

It is surprising how little firmly documented material there is for the study of Bundi painting. Thus, the three series of Rāgamālā wall paintings by B. are particularly important, since unlike the more well known miniature paintings, these wall paintings have a specific archaeological and chronological context. The wall paintings themselves are for the most part enlarged variants of the miniatures and thus the analysis of the wall paintings leads to a study of the miniature painting school in general. The point of departure are three series of Rāgamālā paintings each containing 36 sections. The study of the paintings involves a schematic as well as stylistic analysis.

Following an introduction concerning the geographical setting of the Palace the author defines his method and terminology including the important concept of the Rāgamālās, the supremely Indian notion which originally derived from poetry and music. In a chapter entitled "Serienkatalog" (p. 52ff.) the author orders and analyzes the complete corpus of Rāgamālā miniatures attributable to the Bundi style. This synopsis is indispensable to any serious student of the late medieval north Indian painting.

Following the detailed "Serienkatalog" is the extensive description and comparative analysis of the three series of Rāgamālā wall paintings including an extensive discussion of the date of each series (p. 109ff.). The reader's ability to understand the role of the paintings as architectural decoration is greatly facilitated by the use of the floor plans keyed to the illustrations, and the description which precisely places each of the paintings. In addition there are a number of cross-sections and isometric drawings of those sections of the Palace with the paintings. 168 plates, some in color, give the reader a precise understanding not only of the wall paintings themselves but of the related miniature arts, in short of the Bundi school of painting. A comprehensive bibliography and checklist of the Rāgamālā paintings complete this useful study. I only regret that such a scholarly study has inexplicably omitted an index which certainly would have facilitated the use of this lengthy and important volume.

D. E. Klimburg-Salter

Jackson, David P.: *The 'Miscellaneous Series' of Tibetan Texts in the Bihar Research Society, Patna. A Handlist.* [Tibetan and Indo-Tibetan Studies 2]. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden, 1989. x + 271p. DM 48,-.

Während seiner ersten Tibetreise (1929/30) sammelte der indische Gelehrte Rahula Sāṅkrtyāyana eine große Anzahl tibetischer Manuskripte und Blockdrucke, die er 1936 der Bihar Research Society, Patna übergab. Auch heute noch ist diese Sammlung mit Sicherheit eine der bedeutendsten außerhalb des tibetischen Kulturkreises. Nichtsdestoweniger war sie lange Zeit hindurch, und ist es zum Teil noch heute, auch eine der am wenigsten bekannten und benutzten derartigen Sammlungen. Der Grund dafür ist, daß sie mangels systematischer Erfassung und Katalogisierung der Wissenschaft kaum zugänglich war. Erste Bemühungen, einen Katalog zu erstellen, wurden zwar bereits 1937 vom tibetischen Gelehrten dGe 'dun chos 'phel im Dienste der Bihar Research Society unternommen; sie konnten aber, ebenso wie auch die wenigen späteren Bemühungen, die im wesentlichen auf dGe 'dun chos 'phel beruhen und nicht über ihn hinausgehen – J. geht in seiner Einleitung im Detail darauf ein –, die Sammlung bislang nicht in ausreichender Weise erschließen. Die systematische Erfassung der von Sāṅkrtyāyana gesammelten Texte (sowohl der tibetischen als auch der auf seinen drei späteren Tibetreisen handschriftlich kopierten oder

photographierten Sanskrit-Mss.) ist somit eines der großen Desiderata der tibetologischen und buddhismuskundlichen Forschung.

Diese Aufgabe übernimmt J. in der vorliegenden Arbeit speziell für die außerkanonischen oder „miscellaneous“ tibetischen Texte, „i.e. the early manuscripts and old blockprints, and any works published separately from the standard oeuvres and other collections“ (p. vi), was „Bündel“ 167–595 der gesamten Sammlung entspricht; die restlichen, besser bekannten und größtenteils bereits publizierten Textsammlungen sind oberflächlich auf Identität und Vollständigkeit überprüft.

In diesem allem Anschein nach sehr genau und sorgfältig kompilierten Katalog sind – zum Teil erstmals – nahezu 1500 Texte oder Textfragmente identifiziert. Angegeben sind: Titel, Autor, Art, Umfang und Besonderheiten des Textes (etwa bei der Paginierung, fehlende Folios etc.), Marginaltitel, behandelte Gegenstand und, soweit aus Kolophonen eruiert, auch der Editionsart. Jeder Text ist mit einer Katalognummer versehen, die zur leichteren Auffindung in der Bibliothek der Bihar Research Society so eng wie möglich an die alte Numerierung angelehnt ist; d. h. neu identifizierte Texte erhalten eine Zusatznummer zu der alten, z. B. 1138–1 bis 1138–23 anstelle der alten Nummer 1138, und auch die Nummer des „Bündels“, in dem der betreffende Text enthalten ist, ist angegeben. Ein Autorenindex und ein Titelindex erschließen den Katalog. Um auch Bibliothekaren, die mit den Eigenarten der tibetischen Orthographie nicht vertraut sind, die Benützung des Kataloges zu erleichtern, sind beide Indizes nach dem lateinischen Alphabet geordnet, und zwar auf der Basis des ersten Buchstabens, egal ob Grundbuchstabe oder Präfix, mit Ausnahme des *ʼa chuñ*, das in der alphabetischen Ordnung vernachlässigt ist. Dieses System mag für einen Tibetologen ungewohnt sein, sollte aber keine ernsthaften Schwierigkeiten bei der Auffindung des gewünschten Textes oder Autors bereiten.

J. selbst nennt seine Arbeit „a handlist“, die – so betont er in seinem Vorwort – keinen Anspruch erhebt, „a proper catalogue“ zu sein. Da sie aus verschiedensten Gründen unter einem gewissen Zeitdruck entstanden ist, ist es sehr wohl möglich – vielleicht sogar unvermeidlich –, daß sich Tippfehler und ähnliche Unvollkommenheiten eingeschlichen haben und daß nicht alle Zweifelsfälle und Unklarheiten, die sich bei der Bearbeitung derartigen Textmaterials ergeben, restlos beseitigt werden konnten. Das tut dem großen Verdienst dieser Arbeit aber keinerlei Abbruch, und es handelt sich durchaus um einen „proper catalogue“, der erstmals das gesamte Material der „Miscellaneous Series“ der tibetischen Texte in der Sammlung der Bihar Research Society umfassend erschließt und der in der Fachwelt sicherlich gebührend gewürdigt werden wird. J.s Hoffnung, daß seine Arbeit zu intensiverer Bearbeitung dieser Sammlung tibetischer Literatur und auch zur Publikation wichtiger Texte daraus anregen wird, kann hier nur bekräftigt werden.

H. Tauscher

Lehmann, Thomas – Malten, Thomas: *A Word Index of Old Tamil Caṅkam Literature*. [Beiträge zur Südasienforschung, Bd. 147]. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1992. xi + 425p. DM 98,-.

The greatness of a tradition and the rich heritage of its literature remain unmediated without proper tools of analysis. It is not enough to be well motivated; one needs also to be introduced to the literature through right methods of understanding and interpretation. Interest in Dravidian culture in general and serious attempts by scholars in the West at translations and dictionaries are rather recent. Hence the contribution to Tamil study through a word index like this is to be appreciated.

This index of *caṅkam* anthologies is based on the 1981 reprint of the Rajan edition, comprising all the words occurring in the texts of *eṭṭutokai* and *pattu-pāṭṭu*. Apart from the indices of single *caṅkam* anthologies there is already one complete index published by the French Institute of Indology, Pondicherry between 1967 and 1970. The present volume mentions the advantages over the earlier index, stating the edition on which this index is based, the principles under which words are identified and adding the few words that are missing in the previous index.

In a brief and succinct introduction the salient features of this presentation – and some are specific to Tamil, such as the basis of alphabetic ordering – along with the principles of identifying the words are pointed out, taking note of the earlier attempts and the difficulties involved therein. One can always find one way of entering the compounds more helpful than another, depending on what one looks for using the word index. But this index in one volume prepared with painstaking efforts is a welcome contribution to renew the interest in the study of ancient Tamil literature.

A. Amaladass

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